網路科技不斷進步，服務創新與商業模式陸續推出。線上影音分享網站為目前當紅的領域，但對於網站該如何設計以及使用者為何使用影音分享網站都未有明確準則。因此本研究藉由科技接受行為相關理論的回顧，配合影音分享網站之特性，以Davis(1989)的科技接受模式為基礎，結合相關重要變數，提出概念性架構。目的為找出可能影響網站使用者的相關變數、並瞭解Web2.0影音網站使用者之使用意圖。 實驗方法採用線上問卷方式，在回收的501份問卷中，得到492份有效問卷，以結構方程模式進行研究模式分析。分析結果顯示，研究模式之適配度均達到應有標準。 研究結論章節中會說明本研究之管理意涵，並將研究結果提供給未來欲設立Web2.0影音分享網站的設計者，在網站建立初期，將有限資源投注在重要的變數上，使網站可達到最大效益。 / As the advance of Internet technology continues new business models are emerging in the market. Online video sharing website is the hottest application nowadays, but there is little study on designing the website and why the users using the website. In this research, we propose a conceptual model based on the technology acceptance model developed by Davis (1989) and this model integrating the important variables due to the extant research of relevant theory of technology acceptance and characteristics of video sharing website. The data collection was used the online survey, and we got the 492 eligible data and the analysis was used the Structural Equation Model (SEM). According to the result, the model fit was qualified. This research will give some management implication for designers who want to set up a video sharing website, this research provides the information on how to invest the limited resource on the critical variables in order to maximize the service value in the conclusion section in this paper.

Web2.0締造了許多創業神話與熱潮，但是往往能夠迅速火紅的網站鳳毛麟角，因此本研究以網際網路史以來使用者擴散最快的網站- YouTube做為核心個案，共12個研究個案，研究兩個問題： 1. YouTube使用者能迅速擴散、人氣起飛的原因為何？ 2. 類似的概念許多影音分享網站比YouTube先做、有的和YouTube同時做，為何是YouTube第一個吃下市場，而非所謂有先進者優勢的創新公司？網路是服務複製十分快速的產業，面對後起者的大企業挾金彈攻擊模仿，YouTube為何仍能屹立不搖？ 早在1997年，在頻寬成本都還很高的時候，ifilm就已經開始了線上影片上傳的服務，後續也推出免費上傳影片。Break(1998) 也以主打男性幽默，累積了很高的影片數量，然而當時相關環境卻還不成熟，部落格和線上相簿分享都不普遍。。在2003~ 2005年間，同時有Metacafe(2003)、Grouper(2004)、Sharkle(2004)、Vimeo (2004)、Veoh (2005)、Revver (2005)等影音分享網站各自以精緻影評、P2P、藝術取性、利潤共享等概念切入市場。從YouTube(2005.2)的成長可看到一段不斷嘗試錯誤的過程，從一開始主打美女影片概念、「你的數位儲藏庫」、「上傳、標籤並與世界分享你的影片」、最後出現富有Web2.0精神、彰顯自我的「Broadcast your self」，Slogan改了四次，使用者介面設計也有大幅的改變，程式上也對處理遽增的流量做了大量調整。 資源豐富的大公司Yahoo! 在面對YouTube的成長無所知覺，堅守影片搜尋，錯失先機；而Google雖然比YouTube早推出，但卻仍從搜尋出發，並且對使用者上傳有嚴格的限制，歷經轉型線上影片商店失敗，最後以16.5億美金收購YouTube收場(2006.11)。YouTube發展出「嵌入影片」的功能 (2005.6)，使用者以病毒式擴散，MySpace成為其流量的主要來源 (超過20%)，引發MySpace自家推出MySpace video (2006)，誓言複製一個YouTube。但YouTube腳步並未因為複製而停下，隨著創意影片越來越多，持續針對使用者需求開發新功能，不斷快速設計、測試與修改，YouTube是與使用者共同開發、一同成長，成為YouTube魅力所在。 本研究發現：（一）在嶄新的產業或原創的領域中，學習對象並非專家或權威，而是市場。對於願景的堅持，不斷的針對市場修改，才是持續成長的原因。（二）連結比產能重要，應同時啟動網絡效應與間接網路效應：找到巨人的肩膀，有效利用外部資源，專注自己的核心（三）網路產業複製迅速，先進者難有優勢。優勢來自於企業能夠快速跟上環境脈動的反應力和市場觀察力。並且從利基市場出發，與使用者共同演化完整商品（四）草根策略：大量試驗以聆聽使用者的聲音，速度比正確重要，追求「夠好」而非「最好」，培養能讓創新不斷生長出來的土壤。（五）如果不能有效的輸入知識，核心能力=核心僵固。 / “Web2.0” creates lots of entrepreneur legends and becomes a new trend. But only few of the Web 2.0 websites can grow and become very popular. Therefore, this study picks “YouTube”, the fastest growing website in the Internet history as its core case, and it includes 12 study subjects in total. The two research questions are listed below. 1. Why did YouTube grow so fast? 2. The concept of video sharing which YouTube provided appeared frequently. Some of the websites started their service first; some of them did similar things at the same time. Why not the other competitors who had first mover advantage could win, but YouTube won? One of the characteristics of Internet Industry is “easy to copy”. When facing the competition of big companies which duplicate their idea and attacked with abundant resources, why did YouTube still survive? Ifilm (1997) started its online video sharing business when the cost of bandwidth was still very high. And it served online videos for free afterwards. Break (1998) featured male’s humor, attracted a large number of videos. However, the related environment was not ready. Blog and online photo sharing were not popular at that time. In 2003 to 2005, lots of similar competitors such as Metacafe (2003), Grouper(2004), Sharkle(2004), Vimeo (2004), Veoh (2005), and Revver (2005) established. Some of them used P2P technology; some of them had great editor reviews, and the others provided revenue sharing model. On the other hand, YouTube’s growth came from continuous try-and-error. It failed to be a hotties video sharing website in the begining, and then tried to be “Your Digital Repository”, “Upload, Tag and Share Your Video Worldwide”, and now positions itself as a website for “broadcast yourself” which represents the spirit of Web 2.0. The slogan of YouTube has changed for four times, and the user interface has also changed dramatically. When facing increasing users and videos, YouTube tuned their program very often as well. Yahoo! lost the timing of catching up. Because it stayed in its core capability- search. Although Google video got online a little bit earlier than YouTube, it still started from video search. Moreover, the upload policy is too strict. Google ended up with acquiring YouTube for 1.65 billion dollars after the failure of operating an online video store (2006.11). YouTube developed “Embed” feature and caused a viral spread. MySpace became its main upstream (over 20%). That made myspace build its own “MySpace video” service and vowed to duplicate a similar service as YouTube. Neverthless, YouTube was not stopped by MySpace’s reaction. As creative videos became more and more, YouTube continued developing new features to fit users’ needs. It rapidly went through the cycle of “build-design-test”. Because YouTube grew with its users, co-development with the users became its charisma. The findings are as following. (1) In a developing industry or a new field, the gurus are not experts or authorities, but are the market audience. The insistency of vision and the will to change with the market are the reasons why YouTube continues to grow. (2) Both network effect and indirect network effect should start and be used simultaneous. Linkage is more important than productivity. Take advantage of external resourses efficiently; especially take advantages of those giants in the other industry. Concentrate on company’s own core capability. (3) Because duplication happens often in the Internet industry, the first mover advantage seldom exits. The real advantage is from the ability of quick reaction and deep consumer observation. (4) Grass strategy: using a large scale testing to hear the voices of consumers. The changing speed is more important then accuracy. Pursue “good enough” solution, not “the best” one. The formation of enterprise strategy is like growing grass. The point is keeping the soil fertile and keeping it free to grow. (5) Core capability will be core rigidity if one company can not input knowledge into its organization.

音樂，不僅是一種藝術，更是各種情感，甚至是思想的反映與表現。它存在於整個大自然中，超越人類甚至是先於人類；但人類發現了它，豐富了它，讓它滋潤了我們的生命，可以透過它來表達，也能被它所感動。而宗教音樂，更可視為人類音樂中的最菁華，它能撫慰、感動與昇華我們的心靈，還提供了沉靜思緒，讚頌上主以及與上主溝通的功能，尤其是內涵豐富深廣的基督宗教音樂，它的誕生，就等於西方音樂的誕生；它的歷史，幾乎就等於整部西方音樂史。 　　本論文共分為六章：第一章為緒論，說明研究動機、研究目的、研究途徑、方法及限制、文獻評論，以及研究架構。第二章介紹基督宗教音樂中，從古猶太音樂、古希臘音樂到羅馬天主教聖樂的發展。內容首先釐清聖樂（sacred music/духновная музыка）的觀念，對相關名詞做清楚的闡釋與分類，然後介紹古猶太音樂中對基督宗教聖樂影響較深的部分、對後世音樂理論影響至深且廣的希臘音樂調式、天主教最重要的葛利果聖歌，以及重要記譜法的演進過程等。第三章集中討論東正教聖樂的歷史，從拜占庭到羅斯 ，包含了拜占庭聖樂中最重要的「拜占庭八調式」（осмогласие или октоих）之理論內容以及實際應用、羅斯的「符號歌唱音樂」（знаменное пение）與「多聲部合唱音樂」（партесное пение）兩大重要聖樂形式的起源發展與結構性質，同時，也會提及「符號歌唱音樂」中的「神聖詩文」（духовные стихи），以及羅斯最早的複音音樂「領唱歌唱音樂」（демественное пение）。第四章從「聲學」以及「曲式學」的角度研究俄羅斯東正教聖樂的內部結構；將畢達格拉斯的「純律」、教會調式、希臘調式、拜占庭的音程單位「莫里亞」、計算音程的單位「音分」等交相使用，分析與證明俄羅斯東正教聖樂的調式，並以曲式學分析其曲式。同時本論文將使用柯爾蒂希《俄國音樂史》（Келдыш, Ю.К., «История русской музыки»）中提供之譜例做為具體分析研究之對象。第五章剖析俄羅斯東正教聖樂形於外部的表現規範，包含作曲者的身分、演唱者的性別是否有限制、純人聲無伴奏演唱法（a cappella）的發展及使用、歌唱與教堂建築間的關係、合唱團在教堂中的位置等層面。第六章為全文之結論部分，除對各章節的研究作一個總結，亦包含本論文所預期之學術貢獻。