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“The admissibility of real evidence in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996”Wells, Jerome 11 1900 (has links)
Public, Constitutional, & International / LLD
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“The admissibility of real evidence in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996”Wells, Jerome 11 1900 (has links)
Public, Constitutional, and International / LL. D.
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The admissibility in the main trial of evidence adduced during a trial within a trialVhulahani, Takalani Robert 30 November 2004 (has links)
No abstract available / Jurisprudence / LL.M.
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The admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence : issues concerning impeachmentNiesing, Gysbert 05 1900 (has links)
Thesis (LLM)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The law regarding the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence for
impeaching the accused's testimony is still undeveloped. This work discusses three of the
options available to South African courts and the difficulties inherent in each. The first is to
follow the approach of the Supreme Court of the United States. The American approach
regarding the exclusion of evidence from the case in chief is strict. Courts are not bestowed
with a discretion to admit unconstitutionally obtained evidence: Unless one of the accepted
exceptions exist, a court must exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence in order to deter
unconstitutional behaviour by the authorities. Deterrence of unconstitutional police behaviour
is however no longer considered controlling when cross-examining the accused.
Unconstitutionally obtained evidence - both real and testimonial communications - is
therefore admissible for impeachment purposes despite being excluded from the case in chief.
The rationale is to prevent the accused giving perjurious testimony in the face of the
prosecution's inability to impeach the accused's veracity in the usual manner. The application
of the American approach in South Africa has however already been rejected in S v
Makhathini.1
The second possibility is for South African courts to follow the position of the Supreme
Court of Canada in R v Calder.2 The admissibility of impeachment evidence in Canada - as
with evidence in chief - is based on the effect of its admission of the repute of the
administration of justice. However, evidence excluded from the case in chief will only in very
rare circumstances be admitted in cross-examination of the accused.
Finally, the option suggested by this thesis, is to continue the trend started by s 35(5) of
the South African Constitution, which has already been applied with great success in cases
where the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in the case in chief is in issue.
Section 35(5), like the Canadian s 24(2) it bears some resemblance to, gives courts a
discretion to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence on the basis of unfairness to the
accused or the effect admission will have on the administration of justice. It is submitted in
this thesis that, because of the interlocutory nature of a ruling on admissibility, this approach
adapts easily to the admission of limited purpose evidence such as impeachment evidence: If
the admission of the unconstitutionally obtained evidence, regardless of whether it was previously excluded from the case in chief, renders the trial unfair or would otherwise be
detrimental to the administration of justice it must be excluded. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die reg in verband met die toelaatbaarheid van ongrondwetlik verkree getuienis vir 'n
geloofwaardigheidsaanval op die beskuldigde is nog in 'n vroee stadium van ontwikkeling.
Hierdie tesis bespreek drie moontlikhede beskikbaar aan Suid-Afrikaanse howe en die
probleme inherent aan elkeen. Die eerste is om die posisie van die Amerikaanse
Hooggeregshof te volg. Die Amerikaanse posisie betreffende die toelaatbaarheid van
getuienis tydens die staat se saak is streng. Howe het geen diskresie om ongrondwetlik
verkree getuienis toe te laat nie: Behalwe in gevalle waar aanvaarde uitsonderings bestaan,
moet 'n hof dus ongrondwetlik verkree getuienis uitsluit om ongrondwetlike optrede deur die
owerhede te voorkom. Voorkoming van ongrondwetlike optrede aan die kant van die polisie
is egter nie meer die beherende oorweging wanneer die beskuldigde in kruis-ondervraging
geneem word nie. Ongrondwetlik verkree getuienins - beide reel en verklarend van aard - is
gevolglik toelaatbaar vir doeleindes van 'n geloofwaardigheidsaanval, ten spyte daarvan dat
dit moontlik ontoelaatbaar was tydens die staat se saak. Die rede is om te voorkom dat die
beskuldigde meinedige getuienis lewer terwyl die staat verhoed word om the bekuldigde se
geloofwaardigheid op die gewone manier te toets. Hierdie posisie is egter al verwerp in S v
Makhathini. 3
Die tweede moontlikheid is om die posisie soos uitgele deur die Hooggeregshof van
Kanada, in R v Calder 4 te volg. In Kanada word die toelaatbaarheid van getuienis rakende
geloofwaardigheid - sowel as getuienis rakende skuld - bepaal deur die invloed wat die
toelating daarvan op die reputasie van die regspleging het. Getuienis wat ontoelaatbaar is
tydens die staat se saak sal egter slegs in baie beperkte omstandighed toegalaat word tydens
kruisondervraging van die beskuldigde.
Laastens, die opsie wat voorgestel word deur hierdie tesis, is om voort te gaan met die
patroon wat ontwikkel is deur art. 35(5) van die Grondwet van Suid-Afrika, wat alreeds met
groot sukses toegepas is in sake waar die toelaatbaarheid van ongrondwetlik verkree getuienis
in die staat se saak ter sprake was. Artikel 35(5), soos Kanada se art 24(2) waarmee dit tot 'n mate ooreenstem, gee howe 'n diskresie om ongrondwetlik verkree getuienis uit te sluit op
grond van onregverdigheid teenoor die beskuldigde of indien die toelating daarvan 'n
negatiewe invloed op die regspleging sal he. Omdat 'n beslissing oor die toelaatbaarheid van
getuienis tussenstyds van aard is, pas dit goed aan by die verdere ondersoek na die
toelaatbaarheid van getuienis wat slegs VIr 'n beperkte doel aangebied word: Indien die
toelating van ongrondwetlik verkree getuienis, ongeag of dit voorheen uitgesluit was uit die
staat se saak, die verhoor onregverdig maak of die regspleging negatiefbeinvloed, moet sulke
getuienis uitgesluit word.
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The admissibility in the main trial of evidence adduced during a trial within a trialVhulahani, Takalani Robert 30 November 2004 (has links)
No abstract available / Jurisprudence / LL.M.
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An analysis of the presentation and admissibility of evidence at CCMA arbitrations.Gounden, Shamon. January 2013 (has links)
Historically, labour dispute resolution in South Africa has been synonymous with being
expensive, unnecessarily lengthy and ineffective. The Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of
1995 set out to change this through the creation of the Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). The design of the CCMA is centred on a dispute
resolution institution that adopts a quick, cheap and non-legalistic approach to dispute
resolution. Through the introduction of compulsory arbitration for specified dismissal and
unfair labour practice disputes, the LRA granted the CCMA the mandate of upholding the
objectives of industrial peace and reducing exorbitant legal costs. The outcome of arbitration
proceedings conducted under the auspices of the CCMA are final and binding. Accordingly,
this sui generis type of proceedings aimed at being cheap and informal has several
implications. The adherence to traditional legal principles, in particular the rules relating to
the presentation and admissibility of evidence cannot be adhered to rigorously in a forum
where parties are unrepresented and that has informality as a defining feature. This paper set
out to examine the proposition that based on various statutory powers; arbitrations are to be
conducted informally and free from legalism- which necessarily entails a relaxation if not
elimination of the traditional exclusionary rules pertaining to the presentation and admission
of evidence. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2013.
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Herevaluering van polisiebevoegdhede tot visentering en beslaglegging vervat in die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977Meyer, Pieter William 11 1900 (has links)
Text in Afrikaans / "Free people expect much from their police. In such societies
the police stand at the point of balance on the one hand securing
human rights on the other exercising their lawful powers given
to them by Governments in the name of the people, to protect
people and their institutions" (J Alderson Human Rights and
Police Rights. Publication of the Council of Europe.)
This is no small expectation. It means that the police are
expected to maintain and secure the principles of democracy and
human rights, the principles upon which our Constitution is
based. At the same time it is the duty of a police service to
maintain law and order which sometimes require the exercise of
power and the use of force which on the face of it may appear to
violate human dignity and certain rights and freedoms which a
police force is expected to maintain in a democratic society.
The manner of exercising that power has an impact on the
credibility and effectiveness of the police. Human rights law
internationally accepts that a police service needs to be given
the power to, at times restrict certain individual freedoms in
the interests of the security of the community at large. These
restrictions may take place only in a constitutional way. If it
takes place in an unconstitutional way the courts must have the
right to exclude evidence which is unconstitutionally obtained.
At this stage the courts have to formulate such a qualified
exclusionary rule, but the ultimate goal must be to include such
an exclusionary rule in a future Constitution. / Department of Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M.
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Herevaluering van polisiebevoegdhede tot visentering en beslaglegging vervat in die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977Meyer, Pieter William 11 1900 (has links)
Text in Afrikaans / "Free people expect much from their police. In such societies
the police stand at the point of balance on the one hand securing
human rights on the other exercising their lawful powers given
to them by Governments in the name of the people, to protect
people and their institutions" (J Alderson Human Rights and
Police Rights. Publication of the Council of Europe.)
This is no small expectation. It means that the police are
expected to maintain and secure the principles of democracy and
human rights, the principles upon which our Constitution is
based. At the same time it is the duty of a police service to
maintain law and order which sometimes require the exercise of
power and the use of force which on the face of it may appear to
violate human dignity and certain rights and freedoms which a
police force is expected to maintain in a democratic society.
The manner of exercising that power has an impact on the
credibility and effectiveness of the police. Human rights law
internationally accepts that a police service needs to be given
the power to, at times restrict certain individual freedoms in
the interests of the security of the community at large. These
restrictions may take place only in a constitutional way. If it
takes place in an unconstitutional way the courts must have the
right to exclude evidence which is unconstitutionally obtained.
At this stage the courts have to formulate such a qualified
exclusionary rule, but the ultimate goal must be to include such
an exclusionary rule in a future Constitution. / Department of Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M.
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Die rol van diskresie by die toelaatbaarheid van getuienis wat in stryd met die grondwet verkry isNel, F. (Francisca) 11 1900 (has links)
Text in Afrikaans / Artikel 35(5) van die Grondwet 108 van 1996 handel oor die uitsluiting van
ongrondwetlike getuienis en bepaal dat sodanige getuienis uitgesluit moet word
indien toelating daarvan sal lei tot 'n onbillike verhoor of tot nadeel sal strek vir
die regspleging. Uit die bewoording van die artikel blyk dit dat die howe geen
diskresie het ten opsigte van die toelaatbaarheidsvraag nie en 'n streng
uitsluitingbenadering moet volg. Die doel van hierdie verha• ndeling is om
ondersoek in te stel na die mate van diskresie .en die wyse ·waarop diskresie
toepas word in hierdie besluitnemingsproses. Twee benaderings is deur die
howe gevolg, naamlik 'n benadering waar 'n wye diskresie uitgeoefen word en 'n
benadering waar 'n beperkte diskresie uitgeoefen word, dus 'n gekwalifiseerde uitsluitingsbenadering. Die skrywer doen aan die hand dat beide gronde vir
uitsluiting van belang is en dat die howe verkeie faktore moet oorweeg ten einde
'n beslissing te vel oor die insluiting of uitsluiting van ongrondwetlike getuienis. 'n
Balans moet dus gehandhaaf word tussen die belang van die beskuldigde op 'n
billike verhoor en die belang van die gemeenskap daarin dat regspleging nie
benadeel moet word nie en dat reg en geregtigheid moet geskied / Section 35(3) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 deals with the exclusion of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence and stipulates that such evidence must be
excluded if the admission would render the trial unfair or be detrimental to the
administration of justice. From the wording of the section it seems that the
courts have no jurisdiction in regard to the admissibility question and that a strict
exclusionary approach must be followed. The purpose of this dissertation is to
investigate the amount of discretion that the Courts have, and the manner in
which this discretion is applied in the process of decision making. Two
approaches were followed by the courts namely a wide discretionary approach
and an approach where a strict discretion was applied. It is submitted that botR
grounds for exclusion are of importance and that the courts must consider a
variety of factors in deciding the question on the inclusion or exclusion of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. A balance must be struck between the
interest of the accused in a fair trial and the interest of the community that the
administration of justice must not be prejudiced and that justice must prevail. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Law)
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The admissibility and evaluation of scientific evidence in courtFaurie, Annari 11 1900 (has links)
Increasing use is being made of various types of scientific evidence in court. The
general requirement for the admissibility of such evidence is relevance. Although
expert evidence is considered to be opinion evidence, it is admissible if it can assist the
court to decide a fact in issue; provided that it is also reliable. In South Africa, the
initial wide judicial discretion to either admit or exclude unconstitutionally obtained
evidence, has developed into a more narrowly defined discretion under the final
Constitution. Examples of scientific evidence, namely, DNA evidence, fingerprints,
psychiatric evidence, bite-mark evidence and polygraph evidence are considered and
problems inherent in the presentation of such evidence in courts in various jurisdictions
are highlighted. An investigation of the presentation and evaluation of evidence in
both the accusatorial and inquisitorial systems seems to indicate that the adversarial
procedure has a marked influence on the evaluation of evidence / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Law)
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