陳志華. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 203-216. / Chen Zhihua. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue yan jiu yuan zhe xue xue bu. / 自序 / Chapter (一) --- 前言 / Chapter (二) --- 阿毘達磨的自性形而上學：一個自性形而上學的典範 / Chapter (三) --- 自性形而上學的批判(I)：語言的省察 / Chapter (四) --- 自性形而上學的批判(II)：實體化概念的消解 / Chapter (五) --- 中管哲學的基本立場：形而上學：是/否？ / Chapter (六) --- 結語 / 注釋 / Chapter 附錄一 --- <<龍樹：其人及其著作>> / Chapter 附錄二 --- 參考文獻

呂子德. / 手稿本, 複本據稿本印影. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1989. / Shou gao ben, fu ben ju gao ben yin ying. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 84-89. / Lü Zide. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1989. / Chapter 第一章 --- 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第二章 --- 總論篇 --- p.11 / Chapter 第三章 --- 空之多重涵義及語言的應用限域 --- p.39 / Chapter 第四章 --- 語言陷阱及破解之道 --- p.62 / Chapter 第五章 --- 總結 --- p.79

While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views that hold to some form of substantialist thought (where certain qualities are held to be inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding his philosophical position. He focuses most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga method of argumentation to prove the importance of recognizing that all phenomena are śūnya by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, however, assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful because śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views of substance, he maintains that holding to any view of substance is absurd, that phenomena can only make sense if viewed from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate supporting arguments to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that if saṃvṛti is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya cannot be corroborated on its own terms due to its insubstantiality. But how does viewing phenomena as empty make them meaningful? Scholars who base their understanding of how meaning is established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his twotruths formulation, which grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive truth-values, tend to prove the distinctive truth of saṃvṛti in terms of its linguisticallybased, conventional status.2 I am critical of this approach and argue, instead, that an explanation of how phenomena are meaningful due to their emptiness is found in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths as distinctive, I argue that saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based on their metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena point to, or are metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality akin to understanding of ākāśa in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras which although experienced cannot be cognitively grasped. / Religious Studies & Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2017-03-16T19:17:06Z No. of bitstreams: 1 hugojosemesquitadasilva.pdf: 1542487 bytes, checksum: 01e9705a7153bf0c51475894fc62391d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-03-18T11:48:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 hugojosemesquitadasilva.pdf: 1542487 bytes, checksum: 01e9705a7153bf0c51475894fc62391d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-18T11:48:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 hugojosemesquitadasilva.pdf: 1542487 bytes, checksum: 01e9705a7153bf0c51475894fc62391d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-07-19 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo investigar como o Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Versos Fundamentais do Caminho do Meio) – obra central de Nāgārjuna, um dos maiores pensadores do Budismo Mahāyāna e fundador da escola Mādhyamika (“Escola do Caminho do Meio”), que viveu no século II d.C – se estrutura enquanto um estratagema pedagógico-soteriológico, isto é, um upāya, que lança mão de recursos fundamentalmente racionais para uma sistemática eliminação de erros dos aspirantes ao caminho budista, a fim de que eles possam se libertar da condição de sofrimento que caracteriza a existência calcada na ignorância (avidyā). Para tanto, se faz necessária uma genealogia da noção de upāya no contexto civilizacional indiano-budista. / The present work aims to investigate how the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses of The Middle Way) – major work of the philosopher Nāgārjuna, one of the major Mahāyāna Buddhist thinkers and founder of the Mādhyamika school (“School of the Middle Way”), who lived in the II century C.E – is structured as a pedagogical-soteriological expedient, that is, an upāya, which utilizes fundamentally rational devices for a systematic elimination of mistakes of the aspirants of the Buddhist way, in order to liberate them from the condition of suffering which characterizes existence based on ignorance (avidyā). Therefore, it requires a genealogy of the notion of upāya in the IndianBuddhist civilizational context.

While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views that hold to some form of substantialist thought (where certain qualities are held to be inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding his philosophical position. He focuses most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga method of argumentation to prove the importance of recognizing that all phenomena are śūnya by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, however, assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful because śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views of substance, he maintains that holding to any view of substance is absurd, that phenomena can only make sense if viewed from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate supporting arguments to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that if saṃvṛti is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya cannot be corroborated on its own terms due to its insubstantiality. But how does viewing phenomena as empty make them meaningful? Scholars who base their understanding of how meaning is established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his twotruths formulation, which grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive truth-values, tend to prove the distinctive truth of saṃvṛti in terms of its linguisticallybased, conventional status.2 I am critical of this approach and argue, instead, that an explanation of how phenomena are meaningful due to their emptiness is found in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths as distinctive, I argue that saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based on their metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena point to, or are metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality akin to understanding of ākāśa in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras which although experienced cannot be cognitively grasped. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)

The current study examines several recent comparisons made between the writings of Nagarjuna and Derrida. The main question under examination is why in particular should such a comparison of two widely different thinkers hold obvious appeal for contemporary scholars? In an attempt to answer this question the comparisons of Robert Magliola, David Loy, Harold Coward and others are analysed as are critiques of this type of comparison presented by Richard Hayes, A. Bharati and others. It is concluded that the basis for these comparisons is a strong concern for a "middle way" perspective between forms of absolutism and nihilism in contemporary Western culture.

In this project, I explore the projects of the Indian Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (c. 150-250 CE) and the process metaphysician Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947). Despite their very different historical contexts, I argue that both thinkers defend a process-relational metaphysics: the view that a fundamental aspect of our universe is constant change, in which each moment is interrelated with the next. Though many interpreters have suggested that the projects of Nāgārjuna and Whitehead are fundamentally at odds, I argue that their approaches are compatible and complementary. This interpretation allows us to more deeply understand the central claims of process metaphysics and defend their shared view from two common criticisms, which I call the problems of continuity and identity. In the former, critics of process metaphysics allege that if a person is constantly changing from moment to moment, we cannot explain how that person remains in some sense the same self over time. In the problem of identity, critics allege that if everything is change and process all the way down, nothing could come to be in the first place. Nāgārjuna provides a solution to problem of continuity, but critics argue that he still has trouble answering the problem of identity. Whitehead provides a compelling solution to the problem of identity, but his critics allege that he fails to adequately answer the problem of continuity. By showing how these two philosophers can be read as two sides of a larger system, we can defend process metaphysics from both criticisms at once

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