This dissertation examines the concept of event, as found in the ontologies developed by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). The texts I focus on are Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (1927), "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (1928), "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (lecture 1930, print 1943), Beiträge zur Philosopie (vom Ereignis) (written 1936-38, but not published until 1989), and Deleuze's Différence et répétition (1968). My focus is on the way each philosopher advances an account of the event in relation to a set of key fundamental themes. For Heidegger, these are truth, difference, ground, and time-space. For Deleuze I also discuss ground and time, but focus especially on difference. Deleuze's account of difference entails a distinction between a “virtual” register of dialectical Ideas and an “actual” register of systems of simulacra, and clarifying his concept of event in relation to these plays a dominant role in my analysis. Deleuze's account of dialectical Ideas is profoundly influenced by that of the early twentieth century mathematician and philosopher, Albert Lautman (1908-1944). Lautman, in turn, developed his account through an engagement with Heidegger's early work. In Chapter V, I reconstruct the Heideggerian line of influence on Deleuze via Lautman. Beginning in the mid-1930s Heidegger understands being to be evental in nature, while difference constitutes an essential dimension of the event, though the latter point is often neglected in the scholarship. Truth, ground, and time-space articulate the structure and dynamics of being as event. For Deleuze, being is difference, but difference differentiates by way of events. Ground, time, systems of simulacra, and dialectical Ideas articulate the structure of being's evental differentiation and the genesis of worlds of beings possessing quasi-stable identities modulated by their complex relations. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;

This dissertation aims to reconfigure 'materialism' against the contemporary context of philosophy. By carrying out a meta-philosophical investigation on the logical schemas, philosophical operations and deployments of the major philosophical projects of Albert Lautman (1908-1944), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), and Alain Badiou (1937- ), i.e., Lautman's philosophy of mathematics (especially the dialectic governing his theory of 'mathematical genesis'), Deleuze's philosophy of difference (especially the logic of event and metamorphosis underlying the 'Deleuzian genesis' extracted from Chapter IV and V of Difference and Repetition), and Badiou's mathematical ontology (especially the fundamental logical schema of his mature ontology presented in Being and Event), this dissertation attempts to show how the works of these three philosophers are contributive to the aforementioned task of the reconfiguration of materialist philosophy. In terms of the problematics of 'formalization of the real', the 'transcendental methodology', and the 'immanent principle' of reality shared by all these three philosophical projects, I propose that their works can be defined as a particular type of materialist philosophy that I call 'transcendental materialism'; and this 'transcendental materialism', in turn, ought to be comprehended according to a modern reading of Platonism, i.e., the non-orthodox re-articulation of Platonic philosophy comprised of Lautman's unorthodox-realist Platonism, Deleuze's materialism as overturned Platonism, and Badiou's materialism with the Platonic Idea. I conclude that Lautman, Deleuze, and Badiou are three philosophers of 'transcendental materialism' knotted by this modern Platonism. On the strength of the 'transcendental materialism' constituted in view of the investigation presented by this dissertation, I intend to show that Lautman's philosophy of mathematics offers the proper perspective or the 'condition' for a genuine comprehension of Deleuze's major philosophical project in the late 1960s; on the basis of this genuine comprehension, Deleuze's philosophical project, which concentrates in the study of the transcendental logic of the real instead of providing empirical knowledge of sensible objects and material entities, ought to be categorized as 'transcendental materialism', a category that is also competent to define Badiou's philosophical project, i.e., 'a materialism without object/matter'; and therefore, the philosophical demarcation within contemporary materialist philosophy ought not to be simply portrayed as 'Badiou vs. Deleuze', 'dialectical materialism vs. vitalist materialism'. The genuine philosophical demarcation within materialism today is 'Idea against Matter'. 'Transcendental materialism' is 'a materialism with the Idea' or 'a materialism of the Idea' which is against the 'naïve materialism' or the 'metaphysics of the Matter'. In case transcendental materialism might have been conceived as a new 'metaphysics', it is the metaphysics of the imperceptible, the inexistent, and the inconsistent. The 'material reality', after 'transcendental materialism', is 'non-All'. Concerning the far more complicated confrontations between different trends of contemporary materialist/realist philosophy, my proposal of constituting the 'transcendental materialism' can be considered as an attempt to reconfigure the current debates on materialist philosophy: to reorganize the dialogues, for instance, between Badiou and his opponents -- 'object-oriented-ontology', 'speculative realism', and 'non-philosophy'; to integrate Quentin Meillassoux's project into transcendental materialism in terms of their shared 'transcendental methodology'; and, most importantly, to 'radicalize' materialist/realist philosophy towards a theory of practice.

Tableau d’honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2009-2010 / Comme son titre l'indique, ce mémoire a pour ambition de présenter la philosophie mathématique d'Albert Lautman (1908-1944). L'approche adoptée se distingue en ce qu'elle donne une place centrale aux exemples mathématiques. Cette manière de procéder s'impose, car elle permet de pallier le caractère parfois assez vague des références purement philosophiques de cet auteur. J'accorde ainsi une importance particulière à la méthode de division en mathématiques, que Lautman rattache explicitement au platonisme, et propose de plus une lecture néoplatonicienne de la dualité essence-existence, centrale dans la pensée du philosophe. Cette dernière interprétation me semble fidèle à l'inspiration constante de Lautman. Je décris brièvement en conclusion les quelques pistes de recherche que j'entends suivre au cours des prochaines années. L'oeuvre fascinante d'Albert Lautman se trouve ainsi exposée à partir de ses dimensions mathématiques et ± platoniciennes ¿.

Sous le signe de l'irréductibilité de l'événement ou "devenir" des concepts à l'histoire des idées, le moment philosophique du structuralisme selon Deleuze (1967-1969) est envisagé selon trois points de vue correspondant aux trois parties de la thèse. <p>La première partie adopte la perspective historiographique pour y déceler, chez F.Wahl (1968), M. Frank (1989) F. Dosse (1991), deux principales sources de la méconnaissance du structuralisme philosophique deleuzien au profit d'un prétendu "post" ou "néo-structuralisme" (à partir de L’Anti-Œdipe) :<p> 1° le tracé d'une ligne de partage exclusif entre la philosophie et le structuralisme méthodique des linguistes et de Lévi-Strauss ;<p>2° le rôle de parangon joué par la déconstruction derridienne du structuralisme. <p>La seconde partie fait valoir l'irréductibilité du "portrait conceptuel" du structuralisme peint par Deleuze en 1967, tant à l'égard du "cliché scientiste" (linguistique ou axiomatique) dominant les présentations doxographiques contemporaines (F.Wahl et J. Piaget) qu'à l'égard de la déconstruction du structuralisme par Derrida. A rebours des premiers, Deleuze supprime le mètre-étalon (linguistique ou mathématique) permettant de hiérarchiser les disciplines concernées par le structuralisme et, en s’appuyant sur la théorie lévistraussienne de la fonction symbolique à la clef du structuralisme de Lacan, Althusser, Foucault et le groupe Tel Quel, il propose sept critères formels transdisciplinaires, valant autant dans les sphères philosophique et artistique que dans celles des sciences humaines et des sciences exactes. Ce faisant, à la différence de Derrida et du « néo-structuralisme », Deleuze associe en un même « Jeu idéal » Lévi-Strauss (philosophiquement moustachu d’être associé à Lacan, Foucault, Barthes et Althusser) et Nietzsche (philosophiquement glabre d’être revisité à la lumière du structuralisme). <p>La troisième partie envisage dans Différence et répétition et Logique du sens le développement philosophique de ce "personnage conceptuel" nietzschéo-structuraliste apte à accomplir le « renversement esthétique » du Platonisme nihiliste au profit de la création et de la dramatisation des simulacres/structures. Associant structuralisme et pensée sérielle (U. Eco), Deleuze compose une œuvre chaosmos, un simulacre sériel, polyphonique, « achevé-illimité » jouant de bribes et miette de tout ce que les philosophes ont pu « croire et raconter » depuis l’Antiquité grecque afin de dramatiser l’Idée problématique du structuralisme à la veille de Mai 68./Under the sign of the irreductibility of the event or the “becoming” of concepts to their history, the philosophical moment of structuralism according to Deleuze (1967-1969) is considered from three points of view corresponding to the three parts of the thesis.<p>The first part adopts the historiographical perspective to detect, in F. Wahl (1968), M. Frank (1989), F. Dosse (1991), two main sources for the lack of knowledge about the deleuzian philosophical structuralism in favour of a so-called “post” or “neo”-structuralism (starting from the Anti-Oedipus) :<p>\ / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished