This thesis applies a theory of meaning, suggested by Millikan (1984), for explaining the problematic notion of metaphorical meaning. There is a persistent tension in existing accounts of metaphorical meaning: on the one hand, the fact that metaphors are novel and creative uses of words suggest that no systematic account can be given to what metaphorical expressions mean. On the other hand, the fact that metaphors can, and are being used intelligibly in all areas of discourse, and that metaphorical interpretations can be distinguished from nonsensical interpretations, forces us to accept that there is a systematic relation between the words used and what they are said to mean metaphorically. I exemplify this tension by discussing three accounts of metaphor offered by Searle, Davidson, and Hesse. I then present Millikan's theory of meaning that is based on an analogy she makes between linguistic and biological catergories. Her basic claim is that linguistic entities can be ascribed with a proper function, just as biological entities are so ascribed, according to their evolutionary history. The proper function of a device is that function which earlier tokens of that device had performed, which (partly) accounts for the proliferation on that device. The proper function of a linguistic device, and the conditions that normally obtain when the device performs its function, determine the meaning of the device. Next, I counter Fodor's criticism of Millikan's approach. I show that the conditions which Millikan requires for attributing a meaning to a symbol satisfy Fodor's own suggestion for such conditions. His criticism must therefore apply to his own theory. I show, however, that it is Fodor's theory, rather than Millikan's, that suffers from a related problem to that which he has challenged her with. Finally, I apply Millikan's theory to the problem of metaphorical meaning. First, I discuss Millikan's own conception of metaphor, which is apparently similar to Searlc's. I urguc that her approach nevertheless manages to withstand most of the criticisms that apply to Searlc's theory. Next, I develop an alternative account of metaphor, based on Millikan's theory of meaning. My claim is that in the analogy between linguistic and biological catcrgories, metaphor is analogous to cases of mutation in biological systems: they arc the mechanism by which linguistic changes are introduced. To answer the question of metaphorical meaning, then, we need to ascertain the proper function of mutants. This proper function, I claim is the introduction of adaptive changes to existing devices. Analogously, metaphors have the proper function of introducing semantic changes to the words they arc comprised of. Two results follow from the analogy: first, an important insight from Millikan's theory is that any generalizations made about the structure and functioning of a device need only apply to those devices that do perform their proper function. Accordingly, any claims about systematicity in metaphorical meaning need only apply to metaphors that perform their proper function of introducing semantic change. That is, only to those metaphors that have become established in language. Conversely, not every one-off metaphor need to be accounted for. Second, evolution theory cannot be used to pre-dcterminc what particular function a device may acquire through selection, but nevertheless can characterize constraints on the acquisition of such functions. These constraints are determined by the evolutionary history of existing devices. Similarly, 1 claim that no account can be used to prc-dctermine what particular function a device may acquire through selection, but nevertheless can characterize constraints on the acquisition of such functions. These constraints are determined by the evolutionary history of the existing devices. Similarly, I claim that no account can be given that will uniquely determine the meaning that a metaphoric expression may acquire in the process of its becoming an established part of a language. This reflects the first aspects of tension described above, concerning the novelty and indeterminacy of metaphorical meaning. On the other hand, I argue that constraints on meaning change can be identified. This acknowledges the intuitions that metaphorical meaning is somewhat structured. The notion of metaphorical meaning should be understood as applying to that range of possible meanings, determined by the constraints referred to above, which a metaphor may acquire as it becomes established. This understanding of the notion coherently captures the two apparently opposing characteristics of metaphor.

The thesis consists of a critical evaluation of Paul Churchland's eliminative materialism. The first of the central claims of the thesis is that it is unclear how radical an eliminativism Churchland wishes to adopt, in that his published work appears to vacillate between a position which is too modest to be regarded as a genuinely eliminative form of materialism, and positions which, while radical in their eliminativism, are not supported by the empirical evidence which Churchland presents. I conclude that eliminative materialism is itself a candidate for elimination, on the grounds that the radical positions are unsupportable in principle, while the only eliminativist position which is defensible effectively fails to qualify as a form of 'eliminative materialism'. The early chapters of the thesis consider the negative element in Churchland's position - the claim that 'folk psychology' will not ultimately reduce to neuroscience, and that, this being a constraint on the acceptability of folk psychology as a putative source of mental explanation, folk psychology ought therefore to be eliminated. The positive element of Churchland's position is then considered: his claims that research programmes currently being undertaken in both parallel distributive processing, and neuroscience, converge in providing a more psychologically realistic account of human cognition than do more conventional accounts, which utilise the explanatory categories of fold psychology; and that, as this PDP model eschews the use of folk psychological categories, it thus entails elimination of folk psychology, as anticipated in the earlier, negative thesis. I consider the philosophical implications of the PDP model, and find it deficient with regard to two of the main areas of philosophical interest considered by Churchland: the operation of moral choice; and consciousness. My conclusion is that PDP does not serve to provide support for any but the most modest of eliminativist positions - so that what empirical plausibility PDP may have cannot rescue eliminative materialism from elimination.

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Michael P. Adogbo argued that religion and culture are intrinscally interwoven in the Urhobo mindset. Addressing similar phenomenon generally among Africans, Musimbi K. A. Kanyoro stated that African Christian ‘often walks with one foot in African religion and culture and another in the church and Western culture.’ This phenomenon which Kanyoro argued that could be destructive if not well managed is the main issue examined more specifically in the context of culture and religion among Urhobo Baptists. The approach of the Delta State Baptist Conference (DSBC) to this reality among the Urhobo Baptists has created religious/cultural dichotomy in their funeral rites which this research addressed by examining two key questions: First, Could an Urhobo Baptist be faithful to the Baptist faith the way it is articulated in the DSBC policies, in view of Urhobo cultural identity during funeral ceremonies? Second, Could DSBC hold to its policy on burial rites and at the same time be relevant within the Urhobo society? My experiences as a pastor among Urhobo Baptists enabled me to evaluate symbols and functions of Urhobo funeral rites in the context of some ethnographic, anthropological, and hermeneutical theories examined in this study. A major discovery is that Urhobo Baptists hold on to certain key aspects of Urohobo funeral tradition evaluated in this study in spite of their conversion to the Baptist faith. Similarly, to the Urhobo Baptists, as analysed later in the thesis, the purpose of Urhobo funeral rites does not contradict the Baptist faith. These led to the major argument in this thesis that integration of certain vital aspects of Urhobo funeral rites into the Baptist funeral process is possible, valuable and advantageous for discouraging dual funeral faith practices among Urhobo Baptists.

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The correlativity thesis that every duty implies a correlative right and vice versa holds for particular concepts of right and obligation. Counter-examples to this thesis which depend on the fallacy of changed terms or the ascription of rights in virtue of a misplaced correlation have to he dismissed, but the particular concepts for which the thesis holds require analysis.

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