國家是在一定的領域內所有權力集中的中心。長久以來，都市政治所關心的核心議題為國家機器等行動主體之權力結構為何、結盟的誘因及權力運用的機制與結果又為何等等，此皆攸關都市發展，而都市的發展則脫離不了土地政策的制定與實施，以土地的管理分配與土地利益的炒作，是透過政治運作而成，而政治的本質在於利益的追求，則都市政治與土地政策之政經關係為何，是值關切。本研究以都市政治的理論基礎為主軸，輔以權力三面向作為理論分析的架構，並以南科特定區開發案為例，論述都市政治與土地政策之政經結構，探究國家機器等行動主體之權力結構，並剖析我國土地政策之結構性問題及作進一步的反省。 研究發現，隨著政治民主化，地方與中央的權力關係面臨了轉變與調節，中央雖仍居關鍵地位，惟地方與中央已建構起「地方挑戰中央，中央仰賴地方」的巧妙關係。在南科特定區開發案中，誘發成長下土地利益為都市成長機器背後成長的基礎，地方、中央政府與資本利益團體之間已鏈結為利益共生的妥協性結盟，過程中雖然在地農民從被迫呈現「親開發」的無奈，到反成長聯盟為國家機器意識形態操弄下制度性的排除與嚇阻，惟卻點燃了對抗成長聯盟的火苗。而個案「三贏」的真相，不僅是地方與中央權力的較勁，更是政客與官僚自利心作祟下，挾持公共利益，游走法律邊緣，操弄文字為資本利益團體「圈地」、「養地」的野蠻遊戲。此不僅呼應成長機器論者所論述「Local Politics ＝ Land Politics」的鐵律，更驗證都市政權理論者所強調「power to」的權力關係，另地方的主要本質雖為成長機器，惟關鍵卻是「成長」的結果，所創造的利益並非為全民所共享。在土地政策為選票保證的關鍵舞台，政客選舉至上的習性，視民意為糞土，其經濟發展掛帥的結果，官僚不僅在名利束縛下盲目的迎合上意，邊陲部門更是自我矮化淪為附庸。以土地作為空間規劃的平台，位居關鍵地位，土地應承擔更多的使命，則土地政策結構性問題的解決應回歸制度面，以跳脫「金權城市」的枷鎖。而民意的覺醒，對抗成長的共識已凝聚成一股巨大的力量，反成長聯盟的聖戰終將迫使政經合流國家機器這異形巨獸無所遁形，且這股力量亦將促使大地的守護者—人民成為國家機器權力巨獸的領航者，帶領國家駛向康莊大道，共創社會福祉。 / In certain areas, a country is the concentrated center of all powers. Over the past few years, urban politics concern for the following core issues; what is the political structure of the state machinery and the other political actors? What are the incentives for alliances? And what is the functioning mechanism for using powers and what are their results etc.? These are euphemistically vital to urban development. In addition, urban development is inseparable from land policy formulation and its implementation. Land management, land allocation and land profit speculations are all made through a political operation. But the essence of politics is to pursue interests. Therefore, it is worthy of concerning and discussing the political relationship between urban politics and land policies.In this case study, the theoretical basis of urban politics is a main element for discussion, supported by a theoretical analysis framework of the power’s three dimensions, also taking Tainan Science-based Industrial Park Special District as an example to elaborate the political and economic structure of urban politics and land policies, to explore the power structure of state apparatus and other emergent political actors, to explore the structural problem of Taiwan’s land polices and other further reflections. According to the case study, accompanying Taiwan’s political democratization, local and central governments were facing a shift and adjustment in their power relationship. In this case study’s period, the central government still led a key position. However, local and central governments had constructed a clever relationship as “local government challenging the central government”, and “central government relying on local government.”In the case of Tainan Science-based Industrial Park Special District, the induced growth of interests behind the land profits are laying the background growing foundation of the urban development. Between capital interest groups and local (including central) governments, both have links to a compromise alliance for their symbiotic interests. During the developmental process, local farmers were forced to show their helpless “pro-development” attitude. Under the institutional exclusion and deterrence, farmers were forced to join anti-growth coalition by the ideological manipulation of the state apparatus, but it also fired the flames against the growing alliances. The in-depth truth under the case “three win,” is not only describing the competition between local and central authorities, but also describing their self-serving hearts of politicians and bureaucrats to held hostage in terms of public interests, to walk a legal edge, and to manipulate the text for capital interest groups’ excuses of “land enclosure” and “land raised,” in a brutal game of earning profits.The case study is echoed growth machine commentators’ discussing the iron law of “Local Politics” equals “Land Politics.” It also verifies the urban regime theorists’ emphasizing “power to,” the relationship of power. The other main area is discussing the push for local growth, “although the nature of the growth machine.” However, the key is “growth results,” of which were not shared by all the people.It holds a key position to use spatial planning as a platform, among which the land policies should shoulder more of the mission. The land policies should return back to the systemic way and be institutionalized to escape the yoke of “money power rooted in the city.” The awakening of the public opinion against growth has been a consensus and condensed into a strong force. The anti-growth coalition jihad will eventually force the state apparatus, with political and economic convergence like a twisted-shaped monster, from the escape of detection. And this force will eventually be promoted as a guardian of the earth – therefore, the people will become the leader of the state machinery (power monster) to guide the country towards a broader road and create more social well-being.

由於公、私部門進行土地開發時，常因土地使用分區管制之僵化性阻礙土地開發進行，故本研究之目的，為瞭解美國所實施之浮動分區是否適合實施於台灣，並希望能夠透過建立「浮動分區」之制度，增加國內實施土地使用分區管制之彈性，有效解決土地開發之問題，促進土地合理之利用目標。本研究由探討土地使用分區管制之發展、台灣土地開發過程中產生之問題，以瞭解台灣目前之發展現況，從而瞭解台灣未來實施浮動分區應具何種條件與配套措施，並獲致以下結論： 1.浮動分區是一種可隨現代社會發展需求，推動地方發展之土地開發方式，且可增加土地使用分區管制上之彈性，並配合社會動態之發展。 2.未來在實施浮動分區之初期，實施主體與區位之評選仍應以政府為主，在制度與配套措施皆建立完成後，始可進一步將民間開發業者納入浮動分區開發主體以實施開發。 3.浮動分區之開發計畫可交由實施者或開發者自行擬定，但須注意土地使用分區之相容性問題。 4.浮動分區開發計畫之內容，至少需包括合理之土地使用計畫、完善之交通計畫、公共設施計畫、防災計畫等。 5.實施浮動分區應建立完善之配套措施，如制訂實施法源、浮動分區開發許可審議規範、建立開發協議等。