Many regions of the world would like to replicate the financial and monetary integration of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have shown an interest in such an arrangement. ASEAN is a political, cultural, and economic association that includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Many of these nations are experiencing rapid economic development while others are still relatively poor and under developed. As such, they appear to be an unlikely group for currency unification. Older studies suggest that multiple currency union groupings may be possible in the short run that could be unified into a whole at an unspecified time in the future. The issue has been studied for some time and appeared defunct with the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis. More than a decade has passed and another more global financial crisis has ensued leaving many Asian countries in better shape than their highly developed trading partners in the west. This leads to the need for further examination of the possible unification of some or all ASEAN members into a Regional Currency Arrangement. This dissertation evaluates the readiness of the ASEAN nations for monetary union using data from the post Asian Financial Crisis period. Results of a formal G-PPP test show the area is an optimum currency area. Analysis of other criteria shows incredible diversity across the countries in the region that would make unification a challenge. Coordination of monetary policy would be most difficult given the variety of inflation rates and differences in depth of financial system development as explored in chapter 2. Trade has increased in the region leading to better linkages among economies but the data shows that reaching full integration of all countries by the 2020 deadline without disruptions in some economies may still be difficult.

本篇論文主要是分析俄羅斯中央銀行的獨立性。本文先由西方經濟理論與中央銀行獨立性文獻說明中央銀行為何必須要擁有一個高度的獨立性。對於俄羅斯的高通貨膨脹現象與中央銀行地位轉變之間的關係，本文也有詳細的說明。 另外，本文就法制面俄羅斯中央銀行獨立地位的評析，接著並對實務面的央行獨立地位加以說明。 法制面的俄羅斯中央銀行獨立性相當高。實務面的俄羅斯央行作業，在政治上總統、政府與國會的角力中，形成了一個特殊的政治力真空，使中央銀行能夠取得政策獨立的地位。在俄羅斯面臨高通貨膨脹風險經濟的情況下，中央銀行對於貨幣政策以及政府財政政策的協調取得一個主動的地位。 / This article’s main idea is the analysis of Russia central bank’s independence. From the aspects of the western economic theories and central bank independence literatures, the author interprets why central bank needs to have a high independent status. This article also provides a relationship description between the Russian hyperinflation phenomenon and the transformation of Russia central bank stance. Moreover, this article uses legislative aspect and real facts to analyze the independence of Russian central bank. The article concludes Russia central bank has a high level of independent status. In the political turbulence of president, government, and Duma, it formed a political vacuum to make central bank a high independence to decide his own policy. When facing the high risk of inflation, Russia central bank also has its own initiative to coordinate the monetary policy with the government’s fiscal policy.