<p>Introduction: Over half of the Swedish IT-projects get delayed and more expensive than budgeted. Large corporations and governmental institutions stand before the process of investigating in new IT-systems in intervals of three to five years. In order to decrease the cost, an external consultant with large experience in IT-purchases could be used by the customers. These consultants does today work solely for the customers, helping them to find the best solution. We want to see if an external consultant instead could act as an inde-pendent moderator between the supplier and customer in the IT-systems lifecycle.</p><p>Purpose: The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze problems and possible solutions related to the involvement of third party consultants in larger IT-projects. In particular, we will investigate when and where in the project cycle it could be beneficial to use an independent moderator.</p><p>Method: We have conducted semi-structured interviews with six organizations to get an understanding about consultants in IT-projects. Four of the interviewed were IT-managers at organizations were large IT-systems are bought and implemented. Then, two of the in-terviewed represented the supplier companies that sell large IT-systems.</p><p>Frame of reference: Transaction cost theory and agency theory has been used. Transac-tion cost theory is a theory on whether you should conduct the service internally or purchase it from external firms. Agency theory describes problems in the relationship between a principal and an agent. The agent has a diversified interest towards the principal. In our case, the agent is a consultant.</p><p>Conclusion: The implementation phase benefits from using an external moderator who monitors what the customer needs, and then in a continuous interval measures if the project is aligning towards the stated goal. This can lower the failure of information and identify problem areas early and thereby prevent costly adjustments later in the project. An in-dependent moderator with a high degree of routine and specific knowledge could enhance communication, create a better fit of the implemented system and foresee opportunistic advices from suppliers. In the pre-study phase there are benefits for the customer with evaluating the need, stating specific demands and define a clear goal.</p>

<p>The Enron collapse in 2001 has resulted in an increasing attention to corporate governance. Even in Sweden, some scandals have occurred, for example Skandia, ABB, Trustor; a parallel could be drawn, implying that these scandals have resulted in increased attention to corporate governance. Corporate governance concerns the relationship between a corporation’s management, board of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders. The problems with the relationship between managers and share-holders are referred to as the principle-agent problem. The increase in corporate governance disclosure can be seen as a way by the corporations to regain the trust from the shareholders. Can agency theory be used to explain why some corporation disclose more corporate governance information than others?</p><p>The purpose with this master thesis is, with starting point in agency theory, to contribute to the understanding of which factors that influence corporations to disclose corporate governance information in the annual reports.</p><p>For this thesis, a quantitative research has been performed. Annual reports from corporations listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange have been examined, to be able to develop a corporate governance disclosure index and to measure 15 characteristics, derived from the agency theory and two control variables. The data was analysed in SPSS , using both linear and multiple regressions.</p><p>The analysis showed that role duality actually measured if a corporation had a foreign parent company and corporations listed on the O-list other on Stockholm Stock Exchange served as proxies for smaller corporations. Therefore, it was possible to con-clude that corporations were influenced by the origin of the parent company and the size of the corporation to disclose corporate governance information. Another conclusion was that corporate governance characteristics derived from agency theory is not appropriate when trying to find factors that influence corporations to disclose corporate governance information. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is inappropriate to take the starting point in the agency theory.</p>

Univ., Diss.--Wageningen, 2006. / Zsfassung in niederländ. Sprache.

Wirtschaftswiss. Fakultät der Humboldt-Univ., Diss.--Berlin, 2006. / Zsfassung in dt. Sprache.

Wiss. Hochschule für Unternehmensführung, Diss--Koblenz, 2006.

This study examines the existence of pay-performance sensitivity in total compensation and bonus during the financial crisis, using data between 2007-2010 from Swedish 196 listed firms. We perform panel data regression analysis of CEO compensation on financial performance measured as stock returns. Our results indicate that there is, although not significant, a weak positive relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance during 2007-2010. However during 2009-2010 in a market state defined as post-crisis we find weak negative pay-performance sensitivity at a significance level of 10 %. Nevertheless, as regards to the bonus paid to executives there was a significantly positive relationship relative bonus % and firm performance. These results contribute to our understanding of the pay-performance sensitivity in times of financial disturbance, highly relevant to the existing debate considering CEO compensation.

Organizations are increasingly focusing on their value chain activities in an effort to improve their performance, especially in the recent economic times. Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of their channel activities has become a focal point for many organizations. Interorganizational systems (IOS’s) have played an important part in this effort. While in theory, IOS’s have the ability to enhance the degree of cooperation and coordination between two channel partners, often the results obtained are not what is expected. Hence, it becomes very important to understand the barriers to the assimilation of these technologies. Drawing upon theoretical perspectives of governance, including transaction cost analysis (TCA), control theory and agency theory, we develop an integrative model that examines the factors that influence an organizations assimilation process. The model identifies and examines three stages of assimilation: technological, exploitive and explorative assimilation that add value to an organization. The model features asset specificity, technological uncertainty, performance documentation, agent orientation and bilateral governance mechanisms as antecedents to assimilation. It also examines the moderating effects of bilateral mechanisms. Our results suggest that theories of governance provide an additional lens to examine assimilation phenomena. In specific, our empirical analysis leads to several key findings: (1) channel partners who are locked in to the relationship with high levels of asset specificity are more likely to assimilate the technology; (2) bilateral governance mechanisms are a key force in the assimilation process, with both direct and moderated effects; (3) organizations that view the channel partner as an agent of the firm are less likely to adopt the technology, especially when the relationship exhibits low levels of bilateral governance mechanisms. Together these findings provide new insights into barriers to the assimilation of IOS’s in channel relationships.

No description available.

<p>This literature study aims to identify international best practice concerning the role of the board and more particularly that of the independent director in ensuring good corporate governance. The study is based on sources which include a large contingent of up to date sources on the subject ranging from newspaper articles, journal articles, various corporate governance codes, company reports and reports on governance such as Cadbury and Higgs.</p>

Signals convey information to marketplace participants regarding the unobservable quality of a product. Whenever product quality if unobservable prior to purchase, there is the risk of adverse selection. Problems of hidden information also occur in the consumer marketplace when the consumer is unable to verify the quality of a good prior to purchase. The sending, receiving, and interpretation or signals are potential ways to overcome the problem of adverse selection. In general, there is a lack of empirical evidence for signaling hypothesis, particularly that which links signaling to business performance outcomes. This research proposes that reputation serves as a marketplace signal to convey unobservable information about products offered for sale. Signaling hypotheses are tested in a network context, examining the influence of signals throughout a network of buyers and sellers in a marketplace. There are many situations where a signal does not affect just one sender and one receiver; multiple constituencies may be aware of and react to a given signal. This study incorporates the actions of seller side principals, seller side agents, and buyer side agents when examining marketplace signals and provides a new perspective and better vantage point from which to test signaling theory. The research setting for this study is the world’s largest individual marketplace for Thoroughbred yearlings. Several sources of secondary data are employed. These openly available published sources of information were selected as representative of the information that would typically be available to marketplace principals and agents to use in planning interactions in this unique live auction marketplace. The findings from his study indicate that the reputation of seller side principals and agents affect the eventual business performance outcomes as measured by final price brought at auction for goods. Specifically, seller side principals and agents who have developed a reputation for producing or selling high-priced or high-performing goods will be rewarded in the marketplace with relatively higher prices for their goods. Buyer side agents who are more central in the marketplace will pay relatively higher prices for goods. Evidence suggests that more central seller side agents will receive relatively higher prices for their goods.