Criminals make use of accountants to assist them, knowingly or unknowingly, with complex money laundering schemes. The nature of the accounting profession places accountants in an ideal position to identify possibly money laundering activities. The purpose of this research is to consider whether the reporting obligations of South African accountants in terms of section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, No 38 of 2001, as amended, corresponds sufficiently with the services they provide so as to constitute an effective anti-money laundering measure. In order to evaluate the relevance of section 29, the reporting requirements of accountants practising in South Africa are compared with those of the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force. The research study will also analyse the money laundering process and the nature of the accounting profession and consider some of the methods used to perpetrate money laundering applicable to accountants. The research found that accountants in South Africa have a duty to report suspicious transactions only when they are party to such transactions or when they are going either to receive the proceeds of crime or be used for money laundering purposes. Accordingly, in view of the fact that accountants are more likely to be in a position to observe money laundering than to be party to such a transaction, the requirements of section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, No 38 of 2001, as amended, are not effective when applied to accountants. Copyright / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Accounting / unrestricted

The prevalence of the money laundering crime has prompted the introduction of customer due diligence (CDD) measures. CDD measures facilitate the prevention of money laundering and promote the introduction of certain detective skills. Several international institutions champion the introduction of the detective skills in general and the performing of CDD measures in particular. These institutions acknowledge the cumbersome (administrative and financial) effects of introducing the detective skills and the performing of CDD measures. However, these institutions concedes that the aforementioned burden can be alleviated or lessened if the institutions that are responsible for performing CDD measures, i.e. Accountable Institutions (AIs), can exchange and rely on third parties’ (CDD) data. The exchange and reliance on third parties’ data must however consider the divergent threats or risks that might be associated with the data or third parties. The view regarding the exchanging and relying on third parties’ data is shared by, amongst others, the FATF and the UK. However, South Africa appears to be lagging behind in this respect. In other words, the South African FICA and FICA Regulations omit to encapsulate express and lucid provisions permitting the exchanging and relying on third parties’ data for purposes of performing CDD measures. The aforementioned omission, it is argued, creates a legal vacuum in the South African scheme of anti-money laundering. In other words, the aforesaid vacuum lives the South African AIs in a state of doubt regarding the manner and extent of exchanging and relying on third parties’ data. However, the aforesaid vacuum, this study concedes, can be rectified by introduction provisions that are line with the draft Regulation 5A and 5B that are proposed in chapter seven of this study. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

The work includes a theoretical definition, ways and methods of money laundering, Czech and International anti money laundering (AML) law. The second part is devoted to the fight against money laundering. It describes the main AML organizations. And as an example is given the program of one banking institution.

The prevalence of the money laundering crime has prompted the introduction of customer due diligence (CDD) measures. CDD measures facilitate the prevention of money laundering and promote the introduction of certain detective skills. Several international institutions champion the introduction of the detective skills in general and the performing of CDD measures in particular. These institutions acknowledge the cumbersome (administrative and financial) effects of introducing the detective skills and the performing of CDD measures. However, these institutions concedes that the aforementioned burden can be alleviated or lessened if the institutions that are responsible for performing CDD measures, i.e. Accountable Institutions (AIs), can exchange and rely on third parties’ (CDD) data. The exchange and reliance on third parties’ data must however consider the divergent threats or risks that might be associated with the data or third parties. The view regarding the exchanging and relying on third parties’ data is shared by, amongst others, the FATF and the UK. However, South Africa appears to be lagging behind in this respect. In other words, the South African FICA and FICA Regulations omit to encapsulate express and lucid provisions permitting the exchanging and relying on third parties’ data for purposes of performing CDD measures. The aforementioned omission, it is argued, creates a legal vacuum in the South African scheme of anti-money laundering. In other words, the aforesaid vacuum lives the South African AIs in a state of doubt regarding the manner and extent of exchanging and relying on third parties’ data. However, the aforesaid vacuum, this study concedes, can be rectified by introduction provisions that are line with the draft Regulation 5A and 5B that are proposed in chapter seven of this study. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

In this masters thesis we focused on using machine learning methods for detecting money laundering in financial transaction networks, in order to demonstrate that it can be used as a complement or instead of the more commonly used rule based systems. The graph learning method graph convolutional networks (GCN) has been a hot topic in the field since they were shown to scale well with data size back in 2018. However the typical GCN models cannot use edge features, which is why this thesis combines the GCN model with a node and edge neural network (NENN) in order to solve this problem. This new method will be compared towards an already established machine learning method for financial transactions, namely the tree boosting method (XGBoost). Because of confidentiality concerns for financial transactions data, the machine learning algorithms will be tested on two carefully constructed synthetically generated data sets, which from agent based simulations resembles real financial data. The results showed the viability and superiority of the new implementation of the GCN model with it being a preferable method for connectivly structured data, meaning that a transaction or account is analyzed in the context of its financial environment. On the other hand the XGBoost method showed better results when examining transactions independently. Hence it was more accurately able to find fraudulent and non fraudulent patterns from the transactional features themselves. / I detta examensarbete fokuserar vi på användandet av maskininlärningsmetoder för att detektera penningtvätt i finansiella transaktionsnätverk, med målet att demonstrera att dess kan användas som ett komplement till eller i stället för de mer vanligt använda regelbaserade systemen. Grafinlärningsmetoden \textit{graph convolutional networks} (GCN) som har varit ett hett ämne inom området sedan metoden under 2018 visades fungera bra för stora datamängder. Däremot kan inte en vanlig GCN-modell använda kantinformation, vilket är varför denna avhandling kombinerar GCN-modellen med \textit{node and edge neural networks} (NENN) för att mer effektivt detektera penningtvätt. Denna nya metod kommer att jämföras med en redan etablerad maskininlärningsmetod för finansiella transaktioner, nämligen \textit{tree boosting} (XGBoost). På grund av sekretessanledningar för finansiella transaktionsdata var maskininlärningsalgoritmerna testade på två noggrant konstruerade syntetiskt genererade datamängder som från agentbaserade simuleringar liknar riktiga finansiella data. Resultaten visade på applikationsmöjligheter och överlägsenhet för den nya implementationen av GCN-modellen vilken är att föredra för relationsstrukturerade data, det vill säga när transaktioner och konton analyseras i kontexten av deras finansiella omgivning. Å andra sidan visar XGBoost bättre resultat på att examinera transaktioner individuellt eftersom denna metod mer precist kan identifiera bedrägliga och icke-bedrägliga mönster från de transnationella funktionerna.

Depuis le début des années 1970 la communauté internationale, sous l’impulsion des États-Unis, a progressivement abordé le blanchiment d’argent sale comme un nouveau problème de sécurité représentant une menace pour la sécurité intérieure des États et l’équilibre du système financier international. La création, en 1989, du Groupe d’action financière (GAFI) lors du sommet du G7 se tenant à Paris, marquera l’engagement politique international en faveur de la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux devant constituer « une contribution décisive à la lutte contre les activités criminelles et particulièrement contre le trafic de la drogue et permettre de renforcer la solidité du système financier international » [GAFI, 1991, p. 21]. À travers la publication en 1990, de ses quarante recommandations pour la mise en place d’un régime global de lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, les pays membres du GAFI – les membres du G7 auxquels se sont joints, dès la première année, la Commission européenne et huit autres pays dont la Suisse – viennent concrétiser l’« invention d’un nouveau crime » [Amicelle, 2016, p. 37] : le blanchiment d’argent et la nécessité d’une nouvelle forme de réaction sociale contre la criminalité lucrative. Créé au départ pour lutter contre les revenus issus du trafic de drogue, le dispositif englobe aujourd’hui l’ensemble des revenus issus d’une activité criminelle. En 2001, il a été adapté pour lutter contre le financement du terrorisme et en 2012 élargi aux infractions fiscales pénales et au financement de la prolifération des armes de destructions massives. Ainsi, le dispositif anti-blanchiment est aujourd’hui un instrument théoriquement mobilisable pour lutter contre toutes les formes de criminalité et toutes les personnes (physiques ou morales) – « des plus faibles aux plus puissantes » [Amicelle, 2014, p. 88] – associées à des flux financiers illicites. Plus de trente ans après sa création, le GAFI représente un réseau mondial de plus de 190 juridictions ayant adopté ses recommandations, conduisant en 2019 son président à célébrer « trente ans de succès » et à affirmer que la « valeur de l'organisation pour la sécurité de nos nations et l'intégrité du système financier international n'ont jamais été aussi claires » [GAFI, 2019, p. 5]. À travers l’adaptation de leur législation, la plupart des pays, se sont dotés d’un dispositif de lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du terrorisme (LBC/FT) reposant sur des pratiques inédites de coopération et d’échanges d’informations entre des acteurs provenant du monde de la finance et des acteurs publics d’application de la loi [Amicelle, 2018 ; Helgesson et Mörth, 2019 ; Huysmans, 2014 ; Sheptycki, 2002]. S'appuyant sur les travaux de Latour, de Goede [2018] introduit le concept de la « chaîne de sécurité » pour décrire l’architecture générale du dispositif de LBC/FT composée de trois maillons, décrivant la division du travail et les tâches relatives à la mise en œuvre d’un modèle théorique de policing guidé par le renseignement – financier – ou d’« Intelligence-led policing ». Le premier maillon concerne les institutions financières désignées comme entités déclarantes, obligées par la loi d’organiser la traçabilité des opérations financières devant supporter la surveillance, la détection et le signalement des opérations suspectes en matière de BC/FT dans leurs établissements. Le deuxième maillon concerne la cellule de renseignement financier (CRF) désignée dans chaque pays, comme le centre national chargé de la collecte et l’analyse des déclarations d’opérations suspectes et des autres informations concernant le BC/FT et de la production de renseignement financier mobilisable par les acteurs publics d’application de la loi – dernier maillon de la chaîne – devant lutter contre la criminalité en s’attaquant aux flux financiers illicites. À travers le concept de la « chaîne », de Geode [2018] décrit le dispositif anti-blanchiment selon un processus linéaire, suivant le cheminement des transactions suspectes – les traces financières – qui sont successivement « collectées, stockées, transférées et analysées afin d’aboutir à des actes de sécurité (par exemple des avoirs gelés, des comptes fermés, et des condamnations judiciaires) » (p. 27). Dans cette nouvelle configuration du policing – financier – , le processus de « fabrique de la criminalité » ou de « making crime » introduit par Ericson [1981] – pour décrire le processus à travers lequel les acteurs du policing sont confrontés à des problèmes de sécurité qu’ils vont transformer, en fonction de leur réaction, en crime et en criminel – se déplace a priori, dans une logique de « multilatéralisation du policing », des seules organisations policières vers d’autres acteurs devenant de nouveaux « promoteurs » et « prestataires » du policing [Bayley et Shearing, 2001]. Jusqu’ici, de nombreuses études ont été consacrées à l’analyse du premier maillon de la « chaine de sécurité » questionnant l’implication des acteurs financiers dans la mise en œuvre « réticente » des mesures de vigilance, de détection et de signalement des flux financiers illicites au sein de leurs institutions. Cependant, très peu d’études prêtent attention aux autres maillons de la « chaîne de sécurité » et encore moins lorsqu’il s’agit d’analyser la « chaîne de sécurité » dans son ensemble, seul moyen pour saisir empiriquement l’étendue des relations et la diversité des dispositifs de production de sécurité mis en œuvre, supportant dans sa globalité le processus de réaction sociale aux pratiques de BC/FT. Ainsi, c’est ce vide de connaissances académiques que cette recherche vise à combler à travers l’analyse empirique de la mise en œuvre du dispositif de LBC/FT en Suisse et au Canada. Plus de 30 ans après la création du GAFI et la mise en place par les États d’un dispositif de LBC/FT reposant sur un modèle opérant de policing guidé par le renseignement financier, cette recherche vise à comprendre dans sa globalité : « À quoi sert le renseignement financier ? » Répondre à cette question de recherche, c’est contribuer dans une triple dimension à (a) l’analyse de la mise en œuvre empirique d’un modèle opérant de policing guidé par le renseignement dans une environnement particulier : l’environnement financier, (b) dépassant la vision lacuneuse des travaux centrés sur les acteurs financiers de l’anti-blanchiment et (c) saisir la manière dont les pratiques de production et d’utilisation du renseignement financier contribuent à analyser dans son ensemble tout le processus qui détermine la visibilité des cas de BC/FT, leur signalement à une autorité de contrôle et leur éventuelle poursuite et condamnation. Le dispositif anti-blanchiment n’ayant plus vocation à cibler une forme de criminalité lucrative par rapport à une autre, notre étude est aussi une analyse du processus de « fabrique de la criminalité » décrit par Ericson [1981], par lequel les acteurs du policing financier vont désigner, en fonction de leurs intérêts et de leurs règles propres, les comportements criminels portés à leur connaissance qu’ils vont décider de poursuivre, d’ignorer, d’infirmer ou de vérifier. Alors cette recherche soutiendra la thèse que malgré toutes les promesses implicites portées par la reconfiguration des activités de policing dans ses logiques contemporaines de fonctionnement – redéfinissant a priori, la division du travail et la répartition des tâches situées au cœur du processus de « fabrique de la criminalité » –, l’exemple de la lutte anti-blanchiment en Suisse et au Canada, montre comment les acteurs publics d’application de la loi (APAL) ont su conserver la mainmise sur le processus de « making crime » en développant des stratégies pour détourner les normes anti-blanchiment et les dispositifs qu’elles impliquent, à leur avantage dans la poursuite de leurs priorités opérationnelles. Ainsi, les APAL replacent – dans un mouvement contre-intuitif aux reconfigurations contemporaines des activités de policing – les relations de pouvoir, associées au contrôle et au maintien de l’ordre, dans un rapport de verticalité entre l’État et la société et dont les manifestations contribuent à reproduire la « fabrique de la criminalité » selon, comme l’avait noté Manning [2010], « un ensemble d’habitudes et de suppositions axées sur le trope du crime qui envisage uniquement la nécessité de contrôler, de dissuader et de punir les contestataires visibles et connus » – justifiant aussi une analyse en termes de gestion différentielle des illégalismes. À travers l’accès à un matériau empirique – jamais mobilisé auparavant – dans deux pays membres fondateurs du GAFI, cette recherche repose sur une approche comparée à l’échelle internationale et une méthodologie d’analyse mixte, de la base de données, dénominalisées, colligeant l’ensemble des déclarations d’opérations suspectes et des informations associées reçues par la CRF suisse entre 2004 et 2014 – analyse quantitative – et des entretiens auprès d’une quarantaine d’agents au sein de la CRF suisse et d’un panel « représentatif » de l’ensemble des acteurs publics d’application de la loi habilités à mobiliser le renseignement financier en Suisse et au Canada – analyse qualitative. Alors cette recherche contribue empiriquement et conceptuellement à la littérature sur les transformations du policing soutenues par les modèles de policing guidé par le renseignement – ou d’« Intelligence-led policing » –, évitant l’écueil de penser les processus génériques de renseignement comme les manières de les organiser. De plus, cette recherche questionne à nouveaux frais la réaction sociale aux différentes formes de criminalité lucrative, justifiant une analyse en termes de gestion différentielle des illégalismes renvoyant aux diverses modalités pratiques de jeu avec les règles légales tout en situant socialement les groupes qui en usent. / Since the early 1970s, the international community, led by the United States, has progressively addressed money laundering as a new security problem representing a threat to the security of states and financial system. The creation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989 at the G7 summit in Paris marked the international political commitment to combat money laundering as “a decisive contribution to the fight against criminal activities, particularly drug trafficking, and will improve the soundness of the international financial system” [FATF, 1991, p. 20]. The FATF's forty recommendations, published in 1990, for the establishment of a global anti-money laundering regime, embody the “invention of a new crime” [Amicelle, 2016, p. 37]: money laundering and the need for a new form of social reaction against profit-making crime. Initially created to combat drug trafficking, the system now covers all profit from criminal activity. In 2001, it was adapted to combat the financing of terrorism and in 2012 extended to cover criminal tax offences and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, the anti-money laundering system is today an instrument that can theoretically be mobilised to combat all forms of crime and all persons – “from the weakest to the most powerful” [Amicelle, 2014, p. 88] - associated with illicit financial flows. More than thirty years after its creation, the FATF represents a global network of more than 190 jurisdictions that have adopted its Recommendations, leading its President in 2019 to celebrate “thirty years of success” and to assert that the “value of the organisation to the security of our nations and the integrity of the international financial system has never been clearer” [FATF, 2019, p. 5]. Today, most countries have anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) systems based on innovative practices of cooperation and information exchange between financial and public law enforcement actors [Amicelle, 2018; Helgesson and Mörth, 2019; Huysmans, 2014; Sheptycki, 2002]. Building on Latour's work, de Goede [2018] introduces the concept of the “security chain” to describe the general architecture of the AML/CFT system composed of three links, describing the division of labour and tasks related to the implementation of a theoretical model of intelligence-led policing. The first link concerns the financial institutions designated as reporting entities, which are obliged by law to organise the traceability of financial transactions that should support the monitoring, detection and reporting of suspicious ML/FT transactions in their institutions. The second link concerns the financial intelligence unit (FIU) designated in each country as the national centre responsible for collecting and analysing suspicious transaction reports and other ML/FT information and producing financial intelligence that can be mobilised by public law enforcement actors - the last link in the chain - to fight crime by tackling illicit financial flows. Through the concept of the “chain”, de Geode [2018] describes the anti-money laundering system as a linear process, following the path of suspicious transactions - financial traces - which are successively “collected, stored, transferred and analysed in order to lead to security acts (e.g. frozen assets, closed accounts, and judicial convictions)” (p. 27). In this new configuration of financial policing, the process of “making crime” introduced by Ericson [1981] - to describe the process through which policing actors are confronted with security problems which they will transform, according to their reaction, into crime and criminality - is shifted a priori, in a logic of “multilateralization of policing”, from police organisations alone to other actors who become new “promoters” and “providers” of policing [Bayley and Shearing, 2001]. Many studies have been devoted to the analysis of the first link of the “security chain”, questioning the involvement of financial actors in the “reluctant” implementation of vigilance measures, detection and reporting of illicit financial flows within their institutions. However, very few studies pay attention to the other links in the “security chain” and even fewer analyse the “security chain” as a whole, which is the only way to empirically grasp the extent of the relationships and the diversity of the security production mechanisms implemented, which support the whole process of social reaction to ML/FT practices. It is this gap in academic knowledge that this research aims to fill through the empirical analysis of the implementation of the AML/CFT system in Switzerland and Canada. More than 30 years after the creation of the FATF and the implementation by States of an AML/CFT system based on an operational model of policing led by financial intelligence, this research aims to understand in its entirety: “What is financial intelligence used for?” Answering this research question means contributing in a triple dimension to (a) the analysis of the empirical implementation of an operating model of intelligence-led policing in a particular environment: the financial environment, (b) going beyond the flawed vision of work focused on the financial actors of anti-money laundering and (c) grasping the way in which the practices of production and use of financial intelligence contribute to analyse as a whole the process that determines the visibility of ML/FT cases, their reporting to a supervisory authority and their possible prosecution and conviction. As the anti-money laundering system is no longer intended to target one form of lucrative crime over another, our study is also an analysis of the “making crime” process described by Ericson [1981], whereby financial policing actors will designate, according to their own interests and rules, the criminal behaviour brought to their attention that they will decide to pursue, ignore, deny or verify. This research will therefore support the thesis that despite all the implicit promises made by the reconfiguration of policing activities in its contemporary operating logics - redefining a priori the division of labour and the distribution of tasks located at the heart of the “making crime” process –, the example of the fight against money laundering in Switzerland and Canada shows how public law enforcement agencies (APAL) have been able to maintain control over the process of “making crime” by developing strategies to turn anti-money laundering norms and the mechanisms they imply to their advantage in the pursuit of their operational priorities. Thus, public law enforcement actors situate the power relations associated with policing in a vertical relationship between state and society, the manifestations of which help to reproduce the “making crime” according to, as Manning [2010] noted, a set of habits and assumptions that “envisions only the need to control, deter and punish the visible and known contestants”. Through access to empirical material - never before mobilised - in two founding member countries of the FATF, this research is based on a comparative approach on an international scale and a mixed methodology of analysis of the database of all suspicious transaction reports and related information received by the Swiss FIU between 2004 and 2014 - quantitative analysis - and forty interviews with agents within the Swiss FIU and a "representative" panel of all public law enforcement actors empowered to mobilise financial intelligence in Switzerland and Canada - qualitative analysis. Thus, this research contributes empirically and conceptually to the literature on the transformations of policing supported by models of intelligence-led policing, avoiding the pitfall of thinking about generic intelligence processes as well as ways of organizing them. Moreover, this research questions the social reaction to the different forms of lucrative crime, justifying an analysis in terms of differential management of illegalisms referring to the various practical modalities of playing with the legal rules while socially situating the groups that use them.

Symbole de protection des libertés individuelles, le secret bancaire est perçu par les profanes, avec le développement de la criminalité financière transfrontalière, comme étant un élément qui favorise les fraudes, le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme ainsi que l’évasion fiscale. L’analyse juridique de cette institution nous montre qu’elle est l’élément le plus important de la réussite des opérations ayant pour but les flux internationaux de capitaux, et un facteur qui stimule la réussite économique et la mondialisation. La réglementation et la régulation des flux internationaux de fonds par un certain nombre de législations éparses et variées modifie considérablement la notion du secret bancaire. Une des caractéristiques fondamentales de ce bouleversement est qu’il institue des liens entre les différents opérateurs qui interviennent dans le contrat. Le contrôle de cette opération pousse les Etats à mutualiser leurs efforts et à se mettre ensemble en vue de défendre leurs intérêts financiers respectifs à travers la lutte contre les flux de capitaux illicites. Par ailleurs, la défense de ces intérêts financiers entraine incontestablement la redéfinition substantielle des missions du banquier d’une part, notamment sa façon de percevoir la relation avec la clientèle, de recueillir et d’échanger des informations, ainsi que la coopération avec les autorités publiques et de contrôle internes et internationales. D’autre part, on note du fait de cet élargissement de missions du banquier, une extension des risques pénaux à l’égard de ce dernier. Cependant, la dilution du secret bancaire à l’échelle internationale tant pour des nécessités contractuelles, que pour les nécessités de la lutte contre la criminalité entraine des dérives importantes se manifestant à travers le manque de stratégies adaptées permettant d’éviter dangers et de réagir en cas d’atteinte aux droits de l’Homme. D’où la nécessité de redéfinir un nouveau cadre juridique qui permet non seulement de limiter les atteintes au secret bancaire et aux droits de l’Homme, mais aussi, oblige les différents intervenants dans la chaine des transferts internationaux de fonds, «de jouer aux mêmes règles du jeu», d’être tributaires de mêmes droits, et surtout des mêmes obligations. C’est à ce prix et à ce prix seulement, que le secret bancaire pourra être réhabilité en tant qu’institution fondamentale / The regulation of the international flows of fund by a number of scattered and varied legislations modifies considerably the notion of the bank secrecy. One of the fundamental characteristics of this upheaval is that it establishes links between the various operators who intervene in the contract. The control of this operation urges States to mutualize their efforts and to put itself together to defend their respective financial interests through the fight against the illicit capital flows. Besides, the defense of these financial interest conduct unmistakably the substancial redefining of the banker on one hand, in particular the way it perceives the relation with the clientele, of collects and of exchanges information, as well as the cooperation with the public authorities and control internal and international. On the other hand, we note because of this extension of missions of the banker, an extension of the penal risks towards him.

本國為因應2018年亞太防制洗錢組織（APG）相互評鑑事宜，相關單位陸續參照國際規範，如防制洗錢金融行動工作組織（FATF）2012年發布之「防制洗錢及打擊資恐與武器擴散國際標準40項建議」、巴塞爾銀行監理委員會(BCBS)2014年發布之「健全有關防制洗錢及打擊資恐之風險管理」文件等，以及他國作法進行有關防制洗錢及打擊資恐法制規約、監管措施及自律規範等之修正，並促請義務機構強化執行，以期順利通過第三輪相互評鑑。 銀行向為洗錢及資恐犯罪喜好之金流管道，基於銀行提供之金融服務具安全性、便利性及多元化、全球化等優點，不僅吸引一般金融消費者與銀行緊密往來，亦同時受到不良分子之青睞，致金融體系資源易遭不當利用。銀行為金融體系之核心主體，負有防制洗錢及打擊資恐之義務與責任，本文爰就銀行業防制洗錢及打擊資恐實務切入，針對本國銀行應採行之因應措施基本架構進行探討。 本文將先介紹FATF之評鑑流程及方法論，以立下銀行進行防制洗錢及打擊資恐工作之目標，復就達成前開目標為方向，引述金融機構防制洗錢及打擊資恐機制之國際標準，繼而回歸國內外對銀行實際作為之法規要求，試行建構銀行防制洗錢及打擊資恐基本機制，末則就銀行於執行面可改善空間提出重點觀察建議。 隨著工業4.0、Bank3.0及Fintech（金融科技）之快速演進，銀行客戶樣貌及交易型態正在改變，健全防制洗錢及打擊資恐機制是所有銀行業共同面臨之進階版挑戰，本文謹提出銀行機制基本實務報告，俾作為開展細緻化措施之參考。另本文為一般性原則之探討，並非針對特定機構主體之描述，併此敘明。 / For the Mutual Evaluation which will be conducted by the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) in 2018, basing on the following consulting international norms, such as “International Standards on combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation (The FATF Recommendations)” published by Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2012, “Sound management of risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism” published by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 2014 and foreign advanced practices, the Taiwan authorities have amended the legal system, laws and regulations, supervision measures and self-disciplines referred to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorism Financing(CTF). Meanwhile, every relevant entity is enhancing the prevent measures and internal control on AML/CFT (Counter-Financing of Terrorism) as well. The satisfactory result of the Third Round Mutual Evaluation will be expected. As people know, the banks are always the favorite cash flow channel of money laundering and terrorism financing, since the banks provide the financial services with advantages of safety, convenience, diversification and globalization, etc. Both general financial customers and criminals on ML/FT are attracted to make transactions with the banks. Thus, the financial system’s resources could be utilized improperly. Due to the role of the core of financial system, the banks should take the responsibility and bear the liability of Anti-Money Laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. In this paper, the primary framework on AML/CFT of domestic banks will be outlined according to the real practice. First, this paper has an introduction of mutual evaluation process and methodology in order to set the goal related to AML/CFT of the bank. Next, the model practices of international standards are presenting to achieve the goal for references. Then, this paper will focus on domestic and foreign regulatory requirements on banking, and try to construct the bank’s primary internal system of AML/CFT. Finally, there are some observations of the bank’s performance related to this issue. With the rapid evolution of Industry 4.0, Bank 3.0 and Fintech, the customers’ financial behaviors and transaction types are changing. Therefore, to keep sound internal system of AML/CFT is an advanced challenge to all the banks. This paper is trying to set a primary framework on AML/CFT of domestic banks, and to be taken reference for banks to start developing appropriate prevent measures. In addition, the statement of this paper is an approach to general principles, not indicating any specific institution.

Money laundering involves activities which are aimed at concealing benefits that were acquired through criminal means for the purpose of making them appear legitimately acquired. Money laundering promotes criminal activities in South Africa because it allows criminals to keep the benefits that they acquired through their criminal activities. It takes place through a variety of schemes which include the use of banks. In this sense money laundering control is based on the premise that banks must be protected from providing criminals with the means to launder the benefits of their criminal activities. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (‘FICA’) in aggregate with the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) form the backbone of South Africa’s anti-money laundering regime. Like its international counterparts FICA imposes onerous duties on banks seeing that they are most often used by criminals as conduits to launder the benefits of crime. In turn, POCA criminalises activities in relation to the benefits of crime and delineates civil proceedings aimed at forfeiting the benefits of crime to the state. This study identifies the idiosyncrasies of the South African anti-money laundering regime and forwards recommendations aimed at improving its structure. To this end nine issues in relation to money laundering control and banks are investigated. The investigation fundamentally reveals that money laundering control holds unforeseen consequences for banks. In particular, a bank that receives the benefits of crimes such as fraud or theft faces prosecution if it fails to heed FICA’s money laundering control duties, for example, the filing of a suspicious transaction report. However, if the bank files a suspicious transaction report, it may be sued in civil court by the customer for breach of contract. In addition, if the bank parted with the benefits of fraud or theft whilst suspecting that the account holder may not be entitled to payment thereof, it may be sued by the victim of fraud or theft who seeks to recover loss suffered at the hand of the fraudster or thief from the bank. Ultimately, this study illustrates that amendment of some of the provisions of South Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation should enable banks to manage the aforementioned and other unforeseen consequences of money laundering control whilst at the same time contribute to the South African anti-money laundering effort. / Criminal and Procedural Law / Mercantile Law / LL.D.

Money laundering involves activities which are aimed at concealing benefits that were acquired through criminal means for the purpose of making them appear legitimately acquired. Money laundering promotes criminal activities in South Africa because it allows criminals to keep the benefits that they acquired through their criminal activities. It takes place through a variety of schemes which include the use of banks. In this sense money laundering control is based on the premise that banks must be protected from providing criminals with the means to launder the benefits of their criminal activities. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (‘FICA’) in aggregate with the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) form the backbone of South Africa’s anti-money laundering regime. Like its international counterparts FICA imposes onerous duties on banks seeing that they are most often used by criminals as conduits to launder the benefits of crime. In turn, POCA criminalises activities in relation to the benefits of crime and delineates civil proceedings aimed at forfeiting the benefits of crime to the state. This study identifies the idiosyncrasies of the South African anti-money laundering regime and forwards recommendations aimed at improving its structure. To this end nine issues in relation to money laundering control and banks are investigated. The investigation fundamentally reveals that money laundering control holds unforeseen consequences for banks. In particular, a bank that receives the benefits of crimes such as fraud or theft faces prosecution if it fails to heed FICA’s money laundering control duties, for example, the filing of a suspicious transaction report. However, if the bank files a suspicious transaction report, it may be sued in civil court by the customer for breach of contract. In addition, if the bank parted with the benefits of fraud or theft whilst suspecting that the account holder may not be entitled to payment thereof, it may be sued by the victim of fraud or theft who seeks to recover loss suffered at the hand of the fraudster or thief from the bank. Ultimately, this study illustrates that amendment of some of the provisions of South Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation should enable banks to manage the aforementioned and other unforeseen consequences of money laundering control whilst at the same time contribute to the South African anti-money laundering effort. / Criminal and Procedural Law / Mercantile Law / LL.D.