Hidden mutualities link the work of major postcolonial writers with Marlowe's drama of the Faustian pact - the manipulation of the material world in exchange for the soul - written as the 'scientific' world view was emerging which accompanied the imperial expansion of Europe and has determined the economic and social structures of the colonial and post-colonial world. This comparative study brings together researches in widely different fields to show how Doctor Faustus reflects a Gnostic / Hermetic tradition marginalized within the dominant European power structures. It shows initially how these ideas were crystallized by Ficino and Pico from the available texts of the Corpus Hermeticum, and how they relate to what has become known about Gnosticism and Simon Magus. Combined with the alchemical and cabalistic traditions they form a basis for the study of Renaissance 'Magus' figures such as Trithemius, Reuchlin, Agrippa, Paracelsus or Dee, who are reflected in Faust and in Shakespeare's Prospero in The Tempest. The second part investigates the dual legacy of the Magus. A counterpoint between a law-governed objective material world and an occult visionary pursuit of the divine potential of the human imagination, in which the Gnostic / Hermetic tradition ironically became marginalized by the technological science it had inspired, is traced through the examples of Kepler, Fludd, Newton, Blake, Kipling, Crowley, Yeats, Pauli and Jung. In the third part, textual analysis reveals how attention to these Faustian themes opens new critical perspectives in appreciating the works of postcolonial writers, in particular Dimetos by Athol Fugard, Disappearance by David Dabydeen, Omeros by Derek Walcott, and the novels of Wilson Harris, all of which stress the importance of the creative imagination over mimesis.

The aim of this thesis is to present the fundamental philosophical positions of Early German Romanticism, focusing on the three following writers: J. C. F. Holderlin, Novalis, and F. Schlegel. Chapter 1 begins with an examination of the first-philosophical, or ontological foundations of Romanticism and discusses its appropriation and critique of the work of Fichte, arriving at an elucidation of Romantic ontology as an ontology of differencing and production. The second chapter looks at how epistemology is transformed, in the hands of the Romantics, and due to the attention they paid to language, semiotic theory, and the operations of irony in discourse, into poetology - a theory of knowledge, into a theory of poetic production. In the third chapter a confrontation between the philosophical positions of Romanticism and those of the main currents of German Idealism (Schelling, Hegel) is undertaken; through this confrontation, the essential trait of Romantic thought is arrived at, namely the thought of an incomplete Absolute, as opposed to the absolute as totality in Idealism. The final chapter considers the avenue left open by the notion of the incomplete Absolute, and the Romantics' chief legacy, namely the theory of literature; literature is thus seen as coextensive with philosophy, and analysed under three conceptual categories (the theory of genre, the fragment, criticism) which all betray their provenance from the thought lying at the core of Romanticism: the incomplete Absolute. Finally, in the conclusion a summation of this exposition of romanticism is presented, alongside a brief consideration of the relevance of the Romantic project in contemporary critical/philosophical debates.

Instead of exploring explicit textual or ideological influences of the philosophy of F.W. Nietzsche on Modernist literary writers, this thesis analyses the points at which works such as James Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and T.S. Eliot's Four Quartets bear an implicit relationship to an aesthetic theory for which the notion of representation (artistic or philosophical) and that of sacredness must be thought together. Such a theory is to be found most explicitly in Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy, although some of his earlier and later writings engage with it too. Thus, from the points of convergence of the sacred and the aesthetic that appear in The Birth of Tragedy, I extract the keys for a theory of representation at large, of Nietzschean import, in order to contrast the notion of philosophical representation (Vorstellung) with the activities and discourses which philosophy has traditionally tried to avoid: rituals and myths. Out of this contrast, the conclusion emerges that there is a genealogical progression from ritual (specifically sacrifice) to myth, and from this to philosophical and artistic representation; that is to say, that only after a myth (whose root was a ritual) has lost its religious value, can philosophy and art (and literature in particular) enjoy a fully separate existence, as the secularised discourses that characterise our Modernity: (here modern science is included as a development and continuation of the philosophical discourse). What makes Modernist writers play an essential role in this respect is their tacit awareness of this genealogy, which is manifested in their aesthetic practice. Two instances of this practice are analysed here, in their mythopoeic character (mainly derived from the mythic possibilities of Christianity), and their questioning of modern notions (selfhood, identity, individuality). They re-enact the original sacred speech previous to our secularised modern aesthetics.

In this thesis I argue that Foucault's dispersive historiography is a deepening rather than a purifying of historical existence. This emphasis upon dispersion as a critical principle is contrasted with, and delimited by the possibility of the narrative comprehension of historical existence exemplified by the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. Insofar as the responsibility to act is an important field where tfphis deepening takes place it cannot be subordinated to the responsibility to otherness which aims at dismantling the action orientated frameworks of traditional ethics and politics. Ricoeur's promotion of narrative refiguration as a response to the aporias of time is thus, a timely rejoinder to dispersive genealogy. I argue further that Foucault's historiography exhibits the productive tension of history as both difference and meaning and that the ethical thrust of such writing is to address the concerns of the present in a way that metamorphosizes rather than challenges the narrative function. Insofar as it connects with the struggles of disenfranchised and marginalized groups, and discourses, it also echoes a powerful element In traditional emancipatory historiography which attempts to fully embrace the slaughtered possibilities of the past The emancipatory potential of dispersive historiography is examined further by comparison with the aims and values of traditional critical theory. Two positions are delineated: (1) Complementarity, in which genealogy produces valuable insights into hitherto unacknowledged power structures; (2) Delimitation, in which Foucault's work is seen to be an important limitation on the epistemological and ontological interventions of critical theory. This JOIns the philosophical hermeneutical critique of critical theory In its delimitation of the finite horizon of all emancipatory discourse. Finally I argue that Foucault's work is itself limited by its refusal to countenance the utopian dimension of social reproduction in which the social imaginary is to be considered not as a delusory projection of desire, but as a driving force behind the projection of freedom. Dispersive freedom sees the formation of political, cultural, and social identities as always constraints upon the real practice of freedom. It is this marginalisation of liberation as a process with ends that I seek to dispute. I conclude that Foucault's dispersive principles are belied by the important contribution his work has made to the necessarily ceaseless task of the refiguration of the concepts of history, freedom, power and truth.

The aim for this thesis is to motivate, critically evaluate and defend the claim that subjects are able to consciously perceive the affordances of objects. I will present my protagonist, the ‘Conscious Affordance Theorist’, with what are two main obstacles to this claim. The first of these is that affordance perception correctly understood refers only to a kind of subpersonal visual processing, and not to a kind of conscious visual experience. I claim that this results in an explanatory gap at the level of intentional action, which in order to correct we need to redefine the notion of affordance perception to include conscious as well as subpersonal affordance perception. Precisely, I claim that ‘affordance awareness’ has a crucial epistemological role to play, and that subjects must be able to consciously experience affordances in order to gain this awareness. In answer to this claim, I supplement the objection that affordance perception is defined as subpersonal perception to include the claim that any awareness subjects have of the affordances of objects they visually experience is due to them having thoughts about those affordances, and not visual experience of them. I then consider the Conscious Affordance Theorist’s response to this supplemented account. The second obstacle is the claim that conscious visual affordance perception is an impossible notion given that affordances are dispositional properties, and the dispositional properties of objects cannot be ‘seen’. In facing this objection I look to the supporting claims and motivations that lie behind it, in order to find a way for the Conscious Affordance Theorist to challenge its central claim that affordances cannot be seen. I end this thesis with an account of the Conscious Affordance Theorist’s own positive position, and a consideration of how his account has the ability to provide for conscious affordance perception in the case of non-human animals.

This thesis discusses the relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis. It takes the work of Freud and Lacan as a primary reference, and implements it in the reading of the texts of Nictzsche, Heidegger and Blanchot among others. The relationship is pursued along the lines of the problems originally posed by the philosophical writers and concerning the theme of subjectivity, idcntification, image fonnation and loss in order to punctuate the difficulties and aporias as articulatcd in and by the psychoanalytical questioning. The discussion aims therefore to demonstrate how the problems raised by philosophy can, but also should, be addressed by the psychoanalytical theory, and to what extent the former mishit, in the very way in which they are raised, by virtue of ignoring the discussion of the "fundamentals" of psychoanalysis, namely the status of the unconscious, the subject and the object in the human discourse. My strategy to address the philosophical readings begins in each part of this work with an analysis of the psychoanal)1ical text followed by the effects and implications, as they are imposed on the reading of philosophy/literature. This lack or insufficiency, as emerging in such an encounter, and operative in such a problematization, is thus given a certain psychographic attention which does not merely represent a psychoanalytical 'viewpoint' but rather involves a shift in the strategy itself. This shift questions the status of the subject in the production of discourse, while deploying the subject as a lack in such a questioning, and its relation to the real (object). It is in accordance with such an approach that I have divided this work into two parts, each attempting to address in the way described above the following issues. On the one hand, the analysis revolves around the problems of narcissism, specularity, image, ego and 'I' formation, and the symptom, and in this respect discusses the texts of Freud, Lacan, Rank and Nietzsche. On the other hand. it touches upon the work of "sad passions" or passions of death as operative in the production of the letter, and apparent in what could be called fictional theorisations in the texts of N. Abraham, Torok, Blanchot and Heidegger. Such tactics, again, take us beyond the meaning caught in the real, towards the way in which the problems of philosophy can be, again, taken up by psychoanalysis. To this extent, the second part has been devoted to the discussion and analysis of melancholia, mourning, loss, voice and guilt.

This thesis argues that the role played by the concept of remembrance (Eingedenken) in Walter Benjamin's 'theory of the knowledge of history' and in his engagement with Enlightenment universal history, is a crucial one. The implications of Benjamin's contention that history's 'original vocation' is 'remembrance' have hitherto gone largely unnoticed. The following thesis explores the meaning of the concept of remembrance and assesses the significance of this proposed link between history and memory, looking at both the mnemonic aspect of history and the historical facets of memory. It argues that by mobilising the simultaneously destructive and constructive capacities of remembrance, Benjamin sought to develop a critical historiography which would enable a radical encounter with a previously suppressed past. In so doing he takes up a stance (explicit and implicit) towards existing philosophical conceptions of history, in particular the idea of universal history found in German Idealism. Benjamin reveals an intention to retain the epistemological aspirations of universal history whilst ridding that approach of its apologetic moment. He criticises existing conceptions of history on the basis that each assumes homogeneous time to be the framework in which historical events occur. Insight into the distinctive temporality of remembrance proves to be the touchstone for this critique, and provides a paradigm for a very different conception of time. The thesis goes on to determine what is valid and what is problematic both in this concept of remembrance and in the theory of historical knowledge which it informs, by subjecting both to the most cogent criticisms which can be levelled at them. What emerges is not only the importance of this concept for an understanding of Benjamin's philosophy but the pertinence of this concept for any philosophical account of memory.

The Epiphenomenal Mind is both a deflationary attack on the powers of the human mind and a defence of human subjectivity. It is deflationary because in the thesis I argue that consciousness is an epiphenomenal consequence of events in the brain. It is a defence of human subjectivity because I argue that the mind is sui generis real, irreducible, and largely an endogenous product (i.e. not dependent on society or its resources). Part I is devoted to arguing that the conscious mind is epiphenomenal. Arguing from, the irreducibility of mental states, the causal closure of the physical domain, and the principle of causal explanatory exclusion, I seek to demonstrate that all theories of mental causation necessarily violate one or more of these premises. Contemporary approaches to mental causation come under two broad categories, those that argue that mental events are supervenient on physical events (such as Davidson, Kim and Horgan) and those (like Haskar) who argue that the mind is an emergent property of the brain. Supervenience based theories, I argue, end up reducing mental states in their search for a theory of mental causation and emergence based theories end up violating the principle of the causal closure of the physical. In part II, I explore some of the consequences of epiphenomenalism for social theory. This exploration comes in the context of a defence of human subjectivity against (i.) those sociological imperialists who view the mind and self as a 'gift of society', and (ii.) social situationalists who have abandoned the concept of action and an interest in 'what's in the head' of the actor, in favour of a concept of social action which views behaviour as action only to the extent that it is socially meaningful. The conclusion is that the social sciences should return to an interpretative style (Weberian) methodology.

In this thesis I have set out to perform two interlocking, although separable, tasks. The first is to provide some insight into the philosophical and theoretical roots of ethnomethodology by investigating the work of Garfinkel and others who have in some way assimilated, borrowed from, or been influenced by his work, in a context provided by a discussion of the work of Husserl and Schutz on the one hand and that of Wittgenstein on the other. I will show the ways in which Schutz has adapted Husserlian phenomenological insights to further his own fundamentally sociological ends and how Garfinkel, borrowing only selectively from Schutz and allowing many other influences to play upon his work (here Kaufman, Parsons and Gurwitsch are important sources of ideas), transforms ideas generated in the phenomenological tradition to an extent which suggests that his writings should be seen in a context set by Wittgenstein's writings (in terms particularly of notions such as 'form of life' and trulel in a sense of those terms which will become apparent), rather than encumbering it with too uuch phenomenological baggage I will move on from there to investigate the writings of other ethnomethodologists, showing how some - for example Cicourel - remain more firmly within the phenomenological tradition, whilst others have taken various of Garfinkel's ideas (although few have taken them whole and undiluted) and investigated, in their various ways, their implications for the study of -social order and society. In the process of this arm of the discussion I will point out some of the weaknesses and strengths of various ethnomethodological positions, suggesting in conclusion that there is important work being done and waiting to be done in the areas currently being investigated. The second task of the thesis is less historically oriented. Here the focus will be upon theoretical issues surrounding the problem of social order and the problem of meaning, problems which will be seen to be interrelated. The chief concern here will be to show the ways in which Wittgenstein and Garfinkel struggle to present and make coherent a sense of 'meaning' which is fundamentally different from that which is espoused by phenomenologists like Schutz and by many other contemporary sociologists, and how this difference rests side by side, in Garfinkel's work, with a radically different approach to the problem of social order from that which characterises the work of Parsons and others. The thrust of this difference lies in an attempt to reconceptualise 'meaning' in a way that does not posit as fundamental the distinction between 'subjectivity' on the one hand and an 'objective' world on the other, but which instead, by emphasising the omniprevalence of 'language games' and the 'indexicality' of expressions, focuses attention on some notion of 'form of life' or of the 'formal structures of practical actions'. The effect of this shift of emphasis, I will suggest, is that 'meaning' becomes transformed from seeming to be a 'thing' of some kind contained within a 'structure' of meanings to become instead an 'embedded' phenomenon, bound up with what we do in the social world, where the things we do generate and exhibit those orderly features which make meaning possible.

How are we to understand dementia? The main argument involves an analysis (in Chapter 2) of intentional mental states, using Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following, which suggests that such states demonstrate an irreducible, transcendental normativity. This externalist account of intentional mental states highlights the worldly embedding of practices. In Chapters 3,4 and 5, this analysis is applied respectively to the disease, cognitive neuropsychology and social constructionist models of dementia. Whilst clinically and scientifically useful, none generates an adequate account of normativity. The Wittgensteinian analysis supplies a constitutive (as opposed to causal) account that supports the notion of dementia-in-the-world (Chapter 6). A full understanding of dementia requires the human-person-perspective in order to accommodate all that dementia amounts to in the normatively-constrained world. The sub-plot considers our understanding of the person. Rather than the Locke-Parfit view, which stresses psychological continuity, the Wittgensteinian analysis supports the situated-embodied-agent view of the person (Chapters I and 6). This view and the notion of the human-person-perspective are mutually supportive, so that main and subplot both encourage a broader understanding. The works of Wittgenstein have acted as a primary source, with secondary literature commenting on his works. In discussing the models of dementia, I have cited primary sources. I have also considered philosophical works pertinent to the particular models, usually in connection with the mind-brain problem. The thesis concludes that there is no single way to understand dementia, but any understanding will be from the human-person-perspective, in accord with the situated-embodied-agent view and reflecting an externalist construal of intentional psychological states. This has implications for further research in philosophy, medical ethics and gerontology. The unique application of the Wittgensteinian philosophical analysis to clinical reality suggests an approach to people with dementia that stresses personhood in the context of embedded, embodied histories and continuing relationships with others.