為了研究台灣集團的經營成本和效益,本研究計算超額價值發現台灣集團下的公司並沒有比非集團公司表現更好,本研究進而以五個假說和台灣區的聯貸案來檢視集團經營成本效益,集團下的公司經營成本會高於效益 / To examine the costs and benefits of group and non-group firms in Taiwan we first calculated the excess vale of group firms. We find that group firms in Taiwan do not out-perform relative to non-group firms. To find out the reason behind their underperformance, we test five hypotheses, the profit stability hypothesis, the over-investment hypothesis, the cross-subsidization hypothesis, the co-insurance hypothesis, the bargaining power hypothesis, using data from 1998 to 2008. Our sample consists of 16950 firm samples, 208 group sample, and 3013 syndication deal samples. The results show that the group overall borrowing costs are larger than non-group firms and group characteristic does not influence the spread margin in the syndication market significantly. We conclude that cost exceed benefits for firms to operate under group affiliations.

近年來，國際聯貸市場蓬勃發展，已為當前公司主要外部融資來源之一，許多學者亦針對國際聯貸市場的相關特性進行研究探討，本次研究將針對銀行團在國際聯貸市場上認購行為偏好進行探討，以「超額認購」該現象為例，探討銀行團進行認購決策時的關鍵因子。 全球聯貸案件資料由DealScan資料庫提供，期間為1987年至2009年，利用配對樣本方式進行Logistic迴歸分析，探討造成超額認購現象的因子為何。實證結果發現，當聯貸市場有新競爭者加入，如機構投資人或是外商銀行進入該市場，造成聯貸市場上資金供給增加，因此當市場上有較好的投資案出現時，銀行即會競相進行認購，進而造成超額認購；因此，造成超額認購的主要原因來自於市場上資金供給面的變化。 / Using a sample of global syndicated loan from 1987 to 2009, I collected data from LPC’s DealScan and Compustat database to examine which factors affect the determinants of the financial institutions’ subscription in global syndicated loan market. Using the oversubscribed syndicated loan as our sample, we test the intention of lenders’ subscription and the results show that the odds of oversubscription increased as the capital supply increased in the syndicated loan market. The primary factor for the increase of supply is when new investors, such as institutional investors or foreign banks, joined the syndicated loan market. Therefore, I find that the amount of capital supply can influence financial institutions’ subscription in the syndicated loan market.

本論文主要由兩篇文章所組成，探討有關跨國購併活動中目標公司的選擇，以及聯貸市場中參貸銀行的選擇。第一部份旨在分析市場集中程度與跨國購併在垂直相關產業的議題。Beladi, Chakrabarti and Marjit (2013)建立一般均衡寡佔模型，連結當地國的市場競爭力和跨國購併在垂直相關產業的論點。他們模型認為當地國家的垂直整合程度會改變國外主併者策略優勢。我們使用1990年至2012年涵蓋86個國家，之全球購併活動案件，我們衡量當地國家的市場競爭與垂直整合程度，呈現當地國家前期的市場競爭力將會誘發國外市場主併者進入，以垂直購併的方式購併當地國家之目標公司。本研究結果提供了實證性的結果來支持過去理論之發現，認為產業的集中程度會影響跨國購併。 本論文的第二部份，在研究知識技能互補和銀行商譽在參貸銀行的選擇，觀察主貸銀行該如何選擇參貸銀行之決策分析。延伸Diamond (1991)的商譽建立假說，透過主貸銀行本身的特性因子與工作經驗，來探討主貸銀行選擇參貸銀行的誘因動機。研究結果發現，當主貸銀行具有較高的自身商譽佳、經營及投資具效率性、內部監理機制較佳、且市場經驗較為豐富時，會誘使主貸銀行減少對高商譽參貸銀行的需求。呈現知識技能互補的現象於主貸銀行選擇參貸銀行的決策。本研究結果可提供我們對聯貸銀行團商譽互補現象及分析。 / Two essays are comprised in this dissertation to study on choices of target firms in cross-border M&As and choices of participant banks in the syndicated loan market. In the first essay, cross-border mergers and market concentration in a vertically related industry, we examine the relationship between market concentration and cross-border M&A. Beladi, Chakrabarti and Marjit (2013) present an oligopoly in general equilibrium model to identify the linkages between local market competition and cross-border mergers in a vertically related industry. Their model predicts that a vertical integration at home changes the strategic advantage for foreign acquirers. Using firm-level data from 86 countries between 1990 and 2012, we calculate proxies for local market competition and show that lower (higher) pre-merger local competition at home country will increase (decrease) mergers between a foreign firm and a vertically integrated home firm. These findings provide empirical supports for the significant impact of industry concentration on the decisions of cross-border M&A. In the second essay, the effects of knowledge complementarities and bank reputation on participant banks choices, we focus on the decision of lead arrangers on participant bank choices in the syndicated loan market. We extend reputation building theory (Diamond, 1991) and model the lead arranger’s partner choice problem through the effect of self-related and task-related factors. Our paper show that when lead arrangers have higher reputation, operating efficiency, and market experience, lead arrangers tend to choose less reputable partners. These results help to explain how lead arrangers, through their partner selection decisions, manage the reputation pool among banks in the syndicated loan market.