It has been widely held in our culture for centuries that one ought to “be oneself,” an imperative often referred to as authenticity. The meaning of authenticity, however, remains contested among philosophers and largely shapeless in most people’s minds. In order to make sense of this compelling idea, one must reconcile authenticity with the metaphysics of selfhood and identity. In all of its applications, ‘authenticity’ refers to a convergence between how something presents itself and what it actually is. Yet the marriage of authenticity, with its essentialist structure, and personal identity, with its built-in temporal openness, is prima facie dubious. Authenticity appeals to something true and unchanging, but a person’s identity evolves throughout her life. Furthermore, the ideal of “being oneself” requires that it also be possible to be “not oneself,” but it is difficult to explain how any individual could be other than who she is. I argue that previous theories of authenticity have not adequately negotiated these structural requirements. Heidegger provides an account of authenticity as a formal existential possibility for Dasein. Because of its restriction to ontological phenomena, his analysis fails to show what authenticity actually means for Dasein and how its authentic existence is connected to its identity. Sartre likewise describes authenticity as an ideal ontological state, but his belief in radical freedom translates into a denial of the metaphysics of identity that could explain the content of authenticity. Despite being the locus of the most influential twentieth century accounts, existentialism cannot capture authenticity because of its inability to investigate who one is and how certain choices are more or less essential to our selves. I pursue such an investigation by distinguishing between authenticity and related notions such as originality, sincerity, wholeheartedness, and narrative unity. I argue that authenticity must account for change in personal identity as well as the social and interpretive dimensions of selfhood without forfeiting the criterion that there is something true about who we are. In my view of authenticity as reflective consistency I argue that we can be ourselves by acting in accordance with our necessary dispositions in a certain situation.

It has been widely held in our culture for centuries that one ought to “be oneself,” an imperative often referred to as authenticity. The meaning of authenticity, however, remains contested among philosophers and largely shapeless in most people’s minds. In order to make sense of this compelling idea, one must reconcile authenticity with the metaphysics of selfhood and identity. In all of its applications, ‘authenticity’ refers to a convergence between how something presents itself and what it actually is. Yet the marriage of authenticity, with its essentialist structure, and personal identity, with its built-in temporal openness, is prima facie dubious. Authenticity appeals to something true and unchanging, but a person’s identity evolves throughout her life. Furthermore, the ideal of “being oneself” requires that it also be possible to be “not oneself,” but it is difficult to explain how any individual could be other than who she is. I argue that previous theories of authenticity have not adequately negotiated these structural requirements. Heidegger provides an account of authenticity as a formal existential possibility for Dasein. Because of its restriction to ontological phenomena, his analysis fails to show what authenticity actually means for Dasein and how its authentic existence is connected to its identity. Sartre likewise describes authenticity as an ideal ontological state, but his belief in radical freedom translates into a denial of the metaphysics of identity that could explain the content of authenticity. Despite being the locus of the most influential twentieth century accounts, existentialism cannot capture authenticity because of its inability to investigate who one is and how certain choices are more or less essential to our selves. I pursue such an investigation by distinguishing between authenticity and related notions such as originality, sincerity, wholeheartedness, and narrative unity. I argue that authenticity must account for change in personal identity as well as the social and interpretive dimensions of selfhood without forfeiting the criterion that there is something true about who we are. In my view of authenticity as reflective consistency I argue that we can be ourselves by acting in accordance with our necessary dispositions in a certain situation.

George Berkeley (1685-1753) defends immaterialism, the view that there is no such thing as matter. In place of matter, what exists are only minds and ideas. Berkeley also styles himself a defender of common sense. From early on many of Berkeley's readers doubted that these two commitments could be reconciled. I consider Berkeley's joint commitment to immaterialism and common sense in respect of two philosophical theses. (1) Berkeley argues against a version of scepticism that bodies are single collections, constituted by many ideas placed in certain relations, and veridically sensed by finite minds. I identify these collections as Berkeley's enigmatic archetypes. (2) Berkeley argues that finite minds are able to act causally upon their own bodies by nothing more than an act of will. Both of these theses are defended in the context of immaterialism, and Berkeley persuasively presents them as elements of common sense. I reconstruct Berkeley's arguments for these theses, and suggest that he succeeds in reconciling immaterialism and common sense in these areas. My account draws on previous research, but I introduce a single mechanism to understand both theses. I call this mechanism overlap. On Berkeley's view, finite minds represent bodies by constructing representing-collections that are intended to resemble body-collections. However, these representing-collections overlap with body-collections, meaning that they share members which are numerically the same. My account of (1) depends on the fact that sensed ideas are in the overlapping area, and therefore represent the body-collection exactly as it is. My account of (2) depends on supposing that the causal powers of finite minds are exercised on ideas in the area of overlap, and thus they act on ideas that are accessible to them but are also constituent parts of bodies.

George Berkeley (1685-1753) defends immaterialism, the view that there is no such thing as matter. In place of matter, what exists are only minds and ideas. Berkeley also styles himself a defender of common sense. From early on many of Berkeley's readers doubted that these two commitments could be reconciled. I consider Berkeley's joint commitment to immaterialism and common sense in respect of two philosophical theses. (1) Berkeley argues against a version of scepticism that bodies are single collections, constituted by many ideas placed in certain relations, and veridically sensed by finite minds. I identify these collections as Berkeley's enigmatic archetypes. (2) Berkeley argues that finite minds are able to act causally upon their own bodies by nothing more than an act of will. Both of these theses are defended in the context of immaterialism, and Berkeley persuasively presents them as elements of common sense. I reconstruct Berkeley's arguments for these theses, and suggest that he succeeds in reconciling immaterialism and common sense in these areas. My account draws on previous research, but I introduce a single mechanism to understand both theses. I call this mechanism overlap. On Berkeley's view, finite minds represent bodies by constructing representing-collections that are intended to resemble body-collections. However, these representing-collections overlap with body-collections, meaning that they share members which are numerically the same. My account of (1) depends on the fact that sensed ideas are in the overlapping area, and therefore represent the body-collection exactly as it is. My account of (2) depends on supposing that the causal powers of finite minds are exercised on ideas in the area of overlap, and thus they act on ideas that are accessible to them but are also constituent parts of bodies.

This work engages with three contemporary thinkers who offer directions for a philosophy of translation. The initial thesis is that translation is a privileged mode of examining difference in language, because it indicates both the necessity to bring what is irreducibly other or foreign into terms of familiarity, and the extreme difficulties, perhaps the impossibility, of such an enterprise. I examine the particular responses to this translation dilemma given by Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze/Félix Guattari, ultimately arguing that although Derrida gives crucial insights into the problem itself, a future theory of translation would need to go beyond Derrida’s approach and adopt the radically pragmatic approach to language articulated by Deleuze and Guattari. Throughout, I examine this problem in terms of the distinction between Derrida as a philosopher of transcendence and Deleuze and Guattari as philosophers of immanence. Derrida’s work insists on the impossibility of representing the other in language, and his simultaneous necessity and impossibility of translation is valuable insofar as it offers resistances to the presumptions of translation as standing in for the other. I argue, however, that Derrida’s insistence on impossibility as marked in the performativity of language itself is ultimately unable to give us a satisfying account of the relation between language and the world, which leaves us with no direction for how we might engage with concrete problems in actual translation situations in a productive way. The central problem with Derrida’s view is his insistence on the model of inter-lingual translation as figuring the paradox of difference in language. The approach of Deleuze and Guattari reverses this order and re-conceives of translation in a pragmatic context, where inter-semiotic translations are uniquely able to release the creative power of language. Through their articulation of the expressivity of matter, Deleuze and Guattari place language in a wider context in which it is intricately engaged in a world. I place translation in this wider context in order to demonstrate how Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking about language allows us to re-conceive of translation practices as opportunities for transformations of both language and world.

This work engages with three contemporary thinkers who offer directions for a philosophy of translation. The initial thesis is that translation is a privileged mode of examining difference in language, because it indicates both the necessity to bring what is irreducibly other or foreign into terms of familiarity, and the extreme difficulties, perhaps the impossibility, of such an enterprise. I examine the particular responses to this translation dilemma given by Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze/Félix Guattari, ultimately arguing that although Derrida gives crucial insights into the problem itself, a future theory of translation would need to go beyond Derrida’s approach and adopt the radically pragmatic approach to language articulated by Deleuze and Guattari. Throughout, I examine this problem in terms of the distinction between Derrida as a philosopher of transcendence and Deleuze and Guattari as philosophers of immanence. Derrida’s work insists on the impossibility of representing the other in language, and his simultaneous necessity and impossibility of translation is valuable insofar as it offers resistances to the presumptions of translation as standing in for the other. I argue, however, that Derrida’s insistence on impossibility as marked in the performativity of language itself is ultimately unable to give us a satisfying account of the relation between language and the world, which leaves us with no direction for how we might engage with concrete problems in actual translation situations in a productive way. The central problem with Derrida’s view is his insistence on the model of inter-lingual translation as figuring the paradox of difference in language. The approach of Deleuze and Guattari reverses this order and re-conceives of translation in a pragmatic context, where inter-semiotic translations are uniquely able to release the creative power of language. Through their articulation of the expressivity of matter, Deleuze and Guattari place language in a wider context in which it is intricately engaged in a world. I place translation in this wider context in order to demonstrate how Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking about language allows us to re-conceive of translation practices as opportunities for transformations of both language and world.

This thesis is a quest to find the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. I point out that what we are inclined to believe about the justification of egoistic concern, let's call it the Old Theory, is that personal identity is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, that personal identity involves a deep further fact, and that physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for personal identity. I argue that, if personal identity involves the deep further fact, then physical and psychological continuity are not good evidence for personal identity and thus the Old Theory is mistaken. Furthermore, if the everyday egoistic concern that we have for a person who is physically and psychologically continuous with us is clearly rational, then physical and psychological continuity must be good evidence for the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, and thus either personal identity is not the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, or personal identity does not involve the deep further fact. Therefore, I suggest that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should have the following structure; some relationship, let's call it E, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, E does not involve the deep further fact, and physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for E. I then point out that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should take into account the dominant intuitions that the Old Theory was based on, but should ignore intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs flowing from the Old Theory. I argue that it is not easy to separate these two types of intuitions, but, nevertheless, in trying to find E I attempt to capture the intuitions that underlie the Old Theory, while avoiding the use of methods that might capture intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs involved in the Old Theory. After considering the various candidates for E, I conclude that psychological continuity, even if it occurs coincidentally, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

This thesis is a quest to find the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. I point out that what we are inclined to believe about the justification of egoistic concern, let's call it the Old Theory, is that personal identity is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, that personal identity involves a deep further fact, and that physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for personal identity. I argue that, if personal identity involves the deep further fact, then physical and psychological continuity are not good evidence for personal identity and thus the Old Theory is mistaken. Furthermore, if the everyday egoistic concern that we have for a person who is physically and psychologically continuous with us is clearly rational, then physical and psychological continuity must be good evidence for the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, and thus either personal identity is not the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, or personal identity does not involve the deep further fact. Therefore, I suggest that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should have the following structure; some relationship, let's call it E, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, E does not involve the deep further fact, and physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for E. I then point out that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should take into account the dominant intuitions that the Old Theory was based on, but should ignore intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs flowing from the Old Theory. I argue that it is not easy to separate these two types of intuitions, but, nevertheless, in trying to find E I attempt to capture the intuitions that underlie the Old Theory, while avoiding the use of methods that might capture intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs involved in the Old Theory. After considering the various candidates for E, I conclude that psychological continuity, even if it occurs coincidentally, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

This thesis is a quest to find the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. I point out that what we are inclined to believe about the justification of egoistic concern, let's call it the Old Theory, is that personal identity is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, that personal identity involves a deep further fact, and that physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for personal identity. I argue that, if personal identity involves the deep further fact, then physical and psychological continuity are not good evidence for personal identity and thus the Old Theory is mistaken. Furthermore, if the everyday egoistic concern that we have for a person who is physically and psychologically continuous with us is clearly rational, then physical and psychological continuity must be good evidence for the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, and thus either personal identity is not the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, or personal identity does not involve the deep further fact. Therefore, I suggest that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should have the following structure; some relationship, let's call it E, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, E does not involve the deep further fact, and physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for E. I then point out that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should take into account the dominant intuitions that the Old Theory was based on, but should ignore intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs flowing from the Old Theory. I argue that it is not easy to separate these two types of intuitions, but, nevertheless, in trying to find E I attempt to capture the intuitions that underlie the Old Theory, while avoiding the use of methods that might capture intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs involved in the Old Theory. After considering the various candidates for E, I conclude that psychological continuity, even if it occurs coincidentally, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

This thesis is a quest to find the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. I point out that what we are inclined to believe about the justification of egoistic concern, let's call it the Old Theory, is that personal identity is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, that personal identity involves a deep further fact, and that physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for personal identity. I argue that, if personal identity involves the deep further fact, then physical and psychological continuity are not good evidence for personal identity and thus the Old Theory is mistaken. Furthermore, if the everyday egoistic concern that we have for a person who is physically and psychologically continuous with us is clearly rational, then physical and psychological continuity must be good evidence for the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, and thus either personal identity is not the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, or personal identity does not involve the deep further fact. Therefore, I suggest that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should have the following structure; some relationship, let's call it E, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, E does not involve the deep further fact, and physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for E. I then point out that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should take into account the dominant intuitions that the Old Theory was based on, but should ignore intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs flowing from the Old Theory. I argue that it is not easy to separate these two types of intuitions, but, nevertheless, in trying to find E I attempt to capture the intuitions that underlie the Old Theory, while avoiding the use of methods that might capture intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs involved in the Old Theory. After considering the various candidates for E, I conclude that psychological continuity, even if it occurs coincidentally, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.