Thesis (M.S.)--University of West Florida, 2009. / Title from title page of source document. Document formatted into pages; contains 171 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

Protection of the agriculture and food infrastructure, defined as "the physical production and distribution systems critical to supporting national security and economic well-being, including all activities essential to food, feed, and fiber production, including all techniques for raising and processing livestock," is the responsibility of all stakeholders in the food supply chain (Spellman, 2008, p.8). Though many stakeholders emerge in the chain, producers are the primary line of defense to a disease epidemic. Many factors influence livestock producers‘ protective action decision process in relation to biological hazards. By identifying these factors in a specific producer population, more effective preparedness programs and messages can be developed by risk communicators. The purpose and objectives of this study determined Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association (TSCRA) members‘ perceptions of vulnerability to the Texas cattle industry, perceived emergency preparedness level, barriers to adoption of protective actions, and sources of animal health information. This study targeted 7,661 members of the TSCRA. An online survey questionnaire developed from previous research with similar populations allowed TSCRA members to respond to questions related to the objective of this study. A representative sample of TSCRA members from Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico responded to the survey. Recognizing susceptibility to biological hazards, TSCRA members identified high levels of perceived trust and reliability in local veterinarians as a source of information, consistent with previous studies. Although the majority of members reported they did not have a biosecurity plan implemented on their operations, they did recognize the necessity of preventative practices. TSCRA members were neutral on all barriers to adoption of protective actions; however, the barrier "lack of information" was rated higher by means as a barrier to adoption of protective actions. When investigating differences among noncommercial and commercial operations managed by TSCRA members, no statistical differences were identified in this study. However, when investigating differences among TSCRA members and number of cattle managed, a weak positive correlation was identified for perception of hazard by threat in relation to more animals managed. Findings of this study confirmed sources stating that the agriculture and food infrastructure is vulnerable to biological hazards as perceived by livestock owners (Motes, 2007; Spellman, 2008). Ashlock (2006) and Riley (2007) found similar perspectives of vulnerability among Oklahoma and Kansas producers further strengthening the need to protect the agriculture and food critical infrastructure as outlined by Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 9 (HSPD-9, 2004). Since it was determined that veterinarians are perceived to be the most reliable and trustworthy source of information by TSCRA members, local opinion leaders, such as veterinarians, should engage in train-the-trainer programs to ensure a consistent risk communication message is being disseminated.

Agro-terrorism has become a major concern since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks due to characteristics that create unique problems for managing the threat of an agro-terrorist attack. The costs of trucking delays alone were in the tens of millions of dollars. Over the last few years, the government has spent billions of dollars on biological surveillance and record keeping in preventing potential attacks. Several public and private initiatives are currently in use. Examples include 1) the bio-terrorism regulation of 2004 on maintenance of records; 2) establishment of food protection centers for research and teaching excellence; and 3) investments in emerging technology, such as radio frequency monitoring (RFEM) technology, with the potential to track shipments and provide real-time data that can be used to prevent agro-terrorism risks along food supply chains. This thesis addresses the costs and risk premiums associated with alternative tracking strategies, where and when along the milk supply chain these strategies will reduce the most risks, and what policy implications are associated with the most costeffective tracking strategy. To accomplish these objectives, stochastic optimization is used to determine the costs and risk premiums of alternative tracking strategies. Next, the realoptions method along with a portfolio of options, also referred to as the "tomato garden" framework, is used to determine where and when alternative intervention strategies should be implemented to reduce the most risks. Finally, policy implications are derived on the cost-risk tradeoffs, probability of attacks, and containment efforts if there is an attack by using game theory to determine the incentives needed to motivate participants in the milk supply chain to invest in security measures.

CHDS State/Local / Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / There are many potential targets for terrorists in the United States, one of which is the food supply system. An attack on the food supply system would create great need for information to many audiences, primarily the general public, about the risk resulting from such an attack. The Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture, a collaborative effort of 10 states, has identified the need for development of a strategy for communicating to the public the risk resulting from an agroterrorism incident. Before the Partnership begins development of a strategy, however, it must take into consideration the factors that are important when communicating about agroterrorism risk: recognition that communication of risk about food carries with it specific challenges; the public's level of trust in government will affect how it perceives and accepts risk messages; and Americans' post-September 11, 2001 fear associated with terrorism alters perception and acceptance of risk. Recognition of the existence of these factors is not enough, however. The Partnership must recognize, as well, that these factors may present barriers to effective communication. To overcome these barriers, the Partnership should apply tried-and-true risk communication principles, tailored to specifically address the factors that make agroterrorism risk communication unique. / Civilian, Public Affairs Manager, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division

Agroterrorism is the deliberate introduction of a plant or animal disease with thegoal of causing fear, economic instability, illness, or death. After the 2002 terroristattacks on the World Trade Center, the security of the food supply is of increasingconcern to the United States. A major incidence of agroterrorism or food tampering would have far reaching impacts on the economy and public health. The first objective of this project was to determine knowledge and concern of agroterrorism in meat processing facilities in Kentucky, and to determine knowledge and concern of food tampering and food defense in food service establishments in Warren County, Kentucky. The second objective was to determine security strategies that were being implemented by these facilities. Two separate surveys, one for meat processors and the other for food service establishments, were designed to meet these objectives. An observational study was conducted for meat processing facilities. It was found that these facilities were generally unconcerned with agroterrorism, although a reasonable amount of security implementations were in place at these facilities. A statistical comparison between restaurants and non-restaurant food service establishments, such as schools, hospitals, and hotels, was performed. Both types of food service establishments expressed little concern about a food tampering event. Non- restaurant food service establishments were slightly more concerned than restaurants about both food tampering and food defense.

CHDS State/Local / Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Threatened with the loss of federal funding for Homeland Security and emergency management preparedness programs, state and local entities must implement the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, which includes the Incident Command System, Unified Command, and the Multiagency Coordination System. Although mandated by Congress and implemented by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, underdeveloped areas of Indian country and small towns, especially farming and ranching communities and agriculturally-based counties are likely to find that they do not have the capacity to fully implement these mandated federal response programs. A theoretical terrorist-induced multistate Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak is used to examine the impact of implementing newly established federally mandated response management programs on rural and tribal communities in agrarian states. Recovering from such an agroterrorism bioattack would require a coordinated multi-disciplinary response that is heavily dependent on local, tribal, state, and private sector personnel. However, because the United States has not experienced an outbreak of FMD since 1929, many of the skills required to quickly diagnose and respond may no longer exist. This thesis identifies potential methods for obtaining and deploying the FMD virus in a coordinated bioattack on the U.S. economy. / Director, Idaho Bureau of Disaster Services