My account of thinking, apart from being a piece of analysis in its own right, serves two purposes: (i) It prepares the ground for the later discussion of the relationship between thinking and action. For (a) the activity of answering questions or solving problems ( whether it is primarily reasoning or not) is often necessary before the agent can decide what to do, and (b) if an action is to be rational, it must in principle be capable of being supported by a pattern of expository reasoning which the agent can endorse and give ( whether or not the action is actually preceded by such reasoning or the deliberation which may precede such reasoning). (ii) My account also supports the claim that the activity of thinking is a genuine and indeed central member of the "action-family'1, though it occupies a special position in which it is complementary to other kinds of action. Chapter 1 s Introduction. After considering various possible interpretations of a work with this title, I indicate the issues which I have chosen to discuss ( and which are partly indicated in the previous paragraph), and I add a brief summary of the themes of each chapter. Chapter 2 s Varieties of Thinking. In this general survey of what comes under the label "thought", I draw a number of distinctions, both between thinking as an activity and other things indicated by the verb "to think", and between different kinds of thinking as an activity : of particular significance is the distinction between the two strands in the concept which I note above and their overlap. I argue against the idea that thinking is essentially "private", and in particular against the idea that it consists in a succession of images ( though I note that much thinking has an "experiential" dimension). I also reject the idea that the occurrence, of "thoughts" can, in general, be distinguished from the occurrence or production of words/symbols or images, and the idea that thinking can usefully be regarded as a succession of thoughts. Chapter 5 * Cognition in Absence. I consider briefly Price's approach in Thinking and Experience, namely, that thinking can be thought of as "cognition in absence". X make two criticisms of this: (i) So far as the "objects'1 of thought are concerned, there is such variety and complexity in these that some objects can be perceptually "present" when they are thought about, and others are such that it makes no sense to say that they are present or absent. ' (ii) The variety in the objects of thought is linked with the fact that thinking is essentially active and is something which we do, whereas the term "cognition" has a quasi-perceptual ring to it. On the other hand, Price's discussion is useful, inter alia, because (i) he brings out one "liberating" capacity of thought, namely, our capacity to think of objects and ideas quite unrelated to our present perceptions and situation, and.(ii) he stresses the contrast between what is thought of/about and the activity itself. Chapter 4 s Thinking to some Purpose. This idea is introduced through a discussion of Ryle's view on the x*elation between " autonomous " thinking and " thinking what one is doing 'l. Whilst his particular analysis is not wholly accepted, the general conceptual connection between ordinary intelligent activity and autonomous thinking directed to an outcome is stressed* there are no sharp dividing lines between adaptive behaviour, practical problem solving, context-bound reasoning and working out answers to general questions. All these forms of thinking have the common feature, namely, that there is some uncertainty, d.oubt, question or problem to be resolved, and the aim of the thinking is to resolve them. Furthermore, on the "enquirer's conception of thinking", any kind of activity which is relevant to resolving the question or problem is either part of the thinking or a subordinate means. Chapter 5 * Thinking, Reasoning and Inference. In this chapter I am mainly concerned with drawing a distinction between reasoning as an activity of searching for or working out arguments or rationally supported conclusions and reasoning as an activity of presenting arguments, and between inferring as an activity of presenting arguments (i.e. as a form of reasoning in the second sense) and inferring as an act of mind or transition in the mind to a "new" thought or idea. Rational inference in the latter sense, though distinct from reasoning as an activity, nevertheless presupposes the latter in its analysis. Reasoning, whether exploratory or expository, is essentially "norm-guided" one significant aspect of this is the fact that one can correct and criticise one*s previously accepted arguments.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

This study reports an empirical and theoretical investigation of everyday language. It discusses the speech of teachers and pupils in a school classroom, from a 'phenomenological' point of view. In recent years, mutually contradictory phenomenological theories of language have been developed, based upon the works of Schutz and Sartre, whose essentialist readings of Husserl's explorations in consciousness have been translated into theories for the description of everyday speech. Garfinkel's 'ethnomethodology' follows Schutz in portraying everyday speakers as sustaining in their talk the appearance of a shared 'intersubjectivity' or social order, which he and they presume to be real. On this 'optimistic' view, a social world shared with others is inescapable. Laing's 'existential psychiatry' follows Sartre in portraying everyday speakers as sustaining in their talk the appearance of a unique 'subjectivity' or psychological self, which he and they presume to be real. On this 'pessimistic' view, a social world shared with others is unattainable. In contrast, my approach follows Husserl's attempt to suspend belief in any reality other than that which appears. I aspire thereby to be 'realistic'. My approach throws into relief relations between words which are invisible when attention is focussed on the things to which words refer. I analyse spoken utterances into clauses or quasi-clausal units which I call 'pictures'. Within the speech of a single individual, and more generally, samenesses and differences can be established between pictures on the basis of grammatical structure (form), and vocabulary (content). In the present study, personal pronouns have been especially important for this purpose. On this basis 'realms' can be distinguished within everyday speech 'inhabited' by specific personal pronouns, and endowed with stable properties, which it is the task of linguistic phenomenology to investigate.

No description available.

The thesis is that Hume and Smith between them outline a new theory of justice as the foundation for all social and political life. Justice is a mode of assessing social and political behaviour, the central point of which is that the motives behind such behaviour must not have an injurious tendency which would arouse the resentment of an impartial spectator. This means that they must be in accordance with a general rule which is negative, telling people what not to do, and which thus ensures that the behaviour which is allowed as just is as widely compatible as possible with the rest of the values and aims accepted at any given time by a society. The latter can only be understood as they have developed through the interaction of individual men; and jurisprudence as a critical discipline is, therefore, dependent upon history and the new "science of human nature". Justice is dealt with in the context of the general moral philosophy of the four authors, and it is shown how it stands apart as a negative virtue, the rules of which are enforcible for negative utilitarian reasons. In connection with Smith and Millar a major objection to the present interpretation is cleared away by showing that their view of history was not economic and deterministic but of such a nature that it allows scope for natural justice. Finally, it is shown how Craig changes the doctrine by discarding the theoretical role of history. This contributes to the breaking up of the tradition and points towards the new developments in political thinking in the 19th Century.

By a paradox we understand a seemingly true statement or set of statements which lead by valid deduction to contradictory statements. Logical paradoxes - paradoxes which involve logical concepts - are in fact as old as the history of logic. The Liar paradox, for instance, goes back to Epimenides (6th century B.C.?). In the late 19th century a new impetus v/as given to the investigation of logical paradoxes by the discovery of new logico-mathematical paradoxes such as those of Russell and Burali- Porti. This came about in the course of attempts to give mathematics a rigorous axiomatic foundation. Sometimes a distinction is maintained between a paradox and an antinomy. In a paradox, it is said, semantical notions are involved and a certain "oddity", "strangeness", or what may be called "paradoxical situation", resides in its construction. The resolution of a paradox is therefore not simply a matter of removing contradiction, but also requires clarifying and removing the "oddity". On the other hand, an antinomy is said to consist in the derivation of a contradiction in an axiomatic system and its resolution lies in revising the system so as to avoid the contradiction. In discussing paradoxes and antinomies, we shall not be strictly bound by this usage of these terms: we use "paradox" and "antinomy" interchangeably. Indeed, from our point of view, even antinomies in an axiomatic system ultimately need semantic clarification and thus removal of paradoxical situations.

No description available.

No description available.