This dissertation explores the knowledge systems that doulas use to legitimate their work to the medical community, and to clients. "Doula" comes from a Greek word that means "a woman who serves." In contemporary English, doulas are women who provide other women with support during labor and childbirth. Although research shows that doula support can have positive physiological and psychological effects, doulas' lower social status in the birth fields constricts their reach to those who know about and can hire them privately. In the United States, obstetricians have authoritative knowledge over birth, and all others fall beneath them in the hierarchy of medicine. Doulas serve as a case for exploring the importance of certification and science, versus alternative forms of knowledge for legitimating their expertise within the field of childbirth. This research uses a mixed methods approach to explore the roles that authoritative versus alternative sources of knowledge play in doulas' attitudes and approaches to childbirth. Data come from the Maternity Support Survey, an original, cross-national survey of nurses, doulas, and childbirth educators in the United States and Canada. I also rely on content analysis of five large doula organizations' websites, and interviews with twenty-five doulas, and twenty-five mothers who hired or considered hiring a doula to support them during labor and delivery. This mixed methods research looks at how doulas can legitimate their role in order to better serve women.Results suggest that both authoritative knowledge systems (such as certification) and alternative knowledge systems (such as feminism) influence doulas' approach to legitimating their work. Scientific evidence serves as both an authoritative and alternative source of knowledge, depending on the context. This research has important implications for the future of doula support; while alternative knowledge systems allow doulas to empower women and challenge the dominance of medicalized birth, authoritative knowledge systems allow doulas greater access to the women who need them most. In order to reach a greater population of women, doulas need to find a balance between challenging authoritative medicine and working within it to best serve women.

Objectives: To use the means-end chain (MEC) decision-making approach to compare two groups of participants using natural health products (NHPs) with and without scientific evidence support. Methods: The laddering technique was used to interview 25 participants with osteoarthritis. Hierarchical value maps were generated to depict the decision-making processes. Semi-structured questions probed the role of scientific evidence in the decision-making process and content analysis identified thematic similarities and differences between the two groups. Results: The dominant decision-making chain between participants in the two scientific evidence categories was similar. Scientific evidence is an important decision-making factor but not as important as the advice from health care providers, friends and family. Conclusions: The MEC-approach and its associated laddering methodology helped us understand how people make decisions about NHPs. There were essentially no differences in how consumers in our two groups incorporated scientific evidence into their choice of NHPs for OA.

Objectives: To use the means-end chain (MEC) decision-making approach to compare two groups of participants using natural health products (NHPs) with and without scientific evidence support. Methods: The laddering technique was used to interview 25 participants with osteoarthritis. Hierarchical value maps were generated to depict the decision-making processes. Semi-structured questions probed the role of scientific evidence in the decision-making process and content analysis identified thematic similarities and differences between the two groups. Results: The dominant decision-making chain between participants in the two scientific evidence categories was similar. Scientific evidence is an important decision-making factor but not as important as the advice from health care providers, friends and family. Conclusions: The MEC-approach and its associated laddering methodology helped us understand how people make decisions about NHPs. There were essentially no differences in how consumers in our two groups incorporated scientific evidence into their choice of NHPs for OA.

abstract: There is conflicting evidence regarding whether a biasing effect of neuroscientific evidence exists. Early research warned of such bias, but more recent papers dispute such claims, with some suggesting a bias only occurs in situations of relative judgment, but not in situations of absolute judgment. The current studies examined the neuroimage bias within both criminal and civil court case contexts, specifically exploring if a bias is dependent on the context in which the neuroimage evidence is presented (i.e. a single expert vs. opposing experts). In the first experiment 408 participants read a criminal court case summary in which either one expert witness testified (absolute judgment) or two experts testified (relative judgment). The experts presented neurological evidence in the form of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data and the evidence type varied between a brain image and a graph. A neuroimage bias was found, in that jurors who were exposed to two experts were more punitive when the prosecution presented the image and less punitive when the defense did. In the second experiment 240 participants read a summary of a civil court case in which either a single expert witness testified or two experts testified. The experts presented fMRI data to support or refute a claim of chronic pain and the evidence type again varied between image and graph. The expected neuroimage bias was not found, in that jurors were more likely to find in favor of the plaintiff when either side proffered the image, but more likely to find for the defense when only graphs were offered by the experts. These findings suggest that the introduction of neuroimages as evidence may affect jurors punitiveness in criminal cases, as well as liability decisions in civil cases and overall serves to illustrate that the influence of neuroscientific information on legal decision makers is more complex than originally thought. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Psychology 2016

This study investigates the interface between science and law with reference to models of science described by members of New Zealand's Environment Court. The aim of the research is to identify differences and consistencies between the members of the Court in the way that they articulate their understanding of science and of scientific evidence. This research also aims to locate those individual models of science within a wider philosophical discourse concerning the nature of science. The research adopts a qualitative and interpretive approach that focuses on understanding the detail of contextual interactions arising from interviews with eight Environment Judges and 13 Commissioners. The interview group comprised all of the judges of the Court during the research period (1999 - 2000) and all but one permanent Commissioner. The analysis of interviews show a wide range of views concerning the scope and nature of science. Criteria significant to each individual's model of science have been identified as a series of micro themes. Those micro themes differ between individuals as to the combinations of criteria significant when locating the boundary between science and non-science. The analysis of interviews also identifies three macro themes that describe whether and how individuals differentiate science, technology and expertise. That analysis identifies a group of interviewees, comprising both judges and commissioners, that equates science with expertise without distinction as to any knowledge component or process considerations. The analysis of interview responses adopts a boundary-work approach that identifies how individuals locate the boundary between science and non-science through their articulation of the micro themes significant to their model of science. The study contributes to the discourse concerning the relationship of science and law within modern society. That discourse commonly addresses the appropriate legal framework to assess questions involving scientific expertise and invariably describes the legal process and the role of expert and decision maker within that process. However, that discourse rarely articulates the meaning of the terms science, scientist, or technology, assuming that science is a self-evident concept, its meaning having universal application and acceptance. This research challenges that approach and identifies wide differences in the models of science held by individual decision makers and differences in their expectations of evidence from expert witnesses. Aside from the implications of the research results for the discourse concerning the relationship of science and law, this research also has practical implications for the evaluation of expert scientific evidence within an adversarial system of law, and for expert evidence before the Environment Court. Suggestions to improve communication both within the Court and between the Court and parties appearing before it are made with a view to identifying consistent and fair expectations of experts and their evidence.

abstract: Law and science are fundamental to the operation of racism in the United States. Law provides structure to maintain and enforce social hierarchies, while science ensures that these hierarchies are given the guise of truth. Biologists and geneticists have used race in physical sciences to justify social differences, while criminologists, sociologists, and other social scientists use race, and Blackness in particular, as an explain-all for criminality, poverty, or other conditions affecting racialized peoples. Social and physical sciences profoundly impact conceptualizations and constructions of race in society, while juridical bodies give racial science the force of law—placing legal benefits and criminal punishments into play. Yet, no formal rules govern the use of empirical data in opinions of the Supreme Court. My dissertation therefore studies the Court’s use of social scientific evidence in two key cases involving race and discrimination to identify what, if any, social scientific standards the Court has developed for its own analysis of scientific evidence. In so doing, I draw on Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Institutional Ethnography (IE) to develop a methodological framework for the study and use of social sciences in the law. Critical Race scholars generally argue that race is a social and legal construct and racism is endemic, and permanent, while Institutional Ethnography provides a social scientific method for rigorous study of the law by mapping and illuminating relationships of power manifested in social institutions that construct consciousness and place for marginalized groups in society. Combining methods of IE with epistemologies of CRT, I propose Critical Race Methodologies in the study of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin and Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. These two cases from recent terms of the Supreme Court involve heavy use of social sciences in briefing and at oral argument, and both cases set standards for racial inclusiveness in Texas. Throughout this dissertation, I look at how law and social sciences co-construct racial meanings and racial power, and how law and social science understand and misunderstand one another in attempting to scientifically understand the role of race in the United States. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Justice Studies 2017

Scientific evidence is increasingly relied on in litigation. Discussions and debates aimed at enabling courts to make the best use scientific evidence are therefore critical. This thesis adds the perspective of procedural legitimacy to the science and law dialogue. Procedural Legitimacy is the concept that consistent adherence to legal procedure maintains the overall legitimacy of the legal system, and the validity of its outcomes. I argue that to maintain legitimate legal outcomes, procedural rules must be applied consistently and vigilantly to scientific evidence. This means that admissibility rules must be applied properly to scientific evidence, and that admitted scientific evidence must be duly scrutinized and weighed against the legal standard of proof. This ensures that the legal outcome will be based on valid legal facts. When the law is applied to those legal facts, litigants are legitimately bound by the judicial decision, despite the risk of factual inaccuracy. / The bulk of this thesis develops the notion of procedural legitimacy, and argues that its role in the adjudicative process is vital. The argument is founded on the conditions of uncertainty in which legal decisions are made. I show that both liability determinations and damages determinations in personal injury actions are made in conditions of uncertainty, and are dependent on consistency in procedure to maintain legitimacy. Ultimately, I apply the procedural legitimacy argument to admissibility and use of scientific evidence, and endorse the recommendations of the Goudge Inquiry in that respect.

This thesis consists of three essays in the field of information economics. The first essay studies manipulation of information by partisan media. The recent increase in partisan media has generated interest in what drives media outlets to become more partisan. I develop a model to study the role of diffusion of information by word of mouth. In the model, a media outlet designs an information policy, which specifies the level of partisan slant in the outlet’s news reports. The news spread via a communication chain in a population of agents with heterogeneous preferences. The slant has an impact on whether the agents find the news credible and on their incentives to pass the news to others. The analysis elucidates how partisanship of media can be driven by political polarisation of the public and by the tendency of people to interact with people with similar political views. The second essay, co-authored by Jakub Redlicki, investigates falsification of scientific evidence by interest groups. We analyse a game between a biased sender (an interest group) and a decision maker (a policy maker) where the former can falsify scientific evidence at a cost. The sender observes scientific evidence and knows that it will also be observed by the decision maker unless he falsifies it. If he falsifies, then there is a chance that the decision maker observes the falsified evidence rather than the true scientific evidence. First, we investigate the decision maker’s incentives to privately acquire independent evidence, which not only provides additional information to her but can also strengthen or weaken the sender’s falsification effort. Second, we analyse the decision maker’s incentives to acquire information from the sender. The third essay analyses competition between interest groups for access to a policy maker. I study a model of lobbying in which two privately-informed experts (e.g., interest groups) with opposite goals compete for the opportunity to communicate with a policy maker. The main objective is to analyse the benefits which competition for access brings to the policy maker as opposed to hiring an expert in advance. I show that competition for access is advantageous in that it provides the policy maker with some information about the expert who did not gain access and gives the experts an incentive to invest in their communication skills. On the other hand, hiring an expert in advance allows the policy maker to use a monetary reward to incentivise the expert to invest more in his communication skills.

En 1908, les juges de la Cour Suprême des États-Unis citent pour la première fois des études en médecine, en sociologie et en psychologie afin de valider la constitutionnalité d’une loi. Depuis, le recours aux preuves scientifiques s’est largement développé et il a pris une place dans le travail du juge aux États-Unis et au Canada. La preuve scientifique se présente comme un outil d’information essentiel pour le juge dans le contentieux constitutionnel des droits et libertés. Elle permet ainsi de décrire les réalités sociales et les aspects techniques qui intéressent directement la résolution des questions constitutionnelles. Au delà de son rôle d'information, son recours s’inscrit dans une logique de concrétisation de l’analyse constitutionnelle. Plus précisément, les critères du contrôle de constitutionnalité impliquent des questions de faits que la preuve scientifique pourra démontrer. En prenant ainsi un tout autre rôle, le recours aux preuves scientifiques questionne sur la nature du contrôle de constitutionnalité et sur les méthodes du juge. Malgré l’intérêt des juges américain et canadien pour ce mode de preuve, leur statut et leur régime juridique dans le contentieux constitutionnel demeurent indéterminés. Ces incertitudes touchent tant des questions de procédure que des questions de fond sur leur rôle dans l’analyse constitutionnelle et dans le raisonnement du juge. Dès lors, la recherche d'un cadre méthodologique a semblé nécessaire. Ce modèle permet de revaloriser l’apport des preuves scientifiques dans le contentieux constitutionnel et il contribue à la protection des droits et libertés. Il présente, alors, un intérêt pour l'ensemble juges constitutionnels / In 1908, the U.S. Supreme Court Justices made several citations of medical, sociology andpsychology studies for the first time. Since then, the use of scientific evidence has expanded and it became an important part of the work of the Supreme Court of the U.S. as well as the Supreme Court of Canada. Scientific evidence is an essential tool to inform judges in constitutional rights cases. It gives information on social realities and technical questions which are directly relevant to resolve questions of law. However, the use of scientific evidence is more than a medium of information. Indeed, it implies an interest for facts that go beyond the parties. Constitutional doctrine itself implies empirical questions that could find answers in scientific evidence. By determining those facts, scientific evidence becomes a part of the constitutional doctrineitself. Consequently, the use of scientific evidence interrogates on the nature of judicial review and on the judge’s methods. Thought judges in the U.S. and in Canada frequently cite scientific evidence, their use is mostly unregulated and indeterminate. The uncertainties surrounding the use of scientific evidence concern procedural questions as well as questions regarding their role in decisionmaking. Those questions must be answered. Once resolved, we research a methodological framework in which scientific evidence could be used consistently by American and Canadian judges. This approach is essential to reassert the value of scientific evidence in constitutionalrights cases and to improve constitutional rights protection. Finally, this framework might be relevant for judges beyond the United States and Canada

L'arthrose (OA) est l’atteinte la plus répandue chez les animaux de compagnie et se manifeste par l'apparition de douleurs chroniques et d'incapacités fonctionnelles. En l’absence de remède, des composés comme les produits de santé naturels (PSN) ont gagné en popularité. Cette revue systématique, enregistrée sur PROSPERO (CRD42021279368), avait pour objectif d'examiner les preuves d’efficacité analgésique des PSN et de diffuser correctement les conclusions sur leur potentiel thérapeutique. Quatre bases de données bibliographiques ont été consultées pour identifier les études testant leur efficacité sur l'OA canine et féline, naturelle ou induite. Après sélection des résultats de recherche, les données de qualité et d’efficacité ont été extraites à l’aide d’une grille d’évaluation originale basée sur les directives ARRIVE, CONSORT et l’outil d’évaluation CAMARADES. Ces grilles ont été préalablement validées : validation apparente, de contenu (interne / externe) et de construit (reproductibilité, répétabilité, sensibilité). Un consensus de 3 évaluateurs, de niveau d’expertise différent, était obligatoire pour chaque score attribué aux données extraites. La méta-analyse montre des preuves solides d’efficacité des suppléments et des diètes thérapeutiques enrichies d’acides gras en oméga-3 dans le traitement de l’OA, et le cannabidiol présente des preuves prometteuses. Les formulations de sulfate de glucosamine/chondroïtine ne présentent toutefois aucun intérêt et ne doivent plus être recommandées dans la prise en charge thérapeutique de cette maladie articulaire dégénérative des animaux de compagnie. Les résultats obtenus soulignent un manque évident de preuves pour supporter la recommandation d’utilisation de nombreux nutraceutiques et dénotent la nécessité de mettre en place des procédures normalisées de bonne pratique clinique pour de futurs essais. / Osteoarthritis (OA) is the most common disease in pets and manifests itself as chronic pain and functional disability. In the absence of a cure, compounds such as natural health products (NHPs) have gained popularity. This systematic review, registered on PROSPERO (CRD42021279368), aimed to examine the evidence for analgesic efficacy of NHPs and to properly disseminate findings on their therapeutic potential. Four bibliographic databases were searched to identify studies testing their efficacy in natural and induced canine and feline osteoarthritis. After selection of the search results, quality and efficacy data were extracted using an original evaluation grid based on the ARRIVE and CONSORT guidelines and the CAMARADES evaluation tool. The grids were previously validated: face, content (internal/external) and construct (reproducibility, repeatability, sensitivity) validation. A consensus of three evaluators, with different levels of expertise, was required for each score assigned to the extracted data. The meta-analysis shows strong evidence of efficacy in OA for omega-3 enriched supplements and therapeutic diets, while cannabidiol shows promising evidence. Glucosamine/chondroitin sulphate formulations are of no value and should no longer be recommended for the therapeutic management of OA in pets. The results highlight a clear lack of evidence to support the recommendation for use of many nutraceuticals and indicate the need for standardised good clinical practice procedures for future trials.