陳志華. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 203-216. / Chen Zhihua. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue yan jiu yuan zhe xue xue bu. / 自序 / Chapter (一) --- 前言 / Chapter (二) --- 阿毘達磨的自性形而上學：一個自性形而上學的典範 / Chapter (三) --- 自性形而上學的批判(I)：語言的省察 / Chapter (四) --- 自性形而上學的批判(II)：實體化概念的消解 / Chapter (五) --- 中管哲學的基本立場：形而上學：是/否？ / Chapter (六) --- 結語 / 注釋 / Chapter 附錄一 --- <<龍樹：其人及其著作>> / Chapter 附錄二 --- 參考文獻

呂子德. / 手稿本, 複本據稿本印影. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1989. / Shou gao ben, fu ben ju gao ben yin ying. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 84-89. / Lü Zide. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1989. / Chapter 第一章 --- 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第二章 --- 總論篇 --- p.11 / Chapter 第三章 --- 空之多重涵義及語言的應用限域 --- p.39 / Chapter 第四章 --- 語言陷阱及破解之道 --- p.62 / Chapter 第五章 --- 總結 --- p.79

The current study examines several recent comparisons made between the writings of Nagarjuna and Derrida. The main question under examination is why in particular should such a comparison of two widely different thinkers hold obvious appeal for contemporary scholars? In an attempt to answer this question the comparisons of Robert Magliola, David Loy, Harold Coward and others are analysed as are critiques of this type of comparison presented by Richard Hayes, A. Bharati and others. It is concluded that the basis for these comparisons is a strong concern for a "middle way" perspective between forms of absolutism and nihilism in contemporary Western culture.

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While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views that hold to some form of substantialist thought (where certain qualities are held to be inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding his philosophical position. He focuses most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga method of argumentation to prove the importance of recognizing that all phenomena are śūnya by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, however, assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful because śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views of substance, he maintains that holding to any view of substance is absurd, that phenomena can only make sense if viewed from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate supporting arguments to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that if saṃvṛti is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya cannot be corroborated on its own terms due to its insubstantiality. But how does viewing phenomena as empty make them meaningful? Scholars who base their understanding of how meaning is established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his twotruths formulation, which grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive truth-values, tend to prove the distinctive truth of saṃvṛti in terms of its linguisticallybased, conventional status.2 I am critical of this approach and argue, instead, that an explanation of how phenomena are meaningful due to their emptiness is found in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths as distinctive, I argue that saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based on their metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena point to, or are metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality akin to understanding of ākāśa in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras which although experienced cannot be cognitively grasped. / Religious Studies & Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)

While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views that hold to some form of substantialist thought (where certain qualities are held to be inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding his philosophical position. He focuses most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga method of argumentation to prove the importance of recognizing that all phenomena are śūnya by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, however, assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful because śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views of substance, he maintains that holding to any view of substance is absurd, that phenomena can only make sense if viewed from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate supporting arguments to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that if saṃvṛti is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya cannot be corroborated on its own terms due to its insubstantiality. But how does viewing phenomena as empty make them meaningful? Scholars who base their understanding of how meaning is established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his twotruths formulation, which grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive truth-values, tend to prove the distinctive truth of saṃvṛti in terms of its linguisticallybased, conventional status.2 I am critical of this approach and argue, instead, that an explanation of how phenomena are meaningful due to their emptiness is found in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths as distinctive, I argue that saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based on their metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena point to, or are metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality akin to understanding of ākāśa in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras which although experienced cannot be cognitively grasped. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)