Written in response to a current gap in academic and industry based literature, this thesis was written on the topic of Trade Based Money Laundering (TBML) and risk assessment, within the banking context. Despite the increased use of TBML, most academic descriptions of money laundering have used the cash based model of placement and integration of large cash deposits acquired from criminal activity, which are then merged into legitimate pre-existing funds. However, there are a significant number of examples to show that cash transferred into goods and then shipped to other countries can be easier to move and less conspicuous or traceable than simple cash based deposits. One of the main challenges for detecting shipping based laundering techniques is that they involve a number of agencies sharing data and information, in order to catch the criminals. Simple banking checks may not always elicit the required information without verification from either customs or law enforcement agencies. The research sought to identify the current challenges and issues facing risk assessment professionals in the banking sector and to identify gaps in the current systems being used. The data collected included interviews and survey information taken from professionals working on AML risk assessment in banking and financial institutions from across the globe. In addition to the description of different money laundering schemes, much of the current academic discussion on money laundering in banking has focused on the regulation requirements for financial institutions to stop money laundering activity, but there has been little empirical guidance on how regulation can be adapted and implemented at the individual banking level. This research accessed a number of legal cases available in the public domain, which were analysed to see how and where some of the larger banks have failed to implement current anti-money laundering controls and to consider how this could impact on the detection of TBML activity. This research uses an Agency theory model to look at the pressures banks are under to manage client’s accounts efficiently, versus the requirements of outside regulation to undertake extensive checks on business transactions and accounts. Finally, the researcher proposed a simple risk matrix approach that developed the current thinking of client behaviour and transaction monitoring risk analysis associated with cash based laundering, to develop a four-point risk model that added geography and third party behaviour, to account for shipping and trade based laundering activity.

Magister Legum - LLM / Money laundering (hereafter ML) is a multidisciplinary topic which has become important since the late 1980s. The term ‘laundering’ literally means ‘washing’ or ‘removing dirt’. It has been defined as the conversion of criminal income into assets that cannot be traced back to the underlying crime. Criminals use ML as a way of keeping control over the proceeds of crime and to provide, ultimately, a cover for their income and wealth. ML occurs every time any transaction takes place, regardless of whether it involves any form of property or benefit, whether tangible or not tangible, which is derived from criminal activity. ML is regulated at the global, regional and national levels. To combat ML and other financial crimes, Malawi enacted the Financial Crimes Act (hereafter FCA). The FCA establishes the Financial Intelligence Authority (hereafter FIA) as an institution whose objectives include collecting financial intelligence regarding suspicious transactions.

Money laundering is a serious crime with potentially wide ranging consequences that have numerous implications for criminological research. However, criminology rarely explores this crime, nor its potential impact on other more central crimes of interest (e.g. drug trafficking or organized crime). The present study adds to a limited body of literature examining money laundering from a criminological perspective, evaluating aspects of its regulation and social control within the banking industry. Several aspects of regulatory oversight and company dynamics such as fine/settlement size, company size, and the likelihood of non-AML/OFAC violations to predict future AML/OFAC violations were evaluated. These analyses largely supported that banking crimes, and more specifically AML violations, follow the same patterns observed within previous corporate crime research. However, the primary focus of this research was to evaluate the effectiveness of industry success rankings as a form of social control as it pertains to AML violations and to determine whether or not banks that ranked well on industry rankings were also less likely to have banking violations. A variety of rankings including safety, asset-based, and overall performance measures were used to assess their relationship to bank violations, with analyses supporting that these banking industry success markers held little relationship to or acknowledgment of a firm’s previous AML/OFAC violations. Implications are discussed at length including the importance of and numerous directions for future criminological research on money laundering violation within the banking industry, suggested regulatory reforms, and the need for a wider variety and more tailored industry success measures to affect some level of social control.

Doctor Legum - LLD / Along with its inumerable wonders, the advent of the internet has brought with it very bad vices. The notion of convenience, which comes with the use of the internet, can be attributed to criminals who wish to disguise the proceeds of their ill-derived funds, or what is better known as cyberlaundering. Cyberlaundering is a phenomenon that seems negligible on face value, but, to the contrary, has very dire effects, especially on national economies, which are in no way trifling.This study describes the problem of cyberlaundering, pointing out the various legal issues pertaining to it. Given that cyberlaundering is a comparatively new crime, which is not yet conceptualized legally, criminal justice authorities find it hard to detect, investigate and prosecute cyberlaundering. An adequate legal regime against cyberlaundering is currently non-existent, as there is presently no concise international or national legal framework in place to contain the problem. Whilst the chief focus of the thesis is to devise a legal framework to combat cyberlaundering, considerable attention is also devoted to the tension that arises between public and private interests, amongst several other legal issues that come to play along the way. This is a debate that necessarily arises when legislatures resort to more radical anti-cyberlaundering laws. The study advocates a middle ground, which leads to the desired end of curbing the exponential growth of cyberlaundering, at the very least.

Magister Legum - LLM / Financial crimes are transnational in nature, and no country is immune from them. They are an international problem that can best be solved through international cooperation on a global scale. It is therefore necessary to have rules and norms that apply worldwide in order to deal with these crimes comprehensively.1 Of particular prominence is the crime of money laundering (ML), which may be defined as the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin.2 This term is relatively new and is broadly defined, with the definitions varying from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In Zimbabwe, money laundering acts are listed in the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act 34 of 2013 (the Principal Act).3 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the main international inter-governmental body formed specifically to set AML standards and to promote their implementation globally.

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Article Excerpt: The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, enacted on Jan. 1, 2021, contained the first-ever federal requirement for certain legal entities to identify and report their beneficial owners, also known as the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA). The CTA was designed to “prevent wrongdoers from exploiting United States corporations and limited liability companies for criminal gain, to assist law enforcement in detecting, preventing, and punishing terrorism, money laundering, and other misconduct.” As trusted advisors, CPAs should consider informing clients of the new reporting requirements and advise them on the best option to pursue, even if they do not file the reports for their clients [...]

Politically exposed persons have become a specific risk factor in money laundering. The Financial Action Task Force has formulated clear and specific requirements for dealing with these individuals. Internationally, various jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the European Union have adopted effective legislation encompassing the 2003 Financial Action Task Force Recommendations. In South Africa the requirement to apply appropriate, risk based procedures to politically exposed persons has been limited to banks. The aim of this research study was to identify whether the South African anti-money laundering regulatory framework, adequately addresses managing the risks of politically exposed persons. The regulatory frameworks of the United Kingdom and the European Union, as well as the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force, were used to determine whether best practice is followed in South Africa with regard to politically exposed persons. The process of how money is laundered has been examined as well as the methods that corrupt politically exposed persons use in order to launder money. The study has shown that politically exposed persons are not regulated in South Africa in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations issued in 2003, while the South African Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Framework does not adequately address the risk posed by corrupt, politically exposed persons. Both international best practice and the recommendations of the World Bank were considered in terms of the way in which to address the risks posed by these persons effectively. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Auditing / unrestricted

L’intelligence économique (I.E) peut-elle contribuer à mieux lutter contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du terrorisme (LBC/FT) et, si oui, comment ? Un diagnostic a permis de mettre en évidence des carences qui, au plan institutionnel se matérialisaient par des réponses insuffisantes en raison non seulement de l’absence de contraintes à l’échelle mondiale, mais aussi en raison de la primauté d’intérêts politico-économiques au détriment des dynamiques régionalistes et corporatives. Au plan opérationnel, il est apparu que les faiblesses sont liées à l’absence de prise en compte de l’I.E. Placée au cœur du renseignement, cette thèse soutient que l’I.E peut s’adapter au contexte de la lutte contre la criminalité financière et servir à mieux lutter contre le phénomène. Elle a cherché à montrer en quoi les méthodes et outils d’investigation, d’analyse de l’environnement, d’anticipation, d’influence et de contre-influence de l’I.E pouvaient répondre aux besoins des acteurs de la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du terrorisme. Elle s’est également projetée sur le rôle que pourraient jouer les acteurs de l’I.E dans la LBC/FT. / Competitive and Strategic Intelligence (CST) can it contribute to better anti-money laundering - combating the financing of terrorism (AML / CFT), if so, how ? A diagnosis has helped highlight deficiencies that, institutionally are materialized by insufficient responses not only because of lack of constraints on a global scale, but also because of the primacy of political and economic interests to the detriment of regionalist and corporate dynamics. Operationally, it appeared that the weaknesses are related to the failure to take into account the CST. Placed at the heart of intelligence, this thesis argues that CST can adapt to the context of the fight against financial crime and serve to better the fight against the phenomenon. It sought to show how the methods and tools of investigation, analysis of the environment, anticipation, influence and influence-against CST could meet the needs of stakeholders in the AML/CFT. It also projected on the potential role of CST actors in AML / CFT.

This thesis advances global governance literature by focusing on the conditions under which procedural harmonisation occurs and how it is characterised. It suggests that the existence of a network of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) complements great powers’ action and acts as a force for harmonisation in the making of international anti-money laundering (AML) standards. Procedural harmonisation is identified firstly, through a discussion on great power coalitions and how their interests set international agendas and impose compliance. Secondly, it is also recognised as an outcome of the IGOs’ network action through shared preferences, resource exchanges and stable relationships. Ultimately, the analysis determines that great powers are a necessary but not sufficient condition for procedural harmonisation, which is moreover favoured when legitimacy, expertise, and the need to achieve compliance are present. In sum, the thesis discusses the impact of international actors’ interactions in the making of international AML standards from 1989 to 2014, particularly the development of FATF Recommendations on ‘Customer Due Diligence’. The analysis identifies that the United States and the European Union, as great powers and members to the G-7, are the most influential actors. However, it adds that the IGOs network structure created between the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism is also a necessary actor to the achievement of procedural harmonisation. Data analysis is carried out through process-tracing, which triangulates elite interviews and non-participant observation with primary and secondary documents of legal, policy and expert nature. This thesis concludes that: a) procedural harmonisation is a product of international cooperation; b) IGOs gain influence in standard-making through network structures; and, c) procedural harmonisation may be an example to future global governance strategies if complemented with levels of legitimacy, expertise and the need to achieve compliance.