Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: African affairs have traditionally not occupied a central place in Norway’s official foreign policy, and relations with countries in West Africa have been limited. However, in recent years, resource-rich countries such as Angola – Africa’s largest oil producer – have become the focus of Norwegian strategic interests. Private and public investments are increasing rapidly, paralleling a larger focus on aid. Today, Angola is a core country within Norway’s most prominent petroleum-related assistant programme, Oil for Development (OfD). This thesis will aim to contribute, by means of a critical political economy analysis, to a better understanding of Norway’s role in Angola through OfD. Specifically, this study aims to question who and what structures Norway really is aiding in Angola. Such an objective will be achieved by firstly using critical theory to demonstrate Norway’s role as a traditional middle power – through which Norway seeks to export an altruistic perception of a ‘do-good- image’ – is underpinned by a deeper national self-interest. Secondly, the thesis questions the theoretical foundation of OfD, and, thirdly, it attempts to identify whom the OfD programme is aiding. Ultimately, the thesis questions whether Norway is promoting sustainable development in Angola, or whether, instead, it is contributing to maintaining a status quo, from which Norway as a middle power continues to benefit. The study illustrates that Norway, as a middle power, has neither the capacity nor the national self-interest to achieve fundamental change in Angola. Norway’s commitment to the good governance agenda, and the belief in solutions offered by the resource curse thesis, is tackling the symptoms of Angola’s underdevelopment, rather than its root causes. OfD adopts a state-centric approach, which accepts the political economy structures in Angola, and gives limited attention to global structures and civil society. The thesis offers an alternative analysis, which illustrates how OfD is masking a neo-liberal development approach by incorporating Norwegian business interests and development goals in the same programme. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Afrika sake het tradisioneel nie 'n sentrale plek in Noorweë se amptelike buitelandse beleid beklee nie, en verhoudings met die westelike deel van die Afrika-kontinent is beperk. Tydens die afgelope jare het olie-ryk lande, soos Angola, egter die fokus van Noorweegse strategiese belange geword. Angola is vandag 'n kern land binne Noorweë se mees prominente petroleum-verwante hulpverleningsprogram, Oil for Development (OfD). Hierdie tesis het ten doel om, deur middel van 'n kritiese politieke ekonomie ontleding, by te dra tot ’n beter begrip van Noorweë se rol in Angola deur die OfD. Spesifiek bevraagteken hierdie studie aan wie en watter strukture in Angola Noorweë hulp verleen. Dit sal gedoen word deur eerstens gebruik te maak van kritiese teorie om te demonstreer dat Noorweë se rol as 'n tradisionele middelmoondheid – waardeur Noorweë poog om 'n altruïstiese persepsie van die staat uit te dra – onderskryf word deur 'n dieper nasionale selfbelang. Tweedens sal hierdie studie die teoretiese begronding van OfD bevraagteken, en derdens poog om te identifiseer wie deur die OfD program ondersteun word. Laastens sal die tesis bevraagteken of Noorweë volhoubare ontwikkeling in Angola bevorder, en eerder bydra tot die instandhouding van die status quo, waaruit Noorweë as 'n middelmoondheid voordeel trek. Die studie sal illustreer dat Noorweë, as ‘n middelmoondheid, nie die kapasiteit of die nasionale selfbelang het om fundamentele verandering in Angola te weeg te bring nie. Norweë se ondersteuning van die ‘good governance’ agenda, en oplossings wat deur die sogenaamde ‘hulpbronvloek’ tesis aangebied word, spreek die simptome van Angola se onder-ontwikkeldheid aan, eerder as die kernoorsake. OfD funksioneer op grond van ‘n staat-sentriese benadering, wat die politieke ekonomiese strukture in Angola aanvaar, en beperkte aandag aan globale strukture en die burgerlike samelewing gee. Hierdie tesis bied ‘n alternatiewe analise, wat wys hoe OfD eintlik ‘n neoliberale ontwikkelingsbenadering volg wat Noorweegse besigheids- en ontwikkelingsdoelwitte in dieselfde program inkorporeer.

This dissertation examines the following research question: Which types of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states best promote peace? And are those effects conditional upon other factors? I argue that the effects are conditional upon the types of political parties that exist in the post-conflict environment. Although this explanation is contrary to scholars that speak of political parties as products of the electoral system, political parties often predate the choice of electoral system. Especially in post-conflict states, political parties play an important role in the negotiation process and hence in the design of the electoral rules. I argue that the effects of electoral rules on peace duration are mitigated by the degree to which a party system is broad (nonexclusive) or narrow (exclusive). I develop a theoretical model that led to three hypotheses focusing on the independent role that political parties play in mitigating the effects of electoral rules on peace duration. To test these hypotheses, I use the Cox proportional hazard model on 57 post-conflict states from 1990 to 2009 and had competitive elections. The empirical results show support for the main argument of this study. First, the findings show that electoral rules alone do not increase or decrease the risk of civil war outbreak, yet when interacting with the degree to which political parties are broad or narrow, there is a significant effect on the outbreak of civil war. Second, the results show that post-conflict states with party centered electoral systems (closed list PR system) are less likely to have an outbreak of civil war when more seats in the parliament are controlled by broad-based parties. In addition, I conduct a comparative case study analysis of two post-conflict states, Angola (1975-1992) and Mozambique (1975-1994), using the most similar systems (MSS) research design.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / Abstract: The African continent has been riddled with conflict for many years. Angola and Somalia are prime examples of countries having experienced protracted wars. During those wars, warlords have played a definite role in perpetuating the fighting. The thesis investigates warlordism in Africa. Specifically, it is a comparative analysis of Jonas Savimbi of Angola and Farah Aideed of Somalia. The thesis investigates the concept of warlords and uses the examples of Aideed and Savimbi to illustrate the impact of warlords on the respective countries. The examples of Aideed and Savimbi are further used to show that there are different ways to becoming ultimately labelled as a warlord. The role of state weakness and ethnicity will be investigated in the two cases. The discussion will highlight the points that state weakness (i.e. lack of governmental functionality) and the use of ethnicity play a profound role in the rise and survival of warlords. The case studies of Aideed and Savimbi will emphasise the influence of state weakness and ethnicity in their formation as warlords. The concept of state weakness is defined and the thesis illustrates that there are different levels of state weakness. The thesis compares Angola and Somalia, and shows that Savimbi and Aideed acted under vastly different conditions as warlords. Ethnicity is defined and linked to the idea that the effects of colonialism played a profound role in creating ethnic divisions, enabling warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi to use their ethnic backgrounds to mobilise followers to wage war. The thesis investigates how Aideed and Savimbi maintained their military organisations. Their ability to do so is related to both state weakness and ethnicity. State weakness and ethnicity create conditions which are conducive to the emergence of warlords.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study was to describe the factors that led to the creation of warlords in Angola and Sierra Leone so as to better understand the dynamics and origins of warlord politics. The two warlords that were focused on, and compared, were Jonas Savimbi (Angola) and Charles Taylor (Liberia and Sierra Leone). Authors like Mary Kaldor (2006), William Reno (1995, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2007) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) contributed toward the base of this study. Their work captured the issues contributing toward the warlord phenomenon and generated thought surrounding the context in which these warlords arose. John Mackinlay (2000) was used to describe and analyse the origins of warlordism and how the warlord phenomenon has changed with the onset of new wars, especially in the late 20th and 21st centuries (Kaldor, 2006). Furthermore, the work of Thomas H. Greene (1984) was used in guiding this thesis into a systematic study, focusing mainly on the leadership, following, organization, techniques and external support of both Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor as examples of contemporary warlords. Through utilizing the contributions of the above authors on this topic, the similarities and differences between the two warlords were explored. The study found that while Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor emerged from different eras and contexts (Savimbi out of the Cold War and Taylor as a result of globalization), they both became typical warlords. Savimbi only became a warlord after 1992. Before, Savimbi used Maoist ideology while an insurgent against Portugal, whereafter he became a rebel in the Angolan civil war. Taylor was a warlord in diamond-rich neighbouring Sierra Leone. Both used identity politics to gather a following while Taylor used brute force and the manipulation of the youth. They both manipulated illicit criminal networking and operated internationally, smuggling diamonds. The main difference, however, is that Taylor was an insurgent in Liberia where he seized power in 1990 and became president in 1997, while a warlord in neighbouring Sierra Leone. Savimbi, on the other hand, never attained presidential power even though he participated in the 1992 Angolan elections which he lost, whereafter he ceased to be a revolutionary, and became a real warlord without the external support he previously had. Savimbi was assassinated in 2002 and Taylor abdicated in 2003, currently standing trial in the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. He stands trial for the human right atrocities committed in Sierra Leone. Their legacies live on. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie studie was om die faktore te beskryf wat gely het tot die ontstaan van krygshere (“warlords“)in Angola en Sierra Leone, en om die dinamika van krygsheerpolitiek beter te verstaan. Die twee krygshere waarop gefokus en vergelyk was, is Jonas Savimbi (Angola) en Charles Taylor (Liberië en Sierra Leone). Die denke van skrywers soos Mary Kaldor (2006), William Reno (1995, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2007) en Collier & Hoeffler (2004) het bygedra tot die basis van hierdie studie. Hulle werk het ingesluit die aspekte wat bygedra het tot die krygsheer fenomeen, en het besinning aangemoedig oor die agtergrondsfaktore waaruit hierdie twee krygshere ontstaan het. John Mackinlay (2000) se werk is gebruik om die oorsprong van krygsheerpolitiek te beskryf, asook hoe die krygsheerfenomeen verander het met die uitbreek van “nuwe oorloë“ (Kaldor, 2006), veral aan die einde van die 20ste en 21ste eeue. Verder is die werk van Thomas H. Greene (1984) gebruik om hierdie tesis ‘n sistematiese struktuur te gee wat gefokus is op die leierskap, volgelinge, organisasie, tegnieke en eksterne ondersteuning van Jonas Savimbi en Charles Taylor. Hierdie twee persone is albei voorbeelde van kontemporêre krygshere in die jongste verlede. ‘n Vergelykende studie verg dat ooreenkomste en verskille tussen die twee krygshere verken word deur gebruik te maak van die bydraes van bogenoemde skrywers. In die studie is bevind dat alhoewel Jonas Savimbi en Charles Taylor uit verskillende eras en agtergrond kom (Savimbi uit die Koue Oorlog en Taylor as gevolg van globalisasie), albei tipiese krygshere geword het. Savimbi het Maoistiese ideologie gebruik terwyl hy ’n insurgent teen Portugal was. Daarná het hy ’n rebel in die Angolese burgeroorlog geword. Hy het eers na 1992 ‘n krygsheer geword nadat hy die verkiesing verloor het en sy buitelandse steun verloor het. Taylor, aan die ander kant, was ‘n krygsheer in die diamantryke buurland, Sierra Leone. Altwee krygshere het identiteitspolitiek gebruik om volgelinge te kry, terwyl Taylor ook brutale krag en die manipulasie van die jeug gebruik het. Hulle het beide internasionale diamante gesmokkel deur kriminele netwerke te gebruik. Die groot vi verskil is egter dat terwyl Taylor ‘n krygsheer in Sierra Leone was, was hy ook ‘n insurgent in Liberië, waar hy in 1990 mag gekry het en in 1997 president geword het. Savimbi, aan die ander kant, het nooit presidensiële mag verkry nie, alhoewel hy deelgeneem het aan die 1992 Angolese verkiesing. Hy het daarna opgehou om ‘n revolusionêr en ‘n rebel te wees en het ‘n ware krygsheer geword (sonder die eksterne ondersteuning wat hy voorheen gehad het). Savimbi is in 2002 vermoor en Taylor het in 2003 abdikeer. Taylor is tans onder verhoor in Den Haag waar hy tereg staan by die Internasionale Strafhof vir oorlogsmisdade en menseregteskendings in Sierra Leone. Beide hierdie krygshere se nalatenskap leef egter voort.

Orientador: Omar Ribeiro Thomaz / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-22T05:15:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Oliveira_ArielRolim_M.pdf: 2189699 bytes, checksum: 933089fd3c1ecc008020db1de7a1c9bc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: O líder político Jonas Savimbi ocupou uma posição privilegiada de observação dos entrecruzamentos das linguagens segundo as quais se lutou a guerra em Angola. O nexo entre as esferas global e local do conflito, incluindo aí seus diferentes códigos de reportagem, pode ser apreendido a partir da análise das lideranças - entendidas aqui, não como indivíduos, mas como catalisadores de "comunidades imaginadas". Atento ao plano das estratégias dos agentes que, mesmo se relacionando a referências discursivas inconciliáveis e irredutíveis umas às outras, na prática, conformaram uma rede de inimizades produtiva - e aí surge uma dimensão completamente desvinculada dos modelos e discursos. A questão que coloco aqui é em que medida a noção de "inimigo" como categoria de alteridade no plano das relações práticas, entrevista nos discursos de Savimbi, pode nos ajudar a compreender o cenário de disparidades e a multiplicidade de formas de conflito que o caso angolano comporta. Volto-me aos códigos mobilizados por cada um dos contendores na significação da luta como condição para que, fugindo dos preceitos dos modelos a que cada um se reporta nesse processo, possamos ver a guerra como uma arena de interações onde os atores se comunicam ou, ao menos, se reconhecem (no duplo sentido do termo) para melhor lutar. Sigo a hipótese de que a guerra tenha sido uma rede prática de trocas violentas (jamais simétricas) não só de projéteis, mas também de nomes e códigos entre os contendores que iriam moldar de forma decisiva o imaginário nacional angolano - um país cujas fronteiras mais ou menos arbitrárias haviam sido herança direta do colonialismo português. Nesse sentido, cada umas das partes em disputa necessitavam criar um discurso nacional unificador - concorrente ao rival. Os beligerantes mantinham uma esfera de aliança tácita, mas não expressa, em torno da construção e manutenção da plausibilidade nacional / Abstract: The political leader Jonas Savimbi has occupied a privileged observing position of the language crossings according to which the war in Angola was fought. The nexus between global and local dimensions of this conflict (the different codes of report there included), can be apprehended from the analysis of the leaders - understood, here, not as individuals, but as catalyzers of "imagined communities". I focus on the plan of the agents' strategies that, even if in relation to irreconcilable references of discourse to one another, in practice, comprehend a productive net of enmity. Therefore a dimension completely detached from models rises. The question I pose here is: in which measure the notion of "enemy" as a category of alterity on the plan of practical relations - glimpsed in the speeches of Savimbi - can help us to understand the set of disparities and multiplicity of ways of conflict that the Angolan case bears? I turn myself to the codes mobilized by each of the contenders to ascribe meaning to the fight as a condition - escaping the tenets of the models to which each one reports in this process - for us to see the war as an arena of interaction where de actors communicate or, at least, acknowledge (in the double meaning of the term) themselves to better fight. I follow the hypothesis that the war has been a practical net of violent (and never symmetrical) exchange not only of bullets, but also of names and codes between contenders who would engrave the imagery of Angola in a decisive way - a country which its more or less arbitrary borders had been a direct heritage from the Portuguese colonialism. In this sense, each part in the dispute needed to create a rival national unifying discourse. The belligerents kept a level of tacit alliance, though not expressed, around the construction e maintenance of national plausibility / Mestrado / Antropologia Social / Mestre em Antropologia Social