Magister Legum - LLM / With regard to the establishment of legislative frameworks for investigating and prosecuting genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes at both national and international level, a number of pertinent issues come up concerning the Court which should have primacy to deal with a particular case. States have had a variety of options at their disposal, such as complementarity, exclusivity, subsidiarity and concurrent jurisdiction principles. As a rule, these experiences find their limits in the full criminalisation of conduct that is also punishable before the international criminal tribunals under international law, ignoring the fact that international law does not provide definite guidance with respect to a number of questions in relation to interaction between national and international jurisdiction vis-à-vis the ‘core crimes.’ In addition,a considerable increase in the content of international law and divergences in various legal systems in criminal law, both general and special, since the end of World War II, influence the effective prosecution of ‘core crimes.’ Against this background; this work is organised into five chapters. Chapter one gives a general introduction and background to the study. Chapter two will set out the present international legal framework governing the prosecution of ‘core crimes’ in national courts and a description of the relevant practice in various states. Chapter three will examine critically the jurisdiction and overlaps of the international courts and ad hoc tribunals,along with the corresponding models of international criminal justice of exclusivity, subsidiarity, complimentarity and concurrent jurisdiction. Chapter four seeks to discuss the optimal relationship based on interactions between national and international jurisdictions. It will also include the merits and limits of both jurisdictions, basing on existing precedents and legislation.Finally, Chapter five contains a summary of conclusions drawn from the whole study and winds up with a set of recommendations.

L’échec de l’impérativité du droit international pénal et la fragilité de la justice pénale internationale qui en résulte ne dépendent pas du choix normatif d’un modèle de juridiction, ad hoc ou conventionnel, mais simplement des défaillances et des réticences des États à l’égard de la norme choisie. Ce constat d’évidence trouve sa confirmation dans le processus de mise en place et de fonctionnement de la Cour pénale internationale, fâcheusement contournée à faire prévaloir sur la lutte contre l’impunité une lutte pour la « justiciabilité » des auteurs des crimes les plus graves qui heurtent la conscience de l’Humanité : crimes contre l’humanité, crime de génocide, crimes de guerre, crime d’agression. L’obstacle qu’elle doit essentiellement surmonter est en effet que sa compétence peut être délibérément mise en échec à tout moment, directement ou indirectement, par tout État avant tout soucieux de sa propre souveraineté, qu’il soit ou non partie au Statut de Rome. L’observation des stratégies étatiques montre d’une part que la faculté de renoncer à l’exercice de sa propre compétence répressive se traduit par une négation de l’impérativité des engagements souscrits auparavant, certains Etats se désolidarisent de la répression dont ils se sont désistés. D’autre part, et à l’inverse, l’exercice légitime de sa compétence répressive par un Etat peut très facilement lui permettre de glisser vers une obstruction chronique de la juridiction internationale, voire ou déni du droit impératif qui la régit. En l’absence d’une réelle reconnaissance de la juridiction internationale, les conséquences de telles attitudes sont d’une ampleur qui dépasse l’imagination. Seul un comportement coopératif et constructif, affranchi des compromis égoïstes et opportunistes des États, pourrait parer au risque actuel d’une érosion progressive de l’architecture punitive partagée mise en place par les États eux-mêmes lors de la création de la Cour pénale internationale et ainsi de garantir que soient punis à coup sûr les auteurs de crimes insupportables. / The failure to make international criminal law imperative and the resulting fragility of international criminal justice should not be understood as the consequence of a normative choice toward a jurisdictional model, be it ad hoc or conventional. Rather, it derives from the State's weaknesses and reluctance to abide by the chosen norm. This is clearly confirmed by the very way the International Criminal Court was implemented, functions and is being sadly circumvented. Instead of bolstering the fight against impunity, it focuses on the fight for the “justiciability” of the perpetrators of the most serious crimes, resulting in subsequent negative effects on Humanity’s consciousness: crimes against humanity, crime of genocide, war crimes and crime of aggression. Owing to the fact that a State's primary concern is its own sovereignty, the biggest obstacle the Court has to overcome remains that at any moment, directly or indirectly, its competence can be intentionally overruled by any State, signatory or not of the Treaty of Rome. Observing State strategies shows that relinquishing one’s repressive authority is generally seen through a negation of formerly made commitments: some States dissociate from the repression monopoly they disclaim. Conversely, the legitimate exercise of a State’s repressive authority can easily result in regular obstruction of international jurisdiction, and even the refusal of the imperative law that governs it. Without any genuine recognition of international jurisdiction, such attitudes have undeniable serious consequences that far outreach the imagination. The only solution is cooperative and constructive behavior, free of opportunistic and selfish compromises of States. This behavior could protect against the current risk of the progressive erosion regarding shared punitive organization which States themselves implemented through the creation of the International Criminal Court. The result would guarantee the punishment of perpetrators of unbearable crimes.