This paper tests the relationship between ownership/leadership structures and stock returns for firms listed in Taiwan. A ¡§Governance Index¡¨ is built based on four different aspects of the company¡¦s governance structure: 1.) CEO duality, 2.) Size of the board of directors, 3.) Managements¡¦ shareholdings and 4.) Block shareholders¡¦ holding. This index is used as a proxy measure of the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism. I show that firms identified by the governance index as under sounding governance outperform those under poor governance. The results indicate that the corporate governance index built in this study is a valid measure in evaluating the effectiveness of corporate governance of firms in Taiwan. I demonstrate one additional application of the governance index constructed in this dissertation by showing that firms (identified by the governance index) with strong corporate governance mechanism effectively constrain the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management and improve the quality of reported earnings. Corporate governance is an effective monitoring device of the quality of financial reporting. Firms with poor governance structure are more likely to avoid reporting small losses by reporting small positive earnings. Furthermore, the magnitude of abnormal accruals is significantly related to governance level. Firms with weak corporate governance structures are more likely to use discretionary accruals to raise reported earnings.

The purpose of this research is to examine whether managers of troubled firms engage in income-increasing earnings management for capital market purposes to maintain a listing on the NASDAQ National Market. Troubled firms are defined as those firms whose share price has fallen below the specified dollar-per-share minimum mandated by the market. The two hypotheses attempt to answer two separate, but interrelated questions: First, do managers of troubled firms engage in earnings management more in periods of distress than in periods of non-distress? And second, do managers of troubled firms engage in earnings management more than similar firms not in jeopardy of delisting? Both a time-series and cross-sectional approach is used to answer these questions. The initial grouping consisted of all NASDAQ National Market firms with a share price of $1 or below at some point during the period from March 1997 through September 2002. The final sample consisted of 215 firms for the time-series analysis and 495 firms for the cross-sectional analysis. Two accrual expectation models were used, including the Jones (1991) and the modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995). The results were unable to confirm that managers engage in this behavior, and similar to the results of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994), the findings suggest that managers' accounting choices primarily reflect their firms' financial difficulties, rather than attempts to inflate income through discretionary accruals. After controlling for reverse stock splits, dividend reductions, going-concern issues/bankruptcy, and changes in management, the models found significantly negative abnormal accruals. The dissertation concludes with a discussion of possible interpretations for the findings. / Ph. D.

This study poses two questions relating to earnings management with the intent to mislead the market for the firms equity and debt. A multiple regression model is used to test two hypoteses through 7 hypothesized determinants of discretionary accruals and 3 control variables. A sample of Swedish real estate firms, including only the years when the firms are both quoted and have disclosed discretionary revaluations of their real estate properties is analyzed. Evidence is found of earnings management with the intent of misleading the stock market but no such evidence is found of earnings management with the intent of misleading the market for corporate debt. The implications of the findings are discussed and the direct and indirect harm of earnings management is specified.

In my dissertation, I examine the role of the audit committee chair in the financial reporting process and test if the change in audit committee chair is associated with changes in audit fees, audit report lag, and audit quality. Motivation for this dissertation comes from the increased attention paid by legislators and regulators in recent years on the role of the audit committee in the financial reporting process. While prior studies have examined diverse issues related to the composition of the audit committee, no prior study has examined the role of the audit committee chair on the oversight of financial reporting, even though the chair of the committee has significant control over the functioning of the committee. In the first essay of my dissertation, I show that audit fees are higher in firms that have a change in the audit committee chair. In the second essay, I examine the association between changes in the audit committee chair and audit report lag. In a changes regression, I find that the change in audit committee is associated with higher audit report lag. The third essay examines the association between changes in audit committee chair and two different measures of audit quality: restatements and abnormal accruals. There is no evidence in support of the argument that changes in audit committee chair is associated with higher quality financial reporting. Overall, the results suggest that the change in audit committee chair has an important impact on the financial reporting process of public companies.

This study investigates the use of discretion by oil and gas companies in reporting financial performance and oil and gas reserve estimates during times of high political scrutiny resulting from increases in energy prices. Hypotheses tested in prior literature state that companies facing the risk of increasing taxes or new regulations reduce reported earnings to reduce this risk. This study uses a measure of high profitability (rank order of return on assets relative to industry peers) to identify oil and gas companies more likely to manage earnings during the period from 2002 to 2008. Two measures of discretionary accruals (total and current discretionary accruals), and a measure of discretionary depreciation, depletion, and amortization (DDA) were used as indicators of discretion exercised in reporting earnings. Data on oil and gas reserve disclosures was also hand-collected from Forms 10-K to investigate whether managers use reserve estimate revisions to reduce reported earnings through increasing the annual depletion expense. Results suggest that both oil and gas refining and producing firms use negative discretionary accruals to reduce reported earnings. Results also indicate that profitability is an important determinant of the use of negative discretionary accruals by these companies regardless of the time period examined. There is also evidence that oil and gas producing firms opportunistically revise their oil and gas reserve estimates to increase depreciation, depletion, and amortization expense during periods of high oil prices.