A organização cooperativa é uma, dentre várias, forma de se coordenar a atividade econômica. No setor agropecuário, particularmente, desempenha um papel relevante na economia de vários países, atuando como importantes players em diversos segmentos do agronegócio. A cooperativa difere de outros tipos organizacionais em grande parte devido à sua peculiar estrutura de propriedade e natureza econômica complexa, delineados por princípios históricos que fazem dela uma forma organizacional ímpar, uma simbiose entre propósitos social e o econômico. A motivação do presente trabalho é trazer ao conhecimento do leitor, ao menos em parte, as diferentes abordagens nas quais as teorias sobre o modelo de empreendimento cooperativista têm se baseado para responder questões fundamentais acerca das organizações cooperativas agropecuárias no decorrer da história, tais como: o que são cooperativas? Por que elas se formam? O que as fazem organizações únicas? Quais são as vantagens e desvantagens deste modelo organizacional frente aos demais? Enfim, no presente trabalho busca-se mostrar como a organização cooperativa, deixando questões ideológicas de lado, vem sendo estudada e debatida à luz da teoria convencional da firma e sua análise marginal e, mais recentemente, da moderna teoria das organizações formulada no âmbito da Nova Economia Institucional. / The cooperative organization is one of several means of coordinating economic activity. In the agricultural sector, notably, it plays an important role in the economy of several countries, acting as important players in a number of segments of agribusiness. The cooperative differs from other organizational types largely because of its peculiar structure of ownership and complex economic nature, outlined by historical principles that make it a unique organizational form, a symbiosis between social and economic purposes. The aim of the present work it is to bring to the reader's knowledge, at least in part, the different approaches on which theories of the cooperative model of enterprise have been based to answer fundamental questions about cooperative organizations throughout history, such as: what are cooperatives? Why do they form? What makes them unique organizations? What are the advantages and disadvantages of this organizational model with regard to others? Finally, the present paper seeks to show how the cooperative organization, ideological issues aside, has been studied and debated in the light of the conventional theory of the firm and its marginal analysis, and more recently, those covered by the modern theory of organizations formulated within the scope of the New Institutional Economics.

Society's awareness of the importance of environmental-, social- and economic issues has increased over the last decades. This increased interest has led to the development of the Corporate Social Responsibility concept (CSR) in which companies actively work simultaneously with environmental, social and economic issues that extend beyond what is legally required by these companies in order to achieve a more sustainable society. As the interest in CSR has increased, a debate whether CSR is value-creating or should be considered an agency cost has arisen. To approach this question previous researches have used the CEO compensation to examine if the engagement in CSR actually is an agency cost or a value creating activity and found that agency costs can be mitigated by tying incentives to performance. Based on these assumptions this study will examine the link between CSR and agency costs using the existence of a CSR related compensation incentives for CEOs related agency costs. This study is characterized to be positivistic and within the field of positive accounting research as it has deductive approach in which hypotheses are formulated that this study intends to test which are based on what fundamental economic theories and previous research have found that may affect agency costs. The empirical data are manually collected from companies’ on NasdaqOMX Stockholm 2016 annual reports followed by an analysis of the data using univariate t-test and multiple regressions in order to relate these findings to previous research. This study finds no direct evidence that CEO compensation incentives related to CSR affect agency costs which means that we have not closed the ongoing debate whether CSR engagement is creating shareholder value or should be considered an agency cost. Nonetheless, the results show indications that agency costs are higher for companies that use CEO compensation incentives related to CSR which indicates that CSR is not beneficial to shareholders but should instead be regarded as an agency cost at the expense of shareholders. The result also indicates that a positive accounting research is not particularly useful on a small stock market with reliable results because the findings can not be generalized in a broader perspective

A organização cooperativa é uma, dentre várias, forma de se coordenar a atividade econômica. No setor agropecuário, particularmente, desempenha um papel relevante na economia de vários países, atuando como importantes players em diversos segmentos do agronegócio. A cooperativa difere de outros tipos organizacionais em grande parte devido à sua peculiar estrutura de propriedade e natureza econômica complexa, delineados por princípios históricos que fazem dela uma forma organizacional ímpar, uma simbiose entre propósitos social e o econômico. A motivação do presente trabalho é trazer ao conhecimento do leitor, ao menos em parte, as diferentes abordagens nas quais as teorias sobre o modelo de empreendimento cooperativista têm se baseado para responder questões fundamentais acerca das organizações cooperativas agropecuárias no decorrer da história, tais como: o que são cooperativas? Por que elas se formam? O que as fazem organizações únicas? Quais são as vantagens e desvantagens deste modelo organizacional frente aos demais? Enfim, no presente trabalho busca-se mostrar como a organização cooperativa, deixando questões ideológicas de lado, vem sendo estudada e debatida à luz da teoria convencional da firma e sua análise marginal e, mais recentemente, da moderna teoria das organizações formulada no âmbito da Nova Economia Institucional. / The cooperative organization is one of several means of coordinating economic activity. In the agricultural sector, notably, it plays an important role in the economy of several countries, acting as important players in a number of segments of agribusiness. The cooperative differs from other organizational types largely because of its peculiar structure of ownership and complex economic nature, outlined by historical principles that make it a unique organizational form, a symbiosis between social and economic purposes. The aim of the present work it is to bring to the reader's knowledge, at least in part, the different approaches on which theories of the cooperative model of enterprise have been based to answer fundamental questions about cooperative organizations throughout history, such as: what are cooperatives? Why do they form? What makes them unique organizations? What are the advantages and disadvantages of this organizational model with regard to others? Finally, the present paper seeks to show how the cooperative organization, ideological issues aside, has been studied and debated in the light of the conventional theory of the firm and its marginal analysis, and more recently, those covered by the modern theory of organizations formulated within the scope of the New Institutional Economics.

Opaqueness is inherent to financial institutions but contributes to the fragility of the banking system. The archetypal assets held by banks, loans, have a value that cannot be properly communicated outside of a banking relationship (Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992). Because they are relationship specific and raise adverse selection concerns, these assets are illiquid (Diamond and Rajan 2001). However, these assets are financed with liquid deposits; uncertainty about their value can cause depositors to withdraw their funds and banks to topple (Calomiris and Kahn 1991; Chen 1999). Additionally, the combination of opaqueness and leverage creates moral hazard incentives, exacerbated by government guarantees, as well as other agency conflicts that are detrimental to stability (Jensen and Meckling 1976).This dissertation presents three original contributions on the consequences of bank opaqueness. The first contribution concerns financial analysts. We show that, unlike in other industries, the most talented sell-side analysts are no more likely than their peers to issue recommendation revisions that influence bank stock prices. However, star analysts appear to maintain influence by uncovering firm-specific bad news that induces sharp negative revaluations of bank stock prices. In the second contribution, we find that the persistence of bank dividend policies increases with agency conflicts between shareholders and managers and decreases in the presence of large institutional shareholders who have an incentive to monitor banks and to mitigate agency conflicts. Our third contribution assesses the competitive distortions in bond markets since the recent reforms of the European Union bank safety net. We find that nationalized systemic banks, and those that benefit from high bailout expectations, do not benefit from funding advantages compared to their peers. Our findings also suggest that bailout expectations for these banks have diminished, consistent with new regulatory frameworks enacted after the financial crisis being effective.Overall, our findings suggest that opaqueness presents formidable challenges for public authorities but that its consequences can be mitigated by credible regulation. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

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Using geotextiles in secondary roads to stabilize weak subgrades has been a well accepted practice over the past thirty years. However, from an economical point of view, a complete life cycle cost analysis (LCCA), which includes not only costs to agencies but also costs to users, is urgently needed to assess the benefits of using geotextile in secondary road flexible pavement. In this study, a comprehensive life cycle cost analysis framework was developed and used to quantify the initial and the future cost of 25 representative design alternatives. A 50 year analysis cycle was used to compute the cost-effectiveness ratio for the design methods. Four flexible pavement design features were selected to test the degree of influence of the frame's variables. The analysis evaluated these variables and examined their impact on the results. The study concludes that the cost effectiveness ratio from the two design methods shows that the lowest cost-effectiveness ratio using Al-Qadi's design method is 1.7 and the highest is 3.2. The average is 2.6. For Perkins' design method, the lowest value is 1.01 and the highest value is 5.7. The average is 2.1. The study also shows when user costs are considered, the greater TBR value may not result in the most effective life-cycle cost. Hence, for an optimum secondary road flexible pavement design with geotextile incorporated in the system, a life cycle cost analysis that includes user cost must be performed. / Master of Science

Yes / This study provides new evidence that the performance of issuing firms varies by issue type, based on survival analysis methods. Our non-parametric results show that firms raising capital through rights issues, and notably through cash offers, experience a greater risk of delisting following issuance, as compared to those issuing convertible bonds. Our Cox model analyses demonstrate that plain equity issues, in contrast to convertible issues, are subject to different degrees of regulatory discipline, obligations and incentives in shaping survival trajectory. Further, high ownership concentration, agency issues intrinsic to equity offerings, weak shareholders' protection, and corporate ownership and governance and corporate control development at the time of an offer markedly influence post-issue survival. Plain equity issues, notably cash offers, are strongly linked with the agency costs of free cash flows. A large and truly independent board, allied to a separation of CEO and chairman powers, acts as a primary restraint on managers' self-interested behaviour. Such a cohesive governance mechanism can restrain rent-seeking in the firm's fundraising initiative. These observations hold when we take into account information available before an issue, at the time of an issue, and after an issue, demonstrating the robustness of our findings.

The thesis investigates if investors on the Swedish Stock Exchange, Nasdaq Stockholm, are compensated with a premium for holding shares in family firms due to family-specific agency costs between 2015 to 2019. The thesis uses a portfolio-based approach where the risk-adjusted returns are calculated with the Fama-French three-factor model and the Carhart’s four-factor model. A portfolio consisting of family firms displays a positive weekly alpha between 0,14 to 0,21 percent, 7,28 to 10,92 percent on a yearly basis, indicating a premium for holding shares in family firms. Additionally, the results show that firms where families control a majority of the votes lead to higher abnormal returns. A portfolio consisting of family firms with over 50 percent voting rights generate abnormal returns of 0,16 to 0,26 percent weekly, and 10,92 to 13,52 percent yearly. Higher abnormal returns when the control is higher further implies that investors are compensated with a premium for family-specific agency costs when buying shares in family-controlled firms.

The thesis examines factors that influence sustainability and success of microfinance institutions in Ghana. The topic is important, particularly in poverty stricken Africa, where microfinance institutions play a significant role in supporting governments' initiatives to reduce/alleviate poverty. The developed model is tested using data collected from 14 face-to-face interviews and 114 questionnaires. The data is analysed using different techniques- descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations and regression analysis. The research design and scale of the study are appropriate to both the problem addressed and doctoral level research. A number of factors in the model developed were found to be influencing the sustainability and success of microfinance institutions. A model was proposed that seeks to offer an explanation of sustainability and success of Microfinance Institutions in Ghana. The proposed model identified five categories being: institutional characteristics, agency costs, business strategy, environment/governance and success. Single factor analysis established positive relationships between sustainability and all the five factors but placed more emphasis on three out of the five factors namely; success, business strategy and environment/ governance. Multiple factor analysis established no significant differences in the sustainability with respect to the type of MFI, ownership and source of funding. Multiple Regression which allows for the testing of theories or models established a significant relationship between the Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS) and the predictors, especially the drop-out rate of clients and average loans. The Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) was calculated for the various types of MFIs and the result was a high dependency ratio especially among the FNGOs. Though the dependency is on the decline, it is very slow indicating that most MFIs will depend on subsidies for a very long time to come. Finally it was observed that the relatively high interest rates charged by most of the MFIs tended to defeat the purpose for which the microfinance movement came about. Not only did the study confirm the research model, but it also revealed that most owners did not exhibit a deep sense of involvement and used general knowledge to practice in Ghana. The study concluded that success factors, business strategy, and environment/governance were the most critical of the sustainability factors in Ghana. It is therefore important that managers develop institutional capacities especially in managing the agency problem effectively if they have to be sustainable and successful.

Esta dissertação analisa a representação direta voluntária a partir de três âmbitos: (i) histórico, (ii) estrutural e (iii) econômico. O perfil histórico é abordado a partir de uma breve construção historiográfica do desenvolvimento da representação desde o período clássico romano, passando pela Idade Média e suas transmutações, com concessões ao brocardo romano alteri stipulari nemo potest, até a construção proposta pela pandectística germânica na figura de Laband. A construção labandiana, lapidada por Hupka, é analisada, posteriormente, sob a perspectiva civilista atual, retomando algumas propostas do modelo idealizado por Laband-Hupka e algumas críticas a este modelo, trazendo como ponto central a questão da abstração da representação em relação ao contrato de mandato e outras figuras gestórias. A figura representativa é, então, colocada sob análise econômica, sob a lupa da Análise Econômica do Direito. A análise ultrapassa a questão de economia de custos que a representação oferece, e que é de meridiana clareza, para analisar, sob a perspectiva da Teoria de Agência e da Teoria de Custos de Transação, os custos gerados por esta figura na negociação e conclusão de contratos / This dissertation analyzes the direct and voluntary representation from three different scopes: (i) historical, (ii) structural, and (iii) economical. The historic profile is broached from a brief historiographical construction of the development of representation from tha classical Roman period, through the Middle Ages and its transmutations, with concessions made to the Roman maxim alteri stipulari nemo potest, until the construction proposed by German Pandect author, Laband. The Laband construction, improved by Hupka, is analyzed, subsequently, under the present civil perspective, retaking some of the proposals of the model idealized by Laband-Hupka and some criticism to this model, bringing as central point of discussion the abstraction of representations towards the contract of mandate and other management relationships. The representative figure is, then, put under economical analysis, under the magnifying glass of Law and Economics. The analysis exceeds the matter of economy of costs that is offered by representation, and which is rather explicit, to analyze, under the perspective of the Agency Theorie and the Costs of Transaction Theorie, the costs generated by this figure in transaction and closing of contracts