For most of its existence South African administrative law has been shaped by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty – the heart of the constitutional order from 1910 to 1994 – and a racist political system that favoured the white minority at the expense of the black majority. In these circumstances, the rules of administrative law were of limited use in protecting the individual from exercises of administrative power that infringed fundamental human rights, often on a grand scale. On 27 April 1994, however, a new political and constitutional order came into existence that swept away the very foundations of the old order: parliamentary sovereignty was replaced by constitutional supremacy and the racial exclusivity of the old order was replaced by a commitment to equality, freedom and dignity in a democratic state. A justiciable Bill of Rights was at centre stage in this new order. That Bill of Rights includes a fundamental right to just administrative action. It is both the new constitutional order and this rather unusual fundamental right that have changed the nature of South African administrative law. This thesis examines the effect of the fundamental right to just administrative action on the law and practice of the judicial review of administrative action. It does so principally by examining the legal position before and after 27 April 1994 with particular reference to: what is meant by administrative action; the exercise of administrative power by private bodies regulated by the rules of administrative law, on the one hand, and exercises of private power regulated by rules of private law, on the other; the rules of standing, the notion of justiciability and the constitutionality of rules that seek to limit the right of the individual to approach a court to review administrative action; the meaning and scope of the right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action, in terms of the common law, the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000; the meaning, scope and efficacy of the rights to reasons for administrative actions and of access to information; the procedure of judicial review and remedies that may be granted for the infringement of a person’s right to just administrative action; and conclusions and recommendations with regard to progress made in the construction of South Africa’s new, democratically based, administrative law.

Thesis (LLM)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: South African administrative law has undergone drastic changes since the inception of the interim Constitution, which elevated 'administrative justice' to a constitutionally entrenched fundamental right in section 24. Although the successor of this section, the 'must administrative action' clause in section 33 FC, did not enter into force on 5 February 1996 with the rest of the Constitution, it required more changes to administrative law in the form of legislation, when read together with item 23 Schedule 6 FC. The two most significant factors that brought about change were the passage of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 in terms of section 33 FC read with item 23 Schedule 6, and the ruling of the Constitutional Court in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case. This study shows that in order to give effect to the requirements of the Constitution, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act and the ruling of the Constitutional Court, administrative law must be reorganised. When this happens, section 33 FC, which gives force to the common law that informs administrative law, becomes the starting point in administrative law matters. Although the Act exists under the Constitution and parallel to the common law, Parliament foresees that the Act and the common law will in time become one system of law. It further provides for the direct application of the Constitution by those who cannot find a remedy in the Act. The study further shows that, as not all the common law constitutional principles that previously provided the common law grounds for review of administrative action have been taken up by the Constitution, the possibility exists that some of the common law grounds do not continue to be relevant to the review of administrative action. The Act, which articulates the right to 'just administrative action' as viewed by government, contains most of the common law grounds for review. It is therefore argued that, after the Act has entered into force, the continued relevance of those that have been omitted from the Act, needs to be determined before they can be used through the direct application of section 33 FC. To test for relevance, the requirements in section 33(1) Fe, 'lawfulness', reasonableness' and 'procedural fairness', are therefore interpreted in the study in order to determine which statutory grounds relate to each and which common law grounds have been omitted from the Act. The conclusion reached is that grounds available for the review of administrative action consist of the statutory grounds for review together with the omitted common law grounds that continue to be relevant to the judicial review of administrative action. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Sedert die inwerkingtreding van die interim Grondwet, wat 'administratiewe gerigtigheid' tot 'n grondwetlike reg verhef het in artikel 24, het die Suid-Afrikaanse administratiefreg drastiese veranderinge ondergaan. Al het die reg op 'n 'regverdige administratiewe optrede' in artikel33 FG nie op 5 Februarie 1996 in werking getree saam met die res van die Grondwet nie, het die klousule nog veranderinge, in die vorm van wetgewing, vereis. Die twee belangrikste faktore wat veranderinge to gevolg gehad het, was die aanneming van die Wet op die Bevordering van Administratiewe Geregtigheid, Wet 3 van 2000, en die beslissing van die Konstitusionele Hof in die Pharmaceutical Manufacturers-saak. Hierdie studie bevind dat die administratiefreg heringedeel sal moet word om effek te gee aan die vereistes van die Grondwet, die Wet op die Bevordering van Administratiewe Geregtigheid en die beslissing van die Konstitutionele Hof. As dit plaasvind, word artikel 33 FG, wat aan die gemenereg krag verleën, die beginpunt in administratiefregtelike aangeleenthede. Al bestaan die Wet onder die Grondwet en parallel tot die gemenereg, voorsien die regering dat die Wet en die gemenereg in die toekoms een stelsel word. Daar word verder voorsiening gemaak vir die direkte toegpassing van artikel33 deur persone wat nie 'n remedie in die Wet kan vind nie. Die studie bevind verder dat, omdat al die gemeenregtelike konstitusionele beginsels wat voorheen die gronde van hersiening verskaf het nie in die Grondwet opgeneem is nie, die moontlikheid bestaan dat sekere van die gemeenregtelike gronde nie relevant bly vir die hersiening van administratiewe handelinge nie. Die Wet, wat die reg op 'n '[r]egverdige administratiewe optrede' verwoord soos dit gesien word deur die regering, bevat meeste van die gemeenregtelike gronde van hersiening. Daarom word daar geargumenteer dat die voortgesette relevantheid van die gemeenregtelike gronde van hersiening wat uitgelaat is uit die Wet eers bepaal moet word voordat hulle gebruik kan word deur die direkte toepassing van artikel 33 nadat die Wet in werking getree het. Om te toets vir relevantheid, moet die vereistes in artikel 33 FG, 'regmatigheid', 'redelikheid' en 'prosedurele billikheid' geïnterpreteer word om te bepaal watter statutêre gronde onder elk klassifiseer en watter gemmenregtelike gronde uitgelaat is uit die Wet. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die gronde van hersiening beskikbaar vir die hersiening van administratiewe handelinge bestaan uit statutêre gronde van hersiening sowel as die weggelate gemeenregtelike gronde van hersiening wat relevant bly vir die judisiële hersiening van administratiewe handelinge.

Prior to the current constitutional dispensation, the development of South African administrative law was restricted by the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. Even in that comparatively 'hostile' environment, review for unreasonableness developed as an aspect of judicial review, and was applied as a check on the exercise of administrative power in certain circumstances. The principle of proportionality as an aspect of review for unreasonableness also developed during this period. With the advent of the new Constitutional dispensation, the framework within which administrative law in South Africa operates became one governed by Constitutional Supremacy. The Rights to Just Administrative Action, including a right to reasonable administrative action, were entrenched in the Constitution. Review for unreasonableness is an important aspect of administrative law in the present Constitutional dispensation as the mechanism for protecting the Constitutional right to reasonable administrative action. Proportionality is an important principle underlying the Bill of Rights as a whole, and it is an important aspect of the right to reasonable administrative action, and of review for unreasonableness. In early 2000, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000 ("the PAJA"), was passed by Parliament in fulfillment of the Constitutional requirement to pass legislation to give effect to the constitutional rights to Just Administrative Action. This thesis examines whether or not review for unreasonableness, and proportionality as an aspect of review for unreasonableness, have been meaningfully incorporated in the PAJA, and if they have not been, what potential remedies there might be. This is done by examining the basis of judicial review both before and under the current constitutional dispensation; defining unreasonableness, and proportionality; examining the content of the right to administrative action which is "justifiable in relation to the reasons given" in section 24(d) of the Interim Constitution and the right to reasonable administrative action in terms of section 33(1) of the Final Constitution; examining the application of review for unreasonableness and proportionality by the Courts both before and under the current constitutional dispensation; examining the content of judicial review incorporated in the PAJA and the drafting history of section 6(2) of the PAJA which relates to review for unreasonableness; drawing conclusions regarding whether or not review for unreasonableness and proportionality were meaningfully incorporated in the PAJA; and finally making recommendations with regard to review for unreasonableness and proportionality in light of the provisions of the PAJA.

This study evaluates the court's approach towards the interpretation of administrative justice with specific reference to Roman v Williams 1997(2) SACR 754(C). Section 33 of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 guarantees the right to administration justice. The elements of this right are lawfulness, reasonableness and procedurally fairness. Our courts are bound constitutionally to promote, develop, advance and protect the fundamental rights. This study provides the most effective approach towards the development of the fundamental right in our democratic society where the Bill of Rights binds legislature, executive and judiciary. / Administrative Law / LL.M. (Administrative Law)

This study evaluates the court's approach towards the interpretation of administrative justice with specific reference to Roman v Williams 1997(2) SACR 754(C). Section 33 of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 guarantees the right to administration justice. The elements of this right are lawfulness, reasonableness and procedurally fairness. Our courts are bound constitutionally to promote, develop, advance and protect the fundamental rights. This study provides the most effective approach towards the development of the fundamental right in our democratic society where the Bill of Rights binds legislature, executive and judiciary. / Administrative Law / LL.M. (Administrative Law)

This work examines the legal effects of a declaration of a state of emergency under the Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 and the exercise of legislative and administrative powers pursuant thereto. The general basis of judicial control over executive action and the various devices used to limit or oust the court's jurisdiction are set out and explained. Against this background, the courts' performance of their supervisory role under the special circumstances of emergency rule is critically surveyed and assessed. The legal issues raised by the exercise of emergency powers is examined at the various levels of their deployment: first, the declaration of a state of emergency; second, the making of emergency regulations; third, their execution by means of administrative action, including detention, banning, censorship and the use of force. The major cases concerning emergency issues, both reported and unreported, are analysed in their appropriate contexts, and an overview provided of the effects of emergency regulations and orders on such freedoms as South Africans enjoy under the 'ordinary' law. Finally, an attempt is made to assess how these decisions have affected the prospect of judicial review of executive action, both in the emergency context and in the field of administrative law generally. The conclusion is that, however far the Appellate Division may appear to have gone towards eliminating the role of the law in the emergency regime, grounds remain for the courts to exercise a more vigorous supervisory role should they choose to do so in future.

Since the incorporation of the separation of powers doctrine into the South African Constitution, the problem has arisen that, each of the three tiers of government, the Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature, has sought to protect exclusive jurisdiction over matters that fall within what constitutes that tier's own realm of authority. The effects of this are especially apparent in the field of dispute resolution in administrative law. The administration is predominantly the province of the Executive, and to a lesser extent, the Legislature. Thus, the acceptability of judicial review in dispute resolution and generally, the intrusion by the Judiciary in matters of the administration is perennially questioned and challenged by both the Executive and the Legislature. In this context, the duty to exhaust internal remedies assumes a pivotal role. It offers a compromise, by prescribing qualified exclusion of judicial review as a first port of call for dispute resolution while simultaneously entrusting initial dispute resolution to the administration. Often, this approach yields tangible results, but from a constitutional and fundamental rights perspective, the duty to exhaust internal remedies is problematic. Its exclusion of judicial review goes against, not only the right of access to court in section 34 of the Constitution, but also the rule of law, to the extent that the rule of law allows for the challenging, in court, of illegal administrative action as soon as it is taken. This thesis analyses the constitutionality of the duty to exhaust internal remedies in section 7(2) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act by assessing the consistency of section 7(2) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act with the right of access to court in section 34 of the Constitution. The thesis initially examines the origins and historical development of the duty to exhaust internal remedies in the English law, and the subsequent adoption of the duty to exhaust internal remedies into the South African common law for the purpose of interpreting and comprehending the duty to exhaust internal remedies as it is appears in section 7(2) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. Ultimately, the study focuses on and identifies the deficiencies in the current approach to the question of the constitutionality of section 7(2) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, and offers suggestions on how the law might be developed.

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.