Proefschrift--Leyden. / "Stellingen": [2] leaves inserted. Bibliography: p. xi-xvi.

Pas de résumé / Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Prior to the current constitutional dispensation, the development of South African administrative law was restricted by the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. Even in that comparatively 'hostile' environment, review for unreasonableness developed as an aspect of judicial review, and was applied as a check on the exercise of administrative power in certain circumstances. The principle of proportionality as an aspect of review for unreasonableness also developed during this period. With the advent of the new Constitutional dispensation, the framework within which administrative law in South Africa operates became one governed by Constitutional Supremacy. The Rights to Just Administrative Action, including a right to reasonable administrative action, were entrenched in the Constitution. Review for unreasonableness is an important aspect of administrative law in the present Constitutional dispensation as the mechanism for protecting the Constitutional right to reasonable administrative action. Proportionality is an important principle underlying the Bill of Rights as a whole, and it is an important aspect of the right to reasonable administrative action, and of review for unreasonableness. In early 2000, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000 ("the PAJA"), was passed by Parliament in fulfillment of the Constitutional requirement to pass legislation to give effect to the constitutional rights to Just Administrative Action. This thesis examines whether or not review for unreasonableness, and proportionality as an aspect of review for unreasonableness, have been meaningfully incorporated in the PAJA, and if they have not been, what potential remedies there might be. This is done by examining the basis of judicial review both before and under the current constitutional dispensation; defining unreasonableness, and proportionality; examining the content of the right to administrative action which is "justifiable in relation to the reasons given" in section 24(d) of the Interim Constitution and the right to reasonable administrative action in terms of section 33(1) of the Final Constitution; examining the application of review for unreasonableness and proportionality by the Courts both before and under the current constitutional dispensation; examining the content of judicial review incorporated in the PAJA and the drafting history of section 6(2) of the PAJA which relates to review for unreasonableness; drawing conclusions regarding whether or not review for unreasonableness and proportionality were meaningfully incorporated in the PAJA; and finally making recommendations with regard to review for unreasonableness and proportionality in light of the provisions of the PAJA.

Thesis (LLD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The focus of this study is the rights-based normative overlap of labour and administrative law in public employment. As the judiciary appeared to be unable to agree on a unified approach to the application of the rights to fair labour practices and just administrative action to public employment, it was clear that the complexity and multi-dimensional character of the debate required analysis of existing approaches to the regulation of the public employment relationship. The following initial research question was formulated: To what extent does (and should) the constitutionalised rights to fair labour practices (s 23) and just administrative action (s 33) simultaneously find application in the regulation of public employment relationships? In answering this question, certain realities had to be acknowledged, the most important being that the debate in question jurisprudentially revealed itself to be a jurisdictional turf-war between the Labour and High Courts, rather than proper consideration of the relevant substantive arguments and underlying normative considerations. This called for an additional dimension to be added to the research question, namely consideration of the extent to which the ss 23 and 33 rights are informed by variable and possibly different normative principles and whether these rights allow for cooperative regulation of public employment in accordance with the doctrine of interdependent fundamental rights. This became the primary focus of the study. In an attempt to simplify the debate, a deliberate decision was taken to limit the scope of the normative study to South Africa with its own historic influences, structures and constitutional considerations. The study shows that both labour and administrative law (as constitutionally informed) share concern for equity-based principles. This is evident from the flexible contextually informed perspectives of administrative law reasonableness in relation to labour law substantive fairness, as well as a shared concern for and approach to procedural fairness. Once simplified, and in the absence of any undue positive law complexity, the public employment relationship, at both a normative and theoretical level, furthermore shows no substantive status difference with private employment relationships. It is, however, accepted that there are job and sector-specific contextual differences. In the absence of substantive normative conflict between these branches of law and in the absence of a fundamental (as opposed to contextual) difference between public and private employment, there appears to be no reason to ignore the constitutional jurisprudential calls for hybridity, otherwise termed the doctrine of interdependence. The idea of normatively interdependent rights expresses the Constitution’s transformative vision (through the idea of flexible conceptual contextualism) and recognises that human rights may overlap. This also means that where such overlap exists, rights should be interpreted and applied in a mutually supportive and cooperative manner that allows for the full protection and promotion of those rights. In giving expression to the interdependent normative framework of constitutional rights, these norms (absent any substantive rights-based conflict) should then be used by the judiciary as an interpretative tool to align specific labour law and general administrative law in the regulation of public employment relationships. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die fokus van hierdie studie is die regsgebaseerde normatiewe oorvleueling van arbeids- en administratiefreg in die openbare diensverhouding. Aangesien dit blyk dat die regsbank nie kon saamstem oor ‘n eenvormige benadering tot die toepassing van die regte op billike arbeidspraktyke en regverdige administratiewe optrede op die openbare diensverhouding nie, het die kompleksiteit en multi-dimensionele karakter van die debat dit genoodsaak om bestaande benaderings tot die regulering van die openbare diensverhouding te analiseer. In die lig hiervan is die volgende aanvanklike navorsingsvraag geformuleer: Tot watter mate vind die grondwetlik neergelegde regte tot billike arbeidspraktyke (a 23) en regmatige administratiewe optrede (a 33) gelykmatig toepassing in die regulering van die openbare diensverhouding en tot watter mate hoort die regte gelykmatig toepassing te vind? In antwoord op die vraag is sekere realiteite geïdentifiseer, waarvan die belangrikste is dat die debat in die regspraak grootliks neergekom het op ‘n jurisdiksionele magstryd tussen die Arbeids- en Hooggeregshowe, eerder as werklike oorweging van die relevante substantiewe argumente en onderliggende normatiewe oorwegings. Dit het die byvoeging van ’n verdere dimensie tot die navorsingsvraag genoodsaak, naamlik oorweging van die mate waartoe die aa 23 en 33 regte deur buigsame en moontlik verskillende normatiewe beginsels beïnvloed word, en ook of hierdie regte ruimte laat vir mederegulering van die openbare diensverhouding in terme van die leerstuk van interafhanklikheid van fundamentele regte? Laasgenoemde het die primêre fokus van die studie geword. In ‘n poging om die debat te vereenvoudig, is doelbewus besluit om die strekking van die normatiewe studie te beperk tot Suid-Afrika, met eiesoortige historiese invloede, strukture en grondwetlike oorwegings. Soos die normatiewe studie ontvou het, wys die studie dat beide arbeids- en administratiefreg (soos grondwetlik beïnvloed) ‘n gemeenskaplike belang in billikheids-gebaseerde beginsels openbaar. Daar is ‘n versoenbaarheid tussen die kontekstueel beïnvloedbare en buigsame redelikheidsperspetief van die administratiefreg, soos gesien in vergelyking met substantiewe billikheid in die arbeidsreg. Voorts heg beide die arbeids- en administratiefreg ‘n gemeenskaplike waarde aan, en volg beide ‘n gemeenskaplike benadering tot, prosedurele billikheid. Terselfdertyd, en in die afwesigheid van onnodige positiefregtelike kompleksiteit, blyk daar op beide ‘n normatiewe en teoretiese vlak geen substantiewe verskil in status tussen die openbare diensverhouding en die privaat diensverhouding te wees nie. Dit word egter aanvaar dat daar wel werk- en sektor-spesifieke kontekstuele verskille bestaan. In die afwesigheid van substantiewe normatiewe konflik tussen die twee vertakkinge van die reg en in die afwesigheid van ‘n fundamentele (in vergelyking met kontekstuele) verskil tussen diensverhoudings in die openbare en privaatsektore, blyk daar geen rede te wees om die grondwetlike jurisprudensiële vereiste van hibriditeit, ook genoem die leerstuk van die interafhanklikheid van grondwetlike regte, te ignoreer nie. Die idee van normatiewe interafhanklike regte gee uitdrukking aan die Grondwet se visie van transformasie (via die idee van buigsame konsepsuele kontekstualisme) en erken dat menseregte soms oorvleuel. Dit beteken ook dat waar so ‘n oorvleueling bestaan, regte ïnterpreteer en toegepas moet word in ‘n wedersyds ondersteunende en samewerkende wyse wat voorsiening maak vir die volle beskerming en bevordering van daardie regte. Erkenning van die interafhanklike normatiewe raamwerk van grondwetlike regte hoort daartoe te lei dat die regsbank daardie norme (in die afwesigheid van regsgebaseerde konflik) as interpretasie-hulpmiddel gebruik om die spesifieke arbeidsreg met die algemene administratiefreg te versoen in die regulering van die openbare diensverhouding.

No description available.

Article 21 of the Insolvency Act states that the estate of the solvent spouse transfers to the curator of the insolvent spouse's sequestrated estate. The solvent spouse then has the burden to request the release of property vested in the curator of the insolvent estate. In accordance with Article 21(2), the spouse is required to prove a lawful title on the property. Should the spouse be able to prove a lawful title on the property, the curator is obligated to release the property. Although the constitutionality of this temporarily "deprivation" of the solvent spouse of her rights has already been confirmed by the Constitutional Court; it imposes drastic limitations to his/ her rights. The Insolvency Act does not incorporate procedural measures by means of which the curator has to establish whether the solvent spouse has exempted his/ her from the proof burden. In the same breath, the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act warrant that "everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful. reasonable and procedurally fair." If the curator's actions, in accordance with Article 21. conform to the administrative procedures as set out in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, the spouse shall be entitled to administrative actions which are procedurally fair as concluded within the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. The conclusion is proof that the actions of the curator, in accordance with Article 21 of the Insolvency Act, is indeed administrative by nature and that the solvent spouse has the right to administrative actions which is procedurally fair as prescribed in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, as well as the right to reasons for not being granted the release of property. / Thesis (LL.M. (Estate Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2007.

This thesis studies the evolution of the war prerogative in England from 1600-2010. It traces the historical theory and practice of the war prerogative and proposes reform of the constitutional arrangements for its exercise. It addresses three key questions. First, what have writers on political and constitutional theory said about the constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative, and, in particular, what justifications have been advanced for those arrangements? Secondly, in practice, has the executive in fact possessed sole and exclusive powers over war and the deployment of force, or have Parliament and the courts had a role to play in their exercise and scrutiny? Thirdly, are there better ways to organise our constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative, to enable a more substantive role for Parliament (particularly the House of Commons) in its exercise and scrutiny? On the first question, I show that orthodox theoretical and political discourses have continuously asserted the executive’s exclusive power over war, but the justifications advanced for that arrangement have changed over time. Those changes reflect the varying influence of different political theories at different times. On the second question, I find that, contrary to orthodox theoretical and political discourses, Parliament has played an active and substantive role in the exercise and scrutiny of the war prerogative. The courts have refused to intervene in the exercise of the war prerogative, but have been more ready to intervene in cases involving the exercise of powers incidental to the war prerogative. On the third question, I argue that reform of the constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative is necessary and desirable. I recommend the use of ‘institutional mechanisms’, which are small-scale rules and institutional arrangements, within existing institutions, which aim to promote certain normative goals. In particular, I propose a statute which would impose conditions on the executive’s exercise of its war prerogative. I argue that these proposals show that, through careful institutional design, democratic values, national security and operational efficiency can each be reconciled and promoted.

The term "governance" encompasses both governmental and nongovernmental participation in collective choice and action. Law dictates the structure, boundaries, rules, and processes within which governmental action takes place, and in doing so becomes one of the focal points for analysis of barriers to adaptation as the effects of climate change are felt. Adaptive governance must therefore contemplate a level of flexibility and evolution in governmental action beyond that currently found in the heavily administrative governments of many democracies. Nevertheless, over time, law itself has proven highly adaptive in western systems of government, evolving to address and even facilitate the emergence of new social norms (such as the rights of women and minorities) or to provide remedies for emerging problems (such as pollution). Thus, there is no question that law can adapt, evolve, and be reformed to make room for adaptive governance. In doing this, not only may barriers be removed, but law may be adjusted to facilitate adaptive governance and to aid in institutionalizing new and emerging approaches to governance. The key is to do so in a way that also enhances legitimacy, accountability, and justice, or else such reforms will never be adopted by democratic societies, or if adopted, will destabilize those societies. By identifying those aspects of the frameworks for adaptive governance reviewed in the introduction to this special feature relevant to the legal system, we present guidelines for evaluating the role of law in environmental governance to identify the ways in which law can be used, adapted, and reformed to facilitate adaptive governance and to do so in a way that enhances the legitimacy of governmental action.

LL.M. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

Si la chaîne de contrats est une notion éprouvée en droit civil, les chaînes d'actes n'ont pas reçu les mêmes honneurs en droit administratif. Pourtant, l'observation du champ de l'action administrative unilatérale et contractuelle dévoile les nombreuses hypothèses d'actes juridiquement liés selon un procédé d'enchaînement. Si l'acte administratif s'appréhende comme une action isolée, il est une entité liée au confluent de relations hiérarchiques, fonctionnelles et procédurales. En matérialisant les relations entre les actes, les chaînes se présentent comme l'assise d'un nouveau raisonnement, non plus centré sur l'acte dans son individualité, mais orienté sur une vision globale de ce dernier. Sans remettre en cause les apports de la conception individualiste à la théorie de l'acte, elles offrent un regard nouveau et complémentaire à travers les liens juridiques que l'acte entretient avec d'autres. Expression d'une conception de l'acte en relation, la chaîne d'actes est une notion matériellement hétérogène mais conceptuellement cohérente. Son intérêt théorique a été confirmé par sa confrontation à la réalité du droit positif. A défaut d'être l'application d'un certain régime juridique, les chaînes d'actes font la preuve de leur utilité dans la compréhension des solutions relatives aux relations entre les actes. En cernant les enjeux pratiques soulevés par des actes juridiquement liés, et en centralisant la variété des solutions positives jusqu'alors traitées de manière éparse, la recherche permet de déterminer les finalités des chaînes hiérarchiques et des chaînes fonctionnelles en droit administratif. / Although contracts chain is a proven concept in civil law, chains of acts have not been tackled adequately the public law. However, by observing the unilateral and contractual public scope, we may consider that the acts are legally bound by a chaining process. While the public act is seen as a lone action, the hierarchical, functional and procedural relations are all related to it. By focusing on the links between acts, we contribute to a new way of thinking not just focused on the act itself but as a whole. Without questioning the contributions made by the individualistic conception to the act theory, chains offer a new and complementary vision through the prism of their legal links with other acts. Resulting from a relationship acts understanding, the chains of acts is a physically heterogeneous concept but conceptually coherent. In its confrontation with positive law reality, his theoretical interest has been confirmed. Failing to be an application of a legal regime, chains acts are useful for understanding the solutions about links between acts. Both by identifying practical issues raised by acts legally bound and by centralizing the variety of positive solutions thinly addressed, this research allows to determine the hierarchical and functional chains purposes in administrative law.