Traditionally, it has been argued that companies are only responsible towards their shareholders, to maximize the profits. But lately it has changed into another way of responsibilty. It has become of great importance to demonstrate sustainable long-term values for stakeholders to identify with. This thesis aims to clarify the banks’ definition of responsible investment and what criteria they assume when talking about such kind of investments. Furthermore, the thesis intends to examine how the banks in their role as an agent can contribute so their customers can achieve responsible investments. The issues dealt with are: What criterias must a responsible investment meet according to the Swedish banks? and How can the Swedish banks contribute so their clients' investments falls under what is defined as responsible investment?The conclusions of this study show that to conduct a dialogue with companies that violate norms and principles is considered more responsible, than to exclude companies and divest holding. A responsible investment is thus an investment on which banks are active owners and influence companies through dialogues. / Traditionellt sett har det hävdats att företag endast har ett ansvar gentemot aktieägarna. I takt med globaliseringen och en ökad medvetenhet om hur företag påverkar omvärlden, blir trycket allt större på att organisationer och företag ska ta ett ansvar bortom årets resultat. Påtryckningarna kommer främst från företagens intressenter och utgörs av deras krav på företagets verksamhet. För att ett företag ska kunna överleva i en föränderlig omvärld är det av stor vikt att företaget kan uppvisa hållbara värderingar som intressenterna långsiktigt kan identifiera sig med. Företagsledningen måste därför acceptera att det finns andra mål än vinstmaximering och vara redo att arbeta med flera parallella målsättningar av olika slag. Det är genom detta arbete som företaget måste hitta vägar att möta dessa krav och på så vis axla sitt ansvar gentemot omvärlden. SRI, Socially Responsible Investment, går i linje med att företagen ska förmå att ta sitt ansvar. SRI medför att aktieägarna genom sina investeringar ges en möjlighet att utöva påtryckningar på företagen, att integrera CSR-arbetet i sin verksamhet, samtidigt som de får ekonomisk avkastning. På en internationell nivå är FN:s principer för ansvarsfulla investeringar, UN’s Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), kanske det mest betydelsefulla initiativet för att kombinera ett ansvarsfullt agerande med ekonomisk avkastning. Principerna förser investerare med ett ramverk för att ställa krav på företagen att implementera ett arbete avseende miljö- och socialt ansvar, samt frågor som rör bolagsstyrning i företagens verksamheter. Denna uppsats syftar till att bringa klarhet i vad som, enligt de ledande bankerna i Sverige, avses med ansvarsfulla investeringar och vilka kriterier bankerna utgår från när de talar om den här typen av investering. Vidare studeras hur bankerna i sin roll som agenter kan verka för att kundernas placeringar blir ansvarsfulla investeringar. Frågeställningarna som uppsatsen behandlar lyder: Vilka kriterier utgår Sveriges ledande banker från när de definierar en ansvarsfull investering? samt Hur kan Sveriges ledande banker verka för att deras kunders placeringar faller inom ramen för ansvarsfulla investeringar? Studien visar att de ledande bankerna i Sverige följer Principles for Responsible Investments när de talas om ansvarsfulla investeringar. Respondenterna och bankerna har genomgående definierat en ansvarsfull investering som en investering där ägaren är aktiv i sin roll och påverkar bolagen att leva upp till ESG-kriterierna. Bankerna är i sin roll som agenter av stor betydelse för dialogen med bolagen för att kundernas placeringar faller inom ramen för ansvarsfulla investeringar. Att föra en dialog med bolag som bryter mot normer och principer anses mer ansvarsfullt än att exkludera bolagen och avyttra innehavet.

This study investigates provisions made within institutional and regulatory frameworks of water resources management to enhance multi-stakeholder relationships and the challenges of maintaining those relationships, and implications of water resources management for rural communities in the Densu River basin, Ghana. The primary objectives of this study were four fold, these are to: i) review the existing regulatory framework and how it promotes or hinders multi-stakeholder relationships within the catchment area; ii) examine multi-stakeholder relationships to identify challenges in promoting effective collaboration in water resources management; iii) explore the impacts of catchment management on the livelihoods of rural communities; and iv) generate a model that best or appropriately conceptualizes relationship mechanisms within the framework of water governance. The study employed a mixed methods approach which included data collected through reviewing regulatory and policy documents, key informant interviews, observation, and a household survey of 327 respondents. The results indicate that provisions are made within the existing institutional and regulatory framework to foster multi-stakeholder inter-relationships in the water resources management in the Densu River basin. The management of the Densu River basin is guided by a number of regulatory mechanisms that are scattered within different institutions. The regulatory mechanisms are seen as the instruments for building and maintaining multi-stakeholder relationships, but some have become a source of conflict among stakeholders, posing threats to water resources management in the Densu basin. The findings show that several issues hinder effective multi-stakeholder inter-relationships in water resources management in the Densu River basin. These issues include colonial legacies embedded within institutions, institutional challenges, and political processes. Despite the adoption of integrated water resources management (IWRM) some institutions still hold on to the old water resources management arrangements instituted during the colonial era, creating challenges for effective institutional collaboration. Additionally, institutional challenges such as limited financial and human resources, corruption, high attrition rate, and lack of integration of projects and programs are also threatening multi-stakeholder inter-relationships. The political processes at the district assemblies that determine representatives on the Densu Basin Board were also identified as posing significant threat to building effective multi-stakeholder inter-relationship for water resources management in the Densu River basin. The findings further indicate that a number of uncoordinated catchment management strategies such as restrictions on farming areas, bans on illegal mining and logging, and others strategies have been instituted in the upper Densu basin to prevent degradation of the river. However, these strategies are having significant socioeconomic impacts on the local communities. A majority of residents are aware and comply with the enforcement of the strategies, but some are quite reluctant to adhere to them because of increasing economic hardships. This situation threatens the successful implementation of the strategies and the overall protection of the river. Other residents, however, have adopted alternative strategies (expanding petty trading, farming improvement, multiple jobs and others) to cope with the increasing economic hardships as a result of the enforcement of the catchment management strategies by the government.

Submitted by Clara Brando de Oliveira (brandoclara@gmail.com) on 2016-05-13T19:58:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 CLARA BRANDO_Dissertação_v34 (pós banca).pdf: 823467 bytes, checksum: bec471e6c719296d4671dd8645ee1d8c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2016-05-19T13:51:09Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 CLARA BRANDO_Dissertação_v34 (pós banca).pdf: 823467 bytes, checksum: bec471e6c719296d4671dd8645ee1d8c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2016-06-07T13:33:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 CLARA BRANDO_Dissertação_v34 (pós banca).pdf: 823467 bytes, checksum: bec471e6c719296d4671dd8645ee1d8c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-07T13:36:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 CLARA BRANDO_Dissertação_v34 (pós banca).pdf: 823467 bytes, checksum: bec471e6c719296d4671dd8645ee1d8c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-05-06 / Este estudo teve como objetivo central identificar de que forma a alocação de indivíduos como intermediadores das relações de agência impacta os conflitos inerentes à relação principal-agente no âmbito da administração pública. Para tanto, foi considerado o contexto do arranjo contratual existente entre o Escritório de Gerenciamento de Projetos da Secretaria Municipal da Casa Civil (CVL/EGP-Rio), representante do poder central da Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, e os órgãos e entidades executoras dos projetos e metas estratégicos definidos por esse poder central. A revisão bibliográfica apontou a existência de quatro problemas de agência principais, os quais dizem respeito às diferenças de motivações e objetivos, às assimetrias de informação, às distintas propensões ao risco e aos diferentes horizontes de planejamento. Foram realizadas dez entrevistas semi-estruturadas com ocupantes do cargo de Analista de Gerenciamento de Projetos e Metas (AGPM), que atuam como intermediadores da relação de agência entre CVL/EGP-Rio e unidades executoras. Os resultados do estudo indicam que o intermediador da relação de agência analisada é capaz de provocar redução naqueles conflitos de agência relacionados com as diferenças de motivações e objetivos e com as assimetrias de informação. Quanto aos problemas de agência que dizem respeito às distintas propensões ao risco e aos diferentes horizontes de planejamento, a pesquisa demonstra que o intermediador não promove qualquer impacto, seja no sentido de acentuá-los ou atenuá-los. / The central objective of this study is to identify how the allocation of individuals as intermediaries of agency relationships impacts the inherent principal-agent problems within public administration. For such, it was considered the existing contractual arrangement between the Escritório de Gerenciamento de Projetos da Secretaria Municipal da Casa Civil (CVL/EGP-Rio), that represents the central power of Rio de Janeiro’s City Hall, and the decentralized units, responsible for executing the projects and goals defined by this central power. The literature review has pointed towards the existence of four main agency problems, which are related to different motivations and goals, to information asymmetries, to distinct risk propensity, and to different planning horizons. In order to verify the objective of this study, ten semi-structured interviews with occupants of the position of Analista de Gerenciamento de Projetos e Metas, who act as intermediaries of the agency relationship between CVL/EGP-Rio and the executive units, were conducted. The results indicate that the intermediary of the analyzed agency relationship is able to reduce only the agency conflicts related to the different motivations and goals and to the information asymmetries. Regarding those agency problems related to risk propensity and to different planning horizons, the research shows that the intermediary does not cause any impact, neither to reduce or increase them.

L’économie des contrats complets prédit qu’au sein d’une relation d’agence d’une organisation productive, en présence d’aléa moral, un dispositif de vérification de l’information permet de répondre à la fois à un problème de coopération entre les individus et à un problème de coordination des activités. Cependant, au lieu de discipliner des comportements opportunistes, ce dispositif peut engendrer des coûts cachés et réduire la motivation intrinsèque des agents à réaliser une activité qui leur a été attribuée. Sous certaines conditions, il génère une réduction de l’activité, et une perte en termes d’allocation ce qui nuit à l’efficacité.Dans cette thèse de doctorat, nous avons conduit trois expérimentations contrôlées de terrain avec assignation aléatoire qui visaient à modifier les configurations du dispositif de vérification de l’information afin de résoudre un problème organisationnel propre à trois relations d’agence particulières.Dans notre premier chapitre, nous avons testé l’effet de la variation de la quantité d’informations détenues par les cotisants sur le dispositif de vérification de la déclaration sociale grâce à des messages ciblés contenant des explications sur le pouvoir de contrôle de l’Agence centrale des organismes de sécurité sociale (Acoss) afin de réduire la fraude sociale.Dans notre deuxième chapitre, nous avons testé la réduction de l’intensité de la surveillance électronique de la performance des conseillers d’un centre d’appels sous-traitants afin d’améliorer leur qualité de vie au travail.Enfin, dans notre troisième chapitre, nous avons testé l’effet de la négociation contractuelle du dispositif d’évaluation de la participation des étudiants de licence pendant les travaux dirigés afin d’améliorer leur réussite à l’université. / Economics of complete contracts foresees that within an agency relationship of a productive organization, in the presence of moral hazard, an information check device can address both a problem of cooperation between individuals and a problem of coordination of activities. However, instead of disciplining opportunistic behaviours, this device can generate hidden costs and reduce the intrinsic motivation of agents to perform an activity that has been assigned to them. Under certain conditions, it generates a reduction of the outcome, and a loss in terms of allocation, which is detrimental to efficiency.In this Ph.D. thesis, we conducted three randomized controlled field trials that aimed at modifying the configurations of the information check device to solve an organizational problem specific to three specific agency relationships.In our first chapter, we tested the effect of varying the amount of information held by contributors on the social reporting verification device through targeted messages containing explanations of the control power of the Agence centrale des organisations de sécurité sociale (Acoss) in order to reduce social fraud.In our second chapter, we tested the reduction in the intensity of the electronic monitoring of the performance of advisors of an outsourced call centre in order to improve their quality of life at work.Finally, in our third chapter, we tested the effect of the contractual negotiation of the device which evaluate the participation of undergraduate students during the tutorials in order to improve their success at the university.