Les scandales financiers des années 2000 ont mis en exergue les dysfonctionnements du gouvernement de l'entreprise. Il a été opéré une remise en cause de la capacité de processus de la gouvernance de l'entreprise actuelle à agir de manière cohérente et à gérer au mieux les conflits et les intérêts de toutes les parties prenantes. L'audit légal est apparu comme un des moyens de régulation du comportement des acteurs dans un cadre théorique de l'agence. L'audit légal joue un rôle central dans la gouvernance de l'entreprise en raison de l'asymétrie d'information existant entre actionnaires et dirigeants. L'objet de cette étude est de comprendre quelles sont les pratiques des commissaires aux comptes qui auditent les sociétés cotées en France. A cette fin une étude descriptive des pratiques a été adoptée. La mise en œuvre d'un nouveau cadre réglementaire et législatif semble avoir un impact sur ces pratiques. L'introduction d'un contrôle de la profession par le Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes (H3C) apparaissait pouvoir modifier les pratiques de travail des commissaires aux comptes. Ce travail met en lumière que les commissaires aux comptes peuvent être regroupés en trois groupes : les adaptatifs, les coopétitifs et les généralistes. Par ailleurs, il révèle que les commissaires aux comptes tiennent compte dans leurs pratiques de travail du réseau professionnel, de la constitution des équipes, du knowledge management et de la formation technique. / The financial scandals of the 2000s have brought out many of the corporate governance's malfunctions. The capacity of the present-day corporate governance's process to a better management of all stakeholders' conflicts and interests was called into question. Audit has appeared as one of the means to regulate the operators' performance within the theoretical framework of the agency. Audit plays a causal role in corporate governance due to the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. The aim of this study is to understand what the practices of the auditors auditing listed companies in France are. A descriptive study of the practices was implemented to this end. The implementation of a new regulatory and legislative framework appears to have an impact on these practices. The introduction of a control of the profession by the Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes (H3C) appeared to be able to change the auditors' working practices. This work highlights the auditors' possible division into three clusters: the adaptives, the coopetitors and the generalizing. Moreover, it reveals that the auditors take into account the professional network, the setting up of teams, the knowledge management and the technical training within their work practices.

This dissertation addresses the question of effective delegation, exploring it through the concept of managerial discretion (i.e., a latitude of managerial actions, which lie in the zone of shareholders’ acceptance). While the corporate governance perspective on managerial discretion focuses mainly on the costs associated with delegation, the strategic management perspective emphasizes its benefits in creating value for the firm. Building on research in corporate governance and strategic management, this dissertation develops and empirically tests a theoretical framework that explains how the two distinct dimensions of managerial discretion jointly influence organizational outcomes. The proposed framework illuminates the importance of balance between the restraining and enabling decisions undertaken by professional managers. This dissertation makes a two-fold contribution to the field of corporate governance. First, it identifies and explains organizational and environmental forces that jointly shape strategic and governance dimensions of managerial discretion, redefining the concept. Second, it conceptually and empirically explores an integrative model of managerial discretion within the broader corporate governance framework, providing evidence of the joint effects of governance and strategic dimensions of discretion on organizational outcomes. The results suggest that the effect of governance dimension of managerial discretion on a firm’s performance is contingent on the strategic dimension of discretion. This draws attention to potential strategic implications of board monitoring over managerial decision making. While the majority of studies emphasize the benefits of increased control over managerial decision making, particularly stressing board monitoring, this dissertation also considers the benefits of delegation for firms’ strategic development. By reversing the polarity of the current emphasis on disciplining managers, this dissertation provides a more balanced view of the notion of corporate governance. The value of this approach derives from the integrated model, which highlights the benefits and the costs of delegation.

De kommunala aktiebolagen måste granskas av en auktoriserad revisor. Dock måste dessa upphandlas enligt LOU. LOU har kritiserats för att påverka vilka faktorer som avgör vilken revisionsbyrå som upphandlas. De kommunala aktiebolagen har också kritiseras för att brista i transparens. Få tidigare studier har fokuserat på revision inom kommunala aktiebolag på grund av att det hamnar mellan två forskningsfält. Därför är det intressant att undersöka vilka faktorer som påverkar valet av revisor. Syftet med denna studie är att förklara vilka faktorer som påverkar om sakkunnig yrkesrevisorer anlitade av kommunens revisorer och auktoriserad revisor i kommunens bolag upphandlas från samma revisionsbyrå eller inte. Studien har en deduktiv ansats eftersom befintliga teorier härleds och ligger till grund för studiens hypoteser. En tvärsnittsstudie har genomförts för att förklara sambandet mellan olika faktorer och valet av revisionsbyrå. Empirin består av primär- och sekundärdata och datainsamling har gjorts genom dokumentstudier samt en enkätundersökning. Detta analyseras sedan med hjälp av regressionsanalyser. Studiens resultat visar att det finns faktorer som förklarar valet av revisionsbyrå. Upphandlingsprocessen uppvisar ett signifikant samband med valet av revisionsbyrå. / Municipal corporations require auditing by a certified auditor. These must be procured in accordance with Swedish legislation (LOU). However, this process of procurement has been criticized for affecting auditor choice while Municipal corporations have been criticized for lacking transparency. The fact that municipal corporations are considered part of both the private and public sector have lead to few studies focused on this type of organization. Auditing in municipal corporations is therefor of interest to study. The aim of this thesis is to explain which factors affect whether or not municipal auditors and certified auditors for the municipal corporations are procured from the same audit firm. A deductive approach is used for creating hypotheses based on existing theories. In order to explain the relationship between different factors and the choice of audit firm we use a cross-sectional design. Secondary data is gathered through documents and a survey is designed for the purpose of collecting primary data. The data is analyzed through regression analysis. Results show factors affecting the choice of audit firm. There is a significant relationship between the procurement process and the choice of audit firm.

Cette thèse étudie l’impact de la composition du conseil d’administration sur la performance financière d’une entreprise. Elle est composée de trois chapitres. Dans le premier chapitre, nous effectuons une revue de la littérature sur les conseils d’administration. Nous pointons l’évolution de la gouvernance des entreprises au cours des dernières décennies, et montrons en quoi l’efficacité des conseils d’administration est devenue un sujet majeur de ce champ de recherche et une préoccupation importante des actionnaires et des régulateurs. En particulier, après avoir présenté le cadre théorique de la gouvernance, nous présentons les résultats des articles académiques étudiant l’impact de la composition du conseil d’administration sur la performance de l’entreprise. Dans les deuxième et troisième chapitres, nous étudions l’impact de la présence de différents types d’administrateurs au sein du conseil. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous proposons un modèle théorique pour tenter de comprendre et de déterminer l’impact de la représentation salariale au conseil d’administration sur la valeur actionnariale de l’entreprise et sur l’horizon de ses investissements. Nos résultats suggèrent que la représentation salariale peut s’envisager comme un choix, pour les actionnaires, entre liquidité et information. Nous montrons que lorsque des représentants des salariés siègent au conseil d’administration d’une entreprise, celle-ci a une plus grande probabilité d’investir dans des projets à long-terme qu’une entreprise sans représentation salariale. Nous montrons également que les salariés ayant accès à une information interne précieuse, leur présence au conseil d’administration peut permettre d’augmenter la valeur actionnariale de l’entreprise. Ainsi, nous proposons un modèle de la représentation salariale cohérent avec certaines études empiriques. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous étudions empiriquement l’impact des connexions politiques sur le taux d’intérêt d’emprunts bancaires en utilisant un échantillon de prêts concernant des entreprises de plusieurs pays. Si ce sujet a déjà été largement traité, nous proposons une nouvelle définition de la connexion politique que nous subdivisons en deux catégories, selon l’exposition médiatique, forte ou faible, des politiciens. Les politiciens les plus en vue sont aussi ceux pour lesquels le risque d’être soupçonné de conflit d’intérêt ou de manquement à l’éthique est le plus important, et pour qui le coût d’un scandale est le plus élevé. Aussi discriminons-nous les connexions politiques selon qu’elles impliquent des politiciens très en vue ou des politiciens à un niveau inférieur. Cette division se fonde sur l’hypothèse que les politiciens les plus exposés sont, ayant le plus à perdre d’un scandale, disposent de la marge de manœuvre la plus réduite en tant que dirigeants d’entreprise et sont donc les moins à même d’impacter la performance de l’entreprise. Nos résultats confortent la pertinence d’une telle redéfinition de la connexion politique en fonction de la visibilité des politiciens concernés. Nous montrons en particulier que les entreprises politiquement connectées qui empruntent auprès de banques politiquement connectées le font à des taux significativement inférieurs à celles non connectées, et que cet effet est plus important lorsque la connexion de l’emprunteur passe par un politicien moins exposé. Nos résultats suggèrent que l’effet est encore plus fort si la banque est elle aussi connectée par l’intermédiaire d’un politicien moins exposé. Par ailleurs, nous montrons que les entreprises connectées politiquement empruntent significativement moins auprès de banques connectées par l’intermédiaire d’un politicien très exposé médiatiquement. Nos résultats suggèrent enfin que cet effet est plus fort à l’approche d’élections, un moment il est particulièrement coûteux pour un politicien d’être soupçonné de manquement à la déontologie. / This thesis studies the impact of the composition of the board of directors on the firm financial performance. It consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, we review the literature on boards of directors. We show the evolution of corporate governance over the past decades, and how the efficiency of boards of directors has became a key issue for shareholders and regulators. After describing the theoretical and historical framework, we present and discuss the academic papers studying the impact of board composition on the firm performance. In the second and third chapters, we examine the impact of the presence of different directors on the board. In the second chapter, we provide a theoretical model that aims at understanding and determining the impact of employee representation on the board of directors on the shareholder value of the firm and on its investment horizon. Our results suggest that with employee representation, shareholders face a tradeoff between liquidity and information. We show that a firm with employee representation is more likely to invest in long-term rather than in short-term projects and that, because employees have access to valuable inside information, their presence on the board may increase the shareholder value. Consistent with some empirical studies, we offer some theoretical support for employee representation on the board. In the third chapter, we study the impact of political connections on the rate of interest of bank loans. We conduct a cross-country study of the impact of political connections on bank loans interest rates. While this topic has already been widely investigated, we offer a new definition of political connection. We subcategorize political connections into two categories: politicians with a high media exposure, and lower level politicians. Politicians with business ties bear the risk of being suspected of ethics breaching or of having conflicting interests, which can be costly for their reputation. We discriminate the political connections of firms based on the idea that with greater exposure comes greater risk of suspicion, and thus smaller ability to impact the firm performance. We study the impact of political connection of the borrower as well as of the lender on interest rates. Our results give support to our definition, as we find significant differences depending on the level of visibility of the political connections of the borrower and of the lender. Our results show that politically connected firms which borrow from politically connected banks enjoy a significantly lower rate if they are connected with lower level politicians. Our results suggest that the rate is even lower if the bank also is connected with lower level politicians. Furthermore, our results suggest that politically connected firms tend to avoid borrowing money from banks that are connected with top politicians. Our results also suggest that this effect is stronger in pre-election periods, when the potential cost for politicians of being suspected of collusion is higher.

This thesis examines short- and long-term decision making, CEO-remuneration and its effects on company performance measured as return on assets during a time-period containing market up- and downturns with regards to company resilience. We examined this in a Swedish context by looking at listed companies on the Stockholm stock exchange during the period 2004 to 2014. The research was conducted using a multiple regression analysis to capture relationships between the dependent variable, the independent- and control variables over the observed time-period. We measure short-term action as decreases in R&D-spending, CapEx and number of employees, that can create short-term profits, whilst long-term actions is the opposite which are expected to generate a high level of company performance in the long run. In our observed population we find that companies who balance short- and long-term actions have a higher company performance, thus deviating from previous research. We also find that an increase in CEO-remuneration will not yield higher company performance when regarding firm size. The results of the study indicate that the companies in our sample have a goal alignment between the CEO and owners, although it shows tendencies of risk adversity in decision making. We find there is a more complex relationship between decision making, the CEO, and company performance than first expected.

The issues surrounding sustainability continues to be at the forefront of the human agenda and firms are increasingly being held accountable by their stakeholders to assist in bringing about sustainability. Despite this, there is a tension surrounding the role of firms and the benefits implementing sustainability practices and policies has for these actors. On the one hand, being sustainable underpinned by a strong CSR-oriented governance board with the right compositional factors results in superior firm performance. On the other hand, sustainability is suggested to increase costs and reduced competitiveness thereby reducing firm performance. These contrasting results supported by mixed scholarly findings concerning different mediating factors influencing the overarching relationship creates a confusion gap that warrants this current study. As such, the study’s purpose is to investigate the relationship between two distinct yet interrelated relationships, the impact of board of directors’ composition on CSR performance measured by ESG scores and the impact of CSR performance on firm performance so as to contribute to the debate on these notion that continues to plague academia and the pragmatic world. This study is realized through a quantitative archival-longitudinal study design underpinned by metaphysical assumptions. Regression analyses using panel data on a sample of 123 listed companies headquartered in the Nordic Countries for the period 2010-2018 is undertaken to analyze the potential relation between CSR performance and five board composition factors, specially the gender diversity, independence, size, frequency of meetings and the presence of CSR committee. The association between CSR performance and firm performance is investigated in a similar way. Under rigorous statistical testing and analysis, the results indicate that there potentially is a relation between board composition and firms’ ESG performance. The results derived from the relationship between CSR and firm performance is inconsistent and cannot be fully accepted. This study contributes theoretically to CSR, corporate governance and finance literature by expanding upon how these three notions are linked in light of the sustainability trend that is gripping modern society. Socially, this research is useful for providing empirical evidence on the value of strong governance structures so as to foster sustainability and encourage debate on its value. Pragmatically, our study suggests what board composition factors are most conducive for supporting CSR that may assist firms’ corporate governance structuring and focus.

This study investigates the relationship between corporate sustainability and dividend policy in the Nordic countries. In the field of finance, the importance of corporate sustainability is growing, particularly in the Nordic countries, which excel in global sustainability rankings. In response to this occurrence many firms are increasingly incorporating sustainability into their operations, which in turn might affect the strategic decisions of these firms. One of these is the dividend policy decision. Dividend policy in the form of cash dividends is a central concept in finance and is affected by conservation of capital and time value of money. The purpose of this study is to clarify the relationship between sustainability and dividend policy, which the authors have done by including different theoretical arguments. These are grounded in the agency theory, the signaling theory and the stakeholder theory. Previous research such as Benlemlih (2019) has examined the relationship between sustainability and dividends, but not in the same regional setting. ESG is used as a proxy for sustainability, while two proxies are used for dividend policy; dividend payout ratio and dividend yield. Through a quantitative approach information is collected on the ESG score and dividend data using the Thomson Reuters Eikon database and then analyzed using regression analysis. The data spans over 10 years (2008-2018) and covers 117 firms with available ESG and dividend payout data.  The findings indicate that there is a significant relationship between the ESG score and the dividend payout ratio of Nordic firms, while the dividend yield has no relationship with the ESG score. As both measurements had positive coefficients, the authors determined that there is a positive relationship between sustainability and dividend policy. Based on the findings, the excess liquidity hypothesis was dismissed, while the authors concluded that there was support for and against the overinvesting hypothesis and the signaling hypothesis. The authors believe one possible explanation for these mixed results could be due to the regional setting, as it differs from the settings of previous studies. By illustrating the relationship between corporate sustainability and dividend policy, this study could be of interest to large and medium sized firms in the Nordic countries that use business strategies involving ESG practices or consider implementing such strategies. Similarly, it could be used by investors that use ESG-screening as a decision criterion when investing.

Neste estudo, os conceitos e mecanismos da governança empresarial foram revisados para identificar os instrumentos e elementos que possibilitam seu efetivo exercício aos responsáveis pela determinação dos rumos das empresas. Apoiados na constatação de que não existe governança sem controle e que a mesma depende da estruturação de um quadro completo de avaliação do desempenho que permita monitorar não apenas a gestão dos recursos como também os riscos associados, como os de agenciamento. Assim, emerge a necessidade de garantir a independência e isenção dessa avaliação, o que demanda a existência de um órgão especializado e unificado para realizar tal controle, independente das demais unidades com tarefas de caráter executivo. A atribuição desse órgão seria avaliar e controlar as diversas divisões da empresa e servir como instrumento de apoio e conexão, tanto à atividade de gerir, como de controlar e reportar o desempenho vinculado ao risco desses gestores. Demonstra-se que tais atribuições possuem identificação com as funções primordiais da Área de Controladoria, cujo sistema contábil-financeiro de informações é instrumento poderoso e insubstituível no rastreamento e identificação do processo de criação e erosão do valor da empresa por meio das diversas unidades das organizações. Conclui-se que a Controladoria deve ser reformulada para incorporar novas métricas e procedimentos de monitoração do desempenho vinculado ao risco. Desse modo, é proposta uma nova posição da Área na estrutura empresarial, que garanta independência a seu titular por meio do reporte simultâneo ao principal executivo e ao Conselho de Administração e, por extensão, aos acionistas/proprietários. / This dissertation revise concepts and mechanisms of corporate governance, to identify which are the elements and instruments that make it possible to the responsible ones, to determine the corporation?s lines of direction, its effective action. From the evidence that there is no governance without control, and that it depends, therefore, on the structuring of a complete performance evaluation chart allowing to monitor not only the management of resources, but also the linked risks, among them the agency risk, it emerges the need of guaranteeing the independence and the exemption of such evaluation, which requires the existence of a unified and specialized organ to manage this control independently of the remaining units, that carry executive tasks out. This organ should evaluate and control the several divisions of the corporation and work as an instrument of support and connection, not only to the management activity, but also to the activity of controlling and reporting the performance bounded, to these manager?s risk. Evidence is given that such attributions are identified with the primordial functions of the Controlling Area, whose accounting-financial system is a powerful and non-replaceable instrument to track and identify the creation and erosion process of the corporation value through the several units of the organizations. It is, therefore, concluded that the Control Area should be reformulated in a way to incorporate new measures and procedures for monitoring performance linked to risks and it is proposed a new position of the said Area in the entrepreneurial structure, thus guaranteeing independence to its head through a simultaneous reporting to the main executive of the Board, and by extension, to the shareholders/owners.

As informações contábeis são de grande importância para o equilíbrio do relacionamento entre os stakeholders, sendo direcionadoras para a alocação de seus recursos. A auditoria independente, nesse contexto, surge como um importante mecanismo que contribui para proporcionar confiabilidade a essas informações, reduzindo o conflito de agência inerente a esse relacionamento, ao expressar uma opinião sobre a adequação das demonstrações contábeis às praticas de contabilidade. Diversas são as empresas de auditoria independente cadastradas na Comissão de Valores Mobiliários para realizar tais trabalhos no Brasil; no entanto, quatro empresas se destacam nesse rol: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG e Ernst & Young. Essas quatro empresas são mundialmente conhecidas como Big Four. Até 2001, tal grupo era denominado Big Five e tinha como integrante a Arthur Andersen, que deixou de atuar no ramo a partir de 2002. Este trabalho buscou verificar a participação dessas empresas no Brasil no período de 1997 a 2008. Para tanto, as empresas auditadas foram classificadas pelo ramo de atividade, controle acionário e negociação em bolsa de valores, a fim de verificar a participação das empresas de auditoria sob diferentes aspectos. A amostra foi composta de 2.024 empresas constantes do banco de dados da FIPECAFI no período contemplado na pesquisa. Os resultados apontam que, na média do período, aproximadamente 80% dos ativos das grandes empresas atuantes no Brasil são auditados por empresas do grupo Big Four. Em 2008 a líder geral no Brasil foi a KPMG, responsável por auditar mais de 30% dos ativos da amostra. Outro objetivo deste trabalho foi detectar características das empresas auditadas que poderiam ser indicadores para a empresa escolher um auditor componente do grupo das maiores empresas de auditoria independente, focando-se na influência dos credores nessa decisão. Para esse objetivo foram coletados dados contábeis das empresas auditadas, além das informações não contábeis já utilizadas na primeira análise de participação das auditadas (ramo de atividade, controle acionário e negociação em bolsa de valores) e aplicado o teste estatístico de regressão logística. Os resultados não mostraram que a situação econômica e financeira da auditada influencia essa escolha, mas apontaram para a importância do controle acionário e do porte da auditada. / Accounting information have great importance for the balance of the relationship among stakeholders, and driving to the allocation of its resources. The independent audit, in this context, emerged as an important mechanism that helps to provide reliability of this information, reducing the agency conflict inherent in that relationship, to express an opinion on the adequacy of financial statements to accounting practices. There are several independent auditing firms registered at the Securities Commission to carry out such works in Brazil, however, four companies stand out in this list: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG and Ernst & Young. These four companies are worldwide known as \"Big Four\". Until 2001, this group was called \"Big Five\" and had as a member Arthur Andersen, which no longer operate in the sector since 2002. This study aimed to verify their participation in Brazil from 1997 to 2008. For this, the audited companies were classified by line of business, stock control and trading on stock exchanges in order to assess the role of audit firms under different aspects. The sample consisted of 2024 companies listed in the database FIPECAFI the period covered in the survey. The results show that the average period of approximately 80% of the assets of large companies operating in Brazil are audited by firms of the group \"Big Four\". In 2008 the overall leader in Brazil was KPMG, responsible for auditing more than 30% of assets in the sample. Another objective was to identify characteristics of the audited companies that could be indicators for the company to choose an auditor of the component group of the largest independent audit, focusing on the influence of creditors in that decision. For this purpose, data were collected from accounting firms audited in addition to the information which were already used in the prior market share analysis (line of business, ownership control and stock trading on stock exchanges) and applied logistic regression statistical test. The results have shown that the economic and financial situation do not have any influence in that choice, but pointed the importance of ownership control and audited firms size in that choice.

A alta concentração da propriedade e de controle nas empresas brasileiras, aliada à baixa proteção legal aos acionistas, pode gerar conflitos de agência entre os acionistas majoritários e minoritários. De acordo com a literatura fundamentada pela Teoria de Agência, o pagamento de dividendos poderia minimizar tais conflitos. Para a literatura de governança corporativa, por sua vez, empresas com melhores práticas de governança corporativa ofereceriam proteção mais forte aos seus acionistas, de modo que estes teriam poder para pressionar os gestores a pagar dividendos mais elevados. Neste contexto, o presente trabalho teve como objetivo investigar empiricamente se as empresas brasileiras utilizam a política de dividendos para minimizar os conflitos de agência entre os acionistas majoritários e minoritários e se boas práticas de governança corporativa aumentam a proteção aos acionistas. Para atingir o objetivo proposto, foram realizados testes econométricos para um modelo não explorado em estudos anteriores. Neste, foram incluídas, além das variáveis de controle justificadas pela literatura (possíveis determinantes da política de pagamento de dividendos), duas variáveis proxies para conflitos de agência: excesso de direito de voto em relação ao direito sobre o fluxo de caixa em posse do maior acionista e fluxo de caixa livre para os acionistas e uma variável proxy para melhores práticas de governança corporativa. As estimações foram realizadas usando o método Tobit em painel com informações, referentes ao período de 2000 a 2013, de 466 empresas brasileiras não financeiras listadas na BM&FBOVESPA. Os resultados encontrados sugerem que as empresas brasileiras de capital aberto não utilizam a política de dividendos como mecanismo de redução dos conflitos de agência entre os acionistas majoritários e minoritários. Esses resultados podem ser considerados robustos, uma vez que foram observados em especificações alternativas e quase todas as variáveis de controle foram estatisticamente significativas e apresentaram relações com o índice de payout conforme previsto pela literatura teórica e evidências da literatura empírica. Os resultados também mostraram indícios de que o baixo enforcement da legislação brasileira e os incentivos criados pela BM&FBOVESPA não garantem proteção aos acionistas, sinalizando a necessidade de realização de melhorias no sistema legal brasileiro / The high concentration of ownership and control in Brazilian companies, combined with low legal protection to shareholders, can generate agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. According to the literature grounded by the Agency Theory, the payment of dividends could minimize such conflicts. For the corporate governance literature, in turn, companies with best corporate governance practices would offer stronger protection to its shareholders, so that they would be able to pressure managers to pay higher dividends. In this context, this study aimed to empirically investigate whether Brazilian companies use the dividend policy to minimize the agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders and whether good corporate governance practices increase shareholder protection. To achieve this purpose, have been conducted econometric tests for a model not explored in previous studies. In this were included, besides the control variables justified by the literature (possible determinants of dividend payout policy), two proxies for agency conflicts: excess voting right in relation to cash flow rights in the possession of greater shareholder and free cash flow to shareholders and a proxy variable for best corporate governance practices.000 The estimates were made using the Tobit method panel with information relating to the period from 2000 to 2013, 466 non-financial Brazilian companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA. The results suggest that the publicly traded Brazilian companies do not use the dividend policy as a mechanism to reduce agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. These results can be considered robust, as were observed in alternative specifications and almost all control variables were statistically significant and had relations with the payout ratio as predicted by theoretical literature and evidence of the empirical literature. The results also showed evidence that the low enforcement of Brazilian legislation and the incentives created by BM & FBOVESPA does not guarantee protection to shareholders, pointing to the need of improvements in the Brazilian legal system