Based on the domestic model of law, many assume that the global rule of law requires a world government with a central law-making body, a hierarchical court system, and a supranational system of coercive enforcement. Since there are important problems with the practicality and desirability of a world government, I defend a decentralized conception of the global rule of law without a world government. I begin by examining Immanuel Kant’s theory since he argued that a supreme sovereign is required for a lawful condition within states while recognizing certain limitations with applying this idea to the international level. I argue that Kant proposed a voluntary league of states without coercive public law in part because a supreme coercive authority at the global level would conflict with the sovereignty of nation-states and undermine the civil condition within states. In Chapter Two, I argue that theories of dispersed or shared sovereignty can resolve this problem. However, since there are further problems with even a federal world government, I consider whether the rule of law can be developed without a world government. I argue that the most important feature for the global rule of law is the impartial determination, interpretation and application of international law by various authoritative adjudicative and administrative institutions. There are two important challenges to my view. First, many argue that international law is not really “law” unless it is effectively enforced through a central system of sanctions; without this, it can at most create moral obligations but not true legal obligations. To the extent that such arguments assume a coercion-based conception of law, my response draws on H.L.A. Hart’s rejection of the command theory of law. The second challenge concerns democratic legitimacy. I argue that global administrative law can partly address concerns with legitimacy by using rule of law principles to limit the arbitrary exercise of power by transnational institutions and increase their accountability.

Aristotle famously claims that we become virtuous by performing virtuous actions. He also recognizes the potential puzzle this claim gives rise to: How can we perform virtuous actions unless we are already virtuous? After all, virtuous actions require virtuous motives – they are performed “for the sake of the noble” – and virtuous motives characteristically belong to virtuous people. Many modern commentators presume that Aristotle’s solution rests upon characterizing the actions of learners as actions that are the right things to do in the circumstances but are not done with virtuous motivation. But this leaves Aristotle with the problem of bridging what I call “the moral upbringing gap” – i.e. the gap between the motivationally-neutral actions of learners and the dispositions to act reliably from a virtuous motive that such actions are supposed to produce. This gap emerges because the weaker the link between the way in which the actions of learners are performed and the way in which virtuous actions are done by virtuous agents, the more difficult it will be to understand how the repeated performance of the learners’ actions produce genuinely virtuous dispositions. The main aim of this thesis is to show that (and how) shame plays a crucial role in the process of moral development as the moral emotion that provides continuity between the actions of the learners of virtue and the corresponding dispositions that those actions eventually yield. My view is that Aristotle understands shame not as mere fear of external disapproval, nor as mere tendency to find pleasure in the noble, but as an emotion responsive to praise and blame and consequently to considerations about the nobility and shamefulness of one’s own actions and one’s character. Understood this way, shame provides learners with the sort of motivation that allows them to perform genuinely virtuous actions before they have acquired practical wisdom and the stable dispositions characteristic of virtuous agents. Shame thus bridges the “moral upbringing gap” by providing the kind of motivation that, when entrenched by understanding, constitutes moral virtue.

The philosophical discussion of conceptual content and linguistic meaning in the 20th century has been dominated by two contrasting approaches - the descriptive-internalist approach, and the causal-externalist approach. Recent semantic models, for example the two-dimensional semantics of Jackson and Chalmers, attempt to integrate these two approaches. In this dissertation I explore a series of puzzles that highlight points at which the resources of these two approaches combined fall short. Particularly, the dissertation is an argument for the claim that facts about a linguistic community can affect the conceptual and linguistic content of individual members of that community, developing insights of theorists such as Quine, Wittgenstein, Kripke, Lewis and Davidson. The study proceeds along two lines simultaneously, as an investigation into puzzles concerning conceptual content on the one hand, and concerning linguistic meaning on the other. The centerpiece of the investigation into linguistic meaning is a proposal for an irreducibly social aspect of linguistic meaning, which I call the ‘public content’ of linguistic terms. This proposal is motivated by the identification of some points at which neither individualist models of linguistic meaning nor the ‘social’ models of meaning currently available give convincing accounts. Drawing on recent developments in social epistemology, I argue that this aspect of meaning is determined by what speakers engaged in discourse would agree on under an ideal process of collective reasoning as the meaning of the terms they use. In the last chapter I attempt to reconcile this model of meaning with the two-dimensional semantic model, arguing for a three-dimensional model of meaning that includes internal, external, and public dimensions. Alongside the discussion of linguistic meaning I explore a series of related puzzles that arise for conceptual content, particularly a new puzzle of referential indeterminacy, and the problem of conceptual error or normativity. I propose and defend solutions to these puzzles that lean heavily on the rational resources of individuals, focusing on the ‘personal level’ contents of thought to resolve puzzles in this domain, and rejecting models that lean on ‘sub-personal’ states such as neuronal, historical, or dispositional states of thinkers.

In this dissertation, I lay the foundations for the development of a unique ethical theory, titled “Ethical Harmonism,” on the basis of the early Confucian Xunzi’s thought. First, I attempt to understand Xunzi’s fundamental ethical position centered on his thought of the ideal state for humans. Second, I explore the nature of two attitudes that one should develop in order to create and maintain the ideal state for humans. Xunzi’s ethical position is characterized primarily in terms of “the final good” that it requires one to seek to attain. For Xunzi, the final good is a certain holistic state that every human has reason to create and maintain cooperatively, namely what I call “harmony.” Harmony is the ideal state in which all humans form a well-unified whole in such a way that they interact with one another by properly recognizing various kinds of persons and by appropriately responding to each kind. I also provide a preliminary reconstruction of Xunzi’s view by raising questions concerning whether his holistic view can reasonably accommodate part of contemporary individualistic ethical sentiments, especially, that associated with such a notion as human rights. This reconstruction is intended to serve to develop “Ethical Harmonism,” which is a working-label for the most defensible Xunzian position that is currently in the development stage. For Xunzi, the creation and maintenance of harmony depend on all humans’ proper development of two attitudes, qin (love) and zun (respect). For Xunzi, all humans should control their naturally unlimited desire by cultivating love and respect; and, by adopting these two attitudes in interaction with one another, they can jointly bring about harmony in society. I develop theories of these two attitudes especially by clarifying how each of the two attitudes is understood as a distinctive way of responding to certain kinds of person. I further explain how these two attitudes work cooperatively in ways that promote harmony. My study will provide a new systematic interpretation of two central concepts in Confucian ethics that are grounded in love and respect, namely ren (widely translated as humanness) and yi (widely translated as righteousness).

This dissertation examines a particular quality of emotion experience that has received little attention in contemporary philosophical and psychological studies of the emotions. This is inversely proportional to the significant attention it receives in literature. I will refer to it as poignancy. Poignant emotions, such as nostalgia and the lyrical feelings pervasive in poetry, are emotions about time’s passage, or the fleetingness of things. My inquiry concerns the normative evaluation of such emotion experiences. Episodes of nostalgia and lyrical emotions are typically experienced as profound while they last, but they are also notoriously apt to be dismissed as sentimental, even by those who feel their pull. Sentimentality is a term of censure that exclusively targets emotions and emotionality; if an emotion is sentimental, then something about it is supposed to be false and wrong. But what are the merits of this charge against poignant emotions? When one has a nostalgic or lyrical emotion episode and reproaches oneself for being sentimental, who is correct—the person in the first moment, convinced by the emotion, or the person in the next, who doubts or retracts it? To adjudicate these disputes, we must turn to what I call the standard model of emotion evaluation that has emerged in the philosophy of emotions. This is a normative apparatus that enjoys wide consensus, but it has been built to evaluate the standard stock of examples in the literature, such as fear. Its application to nonstandard cases has not been undertaken. A major task of this dissertation is therefore to analyze poignant emotions in such a way that renders them evaluable on this model. However, once these analyses are in place, it turns out that the normative evaluation of poignant emotions yields surprising conclusions. In spite of their stigmatization, nostalgic aestheticizations of the past are much less vulnerable to the charge of sentimentality than commonly assumed. And lyrical feelings about the fleetingness of things are almost entirely immune to the charge, in a way that risks undermining our critical discourse about such emotion experiences.

One of the fundamental insights of Kants ethical theory is that moral requirements cannot follow from our understanding of motivational capacities. Ethics must precede psychology. But Kant also believes we can learn new things about what we are capable of from ethics, in particular what it would be like to act out of respect for the moral law. This is the task of Kants moral psychology. It must explain how practical reason can, in place of desire, serve as an incentive for action. I argue that Kants psychology of the moral incentive plays a crucial, but often ignored, role in his project of moral justification. While our view of human motivational capacities cannot dictate our understanding of moral requirements, we must still show how those requirements become effective in human conduct. That is, we must show how they enter into the structure of human motivation. The challenge for Kants moral psychology is to explain this. The trouble is that the relationship between practical reason and human sensibility is so puzzling that we may begin to doubt their connection. So we face a problem the problem of motivational skepticism. My dissertation is organized into two parts. First, I argue that Kants project of moral justification in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) fails because it does not specify the psychological conditions required for moral action (PART I). Part of the problem is that Kant thought he could only explain these conditions in causal terms. In the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) Kant abandons this assumption and develops a new analysis of the influence practical reason has on feeling. Secondly, I show that this analysis is meant to address a skeptical worry left unresolved in the Groundwork, namely, the worry that our will may be unfit for morality (PART II). By showing how we are capable of moral sensibility, then, I argue that the second Critique develops a powerful response to skepticism about moral motivation. / PhD

Walter Benjamin persistently refers to Leibniz’s monad, from his doctoral dissertation (1919), to his last written work, the theses ‘On the Concept of History’ (1940). This dissertation argues that the systematic intent of Benjamin’s early work (1916–1928) can be brought out most clearly by examining Benjamin’s appropriation of Leibnizian metaphysics. The task of this dissertation is to interpret Benjamin’s Leibniz, and to follow the gestures of his text. Benjamin was not interested in presenting a scholarly interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy. Leibniz’s monad had a unique significance for Benjamin’s own philosophical project. In his early work, this project was to determine a method for the philosophical interpretation of art. The core of my dissertation distills what could be called Benjamin’s ‘aesthetic theory.’ According to Benjamin, works of art do not express their truth-content discursively; rather, they express an idea in a configuration of material detail. I argue that Benjamin draws on a Leibnizian concept of expression. One thing expresses another if it preserves the same logical relationships as that which it represents. According to Benjamin, an idea is the most adequate expression of a work: it preserves the configuration of a work’s material content, and represents this configuration (or “constellation” in Benjamin’s terms) in the nexus of predicates in a ‘complete individual concept,’ or idea. The second aspect of this argument is more applied in its focus: Benjamin’s Habilitation thesis describes an elective affinity between Leibniz’s monadic metaphysics and the Baroque Trauerspiel. Benjamin’s analysis of the Baroque dramas and his interpretation of Leibniz are mutually illuminating. The point that legitimates this comparison is not only historical, as both are products of the seventeenth century, but can also be presented as an idea. Both Leibniz’s metaphysics and the Baroque Trauerspiel are engaged in the secularization of history. My argument proceeds in five chapters. In Chapter One, I trace the historical sources of Benjamin’s interpretation of Leibniz. In Chapters Two, Three, and Four, I discuss Benjamin’s monadic theory of ideas. Finally, in Chapter Five, I address Benjamin’s response to Schmitt’s Political Theology. The Epilogue to this dissertation is a reading of Hamlet, which was, in Benjamin’s view, the Baroque Trauerspiel, par excellence. Hamlet’s world is a self-enclosed totality, or monad.

Walter Benjamin persistently refers to Leibniz’s monad, from his doctoral dissertation (1919), to his last written work, the theses ‘On the Concept of History’ (1940). This dissertation argues that the systematic intent of Benjamin’s early work (1916–1928) can be brought out most clearly by examining Benjamin’s appropriation of Leibnizian metaphysics. The task of this dissertation is to interpret Benjamin’s Leibniz, and to follow the gestures of his text. Benjamin was not interested in presenting a scholarly interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy. Leibniz’s monad had a unique significance for Benjamin’s own philosophical project. In his early work, this project was to determine a method for the philosophical interpretation of art. The core of my dissertation distills what could be called Benjamin’s ‘aesthetic theory.’ According to Benjamin, works of art do not express their truth-content discursively; rather, they express an idea in a configuration of material detail. I argue that Benjamin draws on a Leibnizian concept of expression. One thing expresses another if it preserves the same logical relationships as that which it represents. According to Benjamin, an idea is the most adequate expression of a work: it preserves the configuration of a work’s material content, and represents this configuration (or “constellation” in Benjamin’s terms) in the nexus of predicates in a ‘complete individual concept,’ or idea. The second aspect of this argument is more applied in its focus: Benjamin’s Habilitation thesis describes an elective affinity between Leibniz’s monadic metaphysics and the Baroque Trauerspiel. Benjamin’s analysis of the Baroque dramas and his interpretation of Leibniz are mutually illuminating. The point that legitimates this comparison is not only historical, as both are products of the seventeenth century, but can also be presented as an idea. Both Leibniz’s metaphysics and the Baroque Trauerspiel are engaged in the secularization of history. My argument proceeds in five chapters. In Chapter One, I trace the historical sources of Benjamin’s interpretation of Leibniz. In Chapters Two, Three, and Four, I discuss Benjamin’s monadic theory of ideas. Finally, in Chapter Five, I address Benjamin’s response to Schmitt’s Political Theology. The Epilogue to this dissertation is a reading of Hamlet, which was, in Benjamin’s view, the Baroque Trauerspiel, par excellence. Hamlet’s world is a self-enclosed totality, or monad.

Agent-centered restrictions are widely accepted both in commonsense morality and across social and legal institutions, making it all the more striking that we have yet to ground them in a compelling theoretical rationale. This dissertation amounts to an effort to fill that gap by seeking out a new principled basis for justifying such constraints. I devote each of the first three chapters, respectively, to the three established deontological normative ethical theories: Rossian intuitionism, Kantianism, and Neo-Thomism. In each of these chapters, I lay out the relevant portion of the view’s deontological apparatus, analyzing it both for its plausibility as a whole and for its ability to justify constraints of the appropriate shape. After assessing and rejecting all three approaches, I devote the next two chapters to developing a new rationale for grounding constraints—one that avoids the pitfalls indicated in the prominent historical alternatives. Specifically, I anchor constraints in the distinction between the agent-neutral and agent-relative points of view, basing them in the widely accepted psychological fact of the natural independence of the personal point of view.

In his influential essay “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Donald Davidson argues that we cannot make sense of conceptual relativism, the doctrine that there could be incommensurably different systems of concepts applicable to a single world. According to Davidson, there is no criterion of identity for language that does not imply or presuppose the possibility that we interpret that language by means of our own language. Given some plausible assumptions, this implies that there is at most one conceptual scheme, one way of interpreting or representing the world. But then the very idea of a conceptual scheme is empty. The dissertation is an examination of Davidson’s reasoning, and a defence of a different position regarding conceptual relativism. I reject much of Davidson’s argumentation, and his radical (subordinate) conclusion that we would be able, at least in principle, to make sense of any language. Languages that we would be unable to translate or interpret, even in principle, are at least logically possible, in my view. However, this possibility should not be thought to imply or encourage conceptual relativism. In this respect, I think that Davidson and many of his critics have conflated the notion of a difference in conceptual scheme, which requires incommensurability between languages or systems of concepts, and mere conceptual difference. I argue that a genuinely alternative conceptual scheme would be associated with language unintelligible to us because of its relation to our language. For what is at issue, supposedly, is a conceptual relation: a relation between languages, not a relation between speakers, or their capacities, on the one hand, and languages, on the other. I try to show how some of Davidson’s arguments, suitably modified, can be deployed against the possibility of an alternative scheme, so understood, and provide some additional arguments of my own. My position is thus significantly weaker than Davidson’s: there could not be languages that we would be unable to interpret because they are incommensurable with our own.