Background: Human capital disclosure is a widely examined topic by scholars, previous studies has mainly focused on annual reports and companies webpages. However, during the last decade, social media has grown in importance and it represent a new way for companies to interact with stakeholders. The increased interactivity provided by social network sites have made it one of the most important communication tools for companies to interact with stakeholders. One of the larger social media, LinkedIn has received little attention by researchers, only one previous study has investigate human capital disclosure on LinkedIn. Previous research has examined different corporate disclosure in connection to ownership structure. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and human capital disclosure made by companies in Sweden and Norway via LinkedIn. Method: This study is conducted with a quantitative methodology, investigating a sample of 150 companies from Sweden and Norway. Human capital disclosure on LinkedIn are analysed through a content analysis and a regression analysis to test the hypothesis in this study. Conclusion: The results confirm the hypothesis that a negative relationship exists between ownership concentration and the level of human capital disclosure via LinkedIn. This is in line with previous research; however, this study shows that companies in a more digitalized environment disclose more HC information.

Este estudo investiga a relação entre a estrutura de propriedade e controle e o valor e desempenho das empresas não-financeiras privadas brasileiras, listadas na Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo, entre os anos de 1998 a 2002. A análise busca investigar e compreender os conflitos de agência existentes nas empresas resultantes da separação entre propriedade e controle sob o ponto de vista da governança corporativa. As variáveis de estrutura de propriedade analisadas são a concentração de votos, concentração de capital e o grau de excesso de votos, sempre em relação aos acionistas controladores. O estudo parte da suposição de que a estrutura de propriedade é um fator determinante do valor e desempenho das empresas, observando-se a endogeneidade da mesma. As principais correntes teóricas propõem que em um contexto como no caso brasileiro, onde existe uma separação entre direito de controle e direito sobre fluxo de caixa através da emissão de ações sem direito de voto, a concentração de votos e de capital favorece o melhor monitoramento efetivo por parte do acionista controlador sobre os executivos de uma empresa. Entretanto, esse efeito seria ao mesmo tempo combinado a uma maior probabilidade de expropriação dos acionistas não controladores, pois os controladores teriam o poder de usufruir de benefícios privados da empresa enquanto os custos desses benefícios seriam compartilhados entre todos os demais acionistas. Na investigação empírica foram utilizados os métodos de Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários, Efeitos Aleatórios e Efeitos Fixos. Os resultados sugerem uma influência quadrática da concentração de votos no valor e uma influência negativa do excesso de votos no valor, mas positiva no desempenho. A concentração de capital não apresentou resultados significantes, e as evidências de endogeneidade da estrutura de propriedade se mostraram fracas e inconsistentes estatisticamente. / This study focuses on the relation between ownership structure, value and performance of non-financial Brazilian public companies listed in the São Paulo Stock Exchange during the period of 1998-2002. The aim of this research is to investigate the agency conflicts that arise from the separation of ownership from control in the meaning of corporate governance. The ownership structure variables used are the voting concentration, property concentration and excess-votes of controlling owners. The main hypothesis is that ownership variables are determinant of value and performance, testing for endogenous problems, concerning the Brazilian context where the separation of control rights from cash-flow rights are widely used by the issuing of non-voting shares. The costs and benefits of such concentration are a combined effect of improved monitoring and higher probability of non-controller owners’ wealth expropriation. The empirical evidence comes from Ordinary Least-Square, Random Effects and Fixed Effects models, suggesting a quadratic relation between voting concentration and value, a negative linear relation between excess-votes and value and a positive linear relation between excess-votes and performance. Property concentration has weak influence on value and performance variables and endogenous effects do not appear to be influential in the models.

Neste estudo, os conceitos e mecanismos da governança empresarial foram revisados para identificar os instrumentos e elementos que possibilitam seu efetivo exercício aos responsáveis pela determinação dos rumos das empresas. Apoiados na constatação de que não existe governança sem controle e que a mesma depende da estruturação de um quadro completo de avaliação do desempenho que permita monitorar não apenas a gestão dos recursos como também os riscos associados, como os de agenciamento. Assim, emerge a necessidade de garantir a independência e isenção dessa avaliação, o que demanda a existência de um órgão especializado e unificado para realizar tal controle, independente das demais unidades com tarefas de caráter executivo. A atribuição desse órgão seria avaliar e controlar as diversas divisões da empresa e servir como instrumento de apoio e conexão, tanto à atividade de gerir, como de controlar e reportar o desempenho vinculado ao risco desses gestores. Demonstra-se que tais atribuições possuem identificação com as funções primordiais da Área de Controladoria, cujo sistema contábil-financeiro de informações é instrumento poderoso e insubstituível no rastreamento e identificação do processo de criação e erosão do valor da empresa por meio das diversas unidades das organizações. Conclui-se que a Controladoria deve ser reformulada para incorporar novas métricas e procedimentos de monitoração do desempenho vinculado ao risco. Desse modo, é proposta uma nova posição da Área na estrutura empresarial, que garanta independência a seu titular por meio do reporte simultâneo ao principal executivo e ao Conselho de Administração e, por extensão, aos acionistas/proprietários. / This dissertation revise concepts and mechanisms of corporate governance, to identify which are the elements and instruments that make it possible to the responsible ones, to determine the corporation?s lines of direction, its effective action. From the evidence that there is no governance without control, and that it depends, therefore, on the structuring of a complete performance evaluation chart allowing to monitor not only the management of resources, but also the linked risks, among them the agency risk, it emerges the need of guaranteeing the independence and the exemption of such evaluation, which requires the existence of a unified and specialized organ to manage this control independently of the remaining units, that carry executive tasks out. This organ should evaluate and control the several divisions of the corporation and work as an instrument of support and connection, not only to the management activity, but also to the activity of controlling and reporting the performance bounded, to these manager?s risk. Evidence is given that such attributions are identified with the primordial functions of the Controlling Area, whose accounting-financial system is a powerful and non-replaceable instrument to track and identify the creation and erosion process of the corporation value through the several units of the organizations. It is, therefore, concluded that the Control Area should be reformulated in a way to incorporate new measures and procedures for monitoring performance linked to risks and it is proposed a new position of the said Area in the entrepreneurial structure, thus guaranteeing independence to its head through a simultaneous reporting to the main executive of the Board, and by extension, to the shareholders/owners.

Optionsprogram har sedan 1990-talet blivit en allt mer tillämpad form av ekonomisk kompensation i företag. Orsaken till varför denna kompensationsform blivit allt mer populär är för att undvika intressekonflikter som kan uppstå mellan aktieägarna och VD eller övriga anställda.Informationsassymmetri är grundproblemet i denna intressekonflikt, som uppstår i situationer då VD eller andra anställda innehar information om företaget som aktieägarna inte har tillgång till. För att undvika intressekonflikter och för att skapa en intressesammanslagning används optionsprogram för att säkerställa att VD eller anställda arbetar i enlighet med aktieägarnas vilja. Inom vetenskaplig forskning har detta område studerats flitigt och där bland annat nyttan av optionsprogram har ifrågasatts. Forskning på området har också visat att marknaden reagerar positivt när ett optionsprogram introduceras.I denna studie har därför utgångspunkten varit att undersöka vilket utfall optionsprogram har haft och vilka skillnader som går att finna beroende på till vilka optionsprogrammen riktat sig till. I uppsatsens syfte ingår explicit att hitta brister i optionsprogrammen som kan leda till förbättringar. För att göra undersökningen hanterbar har en avgränsning gjorts till företagen på Stockholmsbörsens Small-Cap lista. Därefter har information om optionsprogrammen inhämtats tillsammans med aktiekursdata med hjälp av Aktiespararnas analysprogram.Resultatet av undersökningen visar att de implementerade optionsprogrammen haft ett negativt utfall överlag. Detta innebär att det går att ifrågasätta om intressesammanslagning verkligen sker och om marknadens positiva reaktion är försvarbar i denna kontext. I utfallet för de olika målgrupperna framkom att optionsprogram riktade till flera personer presterar bättre än optionsprogram riktade till ett fåtal personer. I forskningsfrågan gällande programutformning framkom att den traditionella varianten utan prestationskrav var den vanligast förekommande och som också medför svagheter jämfört med nyare varianter.Ett förslag på forskning som i framtiden kan vara av intresse att göra inom ämnesområdet är en undersökning av utfallet efter att nya programutformningar implementerats och vilka svagheter eller styrkor som är inneboende hos dessa.

abstract: This dissertation explores the determinants of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) perquisites, i.e., nonmonetary compensation offered to particular employees and not essential to the accomplishment of a CEO’s duties. While the current CEO perquisite literature has focused on understanding the economic determinants of CEO perquisites, I study the social-psychological determinants of perquisites. Specifically, I propose that organizational status is positively associated with CEO perquisites. The status literature suggests that high-status organizations derive benefits from status and status signals, while agency theory proposes that perquisites are a way for CEOs to extract private rents. Therefore, I posit that for high-status organizations, the benefits derived from certain CEO perquisites may negate the costs associated with those perquisites. I examine a specific CEO perquisite: the mandatory use of corporate aircraft for personal travel. Prior research and the popular press suggest that this perquisite is often seen not only as a status signal but also as an agency cost. Accordingly, I hypothesize that higher status organizations and organizations with higher status directors are more likely than lower status organizations or organizations with lower status directors to mandate their CEOs to use corporate aircraft for personal travel. I also propose that the effect is stronger for low- or high-status organizations than for middle-status organizations. In addition, I hypothesize five contingencies moderating the above relationships. I examine hypothesized relationships using a sample of S&P 500 organizations, and I find support for many of my hypotheses. This dissertation contributes to both status and executive compensation literature. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2019

In the nonprofit industry, lapses in internal controls and low levels of accountability have resulted in many organizations becoming insolvent. Grounded in the agency theory, the purpose of this correlational study was to examine the relationship between federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction. Archival data were collected from 144 nonprofit organizations in the southeast United States. The results of the multiple regression analyses indicated the model was able to predict the relationship between federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction, F(7, 136) = 6.559, p < .001, R2 = .252, with non-profit type (hospitals), (β = -9.392, t = 7.191, p <0.050), accounting for a higher contribution to the model than executive compensation, (β = -0.049, t = 1.96, p <0.050). Federal compliance requirement and nonprofit size did not explain any significant variation in internal control infraction. The implications for positive social change included the potential for a better understanding by nonprofit managers of the importance of internal controls, leading to the effective and efficient provision of goods and services needed by members of society.

Nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), of which credit unions comprise, constitute an important part of the financial sector because of their contribution to economic development, particularly in developing economies. This multiple case study explored strategies for maintaining credit union profitability against the backdrop of numerous closures in the past decade. The conceptual framework for this study was agency theory. Data were collected from 6 purposefully selected managers or directors representing individual credit unions in Grenada. Data were also collected from publicly available sources and used to conduct methodological triangulation. The interview data were coded using a computer-aided software package, and the interpretations of the data subjected to member checking. The emergent themes from both sources were then aggregated into 6 major strategies for maintaining credit union profitability, namely credit risk management, portfolio growth and development, operational efficiency, advertising and promotion, performance metrics, and strategy review. Agency problems exist in the credit union environment and influence the strategies leaders of credit unions in Grenada employ to maintain profitability. Findings from this study represent a corollary against the participants' position that agency theory is not applicable in the credit union environment because of the existence of the common bond. Implications for social change include safeguarding the financial wellbeing of credit union members by contributing to the soundness of Grenada's NBFIs. This is social implication is an important consideration given the mission of the credit union sector to serving the disenfranchised and to the growth and stability of developing economies.

A modelagem de contrato de uma Parceria Público-Privada tem aumentado nas principais economias do mundo, principalmente por recomendação do Banco Mundial que organiza estudos e manuais sobre o tema a fim de padronizar o conceito. A pergunta que se faz é como se configuram as relações de agência em uma Parceria Público-Privada, pensados em termos de conduta oportunista, assimetria de informação e desenho institucional. Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo geral discutir as relações de agência a partir do desenho institucional desta Parceria Público-Privada. Os objetivos específicos são: operacionalizar o conceito de PPP para este trabalho, conforme a legislação federal e a estadual sobre o tema; identificar as diferenças de outros modelos de contratação e de investimento tradicionalmente utilizados; reconhecer a capacidade das instituições instaladas, sua histerese ou resiliência à esta modelagem de contratualização; trazer o contexto histórico à atualidade, considerando o ambiente institucional democrático de transparência e responsabilização; e interpretar como a Teoria da Agência pode iluminar os resultados destas parcerias. Como estrutura teórica, apresenta-se a evolução crítica das teorias da regulação, o problema Principal-Agente e a abordagem institucionalista da regulação econômica setorial. A seguir é apresentada a evolução da regulamentação de concessões de PPP no Brasil. Por fim, é realizado um estudo de caso da Rodovia MG-050 à luz da Teoria da Agência. Como resultado a pesquisa apresenta proposições sobre o que a contratualização de serviços públicos do tipo Parcerias Público-Privadas gera para os desafios democráticos de transparência, responsabilização e ampliação da cidadania; sobre o que este tipo de contratualização gera para as falhas de mercado; e sobre a capacidade do Estado neste tipo de modelagem, tanto pela necessidade de um Estado planejador para estes projetos, quanto pela demanda de um Estado garantidor / The contractual modeling of Public-Private Partnerships has increased in the world\'s major economies, mainly on the recommendation of the World Bank that organizes studies and manuals on the subject in order to standardize the concept. This issue raises is how the agency relations are configured in a Public-Private Partnership, thought in terms of capture, asymmetry of information and institutional design. This research has the general objective to discuss the Agency Theory based on the institutional design of this partnership. The specific objectives are: to operationalize the concept of PPP for this research, according to the federal and state legislations on the subject; the differences from other traditionally used contracting and investment models; the capacity of the installed institutions, their hysteresis or resilience to this contractual modeling; bring the historical context to the present, considering the democratic parameter of transparency and accountability; and thus interpret how the Agency Theory can illuminate the results of these partnerships. As a theoretical framework, we present the critical evolution of theories of regulation, the Principal-Agent problem and the institutionalist approach to sectoral economic regulation. The following is the evolution of the regulation of PPP concessions in Brazil. Finally, a case study of Highway MG-050 is carried out in light of the Agency Theory. As a result, the research presents propositions about what the contracting of public services of the Public-Private Partnership type generates to the democratic challenges of transparency, accountability and enlargement of citizenship; what this type of contracting generates for market failures; and on the capacity of the State in this type of modeling, both by the need of a state planner for these projects, and by the demand of a guarantor State.

During the late 1980s, government agencies in many countries commenced the implementation of public sector management reforms in an effort to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. Many of these reforms arose as a result of demands placed on governments for improved use of public funds. These reforms, which have been wide ranging, have involved important improvements in the methods in which public sector agencies collect and report information related to accountability, particularly in the area of performance measurement. This study seeks to add to the literature on public sector accountability and performance measurement by undertaking a comparative cross-country study involving Australia and Malaysia, a developed and a developing country. Each of these countries have adopted, in varying degrees, reforms to their public sector reporting mechanisms as a result of major demands for changes to public sector funding, accountability and reporting methods. Within the study, a multiple theory approach is undertaken which uses aspects of both agency theory and institutional theory to provide a more informed understanding of the impact specific influential parties have on the level of disclosure and dissemination of accountability related information. This study examines the impact of agency and institutional related variables on the extent and frequency of the disclosure and dissemination of performance measurement information by Australian and Malaysian government departments. / The major sources of data for this study comprise firstly, an analysis of the 2003/2004 annual reports of Australian and Malaysian government departments, secondly semi-structured interviews with senior finance officers of selected government departments and thirdly, a questionnaire survey forwarded to senior finance officers of all government departments in Australia and Malaysia. The findings of the content analysis and interviews concerning performance indicator disclosure by Australian Federal government departments show that cost and effectiveness performance indicators are the most disclosed indicator. For Malaysian Federal government departments, results and quantity performance indicators are the most disclosed indicators. For Australia, performance dissemination happens most often on a monthly basis whilst for Malaysia this occurs more regularly on an annual basis. In relation to performance indicator dissemination, Australian government departments are making increased use of the web to disseminate performance indicators whilst the main method of dissemination for Malaysia is their availability upon request. The major questionnaire was prepared using the annual report content analysis and interviews as a base and it was sent to the senior financer officers of all Australian and Malaysian Government Departments. The questionnaire resulted in a 37.1% response rate for Australia and a 21.7% response rate for Malaysian departments. The questionnaire was used as the base to test the influence of agency theory-related variables and institutional theory-related variables and culture on performance indicator disclosure and dissemination. / The results of the agency theory-related variables rejected the hypothesised influence of oversight bodies on performance indicator disclosure and dissemination for both Australian and Malaysian government departments. The relevant size of government departments was also rejected as being an influence on the frequency of performance indicator disclosure by both countries. However, for Australian government departments, a significant influence for frequency of size of government departments of performance indicator dissemination was found to exist. The citizenry was found to have no significant influence on performance indicator disclosure by both countries. However, in the case of Malaysia, the citizenry were found to have an influence on the level of performance indicator dissemination. The results of the institutional theory related variables provided evidence that none of the variables have an influence on the frequency of performance indicator disclosure and dissemination in both countries. Finally, the results for culture showed there is a level of influence of culture on the frequency of performance indicator disclosure and dissemination. Overall the results of this study indicate both some differences and similarities between Australia and Malaysia government departments in the disclosure and dissemination of performance indicators. There is evidence in this study to indicate that in Australia, both efficiency and effectiveness performance indicators are being disclosed more often in the annual reports of government departments. However, the results for Malaysia show a considerably lower level of disclosure of efficiency and effectiveness performance indicators in government departments' annual reports than in Australia. / Therefore the contrasts between the mail survey results and interview results provide for some future research that could expand the interview survey to include a larger sample to see if the Sofas perceptions are the same or different in regards to performance indicator disclosure and dissemination. The dual paradigm (agency and institutional) modeling of the determinants of performance indicator disclosure and dissemination have provided important findings from the perspectives of both the variables and the countries on which this study was based. The important findings of this study are that accountability and managerially have had differing emphases in Australia as compared to Malaysia, and that there are varying levels of disclosure, dissemination and use of performance measurement information between both individual government departments and the countries in which they reside. A range of future research possibilities are generated by this study. These possibilities range from extending the context of the hypotheses to encompass other government entities, other countries and other forms of performance measurement.

本文主要的研究目的在於從代理理論來探討在實務上公務人員中立的情形，以瞭解在政府機關中主管與部屬在互動之下公務人員如何產生不中立的動機與行為。本文將「公務人員中立」區分為兩個層次：一個是屬於政策層次的中立，指的是公務人員制定政策時與政治人物之間的份際；另一個則是本文所關注的焦點—公務人員在執行職務時中立的層次，亦即公務人員依法行政與執法公正的態度不受個人或主管因素而有所影響。本文所採取的研究方法主要是個案分析與問卷研究。本研究試圖從個案分析來瞭解公務人員因個人因素而不中立的原因，然後從問卷研究來探討公務人員對機關中主管的看法以瞭解他們在執行職務時是否會受到主管的影響。 本文共分為六大部分。第一章為緒論，說明本文的研究目的與方法，並針對重要名詞進行界定；第二章主要是說明一般學理上所討論公務人員中立的政治層次，闡述了中立概念的重要性與緣起，進而說明中立的意涵與所引起的爭議；第三章則是探討公務人員日常執行職務層次的中立態度，即從公務人員的角度出發來瞭解他們與主管互動之下如何產生不中立的動機與行為。根據相關文獻的整理，本文建構了公務人員因個人因素而不中立的模式以及他們可能會因主管的獎懲權的使用而產生配合主管偏好執行職務的態度；在第四章中則以三個個案並進行分析來與上述公務人員因個人因素而不中立的模式進行驗證；在第五章中則以問卷研究的方式來瞭解公務人員執行職務時中立的態度是否會受到主管因素的影響；第六章則提出本文的結論與建議。 在針對我國公務人員中立進行研究之後，我們發現公務人員就個人因素而言，他們之所以採取不中立的行為是結合了不中立的意圖與不中立的機會二者的考量。當他們產生了不中立的意圖，即他們的動機明顯的與公共利益相抵觸，他們會進一步衡量是否有適當不中立的機會，即他們會考量「不中立被發現的可能性」與「不中立所能獲得利益的多寡」，從而決定他們是否要採取不中立的行為。就主管因素而言，本文發現台北市政府的公務人員的確會因主管的獎賞權與強制權的使用而影響他們執行職務時的態度。因此本文針對消除公務人員不中立的動機與減少公務人員不中立的機會提出建議。