Many political theorists agree that an equal distribution of certain goods is a requirement of justice. However, they disagree about the types of agents that possess these distributive obligations, and about the range of agents who owe these obligations to each other. Are states primarily responsible for ensuring a just distribution of income? Or, is distributive justice also the responsibility of private individuals? Do agents – whether states or individuals – possess distributive obligations to foreigners? Or, is distributive justice only a requirement within national borders? I argue that the primary subject of distributive justice is the state’s relation to its citizens. States, and not private individuals, possess distributive obligations; and states only possess these obligations to their citizens, not to foreigners. I argue first that the state possesses distinctive distributive obligations to its citizens because of the way in which it exercises political authority over them. To exercise its political authority legitimately, that is, in a way that is consistent with the free and equal nature of its citizens, I argue, the state must secure a just distribution of civil liberties, political rights, income, and opportunities. I argue second that the subject of distributive justice does not extend beyond the state’s relation to its citizens. I argue first that principles of distributive justice do not apply to the private choices of citizens on the grounds that justice demands that citizens be free to decide what to do with their lives on the basis of their own conception of the good, and not on the basis of what is best for others. I argue second that because international organizations do not exercise political authority in the same way that states do, equality is not a demand of global justice.

Ce mémoire est consacré au problème de la place de l’herméneutique dans l’œuvre d’Emmanuel Levinas. Au premier abord, l’œuvre semble présenter une forte ambivalence quant à la valeur que le philosophe accorde aux catégories herméneutiques. D’abord, dans les œuvres proprement philosophiques, Levinas présente une critique sévère de la compréhension dans laquelle il décèle un geste de totalisation et d’appropriation du sens contre lequel il élèvera une pensée de l’éthique comme « philosophie première ». D’autre part, un autre pan du corpus levinassien, celui des Lectures talmudiques, est consacré au déploiement d’une herméneutique des textes religieux de la tradition juive où Levinas fait puissamment intervenir les catégories éthiques propres à sa philosophie au sein de son activité exégétique. L’un des paradoxes intéressants que nous présente donc l’œuvre levinassienne est celui d’une philosophie s’érigeant en bonne partie sur une critique de la catégorie centrale de l’herméneutique, la compréhension, et qui ne se décline pas moins elle-même en une théorie de l’interprétation des textes. Afin de résoudre ce paradoxe, il nous faut d’abord exposer la critique de la compréhension qui est consubstantielle au projet philosophique de Levinas. En nous appuyant sur quelques textes centraux de son œuvre, nous expliciterons à la fois le déficit éthique de la compréhension que pointe Levinas et les possibilités de sens au nom desquelles cette critique s’accomplit. Nous verrons ainsi ce qui conduit Levinas à suggérer qu’autrui, en son visage, témoigne d’un sens qui ferait exception à la structure gnoséologique du sensé que suppose l’herméneutique. Dans un deuxième temps, nous tenterons de cerner les raisons qui peuvent légitiment conduire Levinas à faire usage, dans le contexte de son herméneutique talmudique, des « concepts » nés de sa critique de la compréhension. L’étude du rapport entre éthique et herméneutique, entre texte et visage, nous conduira à identifier le principe directeur de l’herméneutique levinassienne et à articuler la façon dont il se rattache à l’éthique du visage. Finalement, nous tenterons de faire valoir la pertinence philosophique de l’herméneutique levinassienne en étudiant la manière dont elle peut rendre compte de phénomènes fondamentaux liés à l’interprétation des textes. / This thesis presents a study about the place of hermeneutics in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. At first glance, the writings of the philosopher seem quite ambiguous concerning the value that ought to be given to hermeneutics. In his strictly philosophical works, Levinas presents a severe critique of understanding (compréhension) which he views as a totalising approach of meaning. Against the reduction of meaning to understanding, Levinas will defend the idea that the structure of meaning is primary ethical, the relationship to the other being the privileged site where the world, the self as well as the idea of God first become meaningful. Nonetheless, in the other part of the levinassian corpus, that of his Talmudic Readings, Levinas develops an hermeneutics of his own using the ethical categories of his major philosophical works and applying them to his exegetical activity. We are then faced with this paradox, inherent to the work of Levinas, of a philosophy which largely develops itself as a critique of the central category of hermeneutics (i.e. comprehension) but which can nonetheless also present itself as a theory of interpretation (i.e. hermeneutics) in a significant portion of Levinas’ writings. Resolving this apparent paradox will necessitate that we first present the philosophical project of Levinas and the critique of hermeneutics which is consubstantial to it. Using a few central texts of the philosopher’s work, we will try to point with precision at the ethical deficit which Levinas sees in hermeneutics and to identify the possibilities of meaning that, according to Levinas, are being left behind by the primacy conferred to comprehension. We will then see what leads Levinas to suggest that the face (visage) of the other bears a meaning that constitute an exception to the hermeneutical structure of meaning which philosophy, at least explicitly since Heidegger, supposes. In a second step, we will attempt to present the reasons that justify Levinas’ use, in his Talmudic Readings, of the ‘concepts’ born out of his critique of comprehension in order to better grasp the unity of his work. The study of the relationship between ethics and hermeneutics, between the text and the face, will lead us to identify the guiding principle of what might be called levinassian hermeneutics and to articulate how it relates to the ethics of the face. Finally, we will attempt to assert the relevance of the ‘‘philosophical hermeneutics’’ of Levinas by presenting how it can account for two fundamental phenomena related to interpretation, namely the mode through which the subject enters into relation with a text and the individuation of the subject taking part in this relation.

The growing sophistication of version control systems, a class of tools employed in tracking and managing changes to documents, has had a transformative impact on the practice of programming. In recent years great strides have been made to improve these systems, but certain stubborn difficulties remain. For example, merging of concurrently introduced changes continues to be a labour-intensive and error-prone process. This thesis examines these difficulties by way of a critique of the conceptual framework underlying modern version control systems, arguing that many of their shortcomings are related to certain long-standing, open problems around identity. The research presented here casts light on how the challenges faced by users and designers of version control systems can be understood in those terms, ultimately arguing that future progress may benefit from a better understanding of the role of identity, representation, reference, and meaning in these systems and in computing in general.

This study engages a network of music, myth, and metaphysics within late-ancient and twelfth-century music theory and cosmology. It traces the development, expansion, and demise of a (natural-)philosophical harmonic speculation that stems largely from an a priori commitment to a harmonic cosmology with its deepest roots in Plato’s Timaeus. It argues that music theory not only allowed twelfth-century thinkers to conceptualize the fabric of the universe, but it also provided a hermeneutic tool for interpreting the ancient and late-ancient texts that offered detailed theories of the world’s construction. The twin goals of this study are thus philosophical and musicological: firstly and philosophically, to analyze and re-assert the importance of musical speculation in the writings of the self-styled physici, who probed the physical world and its metaphysical foundations during the ‘Twelfth-Century Renaissance’; secondly and musicologically, to document the sources and scope of this musical speculation and to situate it within the larger tradition of ‘speculative music theory.’ The first part of the thesis (chapters one and two) disentangles the knotty question of sources for and connections between the late-ancient texts (by Calcidius, Macrobius, and Boethius) that form the background of twelfth-century thought, and it sketches the proper domain of musical thought by tracing the expansion of music’s role in quadrivial and natural-philosophical contexts from late-ancient encyclopedism though various twelfth-century divisiones scientiae. The second part of the thesis (chapters three through five) assembles and analyzes the direct evidence for twelfth-century harmonic theory. These chapters, heuristically organized around the Boethian tripartition of music, present an anagogic ascent per aspera ad astra. Chapter three (musica instrumentalis) highlights the occasional and perhaps surprising employ of practical, technical music theory in cosmological contexts, and focuses on the epistemological foundations of hearing and the ontological status granted to the sonorous ‘objects’ of hearing. Chapter four (musica humana) targets the anthropological, psychological, and ethical implications of musical relations in and between body and soul. Finally, chapter five (musica mundana) outlines the cosmological framework, the anima mundi in particular, that underpins the concordant machinations of the machina mundi in all its manifestations.

This project seeks to critically examine the hegemony and imperialism of liberal-democratic modernity, and the possibilities for forms of politics that are rooted in subaltern difference. I argue that one of the great challenges in resisting the hegemony of liberal-democracy is that it offers a broad family of both conservative and progressive/critical languages that can be adopted and used by elite and subordinate groups alike. The availability of critical or dissenting languages that are internal to liberal-democracy often entices subordinate groups to make use of them, but this only furthers the subalternization of other distinct normative or practical traditions. I aim to articulate an alternative form of politics that remains rooted in subaltern difference, and is not simply based on an internal or immanent critique of liberal-democracy. This is a type of ethico-politics that seeks to actualize subaltern goods and traditions in its very practice or way of life, and to build its forms of resistance and transformation upon this practice. This dissertation (a) explores some of the key features of this kind of subaltern ethico-politics; (b) examines the ways in which contemporary modes of postcolonial and political thought, especially those with critical or emancipatory intent, often serve to contain and/or efface this form of subaltern praxis; and (c) addresses some of the broader questions and challenges this praxis poses for resistance to imperialism and coalition-building among diverse social movements today.

This study engages a network of music, myth, and metaphysics within late-ancient and twelfth-century music theory and cosmology. It traces the development, expansion, and demise of a (natural-)philosophical harmonic speculation that stems largely from an a priori commitment to a harmonic cosmology with its deepest roots in Plato’s Timaeus. It argues that music theory not only allowed twelfth-century thinkers to conceptualize the fabric of the universe, but it also provided a hermeneutic tool for interpreting the ancient and late-ancient texts that offered detailed theories of the world’s construction. The twin goals of this study are thus philosophical and musicological: firstly and philosophically, to analyze and re-assert the importance of musical speculation in the writings of the self-styled physici, who probed the physical world and its metaphysical foundations during the ‘Twelfth-Century Renaissance’; secondly and musicologically, to document the sources and scope of this musical speculation and to situate it within the larger tradition of ‘speculative music theory.’ The first part of the thesis (chapters one and two) disentangles the knotty question of sources for and connections between the late-ancient texts (by Calcidius, Macrobius, and Boethius) that form the background of twelfth-century thought, and it sketches the proper domain of musical thought by tracing the expansion of music’s role in quadrivial and natural-philosophical contexts from late-ancient encyclopedism though various twelfth-century divisiones scientiae. The second part of the thesis (chapters three through five) assembles and analyzes the direct evidence for twelfth-century harmonic theory. These chapters, heuristically organized around the Boethian tripartition of music, present an anagogic ascent per aspera ad astra. Chapter three (musica instrumentalis) highlights the occasional and perhaps surprising employ of practical, technical music theory in cosmological contexts, and focuses on the epistemological foundations of hearing and the ontological status granted to the sonorous ‘objects’ of hearing. Chapter four (musica humana) targets the anthropological, psychological, and ethical implications of musical relations in and between body and soul. Finally, chapter five (musica mundana) outlines the cosmological framework, the anima mundi in particular, that underpins the concordant machinations of the machina mundi in all its manifestations.

This project seeks to critically examine the hegemony and imperialism of liberal-democratic modernity, and the possibilities for forms of politics that are rooted in subaltern difference. I argue that one of the great challenges in resisting the hegemony of liberal-democracy is that it offers a broad family of both conservative and progressive/critical languages that can be adopted and used by elite and subordinate groups alike. The availability of critical or dissenting languages that are internal to liberal-democracy often entices subordinate groups to make use of them, but this only furthers the subalternization of other distinct normative or practical traditions. I aim to articulate an alternative form of politics that remains rooted in subaltern difference, and is not simply based on an internal or immanent critique of liberal-democracy. This is a type of ethico-politics that seeks to actualize subaltern goods and traditions in its very practice or way of life, and to build its forms of resistance and transformation upon this practice. This dissertation (a) explores some of the key features of this kind of subaltern ethico-politics; (b) examines the ways in which contemporary modes of postcolonial and political thought, especially those with critical or emancipatory intent, often serve to contain and/or efface this form of subaltern praxis; and (c) addresses some of the broader questions and challenges this praxis poses for resistance to imperialism and coalition-building among diverse social movements today.

Measurement is an indispensable part of physical science as well as of commerce, industry, and daily life. Measuring activities appear unproblematic when performed with familiar instruments such as thermometers and clocks, but a closer examination reveals a host of epistemological questions, including: 1. How is it possible to tell whether an instrument measures the quantity it is intended to? 2. What do claims to measurement accuracy amount to, and how might such claims be justified? 3. When is disagreement among instruments a sign of error, and when does it imply that instruments measure different quantities? Currently, these questions are almost completely ignored by philosophers of science, who view them as methodological concerns to be settled by scientists. This dissertation shows that these questions are not only philosophically worthy, but that their exploration has the potential to challenge fundamental assumptions in philosophy of science, including the distinction between measurement and prediction. The thesis outlines a model-based epistemology of physical measurement and uses it to address the questions above. To measure, I argue, is to estimate the value of a parameter in an idealized model of a physical process. Such estimation involves inference from the final state (‘indication’) of a process to the value range of a parameter (‘outcome’) in light of theoretical and statistical assumptions. Idealizations are necessary preconditions for the possibility of justifying such inferences. Similarly, claims to accuracy, error and quantity individuation can only be adjudicated against the background of an idealized representation of the measurement process. Chapters 1-3 develop this framework and use it to analyze the inferential structure of standardization procedures performed by contemporary standardization bureaus. Standardizing time, for example, is a matter of constructing idealized models of multiple atomic clocks in a way that allows consistent estimates of duration to be inferred from clock indications. Chapter 4 shows that calibration is a special sort of modeling activity, i.e. the activity of constructing and testing models of measurement processes. Contrary to contemporary philosophical views, the accuracy of measurement outcomes is properly evaluated by comparing model predictions to each other, rather than by comparing observations.

Measurement is an indispensable part of physical science as well as of commerce, industry, and daily life. Measuring activities appear unproblematic when performed with familiar instruments such as thermometers and clocks, but a closer examination reveals a host of epistemological questions, including: 1. How is it possible to tell whether an instrument measures the quantity it is intended to? 2. What do claims to measurement accuracy amount to, and how might such claims be justified? 3. When is disagreement among instruments a sign of error, and when does it imply that instruments measure different quantities? Currently, these questions are almost completely ignored by philosophers of science, who view them as methodological concerns to be settled by scientists. This dissertation shows that these questions are not only philosophically worthy, but that their exploration has the potential to challenge fundamental assumptions in philosophy of science, including the distinction between measurement and prediction. The thesis outlines a model-based epistemology of physical measurement and uses it to address the questions above. To measure, I argue, is to estimate the value of a parameter in an idealized model of a physical process. Such estimation involves inference from the final state (‘indication’) of a process to the value range of a parameter (‘outcome’) in light of theoretical and statistical assumptions. Idealizations are necessary preconditions for the possibility of justifying such inferences. Similarly, claims to accuracy, error and quantity individuation can only be adjudicated against the background of an idealized representation of the measurement process. Chapters 1-3 develop this framework and use it to analyze the inferential structure of standardization procedures performed by contemporary standardization bureaus. Standardizing time, for example, is a matter of constructing idealized models of multiple atomic clocks in a way that allows consistent estimates of duration to be inferred from clock indications. Chapter 4 shows that calibration is a special sort of modeling activity, i.e. the activity of constructing and testing models of measurement processes. Contrary to contemporary philosophical views, the accuracy of measurement outcomes is properly evaluated by comparing model predictions to each other, rather than by comparing observations.

This dissertation examines Leonardo da Vinci’s literary writings, namely those known as the Bestiario, Favole, Facezie, and Profezia, as compelling expressions of how Leonardo envisioned the role and influence of morality in human life. Through an analysis of these four literary collections from the perspective of their genre history, literariness, and philosophical dimension, it aims to bring to light the depth with which Leonardo reflected upon the human condition. The Bestiario, Favole, Facezie, and Profezia are writings that have considerable literary value in their own right but can also be examined in a wider historical, literary, and philosophical context so as to reveal the ethical ideas that they convey. By studying them from a historical perspective, it is possible to contextualize Leonardo’s four collections within the tradition of their respective genres (the bestiary, fable, facetia, and riddle) and thus recognize their adherence as well as contribution to these traditions. The literary context brings to light Leonardo’s intentionality and ingenuity as a writer who uses generic conventions in order to voice his ethical views. Assessed from a philosophical standpoint, these four literary collections prove to be meaningful reflections on the moral state of humanity, thereby justifying the characterization of Leonardo as a moral philosopher. Current scholarship on the Bestiario, Favole, Facezie, and Profezia generally views these writings as minor Leonardo works and treats them as ancillary parts of his production. This dissertation, conceiving Leonardo as a moral philosopher, provides interpretations that lead to the conclusion that his thought pervades both his major and minor works and that these literary writings must be viewed as an extension (and result) of Leonardo’s greater notions of the world and of how all parts relate to one another. The Bestiario, Favole, Facezie, and Profezia are works that deserve greater attention reflecting as they do the thought of this Renaissance man.