本論文由都市政權理論觀點切入，並連結台灣政治經濟環境及結構變遷過程，探討都市更新權利變換制度建置之政治經濟背景、實際執行狀況及面臨的課題。由於推動更新的最大的困難仍在於取得更新地區內土地及合法建築物所有權人之同意，因此都市更新條例規定強制參與更新之權利變換制度，以多數決的同意門檻並透過鑑價方式查估更新地區內各權利人之權利價值後，循法定程序據以執行更新。經研究發現權利變換制度的設計係賦予實施者具有關鍵的決定權，以作為協調的中介機制，進而調合各方利益及衝突。結論並指出由於權利變換制度係將價值分配予以檯面化，因此各權利人間對於價值的認知差異及利益的分配產生之爭議，仍造成該制度在法令及實際執行上的困難。因此，尚需仰賴政府適時挹注公有土地資源，以促使更新順利推動。嗣後並據以提出對於都市更新權利變換制度的後續執行方向之建議。 / In this research, I approach the subject from an urban regime perspective and connect it with the transition process in the political and economic environment and structure.Then, I examine the political and economic background, the actual implementation and the issues faced in the establishment of a property rights exchange system during urban renewal. The most difficult part in promoting redevelopment is to obtain the agreement from the owners of the land and of legally built structures on the areas slated for redevelopment, thus the regulations for urban renewal provide for forced participation in the property rights exchange system, with the threshold for agreement fixed at a majority rule and the value of the rights for each right-holder in the redeveloped area determined by appraisal; legal procedures are then used to implement the redevelopment. This study reveals that the property rights exchange system as it is designed endows those implementing it with crucial decision powers as an intermediary system for mediation and then for harmonizing the interests of each side and preventing conflicts. The conclusion shows that the open nature of the value distribution in the property rights exchange system leads to controversies due to the perceived differences and benefits in the apportioned value to each right-holder, creating legal and practical difficulties in the implementation of this system. Thus it is dependent on the government allotting enough funding at the necessary time for public land resources so that the renewal project can process smoothly. Finally, I offer some suggestions on the direction for the follow-up to the implementation of a property rights exchange system during urban renewal.

國家是在一定的領域內所有權力集中的中心。長久以來，都市政治所關心的核心議題為國家機器等行動主體之權力結構為何、結盟的誘因及權力運用的機制與結果又為何等等，此皆攸關都市發展，而都市的發展則脫離不了土地政策的制定與實施，以土地的管理分配與土地利益的炒作，是透過政治運作而成，而政治的本質在於利益的追求，則都市政治與土地政策之政經關係為何，是值關切。本研究以都市政治的理論基礎為主軸，輔以權力三面向作為理論分析的架構，並以南科特定區開發案為例，論述都市政治與土地政策之政經結構，探究國家機器等行動主體之權力結構，並剖析我國土地政策之結構性問題及作進一步的反省。 研究發現，隨著政治民主化，地方與中央的權力關係面臨了轉變與調節，中央雖仍居關鍵地位，惟地方與中央已建構起「地方挑戰中央，中央仰賴地方」的巧妙關係。在南科特定區開發案中，誘發成長下土地利益為都市成長機器背後成長的基礎，地方、中央政府與資本利益團體之間已鏈結為利益共生的妥協性結盟，過程中雖然在地農民從被迫呈現「親開發」的無奈，到反成長聯盟為國家機器意識形態操弄下制度性的排除與嚇阻，惟卻點燃了對抗成長聯盟的火苗。而個案「三贏」的真相，不僅是地方與中央權力的較勁，更是政客與官僚自利心作祟下，挾持公共利益，游走法律邊緣，操弄文字為資本利益團體「圈地」、「養地」的野蠻遊戲。此不僅呼應成長機器論者所論述「Local Politics ＝ Land Politics」的鐵律，更驗證都市政權理論者所強調「power to」的權力關係，另地方的主要本質雖為成長機器，惟關鍵卻是「成長」的結果，所創造的利益並非為全民所共享。在土地政策為選票保證的關鍵舞台，政客選舉至上的習性，視民意為糞土，其經濟發展掛帥的結果，官僚不僅在名利束縛下盲目的迎合上意，邊陲部門更是自我矮化淪為附庸。以土地作為空間規劃的平台，位居關鍵地位，土地應承擔更多的使命，則土地政策結構性問題的解決應回歸制度面，以跳脫「金權城市」的枷鎖。而民意的覺醒，對抗成長的共識已凝聚成一股巨大的力量，反成長聯盟的聖戰終將迫使政經合流國家機器這異形巨獸無所遁形，且這股力量亦將促使大地的守護者—人民成為國家機器權力巨獸的領航者，帶領國家駛向康莊大道，共創社會福祉。 / In certain areas, a country is the concentrated center of all powers. Over the past few years, urban politics concern for the following core issues; what is the political structure of the state machinery and the other political actors? What are the incentives for alliances? And what is the functioning mechanism for using powers and what are their results etc.? These are euphemistically vital to urban development. In addition, urban development is inseparable from land policy formulation and its implementation. Land management, land allocation and land profit speculations are all made through a political operation. But the essence of politics is to pursue interests. Therefore, it is worthy of concerning and discussing the political relationship between urban politics and land policies.In this case study, the theoretical basis of urban politics is a main element for discussion, supported by a theoretical analysis framework of the power’s three dimensions, also taking Tainan Science-based Industrial Park Special District as an example to elaborate the political and economic structure of urban politics and land policies, to explore the power structure of state apparatus and other emergent political actors, to explore the structural problem of Taiwan’s land polices and other further reflections. According to the case study, accompanying Taiwan’s political democratization, local and central governments were facing a shift and adjustment in their power relationship. In this case study’s period, the central government still led a key position. However, local and central governments had constructed a clever relationship as “local government challenging the central government”, and “central government relying on local government.”In the case of Tainan Science-based Industrial Park Special District, the induced growth of interests behind the land profits are laying the background growing foundation of the urban development. Between capital interest groups and local (including central) governments, both have links to a compromise alliance for their symbiotic interests. During the developmental process, local farmers were forced to show their helpless “pro-development” attitude. Under the institutional exclusion and deterrence, farmers were forced to join anti-growth coalition by the ideological manipulation of the state apparatus, but it also fired the flames against the growing alliances. The in-depth truth under the case “three win,” is not only describing the competition between local and central authorities, but also describing their self-serving hearts of politicians and bureaucrats to held hostage in terms of public interests, to walk a legal edge, and to manipulate the text for capital interest groups’ excuses of “land enclosure” and “land raised,” in a brutal game of earning profits.The case study is echoed growth machine commentators’ discussing the iron law of “Local Politics” equals “Land Politics.” It also verifies the urban regime theorists’ emphasizing “power to,” the relationship of power. The other main area is discussing the push for local growth, “although the nature of the growth machine.” However, the key is “growth results,” of which were not shared by all the people.It holds a key position to use spatial planning as a platform, among which the land policies should shoulder more of the mission. The land policies should return back to the systemic way and be institutionalized to escape the yoke of “money power rooted in the city.” The awakening of the public opinion against growth has been a consensus and condensed into a strong force. The anti-growth coalition jihad will eventually force the state apparatus, with political and economic convergence like a twisted-shaped monster, from the escape of detection. And this force will eventually be promoted as a guardian of the earth – therefore, the people will become the leader of the state machinery (power monster) to guide the country towards a broader road and create more social well-being.