La privatisation des entreprises industrielles en Algérie a été initiée en 1995 par le PAS (Programme d’Ajustement Structurel) appliqué à une économie qui était en cessation de paiement. La privatisation des entreprises sous l’égide du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale avait donc pour principal objectif d’alléger les dépenses de l’Etat pour rétablir l’équilibre budgétaire et l’équilibre des comptes extérieurs dans le contexte d’une économie en voie de libéralisation progressive. Les mesures du PAS dont la privatisation ne sont pas intégrées dans une politique industrielle. En 2001, une ordonnance stipule que toutes les entreprises sont privatisables. Un tournant a cependant été observé dés 2007 puisque la privatisation des entreprises est intégrée dans une politique industrielle. Elle doit désormais contribuer à freiner la désindustrialisation amorcée durant la décennie 1980 et aggravée par le PAS et à améliorer la compétitivité de l’économie algérienne. Après un échec, le bilan de la privatisation des entreprises s’améliore d’un point de vue quantitatif (dés 2005) et qualitatif (IDE hors-hydrocarbures) particulièrement en 2007, comme le montre notre bilan qui est global et qui traite aussi dans le détail de cas d’entreprises privatisées. Cependant, depuis 2008, le « climat des affaires » marqué par une instabilité juridique, l’interventionnisme, la crise économique mondiale semble peu propice à une privatisation qui pourrait permettre à l’industrie algérienne de sortir de sa dépendance vis-à-vis des hydrocarbures. Nous concluons que malgré quelques rares succès, la privatisation des entreprises en Algérie a échoué parce que ces dernières n’ont pas bénéficié, au préalable de restructuration stratégique. De plus, la privatisation n’a pas été encadrée par des institutions et une politique industrielle efficaces. / The privatization of industrial enterprises in Algeria was initiated in 1995 by the SAP (Structural Adjustment Program) applied to an economy that was insolvent. The privatization of companies under the aegis of the IMF and the World Bank had therefore the main objective to reduce government expenditure in order to restore the balance of both state budget and external accounts in the context of an economy in the process of gradual liberalization. The SAP measures including privatization are not integrated into an industrial policy. In 2001 an ordinance stipulates that all companies can be privatized. A turning point was however observed in 2007 because privatization is integrated into an industrial policy. Privatization must now help to stop the deindustrialization that began during the 1980s and exacerbated by the SAP and to improve the competitiveness of the Algerian economy. After a failure, the privatization results improves by a quantitative point of view (from 2005) and qualitative (non-hydrocarbon FDI), especially in 2007, as shown in our assessment that is global, and dealing also in details of cases of privatized enterprises. However, since 2008, the "business climate" marked by legal instability, interventionism, the global economic crisis does not seem conducive to a privatization that could help the Algerian industry to go out of its dependence on hydrocarbons. We conclude that despite a few successes, the privatization of enterprises in Algeria failed because these last ones have not benefited from prior strategic restructuring. In addition, privatization has not been supervised by effective institutions and industrial policy.

Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei unabhängigen Kapiteln in Vertragstheorie und Industrieökonomik. Die Kapitel 1 und 2 bearbeiten Fragestellungen der Vertragstheorie. In diesen Kapiteln studiere ich die Ausprägung der Informationsasymmetrien, die in vertraglichen Beziehungen entstehen, wenn die schlechter informierte Partei versucht ihren Informationsnachteil gegenüber dem Vertragspartner zu reduzieren. In Kapitel 1 analysiere ich die Möglichkeit, dass die schlechter informierte Vertragspartei eine dritte Partei – einen Berater oder Supervisor – konsultiert, der jedoch mit der besser informierten Partei kolludieren könnte. In Kapitel 2 analysiere ich den Fall, in dem die schlechter informierte Vertragspartei selbst Monitoring-Aktivitäten aufnehmen kann, um zusätzliche Information zu sammeln. In Kapitel 3 untersuche ich den Effekt von Informationsasymmetrien innerhalb von Unternehmen auf diskriminierende Preissetzungsstrategien in Zwischengutmärkten. Hierbei analysiere ich Preisdiskriminierung und die aus dieser resultierenden Wohlfahrtseffekte in einem Modell eines Zwischengutmarktes, auf dem ein monopolistischer Verkäufer ein Zwischengut an zwei Abnehmer verkauft, die aufgrund ihrer unterschiedlichen vertikalen Organisation unterschiedlich stark von Agenturkosten betroffen sind. / This dissertation consists of three independent chapters in the fields of contract theory and industrial organization. Chapters 1 and 2 are concerned with topics in contract theory. In these chapters, I study the form of information asymmetry that arises in contractual relationships where the less knowledgeable party can reduce its informational disadvantage vis-à-vis the contractual partner. In Chapter 1, I analyze the opportunity of the less knowledgeable party to consult a third party – an expert or supervisor – who can provide advice. In Chapter 2, the less knowledgeable party can itself engage in monitoring activities to gather additional information. In Chapter 3, I explore the effect of information asymmetry within firms on discriminatory pricing in intermediate good markets. In particular, I study price discrimination and the associated welfare effects in an intermediate good market where a monopolistic upstream firms sells an input to downstream firms that vary in their exposure to the problem of asymmetric information due to different degrees of vertical integration.

This thesis examines responses to the problem of stock market short-termism ('SMST'). SMST is defined as investors preferring short-term financial returns over potentially more profitable longer-term investment opportunities. Such short-termism may result in serious real-world consequences. Company executives appear to respond to short-term pressures in ways that jeopardize the long-term sustainability of listed companies negatively impacting investors and other stakeholders including employees, customers and the community at large. This thesis provides an original contribution to the academic literature via an in-depth examination of all significant regulatory and financial industry efforts meant to reform SMST in major capital markets after the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. I hypothesize that the extensive discussion of the SMST issue has generated substantial reforms. Based on an analysis of the implemented reforms, I reveal that the anticipated surge of SMST reform has not occurred. I then explore why the widespread SMST discussion has not resulted in greater reform efforts. This examination reveals the complex nature of the SMST problem and the evidentiary issues inherent in viably identifying and measuring the harms of SMST. However, I determine that there is probable cause for concern justifying SMST reform measures. Further, I conclude that SMST issues arise because investors are biased towards short-term returns when calculating risk. This bias is evident in share pricing, meaning that share prices are not a reliable indicator of fundamental corporate value. Based on this conclusion, an original dual pathway for SMST reform is proposed. This dual pathway indicates that SMST reform measures must either: (1) reduce the actual or perceived excessive discounting of future returns by investors (i.e. make share prices better reflective of long-term value); or (2) cut-off the transmission mechanisms of SMST into the listed company (i.e. sever the link between share prices and corporate decision-making). Assessing the reforms against this dual pathway reveals that few of the reforms are conceptually effective. Of the few reforms that are conceptually effective, most are relatively 'light' touch. A 'light' touch approach may not be problematic, however, as such measures are easier to implement than 'hard' law. In the case of regulatory reforms, a 'light' touch approach provides scope for flexibility to minimize the many potential harms associated with 'hard' law measures. Consequently, this thesis concludes that SMST reform is more likely to occur if reformers pursue a 'lighter' touch approach meant to reduce excessive discounting of future returns and 'nudge' capital markets away from their harmful short-termism focus.

Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist) estimates the agency costs of controlling minority shareholders (CMSs) using a panel of Swedish listed firms. CMSs are owners who have a control stake of the firm’s votes while owning only a minority fraction of the firm’s equity. The study documents that families in control are almost exclusively CMSs through an extensive use of dual-class shares. The results show that increased ownership of votes by a controlling owner is associated with an economically and statistically significant decrease in firm value, but that the decrease in firm value is significantly larger for firms with family CMSs than for firms with financial institutions or corporations in control. This indicates that the agency costs of family CMSs are larger than the agency costs of other controlling owners.Family Ownership, Control Considerations, and Corporate Financing Decisions: An Empirical Analysis analyzes the relation between concentrated family control and firms’ choice of capital structure for a panel of Swedish listed firms. The results suggest that the capital structure choices made by firms with families in control are influenced by the controlling families’ desire to protect their control, and that the resulting capital structures are likely to increase the agency costs of family control. The Choice between Rights Offerings and Private Equity Placements (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist) analyzes the determinants of the choice between rights offerings and private equity placements using a sample of rights offerings and private placements made by listed Swedish firms. The results indicate that control considerations explain why firms make uninsured rights offerings. The evidence also suggest that private placements, and to some extent underwritten rights offerings, are made by potentially undervalued firms in order to overcome underinvestment problems resulting from asymmetric information about firm value. Furthermore, private placements are frequently made in conjunction with the establishment of a product market relationship between purchaser and seller, which is consistent with equity ownership reducing contracting costs in new product market relationships. Why Agency Costs Explain Diversification Discounts (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist and Peter Högfeldt) studies diversification within the real estate industry, in which firms can diversify over property types and geographical regions. Similar to previous studies, this essay documents the existence of a diversification discount. However, the major cause of the diversification discount is not diversification per se but anticipated costs due to rent dissipation in future diversifying acquisitions. Firms expected to pursue non-focusing strategies do indeed diversify more, are valued ex ante at a 20% discount over firms anticipated to follow a focusing strategy, and are predominantly family controlled. The ex ante diversification discount is, therefore, a measure of agency costs.  The Difference in Acquirer Returns between Takeovers of Public Targets and Takeovers of Private Targets shows, for a sample of Swedish takeovers, that the average acquirer abnormal return is positive and significant when the target firm is privately held but insignificant when the target firm is listed on a stock exchange. These results are robust when controlling for sample selection problems and other variables capable of explaining acquirer returns. The evidence is consistent with greater acquirer bargaining power and resolution of information asymmetries in takeovers of private targets. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2002

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2008 Sammanfattning jämte 3 uppsatser

Submitted by Daniel Bittar (danielbittar82@yahoo.com.br) on 2010-08-04T14:14:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Daniel Bittar Definitiva.pdf: 202059 bytes, checksum: 48a1d002cecf496323f3b8b3e1eb3e31 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vitor Souza(vitor.souza@fgv.br) on 2010-08-04T14:28:33Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Daniel Bittar Definitiva.pdf: 202059 bytes, checksum: 48a1d002cecf496323f3b8b3e1eb3e31 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2010-08-04T18:03:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Daniel Bittar Definitiva.pdf: 202059 bytes, checksum: 48a1d002cecf496323f3b8b3e1eb3e31 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-31 / This paper proposes through the principles of Corporate Finance and Asset Pricing measure the impact of the level of liquidity of the companies on the expected return of brazilian equities. The basic assumption of this relationship is that the cash position represents a type of risk not captured by other variables. To estimate this risk will be used a multifactor model. The basic model used is the three-factor model of Fama and French, adapted for the inclusion of the cash variable. From the database, it will attempt to estimate the sensitivity of the expected return of brazilian stocks to cash factor. / Este trabalho busca, através dos princípios de Finanças Corporativas e de Apreçamento de Ativos, mensurar o impacto do nível de liquidez das companhias na expectativa de retorno das ações no mercado acionário brasileiro. O pressuposto básico dessa relação é que a posição de caixa representa um tipo de risco não capturado por outras variáveis. Para mensurar esse risco, será utilizada a modelagem de fatores para apreçamento de ativos. O modelo básico utilizado será o de três fatores de Fama e French, adaptado para a inclusão da variável caixa. A partir da base de dados, se tentará estimar a sensibilidade do retorno esperado das ações brasileiras ao fator caixa.

Die studie ondersoek die inligtingswaarde van dividende as 'n moontlike verldaring van die waargenome aandeleprysreaksie op dividendaankondigings. Twee algemene hipoteses is getoets, naamlik dat 'n betekenisvolle verandering in 'n maatskappy se dividendbeleid inligting oor daardie maatskappy se toekomstige verdienste per aandeel bevat, en tweedens dat hierdie inligting in die reaksie van aandelepryse na die aankondiging van die verandering gereflekteer word. Die belangrikste bevindinge is soos volg: • Die inligting vervat in huidige dividendaankondigings kan nie deur beleggers gebruik word om die volgende jaar se verdienste per aandeel van 'n maatskappy te voorspel nie. Die aandeleprysreaksie op positiewe, negatiewe en neutrale nuus is statisties beduidend, maar vind hoofsaaklik in dieselfde rigting plaas. Beleggers sou dus nie die inligting vervat in dividendaankondigings kan gebruik om bogemiddelde opbrengskoerse te genereer nie. • Die inligtingswaarde van dividende is dus 'n onwaarskynlike verldaring van die invloed van 'n maatskappy se dividendbeleid op die waarde van sy gewone aandele. / This research investigates the information content of dividends as a possible explanation for the observed share price reaction to dividend announcements. Two hypotheses were tested, namely that a significant change in a company's dividend policy contains information on that company's future earnings per share, and secondly, that this information is reflected in the share price reaction after the announcement of the change. The most important findings are as follows: • Investors cannot use the information contained in current dividend announcements to predict a company's earnings per share for the next year. • Share price reactions to positive, negative and neutral news are statistically significant, but will be in the same direction. Hence investors cannot use this information to generate above-normal returns. The information content of dividends is therefore an unlikely explanation of the influence a company's dividend policy has on the value of its ordinary shares. / Business Management / MCom (Sakebestuur)

Submitted by Adalto Acir Althaus Junior (adaltojl@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-03-20T19:06:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese2_AdaltojL-V_final_corrigida.pdf: 1890382 bytes, checksum: 4a35dbb3a389546a0654556227bf3070 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2017-03-20T19:09:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese2_AdaltojL-V_final_corrigida.pdf: 1890382 bytes, checksum: 4a35dbb3a389546a0654556227bf3070 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-20T20:24:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese2_AdaltojL-V_final_corrigida.pdf: 1890382 bytes, checksum: 4a35dbb3a389546a0654556227bf3070 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-20 / This study aims to investigate the risk shifting behavior of mutual funds to test the hypotheses that managers have incentives to raise risk. We evaluated the effect of performance fees on the level of risk, risk shifting and mutual fund's performance to assess agency costs differences between both mutual funds - with and without performance fees. We observed the mutual fund's volatility level and its changes imposed by the managers. Volatility was estimated by a standard deviation of returns in the last 12 months. The change on the level of risk measured was the risk shifting, that is, the difference between a mutual fund's current portfolio holdings volatility and its past realized volatility, both estimated over past 12 months' period. We used a sample of 203 Brazilian mutual funds which covered the period from 2009 to 2015. We used data from stock prices, Brazilian bonds prices, BDRs prices and the characteristics of these funds. When funds have higher monthly returns, they tend to run negative risk shifting; when they have lower monthly returns, they tend to seek risk by doing positive risk shifting. When the funds decrease their risk (negative risk shifting), they tend to perform better. It is possible to ensure that the funds which charge performance fee have superior performance if compared to those that without performance fee. Also, they have greater positive risk shifting and lower negative risk shifting. However, funds that charged performance fees presented lower levels of risk. These findings suggest that the performance fee can contribute to align interests between mutual funds and their investors. These results are more in accordance to the behavior of risk-averse managers who used their stock selection or market timing ability to ensure a desirable minimum performance, rather than use maximum effort to looking for extraordinary returns. / Este trabalho investiga o comportamento do deslocamento de risco (risk shifting) nos fundos de investimento em ações e suas consequências sobre o desempenho, para examinar a hipótese de que os gestores têm incentivos para elevar o risco dos fundos. Estuda o efeito da taxa de performance sobre o desempenho, o nível de risco e o risk shifting dos fundos para identificar diferenças nos custos de agência entre os fundos que cobram e os que não cobram taxa de performance. Essa avaliação é feita observando-se o nível de risco dos fundos e as variações impostas pelo gestor em torno do nível de risco operado pelo fundo. O risco é medido pelo desvio padrão do retorno mensal realizado pelos fundos nos últimos 12 meses. O risk shifting dos fundos é medido como a diferença entre a volatilidade de um retorno mensal hipotético, estimado a partir das carteiras divulgadas pelos fundos, e a volatilidade do retorno mensal realizado, ambos sobre os últimos 12 meses. A amostra contou com dados de 203 fundos brasileiros de investimento em ações no período de 2009 a 2015. Foram utilizados dados de retorno das ações da BM&F Bovespa, títulos públicos, BDRs e cotas de fundos de investimento, além das características dos fundos. Quando os fundos têm maiores retornos mensais, tendem a fazer risk shifting negativo; quando têm menores retornos mensais; tendem a buscar risco, fazendo risk shifting positivo. Quando os fundos fazem risk shifting negativo tendem a ter desempenho melhor. É possível afirmar que os fundos que cobram taxa de performance têm desempenho superior àqueles que não cobram, fazem maiores risk shiftings positivos e menores negativos. No entanto, fundos que cobram taxa de performance apresentam menores níveis de risco. Esses achados sugerem que a taxa de performance é um instrumento capaz de contribuir no alinhamento de interesses entre os fundos de investimento em ações e seus investidores. Esses resultados estão mais alinhados com o comportamento de gestores avessos a risco, que usam sua habilidade de seleção de ativos ou market timing para garantir um desempenho mínimo desejável, em vez de imprimir esforços para buscar retornos extraordinários.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:30:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Matias Filho.pdf: 2247216 bytes, checksum: 9f58a8acab229af1da81ea011f6e8bd0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-08-14 / The economic growth is close linked with the growth of the companies. There is a great expectation that the countries of the supposed block BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India and China presented a vigorous growth in the coming decades. The capital structure of these companies will have a key role in providing more financial resources for the increased activity, necessary for this expected growth. The present study investigated the capital structure of the companies in this supposed economic block, in order to identify its determinants, the influence of governmental policies in their training and the alignment with the main theories of capital structure currently discussed in the literature: agency costs, trade-off, asymmetric information and pecking order. Made a comparison with U.S. companies, the leading country in the world economy, and calculate the level of debt off of the sample. The results identified several variables as determinants of capital structure of companies of the sample, with predominance for the variables at the firm level, and to a lesser degree in the macro-economic level. Strongly corroborated the assumptions of the theories discussed, and provided robust evidence of being aligned with U.S. companies. They also showed a reasonable debt off for countries in the sample, which can be applied to increase de activity of enterprises, except Russia. / O crescimento econômico está intimamente ligado com o crescimento das empresas. Existe uma grande expectativa que os países do BRIC: Brasil, Rússia, Índia e China apresentem um crescimento vigoroso nas próximas décadas. A estrutura de capital dessas empresas terá um papel fundamental na oferta de mais recursos financeiros para o aumento da atividade, necessário a esse crescimento esperado. O presente estudo investigou a estrutura de capital das empresas desse suposto bloco econômico, buscando identificar suas determinantes, a influência das políticas governamentais na sua formação e o alinhamento com as principais teorias de estrutura de capital discutidas atualmente na literatura: custos de agência, trade-off, assimetria de informação e pecking order. Efetuou uma comparação com empresas dos EUA, país líder da economia mundial, além de calcular o nível de folga de endividamento das empresas da amostra. Os resultados identificaram diversas variáveis como determinantes da estrutura de capital das empresas da amostra, com predominância para as variáveis no nível da empresa, e em menor grau no nível macro-econômico. Corroboraram fortemente as premissas das teorias discutidas, e forneceram indícios robustos de estarem alinhadas com as empresas dos EUA. Mostraram também uma folga de endividamento razoável para os países da amostra, que pode ser aplicada no aumento da atividade das empresas, com exceção da Rússia.

Cette thèse apporte une lumière sur divers aspects du financement par émission d’obligations convertibles sur le marché ouest européen entre 1994 et 2016. La première étude analyse la réaction du marché à l’annonce d’obligations convertibles en période de crise. Nos résultats montrent une réaction significativement plus négative en période de crise qu’en période normale. L’étude des déterminants de cette réaction indique que les investisseurs intègrent le potentiel des obligations convertibles à réduire les coûts de financement externes. Cependant, la réaction négative du marché est au moins partiellement due à la suspicion d’une possible surévaluation de l’émetteur et cette suspicion est exacerbée en périodes de crise financière. Par ailleurs, nous montrons qu’une part de la réaction négative enregistrée à l’annonce des convertibles est probablement due aux ventes à découvert opérées par les arbitragistes. La deuxième étude de cette thèse teste la théorie du financement séquentiel de Mayers (1998) qui prédit que le recours aux obligations convertibles permet de financer de façon optimale des investissements séquentiels. Nous évaluons l’importance du call émetteur dans la mise en œuvre optimale du financement séquentiel en comparant les activités de financement et d’investissement des firmes ayant rappelées par anticipation leurs obligations convertibles à celles d'entreprises du même secteur les ayant remboursées normalement à leur échéance. Nos résultats indiquent que la clause de rachat anticipé permet aux émetteurs de minimiser les coûts d’émissions et signale une stratégie de financement séquentiel sous sa forme « forte ». De plus, le modèle des doubles différences indique que les firmes ayant rappelées leurs convertibles par anticipation investissent plus que les entreprises les ayant remboursées normalement aux dates de rappel et ce en considérant les effets temporels et autres variables de contrôle. Le dernier chapitre de cette thèse traite de la politique de remboursement anticipé des obligations convertibles. Nous montrons à l’instar des études précédentes que les firmes retardent le rappel de leurs convertibles par rapport au point optimal de rappel préconisé par Ingersoll (1977). L’analyse des différentes théories justifiant le rappel tardif des obligations convertibles débouche sur des résultats cohérents avec l’hypothèse de détresse financière mais rejette celles liées à l’existence de la période de notification. / This thesis focuses on three aspects of convertible bonds financing using a Western European sample between 1994 and 2016. The first study of this thesis is related to the shareholder wealth effects at the announcement of the convertible bonds issuance during financial crises. We find that the market reaction is more negative during crises’ periods compared to that in normal periods. Analysis of the determinant of this reaction indicates that the market recognizes the potential of convertible bonds to reduce agency and adverse selection costs. However, we also find that the signal of overvaluation sent by the issuance mitigates the investors’ optimism about the ability of the convertible bonds to alleviate external financing costs and this bad signal is exacerbated during the financial crises. Furthermore, we find that firms that are short-sale constrained incur less negative market reaction. The second study tests the sequential financing theory of Mayers (1998) which supports that firms issue callable convertible bonds in order to implement optimal sequential financing strategy. We point out in this study the importance of the call provision by comparing the investment and financing activities of Western European firms that early called their convertible bonds to those in the same industry that redeemed their bonds at maturity. We find that the inclusion of such provision allows firms (callable convertible bonds issuers) to better control issuance costs and signals a “strong” sequential financing strategy. We also find that the calling firms invest more than the non-calling firms at the call date and the difference-in-differences model shows that this difference is due to the call decision, after controlling for time fixed effects and other control variables. The last chapter of this thesis addresses the issue of convertible bonds call delay. As previous studies, we find that the companies do not call their bond at the optimum point identified by Ingersoll (1977). Unlike previous researches in the same area, our study considers the main theoretical rationales for convertible bonds call delay. We find strong evidence for the financial distress hypothesis, little evidence for cash flow advantage and signaling theories but no evidence for the notice period justification.