The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

In his influential essay “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Donald Davidson argues that we cannot make sense of conceptual relativism, the doctrine that there could be incommensurably different systems of concepts applicable to a single world. According to Davidson, there is no criterion of identity for language that does not imply or presuppose the possibility that we interpret that language by means of our own language. Given some plausible assumptions, this implies that there is at most one conceptual scheme, one way of interpreting or representing the world. But then the very idea of a conceptual scheme is empty. The dissertation is an examination of Davidson’s reasoning, and a defence of a different position regarding conceptual relativism. I reject much of Davidson’s argumentation, and his radical (subordinate) conclusion that we would be able, at least in principle, to make sense of any language. Languages that we would be unable to translate or interpret, even in principle, are at least logically possible, in my view. However, this possibility should not be thought to imply or encourage conceptual relativism. In this respect, I think that Davidson and many of his critics have conflated the notion of a difference in conceptual scheme, which requires incommensurability between languages or systems of concepts, and mere conceptual difference. I argue that a genuinely alternative conceptual scheme would be associated with language unintelligible to us because of its relation to our language. For what is at issue, supposedly, is a conceptual relation: a relation between languages, not a relation between speakers, or their capacities, on the one hand, and languages, on the other. I try to show how some of Davidson’s arguments, suitably modified, can be deployed against the possibility of an alternative scheme, so understood, and provide some additional arguments of my own. My position is thus significantly weaker than Davidson’s: there could not be languages that we would be unable to interpret because they are incommensurable with our own.

This project is a critique of the connection between lethal violence and justice within Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Our critique focuses on three specific moments—moments that Derrida touches upon in Glas, but does not address in detail—namely, heroic vengeance, execution and warfare. By subjecting each of these moments to a close reading we will be calling into question the very possibility of an act of violence that can lay claim to being absolutely ‘necessary’ or ‘just’ either within its specific historical moment or from beyond it. The theoretical basis of the project closely parallels Jacques Derrida’s work on Hegel, in that it stems from a deconstruction of the connection between epistemology and ontology. This also has serious implications for the question of ethics. By tracing the play of différance through the semeiological structure of both theoretical and practical cognition Derrida’s work makes it possible to address the ethical implications of speculative dialectics from a non-dialectical angle. Figuratively speaking, the relationship between theoretical and practical cognition can be thought of as the relationship between reading and writing. As such, the title of the project is to be taken as a figurative reference to the connection between theoretical (i.e. reading) and practical (i.e. writing) cognition and by extension to the connection between epistemology, ontology and ethics. Addressed in this manner our project begins by tracing the silence (i.e. the ‘a’ of différance) that is, at one and the same time, a condition of the possibility and impossibility of meaning. This silence has serious ramifications for Hegel’s political philosophy. Hegel’s system sets out to ground the law within the ‘positive’ infinity of the Concept [Begriff] and thus, close the circle of philosophy. This project will attempt to expose the ethical stakes—and the ultimate impossibility—of Hegel’s ‘positive’ infinity by taking up the thread of lethal violence in the Philosophy of Right.

Based on the domestic model of law, many assume that the global rule of law requires a world government with a central law-making body, a hierarchical court system, and a supranational system of coercive enforcement. Since there are important problems with the practicality and desirability of a world government, I defend a decentralized conception of the global rule of law without a world government. I begin by examining Immanuel Kant’s theory since he argued that a supreme sovereign is required for a lawful condition within states while recognizing certain limitations with applying this idea to the international level. I argue that Kant proposed a voluntary league of states without coercive public law in part because a supreme coercive authority at the global level would conflict with the sovereignty of nation-states and undermine the civil condition within states. In Chapter Two, I argue that theories of dispersed or shared sovereignty can resolve this problem. However, since there are further problems with even a federal world government, I consider whether the rule of law can be developed without a world government. I argue that the most important feature for the global rule of law is the impartial determination, interpretation and application of international law by various authoritative adjudicative and administrative institutions. There are two important challenges to my view. First, many argue that international law is not really “law” unless it is effectively enforced through a central system of sanctions; without this, it can at most create moral obligations but not true legal obligations. To the extent that such arguments assume a coercion-based conception of law, my response draws on H.L.A. Hart’s rejection of the command theory of law. The second challenge concerns democratic legitimacy. I argue that global administrative law can partly address concerns with legitimacy by using rule of law principles to limit the arbitrary exercise of power by transnational institutions and increase their accountability.

This dissertation is an attempt to understand the role of instruments in the process of knowledge production in science. I ask: how can we trust scientific instruments and what do we learn about when we use them? The dissertation has four parts. First, I construct a novel account of “epistemic possibility,” the possibility of knowing, that captures the dependency of knowledge on action, and I introduce the notion of “technological possibility,” which depends on the availability of material and conceptual means to bring about a desired state of affairs. I argue that, under certain circumstances, technological possibility is a condition for epistemic possibility. Second, I ask how instruments become reliable. I argue that when the material capacities and conceptual functions of a scientific instrument correspond, the instrument is a reliable component of the process of knowledge production. I then describe how the instrument design process can result in just such a correspondence. Instrument design produces the material device, a functional concept of the device revised in light of experience, a measure of the closeness of fit between material and function, and practices of trust such as calibration routines. ii Third, I ask what we learn from instruments such as those used for experimentation and simulation. I argue that in experiments, instruments function to inform us about the material capacities of the object of investigation, while in simulations, instruments function to inform us about the conceptual model of the object of investigation. Fourth, I put these philosophical distinctions into historical context through a case study of Monte Carlo simulations run on digital electronic computers in the 1940s-70s. I argue that digital electronic computers made the practice of Monte Carlo simulation technologically possible, but that the new method did not meet existing scientific standards. Consequently, Monte Carlo design practices were revised to address the worries of potential practitioners.

In this thesis, I present a novel account of scientific modeling that achieves the stability and generalizability of static approaches with the flexibility and practical relevance of diachronic approaches. In this account, modeling is characterized by the use of a similarity relation for the purpose of surrogate reasoning. Many criticisms of similarity are based on the fact that there is no way to objectively assess similarity between two things that share some, but not all, features. This account does not rely on the inherently flawed notion of objectively assessing similarity. Instead, the focus is on subjective assessment of similarity, within the specific context of an agent using the similarity for surrogate reasoning. This account captures the diversity of models while providing coherence among common features and functions, as evidenced by application to a series of interrelated examples in a case study from mid-twentieth century cognitive psychology. The similarity/difference account advocated in this thesis is particularly significant because its demonstrated success, evidenced by the case study, dispels several misconceptions about the study of scientific models. Advocates of static approaches claim that a diachronic approach cannot provide the generalizability necessary for a unified account, but the functional and agent-oriented similarity/difference account proves otherwise. Advocates of practice-based approaches often suggest that imilarity is too restrictive to capture the diversity of scientific models, but the similarity/difference account demonstrates that this concern only applies to a radically naturalized concept of similarity. As part of an agent-oriented account, a non-naturalized concept of similarity can be flexible enough to capture the full range of scientific models. Combining a diachronic approach with the similarity relation usually associated with static approaches results in an account that can circumvent the issues usually associated with either diachronic approaches or similarity alone.