While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views that hold to some form of substantialist thought (where certain qualities are held to be inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding his philosophical position. He focuses most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga method of argumentation to prove the importance of recognizing that all phenomena are śūnya by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, however, assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful because śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views of substance, he maintains that holding to any view of substance is absurd, that phenomena can only make sense if viewed from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate supporting arguments to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that if saṃvṛti is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya cannot be corroborated on its own terms due to its insubstantiality. But how does viewing phenomena as empty make them meaningful? Scholars who base their understanding of how meaning is established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his twotruths formulation, which grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive truth-values, tend to prove the distinctive truth of saṃvṛti in terms of its linguisticallybased, conventional status.2 I am critical of this approach and argue, instead, that an explanation of how phenomena are meaningful due to their emptiness is found in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths as distinctive, I argue that saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based on their metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena point to, or are metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality akin to understanding of ākāśa in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras which although experienced cannot be cognitively grasped. / Religious Studies & Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)

While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views that hold to some form of substantialist thought (where certain qualities are held to be inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding his philosophical position. He focuses most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga method of argumentation to prove the importance of recognizing that all phenomena are śūnya by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, however, assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful because śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views of substance, he maintains that holding to any view of substance is absurd, that phenomena can only make sense if viewed from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate supporting arguments to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that if saṃvṛti is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya cannot be corroborated on its own terms due to its insubstantiality. But how does viewing phenomena as empty make them meaningful? Scholars who base their understanding of how meaning is established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his twotruths formulation, which grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive truth-values, tend to prove the distinctive truth of saṃvṛti in terms of its linguisticallybased, conventional status.2 I am critical of this approach and argue, instead, that an explanation of how phenomena are meaningful due to their emptiness is found in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths as distinctive, I argue that saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based on their metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena point to, or are metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality akin to understanding of ākāśa in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras which although experienced cannot be cognitively grasped. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)