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Attending and graduating from college has become an essential tool for social mobility over the last several decades. However, despite efforts to expand opportunities to increase college access for all students, there is ongoing evidence of meaningful disparities in the rates of postsecondary enrollment among students from traditionally underserved college-going populations, including low income, minority, and first generation college-going students. The present dissertation examines the core assumptions of college for all, which may inadvertently replicate inequality. The dissertation is presented in three parts. The first paper examines the foundational theoretical literature that frames college access scholarship and identifies the strengths and limitations of existing theoretical frameworks used to investigate college access. I rely upon the empirical literature to develop an alternative model: The Ecological Model of College Access. The second paper, draws on data from 54 interviews with college-going seniors from two college for all high schools. It examines how students leverage relationships within and across settings (e.g., home, school, and community) to access multiple dimensions of support throughout the college access process. The results highlight studentsâ ecological experience of support, as well as the scaffolded experiences with support. For example, findings suggest, during the aspiration and expectations phases, emotional, motivational, and informational support emerge as the most critical dimensions; in contrast, during the dual search, emotional, motivational, and instrumental support manifest most powerfully. Additionally, the data highlight characteristics of relationships students leveraged strategically for support. Finally, the third paper employs Tseng and Seidmanâs (2007) theoretical framework of settings to explore how setting-level factors mediate studentsâ experiences. An in-depth assessment of the social processes germane to college access reveals key similarities and differences between the two schools. The findings highlight a number of settings-level factors (e.g., relationships, participation, and norms) that dictated the quality of studentsâ experiences throughout the college access process. Cumulatively, these three papers highlight the complexity of the college access process and the requisite sources of support required to ensure that studentsâ experiences are provided in a way that maximizes their potential for successful enrollment in a postsecondary institution matched to their social, academic, and financial needs.

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We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of intentional action can't explain the whole of agency. Causalist accounts such as Davidson's and Bratman's, according to which an action can be intentional only if it is caused by a particular mental state of the agent, don't work for every kind of action. So-called automatic actions, effortless performances over which the agent doesn't deliberate, and to which she doesn't need to pay attention, constitute exceptions to the causalist framework, or so I argue in this thesis. Not all actions are the result of a mental struggle, painful hesitation, or the weighting of evidence. Through practice, many performances become second nature. Think of familiar cases such as one's morning routines and habits: turning on the radio, brushing your teeth. Think of the highly skilled performances involved in sport and music: Jarrett's improvised piano playing, the footballer's touch. Think of agents' spontaneous reactions to their environment: ducking a blow, smiling. Psychological research has long acknowledged the distinctiveness and importance of automatic actions, while philosophy has so far explained them together with the rest of agency. Intuition tells us that automatic actions are intentional actions of ours all the same (I have run a survey which shows that this intuition is widely shared): not only our own autonomous deeds for which we are held responsible, but also necessary components in the execution and satisfaction of our general plans and goals. But do standard causal accounts deliver on the intentionality of automatic actions? I think not. Because, in automatic cases, standard appeals to intentions, beliefs, desires, and psychological states in general ring hollow. We just act: we don't think, either consciously or unconsciously. On the reductive side, Davidson's view can't but appeal to, at best, unconscious psychological states, the presence and causal role of which is, I argue, inferred from the needs of a theory, rather than from evidence in the world. On the non-reductive side, Bratman agrees, with his refutation of the Simple View, that we can't just attach an intention to every action that we want to explain. But Bratman’s own Single Phenomenon View, appealing to the mysterious notion of 'motivational potential', merely acknowledges the need for refinement without actually providing one. So I propose my own account of intentional action, the 'guidance view', according to which automatic actions are intentional: differently from Davidson and Bratman, who only offer necessary conditions in order to avoid the problem of causal deviance, I offer a full-blown account: E's phi-ing is intentional if and only If phi-ing is under E's guidance. This account resembles one developed by Frankfurt, with the crucial difference that Frankfurt – taking 'acting with an intention' and 'acting intentionally' to be synonymous – thinks that guidance is sufficient only for some movement being an action, but not for some movement being an intentional action. I argue that, on the other hand, Frankfurt's concept of guidance can be developed so that it is sufficient for intentional action too. In Chapter One I present and defend my definition of ‘automatic action’. In Chapter Two I show that such understanding of automatic actions finds confirmation in empirical psychology. In Chapter Three I show that Davidson's reductive account of intentional action does not work for automatic actions. In Chapter Four I show that the two most influential non-reductive accounts of intentional action, the Simple View and Bratman's Single Phenomenon View, don't work either. And in Chapter Five I put forward and defend my positive thesis, the 'guidance view'. Also, in the Appendix I present the findings of my survey on the intentionality of automatic actions.

A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Education, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education. / As a front-end analysis, the present study seeks to investigate two ways in which Creativity-Action-Service [CAS), an activities-based experiential learning programme, can be implemented alongside the overly content-focused curriculum in South African schools in an era of transformation to democracy and as a means of contributing to nation building. Two research questions which relate to two possibilities for the implementation of CAS in Gauteng schools are investigated: (1) How can CAS be implemented in all public secondary schools in District C1, Gauteng? and (2) How can CAS be implemented in a single purpose-built private secondary school? The research design adopted is largely descriptive in nature and the methodology includes gleaning data from disparate sources including key informants and recent state policy documents. From the data it is argued that that CAS can be implemented in response to the first question by means of a combined top-down bottom-up curriculum implementation strategy, namely, Mutual Adaptation and Development, and, in the case of the second question, by means of the Problem Solving/ Critical Factor strategy which is driven by the identification of felt needs. / AC2017

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Education, University of the Witwatersrand in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Education / A major challenge in South Africa in the 1990s is that of assisting black people to take leadership positions in important sectors of community life, including the business sector. To address this need, companies are drawing up affirmative action programmes which have educational aims, such as leadership development, skills training and integration into Western corporate culture. As these companies draw up and implement their plans, it becomes important to consider the perceptions of both the planners and the 'beneficiaries' of these programmes. This study set out to question participants about the meaning and impact of affirmative action on themselves, on the organizations in which they are employed and on South African society generally. The research uses the frameworks of critical education theory and qualitat.ve research to enquire into the historical and present contexts of affirmative action In South Africa; international models of affirmative action; the social background of participants in affirmative action programmes; participants' perceptions of the programmes in which they are engaged; social outcomes of affirmative action; and participants' ideas for changes and improvements to programmes. The research method consisted of in-depth interviews with forty-six managers involved in affirmative.' action programmes in four large Johannesburg-based business organizations. Respondents were selected in an intentional sample, and were predominantly African men, although men and women of all races were interviewed. Policy documents, records and reports on affirmative action in the four participating organizations, and from further afield, were scrutinized. The research results are reported in the form of biographical profiles of individual participants, as well as case studies of the four corporate programmes. These were preceded by a treatment of theoretical positions in affirmative action, as well as historical and international perspectives. The research results show that in the short term affirmative action impacts on organizational values, practices and culture in ways which may be read by white managers as threats to customary standards of performance and productivity. In the longer term, however, affirmative action will be sustained by business survival factors and political considerations. The findings suggest that corporate affirmative action programmes generally fail to provide black managers with a sense of purpose or belonging in their organizations. They also fail to address problems of racism and resistance to change in the organization. The aims of affirmative action programmes are rarely made explicit. Planners and recipients hold different views of the benefits to be gained from them. The ideological component of affirmative action is often under-rated in programme design, and measures of accountability are neglected. For these reasons and others, affirmative action programmes may succeed in bringing black managers into business organizations, but fail to retain them, or offer them viable career paths, so that a stable, motivated and experienced black management corps may be built. So far, corporate affirmative action programmes have contributed to the growth of the black middle class, They do not - and perhaps cannot -address the national need for redistribution, reconstruction and development of opportunities and resources (including human resources). / AC2017

This report discusses the design and development of Xeero, a 3D action-puzzle-platforming game constructed from our own custom engine, original art and sound assets. Despite a small development team, we strove to create a highly-polished and marketable interactive experience. We explain the methodology employed, results gained, and challenges faced by each member of the team in pursuit of this goal.

The ultimate aim of this thesis is to explain how the theory of action found in Anscombe's Intention can be modified to deliver a plausible account of non-human animal agency (henceforth, animal agency). More specifically, it is an attempt to develop her account in a way that respects the Aristotelian insight that animals act in ways that differ, in certain fundamental respects, from the processes of growth and self-maintenance found in plants, on the one hand, and the self-conscious actions characteristic of mature human beings, on the other. The negative aim is to show that the theory of action that constitutes the received backdrop in the study of animal minds is ill-suited for the task. This is what I call the Standard Approach to Animal Agency and, despite its widespread acceptance in comparative psychology, cognitive ethology, and the philosophy of animal minds, I argue that it faces serious problems. This thesis divides roughly into two halves corresponding to these respective aims. In the first half I argue against the Standard Approach. Amongst other things, I suggest that the theory suffers from a tendency to take the notion of action for granted. The result is an oversimplified metaphysics that is ill-prepared to account for the fact that the activities characteristic of animal life are instrumentally structured processes. In the constructive half of the thesis I develop an Anscombean alternative that takes the structure of action as its starting point. On this view, expressions of animal agency are understood as a distinctive kind of material process. After explaining Anscombe's account of intentional action, I adapt and develop these ideas into a theory of animal agency.

Several tools exist for root cause analysis (RCA). Despite this however, many practitioners are not obtaining the quality improvement desired. Those turning to literature for guidance would find most of the information resides in case studies with anecdotal outcomes. Since 5 Whys analysis has been one of the more pervasive tools in use, this study sought to add to the root cause analysis body of knowledge by investigating tool support factors. While studied in conjunction with 5 Whys, the support variables lend themselves to other root cause analysis tools as well. The purpose of the study was to utilize a 2 x 2 factorial design to determine the significance and effect on RCA effectiveness, of using a 5 Whys trained facilitator and action level classification. During the study, problem solving teams at service centers of a North American electric repair company conducted analysis with or without a trained facilitator. Additionally, corrective actions were or were not categorized by defined levels of ability to impact defect prevention. The dependent variable of effectiveness was determined by scoring from a weighted list of best practices for problem solving analysis. Analysis showed trained facilitators had significant effect on problem solving solutions, while classification had minimal

A Paris, il existe en marge des marchés aux Puces des zones de vente informelle réunissant des personnes en situation de précarité qui font commerce d'articles de récupération et, dans une moindre mesure, d'articles neufs. Face à la répression policière accrue dont elles font l'objet, un mouvement militant s'est constitué pour défendre le droit des vendeurs informels d'articles de récupération, les biffins, à occuper l'espace public. Parallèlement, le phénomène, souvent désigné par l'expression de « marchés de la misère », s'est étendu, gagnant des quartiers moins périphériques. L'approche retenue se situe à l'articulation entre action collective et action publique. La thèse retrace l'évolution des « marchés de la misère » et du mouvement de défense des biffins, tout en rendant compte de l'instauration de plusieurs dispositifs d'encadrement des biffins. Il s'agit de montrer comment le traitement politique de l'informalité donne lieu à une hybridation partielle de l'action publique à travers la controverse sur les biffins et les « marchés de la misère ». Dans ce contexte, le mouvement de défense des biffins est marqué par une fragmentation qui entrave sa montée en généralité. Il est traversé de conflits internes qui découlent du caractère partiel et partial de l'encadrement des biffins, mais qui, réciproquement, l'entretiennent. La redéfinition à la marge de la place des vendeurs de rue et récupérateurs informels que sont les biffins relève alors plus du registre de la régulation que de celui de l'alternative, dans un contexte où le recul des tolérances envers les activités informelles débouche une gestion incrémentale et semi-institutionnalisée au niveau local. / In Paris, there are, on the margins of the flea markets, some areas of informal street trade gathering people in precarious situations selling second-hand items and, to a lesser extent, new items. In face of the harsher repression they endure, a collective movement got formed to defend the right of the informal vendors selling second-hand items, the biffins, to occupypublic space. At the same time, the phenomenon, often qualified as « misery markets », has extended, spreading to less outlying areas. The approach focuses on the link between collective action and public action. The thesis relates the evolution of the « misery markets » and of the biffins' movement. It aims at showing how the political treatment ofinformality causes a partial hybridization of public action through the controversy about the biffins and the « misery markets ». In this context, the biffin's movement is marked by a division hindering its generalization. It is crossed by internal conflicts deriving from the partial and biased nature of the institutionnalization of the biffins' activities, but which, in turn, fuels this. The minor redefinition of the place of this informal street vendors and wastepickers is thus more a matter of regulation than of alternative, in a context where the reduction of police tolerances toward informal activities leads to an incremental and semiinstitutionnalized type of management, at the local level.