In a novel approach using agency theory, we conceptualize export pricing as price manipulations an exporter initiates to cope with the distributor-level, internal competition with the other product lines the distributor carries. We argue that suppliers can influence foreign resellers' behaviors and therefore manage export channel relationships with prices. Using a sample of 283 exporter-importer relationships, we uncover the export price manipulations used to cope with internal competition, and we examine their impact on the exporter economic performance. We show that the performance effect of this pricing policy is achieved through the adequate role performance of the importer. Moreover, using a small but rare dyadic data set, we offer an additional test of the effectiveness of this form of pricing. Finally, by comparing the results of our study to exporters' practice we show how they tend to overuse price discounts to motivate their overseas distributors. (authors' abstract)

The theory of Agency, specifically that developed by Jesen and Meckling (1976), will be the subject of examination. Agency theory has been the subject of extensive research since its introduction in modern form by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The generality of the theory of Agency appears unquestionable and it has been widely adopted. Surprisingly, however, the model correctly predicts particular phenomena under investigation in only the simplest of instances, and even in the simplest of instances there are cases where the simple agency model has limited success. Possible reasons for this failure may lie in the assumed universalist foundation and in the common formulation regarding agent behaviour, that all agents are self-interested rationalists seeking to maximise their own utility to the disregard of their principal's interest. While the hypothesis of self-interested rationalism may be apt in some contexts it may be misleading or inadequate in others. This is especially so when the narrow interpretations of self-interested rationalism are used. Human beings are more complex in their totality than can be represented in any parsimonious model. This is particularly a problem when model predictions are not empirically supported. Aspects omitted in a model may be a source of the misfit between prediction and observation. An extended conceptualisation and reformulation of agent behaviour is presented. An approach is developed that addresses the context of agent behaviour, the socio-environment within which the agent interacts. The context particularly refers to the institutional affiliations and interactions that influence agent behaviour through their belief structure (i.e., their Belief-Desire-Intention, BDI, model of rational action). Through the use of an institutional framework contextual analysis is incorporated into the theory of agency and ultimately agent behaviour. This agent is termed a socio-environmental rationalist agent (SERA) which is contrasted with the self-interested rationalist (SIR) agent in the existing agency literature. This research utilises an object-oriented approach to develop a simulation of the extended conceptualisation and reformulation of agent behaviour. Simulations investigate agent behaviours and outcomes at the micro (specifically through individualised SERA and SIR formulations) and macro (specifically through a multi-agent SERA community formulation in the context of the EU financial accounting harmonisation process) levels. Netlogo is the simulation tool through which this is attained. The simulation demonstrates how alternative formulations of rationality lead to different outcomes and these differences are evident at both levels. Importantly the extended model has outputs that are more in tune with current empirical evidence. The analysis thus demonstrates the plausibility of the extended conceptualisation and reformulation and the need to incorporate the context of behaviour more fully within the analysis of the principal-agent relationship. Through this extended examination of agent behaviour further theoretical and practical insights regarding the understanding of agent behaviour, the principal-agent problem and relationship, multi-agent communities, and of business and society in general may be attained. This dissertation provides one step in advancing our fundamental understanding of the principal-agent problem. The scope and power of agency analysis can be substantially extended using the approach and methods outlined, particularly beyond that present in existing Agency research.

Agency theory is one of the principal frameworks utilized in explaining the family business phenomena. The objectives of this dissertation are to (1) identify the unique agent-principal dynamics that differentiate family firms from non-family firms, (2) determine the effects of these unique agency dynamics on family firm performance, and (3) evaluate these unique agency dynamics within family businesses, as moderated by differing forms of governance and management practices.This dissertation proposes that family firms are defined by two unique and opposing agency dynamics. On one hand, it is posited that family firms are defined by their ability to deploy concomitant forms of relational governance that reduce information asymmetry and associated agency costs. On the other hand, it is posited that family firms are distinctly encumbered with agency costs from non-economic family oriented goals. These distinct agency cost-savings, termed as family gains, and agency costs, termed as family costs, contribute to the study on how and why family firms perform differently than non-family firms.In addition, the study proposes that the ensuing trade-off between family gains and family costs may lead to competitive advantages for family firms in highly competitive environments. This agency trade-off provides a link between agency theory and the resource-based perspective of the family firm.Finally, this dissertation seeks to investigate these agency dynamics among family firms that employ differing governance and management practices. In particular, this study looks at how the agency dynamics of family firms that employ the most concentrated forms of management and governance, manifested as owner-manager led family firms, compare against other forms of family firms. This study posits that manager led family firms, on one hand, have greater family gains and, on the other hand, have greater family costs when compared against other forms of family firms. Moreover, it is proposed that under highly competitive environments, the trade-off between family gains and family costs lead to greater competitive advantages for owner-manager led family firms over other family firms.This dissertation employs cross-sectional linear regression as the primary tool for empirical analysis on Australian business data. In addition, non-parametric testing is utilized to support the above analysis. These analyses are complemented by proper robustness checks to support the study’s validity.The results from empirical analysis corroborate this study’s propositions. First, the research suggests that family firms have family gains driven by lower information asymmetries, but have family costs driven by greater divergence in firm objectives. Second, the results indicate that family firms outperform non-family firms, which is consistent with extant family business literature. Likewise, the results suggest that family firms under managerial ownership have greater family gains and greater family costs than other

Wiss. Hochsch., Diss.--Vallendar, 2005.

Univ., Diss.--Copenhagen, 2005. / Enth. 5 Beitr.

Univ., Diss.--Ulm, 2005.

Zugl.: Hannover, Universiẗat, Diss., 2007.

Univ., Diss.--Frankfurt (Oder), 2003.

Zugl.: Göttingen, Universiẗat, Diss., 2009.

Promotion to partner has always been a future goal for auditors, still becoming a partner is not an easy task, and it has many requirements, and since the audit profession is a sensitive profession and it concern everyone in the society, and since partners are the most important capital that audit firms have, so that is why we thought it is very important to investigate how this position can be reached?This research has a qualitative methodology and has interviews and internal documents as research strategy. The research consist of 7 interviews varied between authorized auditors who are still working in auditing firms or left it before becoming partners, partners and HR, the interviews were performed personally via phone or face to face.The findings are based on semi structured interviews and internal documents. There is significant effect between profitability and promotion to partner beside many more aspects such as Reputation, personal characteristics, promotion systems, personal branding, overtime, industry specialized, education and gender, but being profitable was the most important one.