The post-conflict territories of the Western Balkans have been subjected to an unprecedented level of international attention since the mid-1990s. The EU, NATO and OSCE in particular converged on the region intent on redefining their image - if not purpose - in the first major crisis of the post-Cold War era. Responding to the horrific inter-ethnic violence that defined conflict in the region, International Organisations continually emphasised the importance of upholding standards regarding the protection of, and respect for, ethnic minorities. While literature acknowledges that military forces were deployed to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment for post-conflict peacebuilding to emerge, few scholars have explored the substance of the military role beyond the separation of former warring factions and provision of a secure humanitarian space. This research demonstrates that military actors adapted their approaches to contribute across the spectrum of the peacebuilding effort, including on rights based issues; specifically ethnic minority returns and participation. On the basis of case studies in Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina, the thesis adopts an empirical approach to exploring the reasons for military engagement on these issues and their respective successes and failures. It examines the sources that projected ideas on ethnic minority issues – international policy development, peace treaty composition, and domestic acceptance – and how they influenced military decision making processes. Through post-conflict phases it analyses the domestic footprint of international intervention – international administration and civil-military actors – and discusses thematically the means of military engagement, the receptiveness of domestic actors at multiple levels and the nature of compliance. Acknowledging the overarching civilian framework for intervention, where from the outset the prospective of NATO and EU membership were held forth as the 'prize' for a successful return to 'a Europe of integration, democracy and ethnic pluralism', it establishes the utility of strategic mechanisms – conditionality and normative pressure – in military hands acknowledging the potential for linkage to enlargement frameworks. It argues that in spite of principled objections, military operations can and do have influence in delivering policy on rights based issues.

This thesis contributes to a growing body of literature on the role of transparency in public life. Analysing EU transparency through three levels of analysis, the thesis investigates how and why the expert advice proffered to EU policy makers is made transparent to EU citizens. At the institutional level, the study compares the transparency provided through the online registers to assess the extent of compliance with the rules and guidelines on the provision of information. It shows significant errors and gaps in the publicly available data, and demonstrates that these inaccuracies are the result of poor quality assurance at the institutions. At the group/actor level, the study draws on data from a series of elite interviews with policy-makers to consider the purpose of EU transparency. It shows that, whilst individual actors overwhelmingly frame transparency in wholly positive terms, collectively they bestow it with multiple attributes. The thesis posits that the EU has multiple transparencies and that the transparency tools - intended to improve citizen trust in the EU institutions - are frequently used by groups to undermine this trust. The process level of analysis examines the nature of the expertise used in the policy process in two distinct areas. It shows that, overwhelmingly, individuals apply to join an expert group following an informal approach from officials at the relevant Directorate General, and that those appointed in a personal capacity are likely to be already known to the Commission official responsible for the appointment. The study argues that, for the Commission’s expert group appointments, the non-transparent nature of these informal processes undermines the Commission’s rules and guidelines on transparency. Finally, the thesis recommends a number of specific and low cost measures to improve the transparency of the expertise used in the EU’s policy-making process.

This thesis explores the conditions under which incumbent regimes in the Eastern Neighbourhood cooperate effectively with CSDP missions by adhering to and adopting the objectives set out by their mandates. In establishing whether and under what circumstances CSDP missions successfully cooperate with third country governments by inducing the acceptance of and adherence to their mandates, this thesis reclaims a focus on the local dimension of EU partner countries in order to explore the extent to which domestic stakeholders display agency in their relations with the EU and are able to constrain and/or facilitate its foreign policy. It thus asks: under what conditions do incumbent regimes in host countries embrace EU-driven strategies and reforms? The thesis examines two CSDP functions – rule transfer and confidence-building – across three CSDP missions in the Eastern Neighbourhood: the EUJUST Themis rule of law mission to Georgia, the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) and the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to Georgia. Drawing on rational-choice assumptions and recent academic contributions to the Eastern Neighbourhood literature, this thesis starts from the premise that the sine qua non condition for effective cooperation between CSDP missions and incumbent regimes in the Eastern Neighbourhood is the compatibility between EU objectives and the incumbent regimes’ intrinsic preference for gaining and/or maintaining political power. Defined as preferential fit, the ‘match’ between the goals of EU missions – as highlighted by their mandates – and the political agendas of national governments in ENP countries emerges as the necessary condition that facilitates effective EU-ENP cooperation. In addition to confirming the centrality of the agency-oriented concept of ‘preferential fit’ for the development of effective cooperation between the EU and its Eastern neighbours, the findings outlined in the four empirical-analytical chapters also identify the conditions which shape the cost-benefit calculations of national governments: 1. The competing strategies of domestic veto players; 2. The potential for alternative coalitions (Russia, US other international organisations); 3. The cost-effectiveness of threats and side-payments (i.e. EU policy-specific conditionality; and EU capacity-building).

This thesis explores the advocacy strategies and influence of interest groups in EU foreign policy. It examines in particular the impact of institutional factors on the strategies and lobbying outcomes. Conceptually, it contributes to the literature on interest groups and lobbying in the EU and to the study of non-state actor participation in international organisations. Conceptualising EU foreign policy as multi-level and multi-pillar, the study inquires into the relationship between policy regime (ranging from the Community method to the intergovernmental method, as these predominate in different areas of EU external relations) and the degree and type of interest group influence. To this end the thesis compares three examples of EU foreign policy: visa liberalisation towards the Eastern neighbours; sanctions towards Belarus; and CSDP missions in Georgia and Palestine. The research reveals that interest groups engage in multi-level lobbying even in those policy areas that are ruled by the intergovernmental method. Intergovernmentalism limits formal access to policymakers, but groups and policymakers build channels for informal access. To some extent contrary to the predications of established theories, this allows interest groups to exert some degree of influence even on policy dossiers in which intergovernmental arrangements prevail. In such policy domains, groups opposing change do not always succeed, despite the veto opportunities that intergovernmentalism provides. While this is a significant finding, the thesis also notes how interest group influence is most commonly exerted upon relatively technical issues and at later stages of the policy cycle. Moreover, the study emphasises that institutional structures are not the only relevant factor in explaining group influence. Group-level characteristics, including material resources, condition groups’ ability to adapt to complex decision-making in EU foreign policy. The thesis concludes that a combination of factors is required to capture the influence of interest groups over EU foreign policy.

Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU) has become a prominent sender of international sanctions. Most of its sanctions regimes have been imposed to address human rights violations and democratic shortcomings in autocratic regimes. While these developments have attracted an increased attention by academics and practitioners alike, not much is known about the underlying factors that trigger the EU’s decision to impose sanctions in the very first place. Using a new database of EU democratic sanctions between 1989 and 2010, this thesis develops a theoretical model that shows that the imposition of sanctions is the result of a strategic bargaining process between a sender and a target country. I argue that sanctions are only one possible outcome of this process, and claim that the likelihood that sanctions are imposed depends, to a large extent, on the target country’s decision to comply with the sender before sanctions are imposed or, alternatively, on its determination to ignore the sender’s threat of sanctions and resist its pressure. I show that the target’s decision to comply or resist is the result of an endogenous policy formation process, which is determined by the target regime’s domestic institutional setting. Different types of institutions (regime types) impose varying degrees of constraints on the ruler’s margin of manoeuvre and shape her policy choices vis-à-vis the threat and imposition of sanctions. I demonstrate that regimes that face no domestic constraints and rely on a small winning coalition of supporters are likely to be strong and willing to resist the sender’s pressure, thereby “self-selecting” themselves into sanctions. By the same token, regimes that face many domestic constraints are vulnerable to sanctions, and face incentives to comply with the sender before sanctions are imposed. My thesis makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides a theoretical explanation of how domestic institutions matter in the imposition of sanctions, and identifies a set of conditions under which sanctions are more likely (not) to be imposed. Second, it empirically demonstrates the presence of selection effects in the study of sanctions imposition, and shows that these are channelled through the target regime’s domestic institutions. Finally, my findings have relevant policy implications, as they suggest that sanctions are more likely to be effective against certain types of targets. I show that sanctions are more likely to succeed against politically constrained regimes at the threat stage or early during a sanctions episode, whilst they are likely to fail against highly authoritarian regimes which rule free of domestic constraints.

The role of national parliaments in the European Union (EU) has gained prominence in the last decade among academics and practitioners alike in relation to the alleged democratic deficit of the EU. The existing literature has largely focused on the formal powers of national parliaments. However, the formally strongest parliaments are not necessarily the most active, and vice versa. This thesis argues that this divergence between formal rights and actual activity exists because not formal scrutiny powers, but public Euroscepticism, the presence of parties for which Europe is salient and which care deeply about Europe (‘issue entrepreneurs’) as well as internal party cohesion on the EU are the most important factors influencing activity. Public Euroscepticism leads to more debate and resolutions when issue entrepreneurs are present and when parties have a coherent position on Europe. Recent measures and future plans to further increase the formal powers of national parliaments might not lead to more activity and might thus not help to ameliorate the democratic deficit. Methodologically, this thesis relies on computer-assisted content analysis, multilevel models as well as elite interviews. Each of the three papers focuses on a different aspect of parliamentary activity. The first paper focuses on the ‘communication function’ of parliaments and presents an analysis of parliamentary debates in EU affairs. The second paper quantitatively analyses the determinants of parliamentary activity in the form of resolutions, relating to the government control or ‘scrutiny function’. The third paper investigates parliamentary scrutiny activity in-depth in a case study of the ‘Fiscal Compact’. The thesis argues that national parliaments should mostly concentrate on their communication function in EU affairs, while other functions might best be carried out by the European Parliament. It thus suggests that different parliamentary functions can best be fulfilled by different institutions in the EU multilevel system.

This study argues that the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is a constrained agent of Europe’s foreign policy. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty reform created the remodelled version of the High Representative of the Union as a potentially powerful agent to represent and coordinate Europe’s foreign policy. However, the analysis shows how and why the member states granted only limited discretion to the new foreign policy actor during the first years of the post’s existence. The aim of the study is to reveal the conditions of discretion of the High Representative. With the use of a principal-agent (PA) approach, the study shows that conflicting preferences of the member states, tight control mechanisms, as well as inadequate cooperation with the European Commission limited the High Representative’s room for manoeuvre. The findings suggest that the PA approach can be developed further in the future in order to better explain limited discretion of agents in matters of foreign policy. Based on the findings, the study also puts forward a number of characteristics of a ‘constrained agent’. It is suggested that the post of High Representative has the potential to emancipate from its status of a constrained agent over time, and to gain credibility as a foreign policy actor.

The issue of democratic deficit and crisis of legitimacy has been at the forefront of the development of the European project in the last twenty years. However, little attention has been directed towards analysing the way in which democratic legitimacy underlines the construction of the EU s foreign policy. This thesis draws on a broad understanding of democratic legitimacy which is seen to encompass various aspects: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. It shows that the media had a positive effect (although in contrasting degrees) on the democratic legitimacy of the EU s foreign policy in two issue areas, highlighting the ways in which it achieved this. Drawing on insights from political theory, it argues that the European public sphere has the potential to foster the four characteristics highlighted above through the ability of the media to politicise foreign policy issues, which are commonly closed off from democratic scrutiny. Three types of interaction effects between the media and policymakers within the European public sphere are identified: indexing, bounding and agenda setting. Firstly, indexing captures the ability of policymakers to influence and shape media discourse in order to aid their interests and goals by communicating in a favourable manner their policies to the general public. Secondly, through bounding the media can have a constraining or limiting effect on the range of policies and their effectiveness that policymakers can pursue, even if the latter are not aware of or willing to engage with the frames constructed by journalists. Finally, agenda setting captures the ability of the media to purposively influence decision-making processes through its discourse. Empirically two distinct areas of EU foreign policy are explored: the EU s approach to global climate change and its policy towards Russia. Hence, the study makes a significant contribution to the understanding of EU foreign policy and to its international actorness. Secondly, it extends in a comprehensive manner the debate regarding the crisis of legitimacy and democratic deficit in the EU to the realm of foreign policy. Finally, it also contributes to the literature on Foreign Policy Analysis which engages with the issue of democratic legitimacy.

The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) was the latest organisational innovation aimed at bridging the disjuncture between EU external relations and foreign policy structures. Almost immediately after its creation, it attracted wide-spread criticism of its functioning by the very same actors who had created it. This thesis develops a three-stage bureaucratic-institutionalist framework in order to explore the political contestation of this new organisation and its impact on the organisation and functioning of the EEAS. Inception, establishment and consolidation are the three phases of the organisation s life cycle under scrutiny. The thesis begins with the inception of the EEAS during the Convention on the Future of Europe from 2002-2003. Through the lens of rational choice historical institutionalism it analyses the positions of various actors in the Convention and the options that were considered during this phase. It then shows how disagreements between integrationist and more sceptical groups led to a vague compromise on the EEAS and its organisational design. The thesis continues with an analysis of the establishment phase, i.e. the negotiation process leading to the EEAS decision of 2010, throughout which the political conflict continued between the EU institutions on central design elements of the service such as status, scope and staffing. Theoretically, this conflict is captured through the politics of Eurocratic structure approach. In the final consolidation phase, the EEAS started to operate as a new administrative actor, but was heavily influenced by political and bureaucratic contestation. Bureaucracy theory helps to predict the organisational behaviour of the EEAS to a degree, but the thesis shows how the organisation was also shaped by bureaucratic politics between EU institutions and member states. The thesis concludes that a bureaucratic-institutionalist approach explains why the EEAS is a strongly contested bureaucracy and how the processes of contestation at the EU level hindered institutional design throughout the organisation s life cycle of inception, establishment and consolidation. It reveals limitations of this approach, such as the persistence of actors, the weight of decision precedent and the permeability of organisational development phases.

Basé sur un engagement collectif qui a débuté en 2001, cette thèse se penche sur le rôle des États membres de l'Union européenne (UE) dans la stabilisation de l’Afghanistan pendant l'intervention militaire de 2001 à 2014. La thèse analyse les contributions nationales et collectives des Etats membres à la stabilisation et la sécurité nationale de l'Afghanistan, de la réforme du secteur de sécurité à la formation de l'armée et de la police, du maintien de la paix aux combats et aux initiatives diplomatiques. La thèse montre que le Etats membres ont joué un rôle important dans les prestations de sécurité, mais leur impact collectif est en grande partie le résultat de synergies entre des contributions nationales, et ces synergies ont été réalisées en dehors des dynamiques ou des politiques européennes. Le leadership américain a été un facteur important dans l’émergence d’un rôle européen collectif par défaut. La thèse avance également un argument théorique-conceptuel : Loin d'être un obstacle à un rôle européen de sécurité et de défense, l'absence d'une politique ou d'un projet européen a agi comme un important catalyseur de la convergence des comportements, une fois qu’un leadership américain pouvait être invoqué. Cette convergence de comportements en matière de sécurité et de défense a eu lieu en dépit de la grande divergence des cultures stratégiques entre les Etats membres. Elle a été réalisée à partir d’actions conjointes mais sélectives qui furent insérées dans le cadre du leadership américain. Une politique collective et européenne n’a pas été nécessaire pour réaliser ce rôle. / Based on a collective engagement that has lasted since 2001, this thesis looks at the role(s) of the EU Member States (MS) in the provision of security during the intervention in Afghanistan (2001-2014). It analyzes their national and collective contribution(s) to Afghanistan’s post-2001 national security and Security Sector Reform (SSR), from military and police training to peace keeping, war fighting and diplomatic initiatives. The dissertation shows the MS played an important role in security provision, but their collective impact was largely the result of synergies between national contributions that occurred outside of European dynamics or policy planning. US campaign leadership was an important enabler of this collective European role by default. The dissertation also advances a theoretical-conceptual argument: Far from being an impediment to a European role in security and defense, the absence of a European policy or project acted as an important enabler of behavioral convergence once a US lead could be relied upon. This behavioral convergence in security and defense occurred despite the great strategic cultural divergence between the MS. It consisted of, and was driven by, joined-up action on an opt-in/opt-out basis, while a collective European policy was not necessary.