I argue that Friedrich Nietzsche provides us with a political philosophy that deserves serious consideration as a uniquely anti-democratic position within the canon of modern political theory. Beyond recent attempts to democratise Nietzsche's thoughts on power and self-creation, I provide an analysis of Nietzsche's anti-democratic impulse that demonstrates how the elements of hierarchy and philosophy form the core of an antidemocratic and anti-universalist political project in Nietzsche's mature thought. Hitherto, many of Nietzsche's interpreters have assumed that his thought yields no unambiguous political philosophy because he fails to present his ideas in a systematic way. Yet it may be argued that Nietzsche's political thought does reveal a significant, if skeletal, structure that is built upon consistent ideas, however unsystematically presented. The overall aim of this thesis is to determine the best way to characterize what is uniquely political in Nietzsche. I claim that the political in Nietzsche has to do with the relationship between politics as hierarchy and philosophy as independent value creation. I present my thesis in three parts. Firstly, I develop my argument within a critique of recent democratic interpretations of Nietzsche. Secondly, I illustrate the relationship between hierarchy and philosophy through an original exegesis of Nietzsche's texts. And finally, by engaging in a comparative analysis of Hannah Arendt's political theory, I offer an example of how Nietzsche's anti-democratic project may be employed as a tool in the ongoing consideration of important issues in political theory.

In recent times, the Supreme Court of Canada has utilized the ancillary powers doctrine as a means of expanding police powers at common law. Less apparent is the fact that the proliferation of these coercive powers has been achieved solely on the basis of the Court’s unorthodox—and, indeed radical—use of precedent. Put shortly, it is my thesis that the ancillary powers doctrine has precipitated the undemocratic expansion of both state and judicial power. The actual powers created by the Court are, in themselves, fraught with deficiencies and incapable of delivering on the twin promises of providing fairness and predictability in the law. This is due to the fact that any ad hoc judge-made power will be created retrospectively and shown to lack comprehensiveness. Correspondingly, the constitutional protections available to Canadians have waned in strength, leaving them more susceptible to governmental intrusion. In constructing this thesis, I have reviewed both the historic and contemporary case law that has forged the ancillary powers doctrine in Canada. Significantly, the emergence of this doctrine could not have occurred without Parliamentary acceptance and condonation of the Court’s actions. However, it is on the basis of the Court’s perception that Parliament has failed to close off supposed “gaps” in police powers that the Court has been willing to enter the lawmaking fray. Moreover, the Court’s actions have effectively obviated the need for government to legislate and prospectively stipulate the powers possessed by its agents. Therefore, I have situated this institutional interplay within the “theory of gaps” devised by Hans Kelsen. This model is offered as a plausible explanation for how Waterfield/Dedman became conceived in Canada and, why, it has been permitted to take root. Importantly, the Kelsenian analysis that I advance is explanatory only. It does not present a defence or justify for the proliferation of common law powers in favour of the police or judiciary. The lawmaking paradigm, as described above, has had a pernicious effect upon constitutionalism in Canada. It is for this reason, I argue that the ancillary powers doctrine holds an illegitimate place in Canadian law, and should be reversed.

The aim of this thesis is to study state regulation of anti-democratic parties, i.e. party regulation. The term ‘Party regulation’ refers to laws that may regulate the activities and behavior of political parties. This thesis uses a comparative method, conducted on three European countries which regulate anti-democratic parties differently. The cases studied are Germany, Spain and Sweden.The basis for understanding state regulation of anti-democratic parties rests on a historical institutionalist perspective along with theories of democratic tolerance. The analysis reveals that states regulate anti-democratic parties differently as a result of their historical past which has made them adopt different ideas of how political parties should be seen. Further, the analysis shows that there is no connection between the party regulation adopted and the effect it has on the anti-democratic parties.