This project is a critique of the connection between lethal violence and justice within Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Our critique focuses on three specific moments—moments that Derrida touches upon in Glas, but does not address in detail—namely, heroic vengeance, execution and warfare. By subjecting each of these moments to a close reading we will be calling into question the very possibility of an act of violence that can lay claim to being absolutely ‘necessary’ or ‘just’ either within its specific historical moment or from beyond it. The theoretical basis of the project closely parallels Jacques Derrida’s work on Hegel, in that it stems from a deconstruction of the connection between epistemology and ontology. This also has serious implications for the question of ethics. By tracing the play of différance through the semeiological structure of both theoretical and practical cognition Derrida’s work makes it possible to address the ethical implications of speculative dialectics from a non-dialectical angle. Figuratively speaking, the relationship between theoretical and practical cognition can be thought of as the relationship between reading and writing. As such, the title of the project is to be taken as a figurative reference to the connection between theoretical (i.e. reading) and practical (i.e. writing) cognition and by extension to the connection between epistemology, ontology and ethics. Addressed in this manner our project begins by tracing the silence (i.e. the ‘a’ of différance) that is, at one and the same time, a condition of the possibility and impossibility of meaning. This silence has serious ramifications for Hegel’s political philosophy. Hegel’s system sets out to ground the law within the ‘positive’ infinity of the Concept [Begriff] and thus, close the circle of philosophy. This project will attempt to expose the ethical stakes—and the ultimate impossibility—of Hegel’s ‘positive’ infinity by taking up the thread of lethal violence in the Philosophy of Right.

Agent-centered restrictions are widely accepted both in commonsense morality and across social and legal institutions, making it all the more striking that we have yet to ground them in a compelling theoretical rationale. This dissertation amounts to an effort to fill that gap by seeking out a new principled basis for justifying such constraints. I devote each of the first three chapters, respectively, to the three established deontological normative ethical theories: Rossian intuitionism, Kantianism, and Neo-Thomism. In each of these chapters, I lay out the relevant portion of the view’s deontological apparatus, analyzing it both for its plausibility as a whole and for its ability to justify constraints of the appropriate shape. After assessing and rejecting all three approaches, I devote the next two chapters to developing a new rationale for grounding constraints—one that avoids the pitfalls indicated in the prominent historical alternatives. Specifically, I anchor constraints in the distinction between the agent-neutral and agent-relative points of view, basing them in the widely accepted psychological fact of the natural independence of the personal point of view.

This thesis examines the possibility of applying the concept of interest to public urban land use system planning, although it is not intended that the idea should be limited to urban planning. The concept is considered in detail, as is the question of who can have interests. The conclusion on that is that individuals and the public are the only true categories of interest holders, although interest groups need to be recognised for practical reasons. Corporations and governments cannot be true interest holders. The application of the concept was assessed in relation to the subject-matter of urban land use planning, and a typical land use planning process. The possibility of applying it to a hypothetical system of planning using the pragmatic method was also considered. The final part looked at the ‘institutions’ of planning, that is, law, politics, professional planning, administration, and administrative tribunals, to see how they would likely relate to a planning system based on the use of the concept of interest. The conclusion was that there would be no insurmountable difficulties even If not all of these institutions would readily embrace the concept. The idea was found to be plausible in so far as a comprehensive theory of interest-based urban land use planning was able to be worked out. By considering practical issues throughout, a strong presumption was raised that it would be feasible, although testing and further development of the idea would be necessary. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed method were reviewed. The expected benefits were ensuring that public urban land use system planning was humanistic, and providing a concept, or theme, around which a comprehensive theory of such planning could be constructed. Likely areas of difficulty were misunderstanding due to the lack of agreement on the meaning of the concept, although the meaning that should be adopted for the proposed purpose was spelt out. Secondly, a conservative attitude towards the use of concepts other than interest in planning and related disciplines could cause resistance to the adoption of the proposed method. It was shown how the idea is largely novel, but that recently there has been increasing use of the concept of interest in the land use planning literature. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

This thesis examines the possibility of applying the concept of interest to public urban land use system planning, although it is not intended that the idea should be limited to urban planning. The concept is considered in detail, as is the question of who can have interests. The conclusion on that is that individuals and the public are the only true categories of interest holders, although interest groups need to be recognised for practical reasons. Corporations and governments cannot be true interest holders. The application of the concept was assessed in relation to the subject-matter of urban land use planning, and a typical land use planning process. The possibility of applying it to a hypothetical system of planning using the pragmatic method was also considered. The final part looked at the ‘institutions’ of planning, that is, law, politics, professional planning, administration, and administrative tribunals, to see how they would likely relate to a planning system based on the use of the concept of interest. The conclusion was that there would be no insurmountable difficulties even If not all of these institutions would readily embrace the concept. The idea was found to be plausible in so far as a comprehensive theory of interest-based urban land use planning was able to be worked out. By considering practical issues throughout, a strong presumption was raised that it would be feasible, although testing and further development of the idea would be necessary. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed method were reviewed. The expected benefits were ensuring that public urban land use system planning was humanistic, and providing a concept, or theme, around which a comprehensive theory of such planning could be constructed. Likely areas of difficulty were misunderstanding due to the lack of agreement on the meaning of the concept, although the meaning that should be adopted for the proposed purpose was spelt out. Secondly, a conservative attitude towards the use of concepts other than interest in planning and related disciplines could cause resistance to the adoption of the proposed method. It was shown how the idea is largely novel, but that recently there has been increasing use of the concept of interest in the land use planning literature. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

This thesis examines the possibility of applying the concept of interest to public urban land use system planning, although it is not intended that the idea should be limited to urban planning. The concept is considered in detail, as is the question of who can have interests. The conclusion on that is that individuals and the public are the only true categories of interest holders, although interest groups need to be recognised for practical reasons. Corporations and governments cannot be true interest holders. The application of the concept was assessed in relation to the subject-matter of urban land use planning, and a typical land use planning process. The possibility of applying it to a hypothetical system of planning using the pragmatic method was also considered. The final part looked at the ‘institutions’ of planning, that is, law, politics, professional planning, administration, and administrative tribunals, to see how they would likely relate to a planning system based on the use of the concept of interest. The conclusion was that there would be no insurmountable difficulties even If not all of these institutions would readily embrace the concept. The idea was found to be plausible in so far as a comprehensive theory of interest-based urban land use planning was able to be worked out. By considering practical issues throughout, a strong presumption was raised that it would be feasible, although testing and further development of the idea would be necessary. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed method were reviewed. The expected benefits were ensuring that public urban land use system planning was humanistic, and providing a concept, or theme, around which a comprehensive theory of such planning could be constructed. Likely areas of difficulty were misunderstanding due to the lack of agreement on the meaning of the concept, although the meaning that should be adopted for the proposed purpose was spelt out. Secondly, a conservative attitude towards the use of concepts other than interest in planning and related disciplines could cause resistance to the adoption of the proposed method. It was shown how the idea is largely novel, but that recently there has been increasing use of the concept of interest in the land use planning literature. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

This thesis examines the possibility of applying the concept of interest to public urban land use system planning, although it is not intended that the idea should be limited to urban planning. The concept is considered in detail, as is the question of who can have interests. The conclusion on that is that individuals and the public are the only true categories of interest holders, although interest groups need to be recognised for practical reasons. Corporations and governments cannot be true interest holders. The application of the concept was assessed in relation to the subject-matter of urban land use planning, and a typical land use planning process. The possibility of applying it to a hypothetical system of planning using the pragmatic method was also considered. The final part looked at the ‘institutions’ of planning, that is, law, politics, professional planning, administration, and administrative tribunals, to see how they would likely relate to a planning system based on the use of the concept of interest. The conclusion was that there would be no insurmountable difficulties even If not all of these institutions would readily embrace the concept. The idea was found to be plausible in so far as a comprehensive theory of interest-based urban land use planning was able to be worked out. By considering practical issues throughout, a strong presumption was raised that it would be feasible, although testing and further development of the idea would be necessary. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed method were reviewed. The expected benefits were ensuring that public urban land use system planning was humanistic, and providing a concept, or theme, around which a comprehensive theory of such planning could be constructed. Likely areas of difficulty were misunderstanding due to the lack of agreement on the meaning of the concept, although the meaning that should be adopted for the proposed purpose was spelt out. Secondly, a conservative attitude towards the use of concepts other than interest in planning and related disciplines could cause resistance to the adoption of the proposed method. It was shown how the idea is largely novel, but that recently there has been increasing use of the concept of interest in the land use planning literature. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

This thesis examines the possibility of applying the concept of interest to public urban land use system planning, although it is not intended that the idea should be limited to urban planning. The concept is considered in detail, as is the question of who can have interests. The conclusion on that is that individuals and the public are the only true categories of interest holders, although interest groups need to be recognised for practical reasons. Corporations and governments cannot be true interest holders. The application of the concept was assessed in relation to the subject-matter of urban land use planning, and a typical land use planning process. The possibility of applying it to a hypothetical system of planning using the pragmatic method was also considered. The final part looked at the ‘institutions’ of planning, that is, law, politics, professional planning, administration, and administrative tribunals, to see how they would likely relate to a planning system based on the use of the concept of interest. The conclusion was that there would be no insurmountable difficulties even If not all of these institutions would readily embrace the concept. The idea was found to be plausible in so far as a comprehensive theory of interest-based urban land use planning was able to be worked out. By considering practical issues throughout, a strong presumption was raised that it would be feasible, although testing and further development of the idea would be necessary. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed method were reviewed. The expected benefits were ensuring that public urban land use system planning was humanistic, and providing a concept, or theme, around which a comprehensive theory of such planning could be constructed. Likely areas of difficulty were misunderstanding due to the lack of agreement on the meaning of the concept, although the meaning that should be adopted for the proposed purpose was spelt out. Secondly, a conservative attitude towards the use of concepts other than interest in planning and related disciplines could cause resistance to the adoption of the proposed method. It was shown how the idea is largely novel, but that recently there has been increasing use of the concept of interest in the land use planning literature. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

The TaRYaG count, that is the traditional enumeration of the 613 commandments contained in the five Mosaic books (Torah), has gained a prominent place in Judaism. The count is based on a dictum found in the Babylonian Talmud and attributed to R. Simlai, a Palestinian rabbi of the late third century. No one did more to see this count achieve the importance it has than Moses Maimonides, the prominent 12th-century Jewish philosopher and perhaps the most important post-talmudic jurist of all times. M. offered an impressive methodology, made up of rules of individuation, identification and interpretation - in all, fourteen rules - to support his proposed enumerative scheme and used it to critique all previous such attempts. By his own account, Maimonides undertook this project with the sole aim to provide a comprehensive outline for his upcoming Code of Jewish Law. This thesis demonstrates the enormous difficulties inherent in such a project - difficulties that could not have passed unnoticed by such an accomplished author - and seeks to uncover any other reason or reasons that may have prompted him to adopt such a constraining count. The thesis concludes by speculating that Maimonides may have found it convenient to use the TaRYaG scheme in order to introduce into the list of commandments the beliefs in the existence of God and in His unity - beliefs that had previously not been considered commandments. An ancillary product of the dissertation is the discovery that many of the commandment designations proposed in the enumerative scheme are abandoned in the Halakhot, a discovery that was noted, albeit only partially, by less than a handful of scholars over the past eight hundred and fifty years. The dissertation examines the proposed solutions and rejects them on a number of counts. A systematic analysis of these occurrences suggests a more consistent solution and reveals an aspect of Maimonides that has not been sufficiently appreciated, Maimonides the exegete and legal philosopher. The agenda-oriented research also examines some of the important innovations contained in M’s list of positive commandments, the hermeneutics behind them and the politico-philosophical ideas that may have informed them.

Medical decisions should be based on good evidence. But this does not mean that health care professionals should practice evidence-based medicine. This dissertation explores how these two positions come apart, why they come apart, and what we should do about it. I begin by answering the descriptive question, what are current standards of evidence in medicine? I then provide a detailed critique of these standards. Finally, I address the more difficult normative question, how should we determine standards of evidence in medicine? In medicine, standards of evidence have been established by the pervasive evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement. Until now, these standards have not been subjected to comprehensive philosophical scrutiny. I outline and defend a theory of knowledge – a version of Helen Longino’s Critical Contextual Empiricism (CCE) – which enables me to critically evaluate EBM. My version of CCE emphasizes the critical evaluation of background assumptions. In accordance with this, I identify and critically evaluate the three substantive assumptions underlying EBM. First, I argue that medicine should not be held to the restrictive definition of science assumed by proponents of EBM. Second, I argue that epidemiological evidence should not be the only “base” of medical decisions. Third, I argue that not only is the particular hierarchy of evidence assumed by EBM unjustified, but that any attempt to hierarchically rank research methods is incoherent and unjustifiably restricts medical knowledge. Current standards of evidence divert attention from many legitimate sources of evidence. This distorts medical research and practice. In the remainder of the dissertation I propose means for improving not only current standards of medical evidence but also the process of producing and defending future standards. On the basis of four CCE norms, I argue that we have reason to protect and promote those features of the medical community that facilitate diversity, transparency, and critical interaction. Only then can we ensure that the medical community retains its ability to produce evidence that is both rigorous and relevant to practice.

I defend a version of cognitivist motivational internalism which I call belief internalism. The constitutive claim of any version of cognitivist motivational internalism is that moral belief entails motivation. But, while this internalist thesis captures the practical nature of morality, it is in tension with the dominantly held Humean theory of motivation. The constitutive claim of the Humean thesis is that no belief could entail motivation. In defence of this internalist it is tempting to argue either that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus. But, while succumbing to the first temptation places one under an ultimately insurmountable burden to justify the motivational exceptionality of moral beliefs, succumbing to the second temptation saddles one with a thesis that fails to do justice to the practical nature of morality. I avoid the temptation to defend this thesis in either of these flawed ways by defending a more radical departure from the Humean theory of motivation. I avoid the first temptation by arguing for a motivationally efficacious conception of belief. I start the defence by demonstrating that it is conceptually coherent for belief to entail motivation. I then argue that all beliefs have behavioural dispositional properties that are not predicated on desire; in particular, all beliefs can motivate assent without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. I then develop a unified and inclusive account of cognitive motivation, according to which unqualified normative cognition—which includes moral cognition—motivates normative actions without the assistance of such a desire. Beliefs of the form ‘I ought to ф’, in other words, motivate the believer to ф. I avoid the second temptation by arguing that moral belief motivates simpliciter as opposed to ceteris paribus. There are, however, both commonsense and scientifically informed counterexamples which prima facie demonstrate that it is possible to both fully believe and fully understand one’s first person cognitive moral judgement and yet not motivated by that judgement. I argue that the commonsense prima facie counterexamples are not decisive; and I argue that the scientifically informed prima facie counterexamples misinterpret the empirical research on salient psychological conditions.