Thesis (M. Soc. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 76-84).

Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 76-84) Also available in print.

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The basic premise of risk-based auditing is that more (fewer) audit resources should be allocated to accounts that are more (less) likely to be misstated. However, financial reporting managers can exploit such allocations by intentionally misstating balances that are less likely to draw auditor attention. If auditors do not recognize this strategic implication of risk-based auditing, undetected misstatements among ostensibly low-risk accounts could be much more common than traditional risk assessment procedures suggest. The purpose of this study is to examine whether prompting auditors to form beliefs about managers’ expectations of, and responses to, audit strategies can enhance auditors’ sensitivity to the strategic risk of fraud among accounts typically considered low-risk. Using a multi-account audit game, I find that auditors do not naturally attune to strategic risks but instead tend to focus resources on “highrisk” accounts. However, when auditors are prompted to reason strategically, they utilize more resources and devote that increase almost entirely to “low-risk” accounts. I also find that, although increasing available resources does result in an overall increase in the amount of utilized resources, the relative effect of the strategic prompt is robust to the level of available audit resources. / text

In this study, I explore whether managers and firms are penalized when they face pressures to manage earnings, but chose not to do so. I use periods in which an industry-leading firm inflates earnings fraudulently, and in which the public is unaware of the fraud, as a setting where managers at industry peer firms face pressures to manage earnings. Using the Dechow et al. (2011) F-score, I identify two groups of industry peer firms: one group where firms show no evidence of having managed earnings in response to the industry leader’s fraud, and another group where firms do show evidence of having managed earnings in response to the industry leader’s fraud. I hypothesize that managers of firms in the first group face a penalty in terms of personal compensation, and that the firms they lead face an increase in the cost of equity, but not in the cost of debt. I find evidence of a negative association between the decision to refrain from managing earnings and managerial compensation. However, I also observe declining compensation for managers who do manage earnings over the same period. This latter result precludes me from being able to entirely attribute the drop in compensation for the managers of the first group to the decision to refrain from managing earnings. I find that the cost of equity increases in the period of industry-leader fraud for firms that refrain from managing earnings, but the increase is statistically insignificant. The difference in the change in the cost of equity capital for these firms and for those who manage earnings is insignificant. The latter two results preclude me from being able to entirely attribute the increase in the cost of equity for firms in the first group to the decision to refrain from managing earnings. I find no evidence of changes in the cost of debt for firms in either group.

This study examines the relationship between executives and their independent auditor to see if there is a conflict of interest in their interaction. This study was motivated by the meltdowns, partially caused by fraudulent accounting, of many public companies in the late 1990s and early 2000s and the consequent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This study examines the variables of audit fees, fees for other services, and auditor tenure to see if they are connected with the occurrence of an SEC-prompted restatement. The results show no significant correlation between amount of fees and the likelihood of an SEC-prompted restatement but indicate a negative correlation between length of executive-auditor relationship and the occurrence of an SEC-prompted restatement.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-55). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

The purpose, of my thesis, was to extend results of my previous thesis concerning ethics in accounting. Mainly in the field of accounting fraud detection and prevention. First, I referred to ethics in accounting, financial fraud, risks resulting from its insufficient sentencing and specific types of fraud. Secondly, I described methods of accounting fraud detection and prevention. Among others internal audit, whistleblowing, software, preventive controls, confirmation of work history and education presented on a job application, authority limits, reviews of third-party transactions, ethical leadership and zero tolerance. At the end I found out what the views and experience of companies were by means of online question-form. My questions included presence of code of conduct in the company, types of frauds encountered, means of prevention used and more. I also described three concrete examples, based on verdicts of The Supreme Court, relating to economic crime.

Ph.D. (Computer Science) / Thanks to several advancements in communication technologies, the world today is a highly connected society promoting business transformations that highlight improved efficiency [1]. Unfortunately, systems developed for an increasingly connected world are also subject to increases in change, complexity and risk – the same connectedness that makes lives easier also signifies that any negative influences can be more difficult to handle and contain [2]. Multi-agent systems have been touted as ideal solutions to realising the required complexities across wide and varied problem domains that range from manufacturing [3] to eco-system management [4] to construction [5]. In an increasingly connected world, complex problems may require that various multi-agent systems work together in order to accomplish larger, overarching objectives. A fraud detection system, for example, could comprise a number of multi-agent systems, each designated to fulfil a very specific and important fraud detection task. The success of the fraud detection system will then depend on each of the various multi-agent systems’ abilities to achieve allocated goals and thus, contribute towards efforts to detect fraud accurately. Depending on factors that include objective and environment type, fraud detection tasks may entail working with numerous disparate systems [6] – it is possible that agent designs that are different from the rest of the fraud detection system must be implemented.Such inconsistency between multi-agent systems could potentially lead to conflicting goals, thereby jeopardising the resolution of the fraud detection system’s overall objectives. A further complication that may arise is the continuously changing financial services landscape – fraud detection systems must not only contend with the creativity of fraudsters, but should also be acutely aware of when day-to-day processes have changed due to recent innovations or technological advancements in the domain. Existing fraud detection methodologies may therefore need to be updated frequently in order to remain sufficiently informed of current developments. An agent-based fraud detection model was thus developed to assist anti-fraud professionals in the classification of day-to-day financial transactions. The proposed model comprises a number of multi-agent systems, each incorporated to add a particular aspect of the criminal justice process in investigating incidences of potential crime. By having agents emulate the various tasks that are involved in dealing with a crime, it is anticipated that the resulting fraud detection system will be able to achieve similar successes from applying the same procedure. In order to successfully develop the fraud detection model, an architecture for implementing a collaborative community of multi-agent subsystems for a dynamic environment was also developed. The architecture is intended to allow each multi-agent subsystem member to adapt to changes in the environment while ensuring that teamwork links are maintained amongst the different subsystems.