本篇論文主要是分析俄羅斯中央銀行的獨立性。本文先由西方經濟理論與中央銀行獨立性文獻說明中央銀行為何必須要擁有一個高度的獨立性。對於俄羅斯的高通貨膨脹現象與中央銀行地位轉變之間的關係，本文也有詳細的說明。 另外，本文就法制面俄羅斯中央銀行獨立地位的評析，接著並對實務面的央行獨立地位加以說明。 法制面的俄羅斯中央銀行獨立性相當高。實務面的俄羅斯央行作業，在政治上總統、政府與國會的角力中，形成了一個特殊的政治力真空，使中央銀行能夠取得政策獨立的地位。在俄羅斯面臨高通貨膨脹風險經濟的情況下，中央銀行對於貨幣政策以及政府財政政策的協調取得一個主動的地位。 / This article’s main idea is the analysis of Russia central bank’s independence. From the aspects of the western economic theories and central bank independence literatures, the author interprets why central bank needs to have a high independent status. This article also provides a relationship description between the Russian hyperinflation phenomenon and the transformation of Russia central bank stance. Moreover, this article uses legislative aspect and real facts to analyze the independence of Russian central bank. The article concludes Russia central bank has a high level of independent status. In the political turbulence of president, government, and Duma, it formed a political vacuum to make central bank a high independence to decide his own policy. When facing the high risk of inflation, Russia central bank also has its own initiative to coordinate the monetary policy with the government’s fiscal policy.