Proefschrift--Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, 1995. / Résumé en anglais. Bibliogr. p. 283-285. Index.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-29T14:12:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_4756_.pdf: 851130 bytes, checksum: 4c95ba70e046be74198dce1d3628d67e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-04-25 / Esta dissertação aborda o esquadrão Kamikaze, os pilotos suicidas japoneses na Segunda Guerra Mundial. O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a trajetória deste grupo dento do cenário político e cultural do Japão Imperial durante o período da Segunda Guerra, abordando a formação do modelo de governo que acabou se aliando a alemães e italianos durante o conflito mundial, e também a ideologia que guiou a população japonesa durante este período, ideologia esta sustentada principalmente pelo ethos que foi construído e desenvolvido durante a primeira metade do século XX: o Bushido. Os membros do esquadrão Kamikaze acabaram entrando para a História, sobretudo no ocidente, como exemplos de fanatismo por uma causa, mas através da observação de fontes que vão desde testemunhos de pessoas que tiveram que conviver e lidar com os Kamikaze (como aliados e inimigos), até as palavras dos próprios Kamikaze, deixadas por meios como cartas e diários, buscaremos entender qual era o posicionamento destes pilotos dentro desse cenário, afastando-nos do estereótipo vigente para buscar compreender as motivações políticas e culturais que levavam estes pilotos a aceitar este sacrifício, nominalmente feito pela honra do Imperador e pela grandeza do Império.

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Comunicação e Expressão. Programa de Pós-graduação de Literatura, Florianópolis, 2013 / Made available in DSpace on 2013-12-05T23:46:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 321215.pdf: 2486663 bytes, checksum: 2ef79a4d94068745ad9f239b9a8f2c7f (MD5)

D.Litt. et Phil. (Historical Studies) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

Since 1945 a number of historical controversies have arisen over the German leadership in the Second World War. Hitler has been described both as an astute opportunist and as a fanatic relentlessly following a preconceived plan. Thus his decision to turn east in 1941 has been regarded as the result of frustration in the West and also as the ultimate step in a great plan for eastern conquest which he followed throughput his career. Most of the German military leaders have supported the idea that Hitler had no "war plan." They have depicted themselves as subordinates hopelessly attempting to avert the worst effects of Hitler's irresponsible opportunism and amateurish interference in military strategy. Thus they have attributed most of the blame for the failure of the Blitzkrieg in the East to Hitler’s errors. This study re-examines these controversies in the light of the planning for the invasion of Russia. It shows that Hitler consistently followed a broad plan for the conquest of Lebensraum. Thus in 1940 his decision to attack Russia even if the war was still unfinished in the West was the result of his determination to fulfill his plan while Germany still held the initiative in Europe. Most of Hitler's military leaders shared his anti-Bolshevism and favoured a policy which would revive the situation created by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in 1918. These attitudes made them willing to attack Russia. However, the optimism fostered by their defeat of France and their serious underestimation of Russia's strength caused them to omit careful consideration of the logistic and operational difficulties in the East. While accepting Hitler's more cautious plan they neglected to make the necessary preparations to implement it and instead attempted to adhere to their own simpler plan for a battle of destruction near the frontier followed by a thrust on Moscow. By the time it had become clear that the initial battles had failed to yield a decisive victory it was too late to revive Hitler's plan and the campaign deteriorated into a series of improvised operations. These served only to show that the Wehrmacht lacked the range and striking power to defeat the Soviet Union by military force alone. Hitler might have compensated for this deficiency by developing a coalition grand strategy capable of exerting further pressure on Russia from the Far East or the South. But instead, he failed to win the trust and cooperation of the Japanese by concealing his intention of attacking Russia and by directing them and the Italians towards the war against Britain. Furthermore, the Nazi terror and exploitation in Russia precluded the development of a positive policy which might have caused an internal collapse of Stalin's regime. The basic flaws of Hitler's Lebensraumpolitik as presented in Mein Kampf, his misjudgement of the British and his contempt for the Russians, were major political and grand strategic causes of his ultimate defeat. But on the military strategic level the German generals bear a far greater share of the responsibility for the failure of the Blitzkrieg in the East than has previously been recognised. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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