本論文主要由兩篇文章所組成，探討有關跨國購併活動中目標公司的選擇，以及聯貸市場中參貸銀行的選擇。第一部份旨在分析市場集中程度與跨國購併在垂直相關產業的議題。Beladi, Chakrabarti and Marjit (2013)建立一般均衡寡佔模型，連結當地國的市場競爭力和跨國購併在垂直相關產業的論點。他們模型認為當地國家的垂直整合程度會改變國外主併者策略優勢。我們使用1990年至2012年涵蓋86個國家，之全球購併活動案件，我們衡量當地國家的市場競爭與垂直整合程度，呈現當地國家前期的市場競爭力將會誘發國外市場主併者進入，以垂直購併的方式購併當地國家之目標公司。本研究結果提供了實證性的結果來支持過去理論之發現，認為產業的集中程度會影響跨國購併。 本論文的第二部份，在研究知識技能互補和銀行商譽在參貸銀行的選擇，觀察主貸銀行該如何選擇參貸銀行之決策分析。延伸Diamond (1991)的商譽建立假說，透過主貸銀行本身的特性因子與工作經驗，來探討主貸銀行選擇參貸銀行的誘因動機。研究結果發現，當主貸銀行具有較高的自身商譽佳、經營及投資具效率性、內部監理機制較佳、且市場經驗較為豐富時，會誘使主貸銀行減少對高商譽參貸銀行的需求。呈現知識技能互補的現象於主貸銀行選擇參貸銀行的決策。本研究結果可提供我們對聯貸銀行團商譽互補現象及分析。 / Two essays are comprised in this dissertation to study on choices of target firms in cross-border M&As and choices of participant banks in the syndicated loan market. In the first essay, cross-border mergers and market concentration in a vertically related industry, we examine the relationship between market concentration and cross-border M&A. Beladi, Chakrabarti and Marjit (2013) present an oligopoly in general equilibrium model to identify the linkages between local market competition and cross-border mergers in a vertically related industry. Their model predicts that a vertical integration at home changes the strategic advantage for foreign acquirers. Using firm-level data from 86 countries between 1990 and 2012, we calculate proxies for local market competition and show that lower (higher) pre-merger local competition at home country will increase (decrease) mergers between a foreign firm and a vertically integrated home firm. These findings provide empirical supports for the significant impact of industry concentration on the decisions of cross-border M&A. In the second essay, the effects of knowledge complementarities and bank reputation on participant banks choices, we focus on the decision of lead arrangers on participant bank choices in the syndicated loan market. We extend reputation building theory (Diamond, 1991) and model the lead arranger’s partner choice problem through the effect of self-related and task-related factors. Our paper show that when lead arrangers have higher reputation, operating efficiency, and market experience, lead arrangers tend to choose less reputable partners. These results help to explain how lead arrangers, through their partner selection decisions, manage the reputation pool among banks in the syndicated loan market.