The aim of this thesis is to discuss the nature of social phenomena, and to determine (with particular reference to economics) the appropriate way to explain them. Many of the contentions advanced rest largely upon the fact that social phenomena can be investigated only by methods which respect their distinctive character and status as social phenomena. In chapter I it is argued that the most important difference between the social and the natural sciences is that the former have to employ intentional criteria to identify their explananda-phenomena. Because human and societal phenomena are intrinsically meaningful, the type of causation which prevails in the social realm is fundamentally different from that which prevails in the physical. In chapter II the claim of Popper and Hayek that the task of the social sciences is to trace the unintended consequences of human actions is critically examined. Two examples of economic explanation are given in order to show the importance of unintended consequences, and to illustrate the general form explanations of social phenomena (apart from those of single actions) should adopt. In chapter III the contention that the social sciences deal with inherently complex phenomena is examined and defended, and the main implications of this contention for social analysis are drawn. The extent to which social phenomena are in principle predictable is discussed. In chapter IV the structural properties of formal scientific theories are briefly characterised, and then Friedman's famous argument on the testability of economic theories is analysed and rejected. The role within a scientific theory of statements formulated with reference to idealisations of the phenomena being studied, and the role within a social explanation of the 'principle of rationality', are discussed. In chapter V the central questions behind the methodological individualism/methodological holism controversy are brought to light. Provided that methodological individualism is not construed as a reductionist or mechanistic principle, it can successfully avoid the main objections of its detractors. It is argued that the method of functional analysis in sociology (in the form developed by Merton) is consistent with methodological individualism. Finally, it is claimed that (apart from a few minor exceptions) the principle of methodological individualism does indeed recommend the appropriate way to explain societal phenomena. In chapter VI, the various strands of thought running through the five preceding chapters are drawn together in a brief summary of the most important points raised by this thesis.

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In trying to understand what pleasure is and how it is related to pain and unpleasantness, I tackle various basic questions about the role of pleasure, pain, and unpleasantness in motivation and about the intrinsic goodness of pleasure and the intrinsic badness of pain and unpleasantness. In pleasure's nature of being good, wanted, and sought and pain's nature of being bad, unwanted, and avoided we locate the way in which pleasure and pain are opposites and the central defining properties of the 'pleasant' and the 'unpleasant'. Within my analysis of pleasure and unpleasantness I reach thee conclusions that pleasure and unpleasantness are 'special experiences', explain what is involved in this claim and defend it against the objections, which Ludwig Wittgenstein raised in his Private Language Argument. The view of the emotions which I outline and defend is the view which Aristotle, Spinoza, and many other philosophers have held. According to this view our 'feelings' such as confidence or fear, delight or misery, and pride or shame are 'modes' of pleasure or unpleasantness. Given my views on pleasure and unpleasantness, it would follow that a number of emotions are, in part, the 'special experiences' of pleasure and unpleasantness.

This thesis examines the claims that philosophy can provide the foundation for science, that philosophy can show the presuppositions of science to be necessary, and that philosophy itself is presuppositionless. The investigation begins by considering Husserl's attempt to provide such a foundation - in particular, to show that it is pure logic that grounds science. It is in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic that Husserl develops this argument, through a sustained attack upon psychologism (the view that psychology grounds logic). By considering this attack in detail we attempt to demonstrate the emergence of certain limitations in the beginnings of Husserl's own views as to the nature of science, logic and truth. It is argued that these limitations entail the failure of the Husserlian project. A resolution of these limitations is developed through a consideration of the phenomenology of Hegel, and his arguments concerning the way philosophy should begin if it is to yield truth. In particular, Hegel's arguments for the necessity of phenomenology as preceding all other philosophy and providing the complete justification for science, for his particular conception of science, and for the nature of experience as being dialectical are examined. It is argued that these arguments enable science to be properly grounded. The final section of this thesis briefly reconsiders the Husserlian position in the light of the Hegelian position adopted.

The concept of "nature as inner principle of change" is fundamental to Aristotle's theory of the physical world; it is the object of the present thesis to substantiate this claim by tracing the effects of this idea in Aristotle's rejection of materialism, in his doctrine of "natural places", in his definition of change and process in general, and (via the latter) in his notion of agency in general and the supreme Unmoved Mover in particular ((1)). Aristotle elucidates "natural" by contrast with "artificial" ((2) - (3)), holding that natural substances not merely collectively ((4) - (5)) but as individuals each possess an 'innate impulse of change'. But this must be explained so as to allow for the fact that no change is entirely independent of external conditions ((6) - (7)). If, however, change were totally dependent on external conditions, its occurrence would be inexplicable ((8) - (9)), and the very concept of "change" would be incoherent. This latter conclusion emerges from an examination of the ancient paradox of becoming and Aristotle's treatment of it ((10) - (33)). The paradox is expounded ((11) -(14)). Aristotle answers it by showing that language assumes a continuing subject of change ((15) - (21)). But this assumption meets the problem only if the metaphysical category of substance is also assumed, and along with it some distinction between substance-constitutive and non-substance-constitutive characteristics ((22) - (27)). The former mark off their subject as a thing of a certain causal type; thus change, in presupposing a substantial subject (see also Appendix to Chapter 1), presupposes one that makes some causal contribution to its own changes ((28) - (33)). But Aristotle means more than this by 'nature as inner principle'. He holds a natural substance to be (like a craftsman) the autonomous determinant of certain changes; these therefore (by contrast with changes not so determined) are "natural", as manifesting the substantial nature ((34) - (36)). This problematic notion is taken for granted by Aristotle in the Vhys-ics ((37) - (39)), but can be seen to rest on his metaphysic of substance. It is a consequence of this that the natural change of a given substance be of one kind and display a unitary pattern reflecting the unity of the substance ((40)). This view cripples scientific method as we understand it ((41)), but Aristotle's idea of substance anyway cuts him off from the approaches successfully operated in later mechanics and chemistry ((42) - (45)). A summary of the ground so far covered ((46)) introduces a further sense in which Aristotle's natures are "inner" principles of change: the subject of change is not (as in artifice) external to the being which is the source of change ((47) - (54)).

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