This thesis explores and identifies patterns of dating attitudes and behaviors among second-generation Chinese Americans. Grounded theory is applied to analyze data from in-depth interviews with 20 second-generation Chinese Americans in metro- Atlanta area. By using a social constructionist model of ethnicity, I uncovered a subtle process by which the second-generation Chinese youths constructed their dating values and identities through both differentiating and integrating their parents¡¯ and white peers¡¯ dating cultures and gender norms. Second-generation Chinese American youths constructed and reconstructed their own dating values, gender norms, and further ethnic identities through various processes of picking and choosing from both cultures. I argue that straight-line assimilation theories, which assume adaptation into mainstream American culture, do not explain the complexity of the dating culture created by the second-generation Chinese American youths. In conclusion, the findings of this study revealed a new dimension of the social construction of ethnic identity: the agentic dynamics of constructing the second-generation Chinese American identity.

This thesis investigates how web agencys in Stockholm use, value and incoroprate the terms usability, user experience and interaction design in their work process. The purpose of this study is to investigate how creative professionals works with the notions of usability, user experience and interaction design with focus on the end user. Our definition of creative professionals is every employee at a web agency involved in the work process of developing digital artefacts in any capacity. We wanted to investigate how these notions are considered, consciously or unconsciously, during the workprocess. Semi-structured interviews were conducted at three different web agencys with eight different employees. The result of the study has shown that all web agencys have a constant focus on the end-user during the entire development of digital artefacts towards their customers.This focus is kept during the whole process, from the development of a concept based on knowledge on both the customer and the end-users, until the release of the end-product. The work and design methods differs between the different web agencys in which way they incorporate end-users in the process.

Purpose: This thesis aims at exploring some of the possibilities,opportunities and challenges within the temporary agency work sector from boththe regular and the temporary agency workers points of view within the Swedish labourmarket. Background: Temporary agency work sector in the past two decadeshas been a fast growing sector that has got many young people into the labourmarket. With the current changes in the global economy, many organizations areturning more to these organizations to enable them adapt to changes in theirenvironment. In Sweden for instance, the growth and development of this sectorhas primarily been due to the constantly increasing rates of unemployment,massive job losses and also as a result of de-regulation of labour regulations. Methodology: A quantative survey was carried out using structuredquestionnaires in three companies that largely engage in hiring of temporaryworkers.  A total of 137 regular andtemporary agency workers, took part in the survey which was conducted through aweb-survey to e-mail addresses provided by client companies and temporary work agenciesand for those who had no access to e-mail received the questionnaires duringstaff meetings. Findings: Majorityof those engaged in this sector are young people of ages between 20 and 30years old, with high school education level and not married but maybe livingwith girlfriend or boyfriend. It resulted that many see these sectors asoffering an entry point into the labour market through which they feelrecognized and hopefully can advance their careers. Although all that glittersis not gold, those who work within this sector are also faced with variouschallenges that make it more of a stepping stone work place such as lack ofcontrol, complex interpersonal, insecurity and being treated as commodities andthe inability to decide when, where and how to work, with very little or nocontrol of when they can take off. Conclusion: On testing thehypothesis in relation to the possibilities, opportunities and challenges ofworking in the sector, it was not very obvious within the sector that ingeneral the regular staff had more favourable conditions than the temporary,but it did vary from one situation to the other and more often than not theyhad similar conditions. For instance, individualized flexibility was equallynot easy to achieve by the employees within the two groups. Keywords; Temporary Agency Work, Temporary Agency workers, Client Company, Regular/ordinarystaff, Motivation

Agency theory, proposed by previous studies such as Guidry, Leone, and Rock (1999) and Arya and Huey-Lian (2004), suggests that bonus and other accounting-metric-based compensation can motivate managers to perform well in the short horizon while equity-based compensation, such as restricted shares and stock options, can serve the purpose of aligning the long run interests of shareholders and managers. The empirical evidence, for example Jensen and Murphy (1990), Kaplan (1994), Hall and Liebman (1998), Murphy (1999), Zhou (2000), and Chowdhury and Wang (2009), confirms that incentive compensation is popular in many countries. However, recent studies suggest that the relation between performance and incentive compensation is weak. Shaw and Zhang (2010) find that CEO bonus compensation is less sensitive to poor earnings performance than it is to good earnings performance. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) study the relation between bank performance during the 2008 bank crisis and the bonus and equity-based compensation of bank CEOs. They find that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse than other banks. This study examines whether ownership structure can explain the differences among compensation structures of chief executive officers (CEOs). In particular, we examine the compensation structure of three distinct groups: family-controlled, institution-controlled, and widely-held firms. We distinguish these three kinds of firms to represent different levels of market imperfection. Compared with family-controlled and institution-controlled firms, widely held firms have dispersed ownership. The most significant weakness of a widely-held ownership structure is the lack of shareholder monitoring due to the unmatched benefit and cost of monitoring for small shareholders. In contrast, a holder of a large block of shares will have the same monitoring costs but the benefits to this shareholder from monitoring management and reducing agency costs would be substantial and larger than the costs of monitoring. Thus the presence of a large shareholder will reduce the agency costs. In addition, large shareholders may be willing to spend time and effort continuously to collect more information on management performance or to estimate the firms investment projects. This behaviour will reduce the problems that arise from information asymmetry and will decrease the waste of free cash flows by managers. Both family-controlled firms and institution-controlled firms have large shareholders. However, whether or not the control shareholders are playing an active monitoring role is still an important issue. From the viewpoint of aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, the family-controlled group is superior to the institution-controlled group. First, institutions are more flexible in moving their ownership from one firm to another depending on performance. If the costs of monitoring are high in comparison to the costs of rebalancing portfolios, institutions will choose to rebalance instead of monitoring. In contrast, a family that controls a firm does not have this flexibility. Second, family-controlled firms generally assign influential positions to family members whose focus is in line with that of the family group. Even though a non family member may be appointed as the manager, the level of monitoring is significant given the high ownership concentration by the family. However, the level of monitoring by a family may not necessarily translate into a reduction of agency costs for minority shareholders. Indeed, previous studies suggest that significant family ownership may lead to agency costs of its own. The family may divert company resources for its own benefit despite the presence of a manager who may or may not be a family member. Essentially, the family and the manager can collude to spend on perks and personal benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Chourou (2010) suggests that excessive compensation of chief executive officers at some family owned Canadian corporations may be viewed as expropriation of minority rights. Overall, the main objective of this study is to examine whether block-holder monitoring is a substitute to the incentive components of compensation. We propose that as we move from widely-held to institution-controlled the level of monitoring may or may not increase. However, as we move further into higher control, as may be suggested by family ownership, the level of monitoring will increase but this monitoring may not necessarily reduce agency costs. The results show that the institution-controlled firms pay significantly less bonus compensation per dollar of assets than widely-held firms but the differences in equity based compensation are not significant. In addition, the family-controlled corporations offer the lowest performance-based compensation, bonus per dollar of assets, in comparison to the institution-controlled and the widely-held groups. These results indicate that the family-controlled Canadian corporations rely more on monitoring managers than paying them incentive payments in the form of bonus payments. In addition, our results indicate that the institutions which control corporations may be monitoring the managers of these corporations but this monitoring does not significantly reduce the need for the long-term incentive components of compensation. This result suggests that institutions may monitor the short-term performance effectively but they may prefer rebalancing their portfolio rather than monitoring long term performance.

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Corporations are subject to agency problems resulting from the separation of ownership and control. When the managers and shareholders¡¦ interests are not consistent, managers will not care whether capital structure is stable, and furthermore will not mind if the project would improve firm value or not. The only thing managers concern about is to maximize their own benefit. Previous work only discusses the relation between firm value and capital structure, or the connection between agency problems and firm value. However, capital structure, agency problems and firm value are multi-connected. When managers adjust firm¡¦s capital structure, firm value changes and agency costs decreases. This research examines the relation among firm value, capital structure, and agency problems of Taiwan listed companies from 1991 to 2003, excluding banks, securities, and insurance company. We address the potentially endogenous relation among these variables by estimating a three-stage least squares regression model. The empirical results show that the higher the debt ratio, the lower the firm value, and the higher the agency costs, the lower the firm value. Nevertheless, raising debt can mitigate the effect of agency problems on firm value. The higher firm value implies the better asset utilization. However, after firms¡¦ gaining profit, managers might abuse discretionary expenses, such as luxurious office, cars, and upper salaries leading to serious agency costs. In the industry aspect, debt ratio of electronic industry hurts firm value. But in the non-electronic industry, debt can mitigate the effect of agency problems, especially for firms with low tangible asset ratio, because many companies in Taiwan are facing underinvestment. Raising debt will force firms to select the best portfolio and then increase the firm value.

This study utilizes a hypercube model with secondary data analysis and comparative analysis to analyze the gaps in technological knowledge and business model aspects used in e-business versus bricks-and-mortar business for the Hardware Agency, so as to explore the impacts in these two dimensions to the e-business innovation. The results indicate that the nature of e-business innovation is architectural for Hardware Agency, customer, and complementors, leading to drastic change in business model. However, the innovation for suppliers is radical, leading to drastic changes in both technological knowledge and business model. We further identify the core business model (in terms of business, logistic and cash flows) and IT infrastructure that are necessary for the Hardware Agent to cope with the e-business change. The findings have the potential to contribute to the understanding of impacts occurring in the change associated with e-business and offer rich insights for the stakeholders, especially for Hardware Agency to manage e-business innovation.

In East Asian economies, about 2/3 listed firms are controlled by family shareholders. In the US and West European, the proportions of family firms are about 33% and 44%, respectively. Thus, family-controlled listed firms are common in almost every nation. In Taiwan, nearly 70% of listed firms are family-controlled. Many previous studies have pointed out that family firms are playing an important role in global economic activities. The equity structures and management ideas of family firms are different from those of common firms. For instance, family members possess decisive equities and will usually take positions of directors or top managers. They may usually view their firms as an asset inherited from forefathers, and they should pass it on to their next generations. The impact of these differences on firm¡¦s financial decisions has become a main research focus in recent years. Previous studies of family firms mainly placed the focus on the impact of family factors on corporate performance, but this study would attempt to investigate the impact of family factors on debt decisions from the perspectives of debt-financing decision and cost of debt-financing. First of all, this study probed into whether family and non-family firms have differences debt-financing decisions. Empirical findings indicated that family firms have a lower debt ratio and a 0.2813% lower cost of debt than non-family firms. A further comparison on the factors of debt decisions showed that the difference in the impact of family and non-family firms on debt levels lies in mainly three aspects, including depreciation tax shield, operational risk, and firm size. In the aspect of cost of debt-financing, family firms are relatively more sensitive to firm size, debt ratio, and credit risk. Previous studies that applied the agent theory to investigate debt decisions focused more on the problems of debt agency problem and seldom used the inter-relationship between equity agency problem and debt agency problem to discuss the impact of equity agency problem on debt decisions. The problems of equity agency of family firms encompass the traditional equity agency between the manager and shareholders and core equity agency between controlling shareholders and external shareholders. Besides, family ownership and management can reduce the problems of traditional equity agency, and controlling shareholders using the pyramid structure of equities and cross-holding to enhance control right will increase the problems of core equity agency. Thus, based on the problems of equity agency problem, the family factors can be divided into family ownership, enhancement of control, and family management to investigate the respective impact on debt-financing decisions. In the aspect of debt-financing, it was empirically discovered that higher family ownership would lead to a closer relationship between firm value and the wealth of family shareholders. Debt financing would be avoided to reduce financial risks and maintain the wealth of family shareholders. A positive correlation existed between debt ratio and the difference between family control and family ownership, implying when the difference between family control and family ownership is higher, the problems of core equity agency between controlling shareholders and small shareholders will be more serious, and the company will be inclined to adopt debt-financing to acquire long-term capitals. The estimate coefficient of the effect of family management on debt ratio is not significance. Thus, whether the CEO is taken by a family member will not affect debt-financing decisions. In the analysis of control level, when the control level is low, firms are inclined to adopt debt-financing decisions to reduce the effect of equity dilution. On the contrary, when the control level is high, in order to avoid the loss of control benefit caused by debt monitoring, firms will be inclined to avoid debts. As a result, control and debt ratio are in an inverted U-shaped relationship. In addition, for family firms, the maintenance of control and risk control are important factors affecting their debt-financing decision. In the aspect of cost of debt, family ownership can reduce the cost of debt-financing. If the non-linear relationship of family ownership is considered, the impact of family ownership on the cost of debt-financing is non-linear and in an inverted U shape. The maximum value is 8.64%. When the family ownership exceeds 17.9%, the effect of family ownership on the cost of debt financing is negative. As the minimum family ownership was defined as 10% in this study, and the average family ownership among the samples was 21%, it could be inferred that higher family ownership would lead to a lower cost of debt-financing. In a comparison with Anderson et al. (2003), it was discovered that the average family ownership has negative influence on the cost of debt, but for the family firms in the US, higher family ownership would reduce its negative influence on cost of debt, and for domestic family firms, higher family ownership would increase its negative influence on the cost of debt. The Control-enhancing mechanisms will increase core equity problem and cost of debt, and the relationship between control enhancement and cost of debt are not in a non-linear relationship. Creditors conceive that their mortgage will be more secured if family members take the position of CEO. Thus, family CEO can reduce the cost of debt-financing.