The reason for highlighting the difference between GATT and GATS is to focus on the impact of these agreements on the developing countries and in particular the latter will be the main focus of this paper. The economies and governments of the developing states are struggling to generate sustainable capitol growth and maintain financial stability to enhance economic growth. This is due to dictators who rule in such a manner to maintain power irrespective of the future economic viability of their state. Thus the environment for sustainable economic growth is wrath with political instability, lack of proper financial control and eagerness to attract foreign investment and allowing market access to developed states.

The reason for highlighting the difference between GATT and GATS is to focus on the impact of these agreements on the developing countries and in particular the latter will be the main focus of this paper. The economies and governments of the developing states are struggling to generate sustainable capitol growth and maintain financial stability to enhance economic growth. This is due to dictators who rule in such a manner to maintain power irrespective of the future economic viability of their state. Thus the environment for sustainable economic growth is wrath with political instability, lack of proper financial control and eagerness to attract foreign investment and allowing market access to developed states.

Magister Legum - LLM / The reason for highlighting the difference between GATT and GATS is to focus on the impact of these agreements on the developing countries and in particular the latter will be the main focus of this paper. The economies and governments of the developing states are struggling to generate sustainable capitol growth and maintain financial stability to enhance economic growth. This is due to dictators who rule in such a manner to maintain power irrespective of the future economic viability of their state. Thus the environment for sustainable economic growth is wrath with political instability, lack of proper financial control and eagerness to attract foreign investment and allowing market access to developed states. / South Africa

Magister Legum - LLM

The Agreement on Trade – Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights has almost universal application due to the large number of signatories from the World Trade Organization member states. 149 countries signed the TRIPS by 1994. Therefore, the TRIPS Agreement has also become a valuable tool for the protection of special intellectual property rights under the term geographical indications. GIs have current relevance in the world market to consumers who are healthy and quality conscious. The legal protection of GIs is due to their economic value to many countries where the producers are in rural areas. This is because most GIs are based on traditional methods of production which have earned goodwill. The TRIPS came in to prevent fee riding of such rights by producers who do not conform to the standards and rules of production. The TRIPS Agreement requires member states to harmonise their legal systems to provide legal means of protecting GIs to the standard stipulated therein. Malawi joined the WTO on 31 May 1995 which means that the obligation above mentioned is applicable from then on. Therefore, this study is an investigation of whether Malawi has complied with the obligations in article 1.1 of the TRIPS especially in so far as geographical indications rights are concerned. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

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The liberalisation of domestic telecommunication (telecom) markets has become a worldwide trend. As a result, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), evolving from deliberations within the World Trade Organisation (WTO), has been heralded as the mechanism with which to effect telecom liberalisation domestically. For countries in Africa, the GATS instruments have been translated as a means to establish the principles required for an effective telecom industry supported by key institutions in policy, regulation and implementation. However, the analysis of relevant literature on telecom in Africa has tended to focus on technological developments based on current observable outcomes. This methodology is inadequate because it fails to account for the context-specific nature of the policy arena and framework shaping telecom outcomes. I argue that we must consider telecom outcomes by understanding the nature of political institutions domestically and their interaction with the international arena. To explicate this intersection of ideas, I draw on two seemingly independent theories, Neopatrimonialism and New Institutional Economics (NIE) with reference to the works of van de Walle (2001) and North (1990) respectively, to shed light on the nature of the Kenyan political context and the value of the GATS as an instrument that facilitates credibility and reduces opportunistic ex-post behaviour. It is contended in this study, that for the Kenyan Government, the value of the GATS accession lies in the legitimising role that it facilitates in accessing funds from the international community. This study thus highlights the inevitable tension that arises when domestic policy-reform goals are juxtaposed with international trade obligations undertaken through treaty accession and informed by a liberalisation agenda. A qualitative approach was used to collect the data and involved interviews and documentary analysis. The findings suggest that Kenya is partially in compliance with its GATS telecom commitments. However, this partial reform results from patrimonial tendencies in Kenya and is exacerbated by the need to attract hard currency through aid packages that dictate the nature of the policy process and the relationship between Kenya and the international community. In conclusion, even with policy reforms, state agents always find ways to maintain or create clientelist practises. Unless such reform is accompanied by political changes that provide checks and balances on institutions and state agents, reform policies on their own will not create an effective telecom sector. To truly evaluate telecom reform therefore, we must appreciate the context-specific nature of policy making.

The abundance of wealth and technology in the North, and biological diversity and poverty in the South provokes an inquiry into an appropriate modality for the equitable harnessing and allocation of biodiversity dividends. Over the years, the traditional knowledge relating to biological diversity has been regarded as part of the "global intellectual commons", open to exploitation by all, and subject to validation by formal methods. That knowledge has remained the source of both increasing knowledge and critical discoveries of the therapeutic values of most components of biological diversity. There is a consensus between the North and the South that an effective biodiversity conservation strategy should be one capable of providing incentives to the traditional custodians of wild habitat. Intellectual property is generally recognised as an appropriate framework to implement this objective. However, as a perennial subject of North-South disagreement, there is no consensus on the relevant details or mechanisms for deploying intellectual property rights to effectuate the objective. The United Nations Framework Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) signifies a global regime embodying the ideals of incentivising the traditional custodians of the wild habitat as well as equitable sharing of the benefits of biodiversity. Arguably, it marks an end to the idea of regarding traditional knowledge as part of the global intellectual commons. This thesis contends that the CBD regime carries with it the burden of unresolved North-South perspectives on intellectual property rights. It argues that the heart of the conflict is the reluctance of the North to accord intellectual property status to traditional knowledge. This is partly because of the latter's informal nature but most importantly it derives from an inherent geo-political ideological conflict on the subject of intellectual property rights. Presently, the recognition of rights over traditional knowledge is approached on a sui generis basis. This thesis takes the position that the approach with its several limitations is not persuasive. It contends that on the merits, traditional knowledge is, and ought to be recognised as a subject matter of intellectual property rights. The recent elevation of intellectual property (a traditional subject matter of national law) to the international level under the WTO/TRIPs Agreement further undermines traditional knowledge. This has posed a setback not only to the global biodiversity conservation initiative, but also to the quest for equitable allocation of its dividends. It is my thesis that a national approach offers a better option for accommodating the intellectual property status of traditional knowledge and consequentially for advancing the quest for biodiversity conservation as well as equitable allocation of the dividends arising therefrom.

Zugl.: Hamburg, University, Diss., 2006.