本論文利用超穩定機器的概念，用以解釋天津城市成長轉型的路徑選擇，三個觀察的指標包括支柱產業的選擇、土地政策的更迭以及行政區劃的調整成果。既有針對中國大陸城市治理的文獻概以成長機器作為主軸。但本文認為，受政績誘因以及中央地方關係制約下的初始條件影響，1980年代的天津以超穩定機器而非成長機器的方式運作，具體運作面向包括漸進的經濟改革、具福利性質的土地使用政策以及對外資的保守與防範。事實證明，當時建立的產業發展方向、土地運用制度與城市內部行政體制，對於天津今天在加速經濟增長階段仍然具有相當的影響力。天津經濟轉型過程中呈現的路徑依賴特質，也突顯出地方政府從超穩定機器邁向成長機器轉型的過程中，實際上涉及了學習與轉化的考驗。 / This dissertation aims to identify the patterns of urban transition in China that uses Tianjin as a specific case. In order to illustrate my argument, an analytical approach that combines path dependence and pro-stability machine is employed. Existing literature that attempts to explore the dynamics of urban development in China has been made predominantly on the basis of the “growth machine” model, which takes the growth of cities as a result of interaction among some internal urban-based players for pecuniary gains and property development. Yet, I argue that Tianjin as a pro-stability machine in the 1980s and the story background was bounded by the official’s incentive of promotion and initial provincial conditions backed by the central government influences. This dissertation identifies three core issues in relation to the pro-stability machine, including: incremental reform in economic area, welfare implication in land use policies and conservative attitude toward foreign forces. Such issues associated with challenges of rapid urban growth in Tianjin today: the selection of pillar industries, reforming land policies and drastic administrative restructuring in Binhai New Area. This dissertation argues that Tianjin’s experience significantly highlights difficulties faced with local governments when they confront with the ‘path dependency’ dilemma in economic transition. The Tianjin government has to not only adjust itself to the roles shifted from a pro-stability machine to a developmental machine but also deal with the accompanied challenges of learning and transformation. It seeks to fill the gap in the existing literature that pays scant attention to the urban renewal experience in Tianjin as a traditionally significant developmental center in north China. This dissertation, therefore, will make important contribution in two aspects. First, it will shed light on the institutional reform process in Tianjin that is critical to the developmental catch-up of the city. Second, it will offer a fresh insight into the debates upon the urban development models in contemporary China.

國家是在一定的領域內所有權力集中的中心。長久以來，都市政治所關心的核心議題為國家機器等行動主體之權力結構為何、結盟的誘因及權力運用的機制與結果又為何等等，此皆攸關都市發展，而都市的發展則脫離不了土地政策的制定與實施，以土地的管理分配與土地利益的炒作，是透過政治運作而成，而政治的本質在於利益的追求，則都市政治與土地政策之政經關係為何，是值關切。本研究以都市政治的理論基礎為主軸，輔以權力三面向作為理論分析的架構，並以南科特定區開發案為例，論述都市政治與土地政策之政經結構，探究國家機器等行動主體之權力結構，並剖析我國土地政策之結構性問題及作進一步的反省。 研究發現，隨著政治民主化，地方與中央的權力關係面臨了轉變與調節，中央雖仍居關鍵地位，惟地方與中央已建構起「地方挑戰中央，中央仰賴地方」的巧妙關係。在南科特定區開發案中，誘發成長下土地利益為都市成長機器背後成長的基礎，地方、中央政府與資本利益團體之間已鏈結為利益共生的妥協性結盟，過程中雖然在地農民從被迫呈現「親開發」的無奈，到反成長聯盟為國家機器意識形態操弄下制度性的排除與嚇阻，惟卻點燃了對抗成長聯盟的火苗。而個案「三贏」的真相，不僅是地方與中央權力的較勁，更是政客與官僚自利心作祟下，挾持公共利益，游走法律邊緣，操弄文字為資本利益團體「圈地」、「養地」的野蠻遊戲。此不僅呼應成長機器論者所論述「Local Politics ＝ Land Politics」的鐵律，更驗證都市政權理論者所強調「power to」的權力關係，另地方的主要本質雖為成長機器，惟關鍵卻是「成長」的結果，所創造的利益並非為全民所共享。在土地政策為選票保證的關鍵舞台，政客選舉至上的習性，視民意為糞土，其經濟發展掛帥的結果，官僚不僅在名利束縛下盲目的迎合上意，邊陲部門更是自我矮化淪為附庸。以土地作為空間規劃的平台，位居關鍵地位，土地應承擔更多的使命，則土地政策結構性問題的解決應回歸制度面，以跳脫「金權城市」的枷鎖。而民意的覺醒，對抗成長的共識已凝聚成一股巨大的力量，反成長聯盟的聖戰終將迫使政經合流國家機器這異形巨獸無所遁形，且這股力量亦將促使大地的守護者—人民成為國家機器權力巨獸的領航者，帶領國家駛向康莊大道，共創社會福祉。 / In certain areas, a country is the concentrated center of all powers. Over the past few years, urban politics concern for the following core issues; what is the political structure of the state machinery and the other political actors? What are the incentives for alliances? And what is the functioning mechanism for using powers and what are their results etc.? These are euphemistically vital to urban development. In addition, urban development is inseparable from land policy formulation and its implementation. Land management, land allocation and land profit speculations are all made through a political operation. But the essence of politics is to pursue interests. Therefore, it is worthy of concerning and discussing the political relationship between urban politics and land policies.In this case study, the theoretical basis of urban politics is a main element for discussion, supported by a theoretical analysis framework of the power’s three dimensions, also taking Tainan Science-based Industrial Park Special District as an example to elaborate the political and economic structure of urban politics and land policies, to explore the power structure of state apparatus and other emergent political actors, to explore the structural problem of Taiwan’s land polices and other further reflections. According to the case study, accompanying Taiwan’s political democratization, local and central governments were facing a shift and adjustment in their power relationship. In this case study’s period, the central government still led a key position. However, local and central governments had constructed a clever relationship as “local government challenging the central government”, and “central government relying on local government.”In the case of Tainan Science-based Industrial Park Special District, the induced growth of interests behind the land profits are laying the background growing foundation of the urban development. Between capital interest groups and local (including central) governments, both have links to a compromise alliance for their symbiotic interests. During the developmental process, local farmers were forced to show their helpless “pro-development” attitude. Under the institutional exclusion and deterrence, farmers were forced to join anti-growth coalition by the ideological manipulation of the state apparatus, but it also fired the flames against the growing alliances. The in-depth truth under the case “three win,” is not only describing the competition between local and central authorities, but also describing their self-serving hearts of politicians and bureaucrats to held hostage in terms of public interests, to walk a legal edge, and to manipulate the text for capital interest groups’ excuses of “land enclosure” and “land raised,” in a brutal game of earning profits.The case study is echoed growth machine commentators’ discussing the iron law of “Local Politics” equals “Land Politics.” It also verifies the urban regime theorists’ emphasizing “power to,” the relationship of power. The other main area is discussing the push for local growth, “although the nature of the growth machine.” However, the key is “growth results,” of which were not shared by all the people.It holds a key position to use spatial planning as a platform, among which the land policies should shoulder more of the mission. The land policies should return back to the systemic way and be institutionalized to escape the yoke of “money power rooted in the city.” The awakening of the public opinion against growth has been a consensus and condensed into a strong force. The anti-growth coalition jihad will eventually force the state apparatus, with political and economic convergence like a twisted-shaped monster, from the escape of detection. And this force will eventually be promoted as a guardian of the earth – therefore, the people will become the leader of the state machinery (power monster) to guide the country towards a broader road and create more social well-being.