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Aspects of rearing red grouse (Lagopus lagopus Scoticus (Lath.)) in captivity and their release onto moorlandPrice, Antonia Julie January 1994 (has links)
A problem with the captive breeding of grouse in this and other studies has been that cocks may attack hens in the confined space of an enclosure. One approach used to avoid severe injury to the hens has been to limit the amount of time each cock spends with his hen. However, separating pairs by hand is labour intensive and disruptive to the grouse. During this study a pen was developed which was separated into two parts by a 60cm tall barrier: this kept the wing-clipped cock on one side but allowed the unclipped hen to flutter to either side and so escape from the cock when she wanted to. The hatchability of eggs produced by captive grouse was unaffected by the type of hatcher used. Both still-air and forced-draught hatchers produced a hatchability of 52-57%. In 1989 and 1990 a total of 107 grouse aged 6-9 weeks was released into a wild grouse population. Data from 22 grouse fitted with radio transmitters showed a similar pattern in survival in both years. Over half died within three weeks of the release date, and most carcasses were discovered in a thin and emaciated condition. After three weeks the main cause of death was predation and only 2 of the 107 released grouse survived to the following breeding season. Initially, released grouse were reluctant to fly, but with time they did take to the wing more readily. In 1989 the release pens were located at the edge of the moor and many released grouse were found on the surrounding farmland. In 1990 the release pens were relocated in the middle of the moor and most grouse were subsequently found on the moor. In 1989 none of the released grouse were shot. In 1990 the total number of grouse shot on the release area was 14 and of this 6 were released grouse. The breeding density of the wild population on the release area declined during the period of the release experiments. However, on an adjacent control area where grouse were not released the breeding density increased. The causes of these patterns were not established.
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Market Intelligence : A literature reviewBohlin, Sofia, Inha, Eini January 2017 (has links)
The aim of this paper is to provide insights of market intelligence and answer to the question “What is market intelligence?” by reviewing existing literature of market intelligence. This study also aims to investigate the connection between market intelligence and Game theory, which is believed by the authors to create the foundation for market intelligence studies. The search of relevant material for this literature review was conducted by using the databases of Halmstad University and Google Scholar. Due to the lack of literature on market intelligence as an overall theory, also other literature, such as books, were utilized besides the articles. This study recognizes six theoretical connections based on the reviewed literature and Game theory. Also, a general definition of market intelligence was recognized as a result of the literature review.
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Three Chapters in Information Economics / Trois essais à l'économie de l'informationSu, Tong 15 November 2016 (has links)
Ma thèse étudie le mécanisme de l’acquisition et de l’approvisionnement des informations. Il est appliqué à trois situations. Le premier chapitre (travaillé avec Georgy Lukyanov) développe un modèle dans lequel l’émetteur communique stratégiquement avec un groupe de récepteurs. Les gains des récepteurs dépendent des informations de l’émetteur. Ceci indique que, en dépit de la bienveillance de l’émetteur, le conflit des intérêts entre l’émetteur et les récepteurs apparaît de façon endogène à la présence de friction de la coordination. Par conséquent, l’équilibre de communication est imparfait : les nouvelles extrêmes, bonnes ou mauvaises, sont relevées mais les nouvelles relativement neutres ne sont pas prises en compte. Donc, un biais exogène dans les préférences de l’émetteur peut améliorer la communication et augmenter le bien-être. Le second chapitre (travaillé avec Takuro Yamashita) parle du problème de la divulgation optimale des informations dans le mécanisme désigné où le principal peut s’engager dans sa divulgation et aussi dans son mécanisme. Au début, on offre un résultat caractéristique pour optimiser la politique de révélation complète. Pour appliquer le résultat, on montre que le principal (vendeur) préfère toujours révéler toutes les informations relatives aux récepteurs de la vente aux enchères générale. Dans le cas du commerce bilatéral où son but est le surplus avec une légère condition sur l’environnement, il ne trouve pas optimal de révéler toutes les informations. Pour une procédure de vote, les votants peuvent choisir entre le statu quo et la réforme. On démontre que le principal doit révéler toutes les informations sur le bénéfice global mais qu’il ne doit révéler aucune information sur le bénéfice individuel de chaque agent. Dans le troisième chapitre on montre que, contrairement à l’idée conventionnelle selon laquelle les agents qui ont des convictions hétérogènes vont s’entendre à long terme (suite aux nouvelles informations), leurs convictions peuvent diverger s’ils sont rationnellement inattentifs. Quand l’attention a un coût, le choix optimal des agents est d’accepter les nouvelles informations qui leur paraissent plus vraisemblables. Cela va conduire à un apprentissage conformiste. Ainsi, les agents qui ont des croyances éloignées de la vérité réagiront moins que les agents qui ont des croyances proches de la vérité. Ceci va mener à une divergence de leurs anticipations. Je caractérise la condition de la divergence de croyance et je montre que ça a plus de chance d’arriver quand la vérité est plus extrême et que le coût de l’attention est moins important. / My thesis studies the mechanism of endogenous information acquisition and provision, and applies it into three applications. The first chapter (joint with Georgy Lukyanov) develops a model in which the sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender’s information. It is shown that, in the presence of coordination frictions, conflict of interests between the sender and the receivers arises endogenously, in spite of the sender’s benevolence. As a result, equilibrium communication is imperfect: extremely good or bad news get disclosed, while relatively “neutral” information is withheld. Consequently, an exogenous bias in the sender’s preferences can improve communication and raise welfare. The second chapter (joint with Takuro Yamashita) considers the problem of optimal information disclosure in mechanism design where the principal can commit to his disclosure policy as well as to his mechanism. We first provide a characterization result for the optimality of the full disclosure policy. Applying this result, in a generalized auction setting we show that the principal (seller) always prefers to disclose all the relevant information to the agents. In a bilateral trade setting where his objective is surplus, under a mild condition on the environment, he does not find optimal to reveal all the information. In a voting application where voters choose between either the status quo or a reform, we show that the principal should reveal all information regarding to the aggregate benefit from the reform but reveal no information about individual benefit for each agent. The third chapter shows that, in contrast to conventional idea that agents with heterogenous beliefs will agree in the long-term as they learn from new information, their beliefs may diverge if agents’ learning is rationally inattentive. When attention is costly, agents optimally choose to acquire potentially new information which they believe most likely to come, leading to a conformism learning. Hence, agents whose initial beliefs are far from the truth will react less often compared to agents whose beliefs are closer to the truth, leading to a divergence in agents’ beliefs in expectation. I characterize the condition for belief divergence and show that it is more likely to happen when the truth is more extreme and the attention cost is moderate.
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Essays in Network Economics and Game TheoryTan, Hi-Lin January 2009 (has links)
Thesis advisor: Richard J. Arnott / This dissertation comprises three papers that are concerned with the implications of strategic interactions between a finite set of agents in private goods economies. One form of strategic behavior I consider arises in a social network when the consumption decisions of agents are influenced by those around them. The other form of strategic behavior I consider arises when agents bargain with one another. The first paper focuses on undirected networks in which consumers care about the average of their neighbors' consumption. The main contribution is to show how social networks affect equilibrium prices. I show that if every consumer has the same number of neighbors, then each consumer's influence on the market is independent of the number of neighbors. Due to the tradeoff between more neighbors responding and less sensitive responses, greater network intensity may not result in greater average influence of all consumers. In addition, I show that a consumer who is central in the network may not have the highest influence on the market because of the need to consider not only the number of neighbors that he has or his distances to other consumers, but also the number of neighbors that his neighbors have. The second paper examines strategic consumption in a directed network. The main contribution is to show how directed networks affect equilibrium outcomes. I show how the critical and promising links, and the key players in a social network can be identified. In doing so, I introduce the impact centrality and reaction centrality measures, and show how these measures are used to determine the effects on aggregate centrality of removing any agent from the network, and of removing or adding any directed link. The third paper considers bargaining under two-sided incomplete information in a market with multiple buyers and sellers, each with either high or low independent private values. I show that there exists a mechanism that guarantees efficient trading outcomes even when gains from trade are uncertain. The main contribution of this paper to show that a large number of traders is not necessary to guarantee efficient trading if there are at least as many sellers as there are buyers, and there is at least one low valuation buyer. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.
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Balancing ActYang, Yrenia 19 April 2019 (has links)
Balancing Act is a card matching game for 2 players that aims to inform players about basic money management principles. The purpose of the game is to educate players on different money management concepts in a fun and engaging manner. This paper will discuss the story of Balancing Act, the development of the game, and how the design of the game seeks to inform the player of its purpose. It will also include a post mortem that details the challenges of developing both a board and card version of the game, the overall outcomes of the project, and future directions for the game.
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Strategy dynamics, decision making, and global performance in agent-based models of competing populations. / 競爭性系統個體模型中的策略動態、決策及整體表現 / Strategy dynamics, decision making, and global performance in agent-based models of competing populations. / Jing zheng xing xi tong ge ti mo xing zhong de ce lüe dong tai, jue ce ji zheng ti biao xianJanuary 2006 (has links)
Chan King Pak Keven = 競爭性系統個體模型中的策略動態、決策及整體表現 / 陳景柏. / Thesis submitted in: August 2005. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves vii-viii (4th gp.)). / Text in English; abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chan King Pak Keven = Jing zheng xing xi tong ge ti mo xing zhong de ce lüe dong tai, jue ce ji zheng ti biao xian / Chen Jingbo. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Review on the Minority Game --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Background --- p.5 / Chapter 2.2 --- Model of MG --- p.6 / Chapter 2.3 --- Features --- p.7 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Phase Transition --- p.7 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Inefficient and Efficient Phase --- p.8 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Anti-persistence --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- Data Collapse --- p.10 / Chapter 2.4 --- Existing Theories --- p.10 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Reduced Strategy Space --- p.11 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- The Crowd-Anticrowd Theory --- p.12 / Chapter 2.5 --- Summary --- p.13 / Chapter 3 --- Introduction to Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1 --- Strategy Ranking Theory for Mean Success Rate --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Time evolution of Virtual Point Ranking --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Winning Probability for m = 1 --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2 --- Calculation of Mean Success Rate --- p.21 / Chapter 3.3 --- "Size Dependence of weυen(K) (""Market Impact"" Effect)" --- p.23 / Chapter 3.4 --- Size Dependence of wodd、K) (Uneven Distribution of Agents into Split Ranks) --- p.25 / Chapter 4 --- Implementation of Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.30 / Chapter 4.1 --- Feature of wodd(k) for higher m --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2 --- Derivation of wodd(k) from Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.32 / Chapter 4.3 --- Proof of Eq. (4.14) --- p.36 / Chapter 4.4 --- Discussion on wodd(k) --- p.41 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Asymptotic Behavior of wodd(k) --- p.42 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Finite size correction of wodd(k) --- p.43 / Chapter 5 --- Applications of Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.46 / Chapter 5.1 --- Probability Density Function of Agents Making a Particular Choice --- p.46 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Odd time steps: k = 1 --- p.47 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Odd time steps: k = 2 --- p.48 / Chapter 5.1.3 --- "Rodd,K" --- p.49 / Chapter 5.1.4 --- Even time steps --- p.51 / Chapter 5.1.5 --- Overall Attendance Distribution --- p.51 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Variance of the Attendance --- p.52 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Asymptotic behavior of the variance --- p.54 / Chapter 5.3 --- Anti-persistent Nature of Efficient Phase of MG --- p.55 / Chapter 5.4 --- Summary --- p.58 / Chapter 6 --- Strategy Ranking Theory and Crowd-Anticrowd Theory --- p.59 / Chapter 6.1 --- Introduction --- p.59 / Chapter 6.1.1 --- Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.60 / Chapter 6.1.2 --- Crowd-Anticrowd Theory --- p.61 / Chapter 6.2 --- Crowd-Anticrowd Theory with Ranking Patterns Characterized by k --- p.63 / Chapter 6.3 --- Variance: Crowd-Anticrowd Theory --- p.65 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- m = 1 --- p.65 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- m = 2 --- p.66 / Chapter 6.4 --- Variance: Modified Crowd-Anticrowd Theory for m̐ơح 1 --- p.66 / Chapter 6.4.1 --- k = 0 --- p.67 / Chapter 6.4.2 --- k = 1 --- p.67 / Chapter 6.4.3 --- k = 2 --- p.67 / Chapter 6.4.4 --- Sum over all k --- p.68 / Chapter 6.5 --- Variance: Modified Crowd-Ant icrowd Theory for m=2 --- p.68 / Chapter 6.5.1 --- k = 3 --- p.69 / Chapter 6.5.2 --- k = 4 --- p.70 / Chapter 6.5.3 --- Sum over all k --- p.71 / Chapter 6.6 --- "Strategy Ranking Theory Expressed in (Nkl-Nk,(l)" --- p.71 / Chapter 6.7 --- Summary --- p.73 / Chapter 7 --- Variance of the Attendance in MG: Data Collapse --- p.75 / Chapter 7.1 --- Previous Studies --- p.75 / Chapter 7.2 --- Attempt 1 --- p.76 / Chapter 7.2.1 --- Understanding from the Existing Theories --- p.76 / Chapter 7.2.2 --- Numerical Results --- p.79 / Chapter 7.3 --- Attempt 2 --- p.80 / Chapter 7.3.1 --- Modification Based on αc ß 1/2 --- p.81 / Chapter 7.3.2 --- Numerical Results --- p.81 / Chapter 7.4 --- Summary --- p.82 / Chapter 8 --- Minority Game in Networked Population --- p.83 / Chapter 8.1 --- Introduction --- p.83 / Chapter 8.2 --- Model --- p.84 / Chapter 8.3 --- Numerical Results --- p.85 / Chapter 8.4 --- Classification of Predictors --- p.86 / Chapter 8.4.1 --- Major Classification of Predictors - Hamming Distance D --- p.87 / Chapter 8.4.2 --- "Minor Classification of Predictors - Dynamical Ranking (k,1)" --- p.88 / Chapter 8.4.3 --- "Using the Classification (k,l, D)" --- p.89 / Chapter 8.5 --- "Winning Probability of a Predictor (wk,l,d)" --- p.89 / Chapter 8.5.1 --- "Odd Steps, k = 1" --- p.90 / Chapter 8.5.2 --- "Odd Steps, k = 2" --- p.91 / Chapter 8.6 --- Number of Predictors --- p.93 / Chapter 8.7 --- Mean Success Rate of Non-networked MG: m = 1 --- p.93 / Chapter 8.8 --- "Cluster Size of a Predictor (sk,l,D)" --- p.95 / Chapter 8.9 --- Mean Success Rate of Networked MG --- p.97 / Chapter 8.9.1 --- With wK(even)=0.5 --- p.97 / Chapter 8.9.2 --- "Modification of wK(even) Using skl,D" --- p.98 / Chapter 8.9.3 --- Modification of Using Modified wK(even) --- p.100 / Chapter 8.10 --- Variance of the Attendance in Networked MG --- p.101 / Chapter 8.11 --- Attendance Distribution --- p.103 / Chapter 8.12 --- A Network-type Independent Approach --- p.104 / Chapter 8.12.1 --- Degree Depending Success Rate --- p.104 / Chapter 8.12.2 --- Evaluating w(k) --- p.107 / Chapter 8.12.3 --- Application on Random Graph as Underlying Network --- p.108 / Chapter 8.13 --- The Position of the Minimum Variance --- p.108 / Chapter 8.14 --- Summary --- p.110 / Chapter 9 --- Conclusion --- p.111 / Bibliography --- p.115
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Obliti - Empathy game regarding depressionStevens, Mitchell 26 April 2018 (has links)
Obliti is a game meant to promote empathy for people with depression, and applies a personal story to the experience. Empathy is the experience of understanding another person€™s condition from their perspective. You place yourself in their shoes and feel what they are feeling. 17 The story follows the character through corrupted dream states, stuck in an infinite loop; reliving the tarnished dreams. This paper will discuss the story of Obliti, its history and the way the design helped the story come to the forefront of the experience. Using lighting, first person character and art assets, Obliti puts the player into the shoes of the main character. The paper also includes a post mortem in order to discuss the challenges of working with paid art assets, making a game about your past and the overall outcome of the project. In order to test the effectiveness of Obliti, 20 subjects were asked to fill out a series of questions regarding mood and depression. The results of the study showed a change in mood from pretest and posttest, pointing toward empathy being transferred to the player. Part of the study asked players if they understood depression, in which there was a 10% change from €œNo,€� to €œI don€™t know,€� suggesting some internal thoughts were changed on the topic.
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Four ways of hearing video game musicKamp, Michiel January 2015 (has links)
No description available.
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Online Face Recognition GameQu, Yawe, Yang, Mingxi January 2006 (has links)
<p>The purpose of this project is to test and improve people’s ability of face recognition. </p><p>Although there are some tests on the internet with the same purpose, the problem is that people </p><p>may feel bored and give up before finishing the tests. Consequently they may not benefit from </p><p>testing nor from training. To solve this problem, face recognition and online game are put </p><p>together in this project. The game is supposed to provide entertainment when people are playing, </p><p>so that more people can take the test and improve their abilities of face recognition. </p><p>In the game design, the game is assumed to take place in the face recognition lab, which is </p><p>an imaginary lab. The player plays the main role in this game and asked to solve a number of </p><p>problems. There are several scenarios waiting for the player, which mainly need face recognition </p><p>skills from the player. At the end the player obtains the result of evaluation of her/his skills in </p><p>face recognition.</p>
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Spelarupplevelser i Azeroth : Immersion och Presence i World of Warcraft / Player experiences in Azeroth : Immersion and Presence in World of WarcraftTakala, Victor January 2010 (has links)
<p>This study examines the players experience, environments and objects in the videogame World of Warcraft. The purpose of this study is to get more knowledge about the players experience in the game with the focus on factors contributing to some form of immersion or/and presence. The data for this study were gathered using interviews as method and then analyzed with relevant literature in the chosen field. A game content analysis and a group of questions are tested with the results of the study which is presented at the end in with an analytic discussion.</p><p> </p>
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