The thesis inquires into Heidegger’s attempt to overcome philosophical theories that rely upon metaphysical conditions, that is, transcendent and transcendental conditions of truth and ground. According to Heidegger, a reliance upon transcendent/transcendental conditions forces philosophy into a metaphysical structure that prioritises reason above other modes of thinking. Reason requires matter or content on which to think.  In order to think logically reason necessarily focuses on things or ‘beings.’ Heidegger’s claim is that the methodology adopted by philosophy has a preordained outcome that focuses on beings and the knowledge of those beings. Once rational knowledge is conceded as the principal means of thought the subjectivity of human beings dominates all modes of analysis and leads philosophy into subject-object dualism that it cannot escape from. Heidegger argues that metaphysics demonstrates a necessary logic that begins with Platonic ‘ideas’ and ends with Nietzschean subjectivism as the self-determining condition of life. Heidegger argues that this state of affairs is nihilistic in that human beings can no longer gain access to what provides the ground for beings and existence. According to Heidegger’s reading what is ‘forgotten’ in the philosophical tradition is the question of being. My thesis hopes to demonstrate the logic of Heidegger’s critique and identify the problems that the question of being addresses. One of the major obstacles that Heidegger’s work confronts is the status of traditional conceptions of truth and authority. In an era proclaimed by Nietzsche as the age of nihilism, religious and philosophical truths appear to have suffered a collapse and are no longer trusted to provide ground for meaningful judgements on life. I hope to show that Heidegger’s question of being is an attempt to rescue meaning by way of inquiring into the ground of beings. Central to my argument is a description of the methodology that Heidegger employs. Following Nietzsche, Heidegger demonstrates that metaphysical thinking is responsible for bringing about a disintegration of its own discipline. If metaphysics contains a necessary relationship with nihilism, then Heidegger’s task is to dismantle metaphysics and search for a new expression of truth and meaning. His task is obliged to restructure the methodology of metaphysics and replace it with something that does not exhibit the same internal logic. The search for meaning requires ‘conditions’ or ‘grounds’ on which to establish meaning. I explore the transformation of transcendental conditions that occurs in Heidegger’s work and the effect this has on philosophical and theological ground.

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This thesis examines Hegel's attempt to mediate the opposition of subect and object. It is an explication and an interpretation of "Consciousness", "Self-Consciousness" and "Reason". Hegel attempted to develop a system of philosophy whose conclusion was demonstrated to be true and one in which all that falls within experience became rationally comprehended. Since, according to Hegel, consciousness contains within it the two elements "subject" and "object" he analyzed the experience of consciousness in its relation to these modes. The procedure of the Phenomenology is to examine the claims of objectivity and those of subjectivity to be the essence of the true. Hegel shows that complete philosophical knowledge requires both sides to be equally essential. Part II discusses the unification of subject and object through the examination of knowledge and shows that this examination must also be of the object which is known. Therefore, in Hegel's theory, a true epistemology must also be an ontology. His conclusion is that non-sceptical knowledge is possible and that it is co-extensive with the actual. Part III shows that Hegel's conclusion is possible because Reason is what is real. So his rationalism is a metaphysical claim. This distinguishes it from other forms of rationalism and it is therefore immune to usual criticisms. However, his position requires a rational necessity in the world and, since contingency is an element of experience, he failed to give the complete account of experience he himself demanded.

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Al-Ghazali, who lived in the eleventh century of the Christian era, was one of the greatest Muslim thinkers. He had an encyclopaedic knowledge and wrote a great number of "books on many subjectsj ethics, Islamic jurisprudence, theology, metaphysics and logic. Ethics occupied a central position in his thought. He set forth his ethical views in many books according to the need and interest of various categories of his readers. Since his thought developed through several stages, the books he wrote including those on ethics are usually divided in accordance with these stages. They have been arranged chronologically by such scholars as Maurice Boyges, W. Montgomery Watt, George F. Hourani, ^Abd-ar-Rahman Badawl and Farid Jabre. The creative part of al-GhazalPs life may broadly be divided into two phases, the early period and the later period which began from his conversion to Islamic mysticism (sufism). His ethical works belonged to both periods and are coloured with their characteristics. There is disagreement on the authenticity of some of the works attributed to al-Ghazali, Some ethical works ascribed to him as of the later period of his life are of doubtful authenticity in their entirety, while some ethical works of both periods are shown to be spurious only in part. Some ideas in an ethical work of a moderate size of the earliest period or, more accurately, of the transitional period, are regarded as superseded by those set forth in his later works. In view of these established facts regarding al-Ghazall's works on morals, any study of them which does not take these facts into consideration may not "be regarded as revealing the truth about him in its entirety. Such a study misleads readers and scholars with regard to al-Ghazall and engenders various theories of his life. Unfortunately, all of the very few studies hitherto made on his ethics are partly based upon the unauthentic books, unauthentic parts of books and the books containing the superseded ideas, as they are also based upon the authentic books. Besides thtis mixing the non- Ghazalian or superseded Ghazalian ideas with the genuine Ghazalian teachings, they often failed to investigate the basic moral principles which are explicit or implicit in his teaching and also to give as complete a description of it as possible in the length of a book. They are unsatisfactory on various other accounts also. Therefore, there is a need for a study of his ethics which is based only upon those ethical works which all the scholars have accepted as authentic and which have not been superseded by others. Such a study should give readers a true knowledge and understanding of this great man and of his thought concerning moral problems. The present work is an effort to meet this need. It is a new approach to the study of al-Ghazsli's ethical theory for it seeks to present this theory in a reasonably complete form "by drawing only upon materials from Ms genuine works or genuine parts of works which have not "been superseded. Among the works of the earlier period, therefore, Mizan al-rAmal (Criterion o f Action) is discarded altogether; (reference to it is made in a few places only for the sake of comparison). Out of the large number of the ethical works of the later period whose authenticity has "been generally accepted, almost a score is selected to constitute the basis of the present study, since to make use of all Ms works would be impossible in a limited period of time. Efforts are also made in tMs work to bring to light the principles of al-Ghazalis ethics. Sometimes it has been found necessary to enquire into the sources of his inspiration and ideas. This study, however, does not seek, except very rarely, to determine the influence of al-Ghazali's ethics upon the subsequent development of ethical thought in Islam or in Christianity - a task which may form the subject-matter of a separate study.

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Greek logic was transmitted to the Islamic World within the Greek philosophical tradition. Although various Greek books on logic had been translated into Arabic several times, logic remained, up to the time of Al-Ghazali, suspected as dangerous for religious belief and confined to the circles of the philosophers. It was not able to enter overtly into religious education. Al-Ghazali found many schools of thought in his time, each one claiming that truth and certainty were confined to it. He was acquainted with all these different schools of thought. At first, he was not able to determine which was right or wrong. Thus he searched for a criterion by which he could distinguish between certain and non—certain knowledge. After a comprehensive quest, he found that logic was the only criterion of knowledge and its methods of inference are the onlymethods of research by which one can achieve new certain knowledge. Thus he adopted Aristotle's theory of certainty. Furthermore, he tried to build his concept of certainty and certain knowledge on epistemological bases. After becoming completely convinced of the great importance of logic, al-Ghazali, in an attempt to restore the system of religious education, worked out a plan aiming to introduce logic into the curricula of religious education. In the first stage, he declared the neutrality of it while at the same time attacking the philosophers. Then he claimed that logic was found in the Qur'an. After that he wrote books on logic, in which he was interested mostly in the formal parts of logic, and he endeavoured to clothe logic with an Islamic clothing. All that was not sufficient to make his attempt successful. So he showed the scholars and students in religious education how logic could be used in the Islamic sciences - this was clear in his books on kalam and usul al-fiqh, where he applied definition and the methods of inference in Aristotelian logic. In doing this, he was the first Muslim scholar to mix, overtly, logic with the Islamic sciences, and to Islamicise Greek logic (Aristotelian).

This thesis is neither e page to page commentary nor en assessment of Hume's place in the history of Philosophy. It mainly consists in an attempt at justifying a certain approach to the Interpretation of his theory of value with special reference to morals.