Of the three bodies of the Buddha, the sambhogakaya was the last to have been formulated (circa, the third to fourth century CE) To date, scholars have not established any substantiated theory with regard to its origins. It is with this aim that I began my research on the subject. In earliest Buddhist literature, the concept of the Buddha reveals two aspects: a human identity and a superhuman character. The rationalist Sarvastivadins developed their belief in the human Buddha while the Mahasarnghikas relied more on pure faith and developed their concept of the transcendental Buddha endowed with superhuman qualities. It is on this basis that the two-body theory of the Buddha was formulated. Most probably the originator belongs to the Sarvastivada school and flourished before the composition of the Mahdprajndparamita-sastra. From the fourth chapter onwards, I have traced the origins and developments of each of the three bodies. The concept of the dharmakaya, derived from the Buddha's teachings collected in the corpus of early Buddhist literature, was further developed as a collection of pure dharmas by the Sarvastivadins. It finally evolved into the cosmic body, an impersonal principle supporting all phenomena through its identification with the tathata which pervades the whole universe in Mahayana Buddhism. It is on this basis that the Mahayanists identified the dharmakaya with other key concepts such as the Buddhadhatu and the Tathdgatagarbha. The sambhogakaya theory arose as a result of the debate on the rupakaya of the Buddha. Initially, the Sarvastivadins and the Mahasamghikas debated on the transcendental qualities of the Buddha. This later led to the problem of the short lifespan of Sakyamuni when Mahayanists increasingly emphasized the great merit of the Buddha gained through bodhisattva practice. The formulation of the sambhogakaya was arguably a solution to this complex problem, basing itself as precedent on the teachings of the early and middle Mahayana sutras. The nirmanakaya doctrine originated from the early Buddhist theory of the mind-made body produced through the supernatural power of rddhi. It had probably first been conceived by the Mahasarnghikas when they idealised the Buddha as transcendental. The Mahayanists accepted this concept in its entirety and further developed it into that of the nirmanakaya. Many scholars think that the development of the concept of the Buddha is mainly driven by faith in Gautama, but our study of the subject shows that philosophical thought also plays a very important role.

While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views that hold to some form of substantialist thought (where certain qualities are held to be inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding his philosophical position. He focuses most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga method of argumentation to prove the importance of recognizing that all phenomena are śūnya by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, however, assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful because śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views of substance, he maintains that holding to any view of substance is absurd, that phenomena can only make sense if viewed from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate supporting arguments to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that if saṃvṛti is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya cannot be corroborated on its own terms due to its insubstantiality. But how does viewing phenomena as empty make them meaningful? Scholars who base their understanding of how meaning is established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his twotruths formulation, which grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive truth-values, tend to prove the distinctive truth of saṃvṛti in terms of its linguisticallybased, conventional status.2 I am critical of this approach and argue, instead, that an explanation of how phenomena are meaningful due to their emptiness is found in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths as distinctive, I argue that saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based on their metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena point to, or are metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality akin to understanding of ākāśa in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras which although experienced cannot be cognitively grasped. / Religious Studies & Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)

While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views that hold to some form of substantialist thought (where certain qualities are held to be inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding his philosophical position. He focuses most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga method of argumentation to prove the importance of recognizing that all phenomena are śūnya by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, however, assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful because śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views of substance, he maintains that holding to any view of substance is absurd, that phenomena can only make sense if viewed from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate supporting arguments to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that if saṃvṛti is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya cannot be corroborated on its own terms due to its insubstantiality. But how does viewing phenomena as empty make them meaningful? Scholars who base their understanding of how meaning is established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his twotruths formulation, which grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive truth-values, tend to prove the distinctive truth of saṃvṛti in terms of its linguisticallybased, conventional status.2 I am critical of this approach and argue, instead, that an explanation of how phenomena are meaningful due to their emptiness is found in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths as distinctive, I argue that saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based on their metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena point to, or are metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality akin to understanding of ākāśa in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras which although experienced cannot be cognitively grasped. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)