中國在經歷了改革開放後, 經濟實力突飛猛進, 成為世界經濟的主要成長動 力之一, 有別於歐美的資本主義體系, 中國的計畫經濟體系使政府的角色遠比歐美來的關鍵, 引起了許多學者探討其體制隨著經濟成長時產生的各種議題, 本篇論文著重在研究創新系統, 有別於之前的文獻著重在創新系統的技術效率表現,和其可能降低其技術效率的原因探討, 本文引用了Chang-Tai Hsieh 資源配置不當的模型概念, 從資源分配是否恰當的觀點重新審視中國創新系統的表現, 結果顯示中國資源配置的整體效率逐年上升, 並未因為東部沿海地區和中西部的經濟條件差異而惡化。

近年創新研發相關文獻指出創新政策可能因政策不一致性及資源被不適任者所佔有等因素而宣告失敗。其中「資源錯置」此議題乃最為大眾所關注，因此本研究採用Hsieh and Klenow（2009）的資源配置效率模型以檢視台灣兩大科技計畫─「法人科專計畫」與「科技部計畫」是否有資源錯置之情事，以確保我國科技計畫之成效。結果指出，科技部計畫之資源配置效率相對於法人科專計畫較為不穩定，主因為科技部計畫執行機構多為學術型機構，其專利產值較易浮動。研究後續進一步分析兩大計畫底下各機構之扭曲程度。法人科專部份，工研院長期為正向扭曲，中科院則長期為負向扭曲，其正負之差異源自於機構的研發屬性不同；科技部計畫部份，各機構扭曲程度波動較大，乃受到機構研究目的與發表形式差異所導致。本文受限於利用專利作為產出衡量，無法提供科技部計畫全面性的評估觀點。未來若能納入人文社會科學領域且綜合其他學術指標做為產出衡量，將能提供更完整的科技部計畫資源配置效率分析，提供更精確之政策建議。 / Past literature has sounded an alarm to the failure of innovation and warned that policy inconsistency and misallocated innovation inputs as two major reasons to fail innovation. Since Taiwanese government had consistent support over research and development via policy support, this research has focused on the issues of innovation input distortions. In this thesis, the "Technology Development Program (TDP)" supported by Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) as well as endowment projects financed by Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) are utilized as the research target to investigate the innovation efficiency. The results in this research suggest that TDP has stably higher performance than the MOST-financed projects. TDP projects are executed as more business-related uses while MOST-financed projects usually focus more on the fundamental technological breakthroughs. Besides, the results also suggest that the innovation objectives set by different institutions are crucial to the current innovation efficiency measure. For example, the TDP projects executed by Industrial Technology Research Institute, a commercial technology developer, record less distortions than other TDP projects granted to other institutions responsible for national defense development. This would shed light on the more aligned innovation objective setup and the following innovation resource allocation.

「促進民間參與公共建設法」賦予民間機構從事開發交通建設所需用地，藉以提高交通建設之財務自償能力。回顧目前國內所推動之高速鐵路及捷運建設BOT案，均藉由土地開發收入以挹注建設成本，誠然所引發公共論壇的焦點環繞在土地開發利益議題上。惟土地開發收入取決於開發規模及代理人努力效果等因素，在政府與民間機構存在對土地市場價值資訊不對稱下，恐衍生委託代理問題與權力宰制。 審視現行法令賦予私有土地參與捷運場站開發制度，包括政府和所有權人合作開發、政府徵收開發、所有權人申請開發等多樣性之土地開發方式。面對具提高不動產價值之捷運場站土地開發，研究思維理應從單向滿足民間機構對土地開發需求外，亦需同時考量維護所有權人參與之權益，各方最佳的策略與報酬，並非獨立於他人的行動之外，其間之策略組合報酬主要涉及土地開發方式之權益分配率及開發回饋金，捷運場站開發制度存在策略賽局關係。 因此，如何建構兼具代理規範、參與決策及均衡結果為導向的制度經濟分析模型，已成為推動民間參與捷運場站土地開發之關鍵所在。本研究首先，嘗試以代理理論、權力面向及賽局理論分析方法，作為民間參與捷運場站土地開發制度之立論基礎；其次，深入分析土地開發之代理與權力交互效果，重新詮釋資源配置效率問題；其三，研擬民間參與之代理與賽局整合模型，經由制度賽局均衡結果以達成各方自由選擇下之同意；最後，進行案例模擬分析。 本研究所獲致之結論包括：(1)民間參與捷運場站土地開發制度得以代理理論、權力面向及賽局理論一窺全貌；(2)制度的賽局均衡觀得以降低因徵收土地開發之代理與權力交互關係對資源配置效率之衝擊；(3)模擬分析民間參與之代理與賽局整合模型具可操作性並可運用於實務界。再者，本研究所提出之建議包括：(1)建構政府與民間機構之代理模型俾以降低委託代理問題；(2)建構政府與所有權人之制度賽局模型俾以達成自願交易；(3)建構代理規範與制度賽局之整合模型以維護所有權人參與土地開發之權益。 / “Law for Promotion of Private Participation in Public Infrastructure Projects” provides a mechanism for the private sector to develop the land for any public infrastructure project so that the financial self-liquidating ratio may be increased. The financial concept of BOT projects in Taiwan, such as HSR and MRT, is to recoup the cost of the infrastructure project by land development revenues. Indeed, the public concerns focus on the revenues, which depend on the institution and scale of development. However, the revenues depend on the scale of development and effect of the agent’s efforts. While the information asymmetry exists, there may arise the issues of agency and power control. The institution of the MRT station development provides a diversity of land development, including cooperation development, expropriation development and application development. The development issue has switched from government-led development approaches to the interaction between the government and landowners. As for the payoff function of their strategy combination, it depends on the right distribution rate and feedback payment. In the MRT station development institution exists a form of strategic game. Therefore, how to establish an institutional economic analysis model takes agency norm, and involves decision-making and equilibrium, which forms the criterion, serving as a key to promote the private participation in MRT station development. This study attempts: First, to analyze the private participation in MRT station development based on the agency theory, power dimension, and game theory. Second, to explore the allocation efficiency of resources under the interaction effect of agent and power. Third, to establish an integrated model of both the agent and the game, which by equilibrium-of–the-game view of institutions reach a mutual agreement among the government, private sector, and landowners. Finally, case simulation. It is concluded that, (1) the institution of the private participation MRT station development may be fully reviewed by agency theory, power dimension, and game theory. (2) the equilibrium-of–the-game view of institutions may reduce the impact on the allocation efficiency of resources under the interaction effect of agent and power. (3) by case simulation found that the integrated model of both agent and game is available. It is suggested that, (1) to establish an agency model for both the government and private sector serves to solve agency issues. (2) to establish an institutional game model for both the government and landowner functions as voluntary exchanges. (3) to establish an integrated model of both agent and game helps to keep landowner on the rights of participation in MRT station development.