Thesis--Paris IV, 1976. / French or Latin. Bibliography: p. 594-498.

"This study ... in its original form, was a dissertation presented ... in Yale University." / Bibliography: p. 150-159.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2005. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 75-77).

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2005. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 118-120).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Westminster Theological Seminary, 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-146).

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2005. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 75-77).

Os fragmentos que compõem a obra que, hoje, conhecemos como Pensées, são notas preparatórias de uma apologia da religião cristã que Blaise Pascal pretendia escrever. Ao nos debruçarmos sobre as anotações do filósofo francês, chama-nos a atenção o fato de o autor, em nenhum momento, propor qualquer demonstração metafísica da existência de Deus ou mesmo pretender provar, de modo inquestionável, algum dos dogmas católicos. A total ausência de demonstrações que se pretendam perfeitamente probantes explica-se, a nosso ver, pelo fato de Blaise Pascal ser um filósofo cético, ou seja, pelo fato de Pascal não crer que a razão humana é um instrumento capaz de apreender a Verdade. Assim, trata-se, aqui, de, primeiramente, estipular a plausibilidade da hipótese de leitura segundo a qual Pascal pode, com justiça, ser considerado um pensador cético. Isto feito, tratar-se-á de analisar os motivos que levaram nosso filósofo a não se utilizar de nenhuma das tradicionais provas da existência de Deus e a não considerar como plenamente probantes os raciocínios por ele elaborados em prol da religião cristã fatos que caracterizamos como limites epistemológicos da apologética de Blaise Pascal. / The fragments that compose the book that today we know as Pensées are preparatory notes of an apologetics of the Christian religion that Blaise Pascal intended to write. When examining the annotations on the French philosopher, our attention is attracted by the fact that the author never proposes any metaphysical demonstration of God\'s existence, neither intends to prove, unquestionably, some of the Catholic dogmas. The total absence of demonstrations presented as definitive is explained, in our point of view, by the fact that Blaise Pascal is a skeptical philosopher, ie, because Pascal does not believe that human reason is an instrument capable of grasping the Truth. Thus, it is here to, first, establish the plausibility of the hypothesis of the interpretation according to which Pascal may justly be regarded as a skeptical thinker. This done, well analyze the reasons why our philosopher did not use any of the traditional proofs of God\'s existence and did not consider as fully demonstrative the reasonings he elaborated himself in favor of the Christian religion - facts that we consider as epistemological limits of the apologetics of Blaise Pascal.

From Preface: This study has a two-fold nature. In one sense the focus of attention is on the Apologists. The chapters on Clement and Athanasius attempt to follow through the basic questions raised by the Apologists. But in the other sense, what I have presented is four independent studies dealing with Justin, the other Apologists, Clement and Athanasius's Contra Gentes. Although much the same questions have been asked in all four sections, there has been no rigid attempt to systematize the answers. This may well be one of the strengths as well as one of the weaknesses of the work.

The key issue in recent debates of Christian apologetics is whether there is any common ground of data and criteria between believers and unbelievers. Two main schools are divided on this issue, namely: evidential and presuppositional apologetics. The evidential apologists claim that a common ground exists, and that objective proofs of theism are possible from this common ground. In contrast, the presuppositional apologists argue that there is no common ground; and they maintain that theoretical arguments (including apologetic ones) are unavoidably prejudiced by religious presuppositions. In this study, both sides are claimed to have their own flaws. The former apologetics has the flaw that its epistemic foundation (i.e., “classical foundationalism”) is fatally defective; and it is criticised by the reformational philosophical tradition, as well as secular contemporary (postmodern) epistemology. In contrast, the latter apologetics has the flaw that when the existence of common ground is entirely denied, the problems of circular reasoning (hence, relativism) and total communication breakdown are unavoidable. In order to clarify and deepen the issue, the tradition of reformational philosophy, which is represented by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd and Van Til is first examined; and it is shown that all three scholars struggle with the tension between antithesis and common ground; and they attempt their own solution. Secondly, the contemporary anti-foundationalist epistemology is examined; and it is shown that the same tension exists between “radical” and “moderate” postmodern (anti-foundationalist) epistemologies; and their debate is on-going – without any satisfactory conclusion. As a solution, it is suggested that the notion of common ground should be distinguished by the ontological and epistemological dimensions. From the epistemological standpoint, all knowledge is prejudiced; and no objective conclusion (on the issue of e.g., theism) can be arrived at by so-called “neutral” rational arguments. However, from the ontological standpoint, it is undeniable that all kinds of knowledge are made possible by certain universal (transcendental) conditions, which constitute the ontic common ground. In this distinction, the confusion is caused by the false assumption that the ontic common ground is meant to function as an epistemic neutral criterion. In contrast, this study argues that the ontic common ground functions only as the condition for the possibility of legitimate knowledge (including apologetic arguments). As a result, this study claims that traditional apologetics, based on objective theistic proofs should be abandoned, and that (radical) presuppositional apologetics needs to be modified. Therefore, as an alternative approach, a new “integral apologetics” is proposed – on the basis of Dooyeweerd’s modal theory of reality. This approach emphasizes the need to utilize different types of knowledge, which together could strengthen the apologetic persuasion towards Christian theism, and take into consideration of the whole context of apologetic dialogue. / PhD (International Trade), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The purpose of this thesis will be a contrast of the Buddhist and the Christian responses to this-worldly suffering. Many scholars have proposed that the best way to create a better world with less suffering is to make Christianity more like Buddhism, so that an interfaith synthesis between the two religions results. These scholars’ proposals are described in Chapter 2. However, what these scholars desire (i.e. less this-worldly suffering) will not logically result from the solution they suggest (i.e. Buddhicizing Christianity). For to make Christianity more like Buddhism in its essentials would render Christianity less potent to oppose this-worldly suffering. The thesis will thus contrast Buddhism with Christianity in five crucial areas, namely, their viewpoints on ultimate reality, ultimate attachments, ultimate aversions, ultimate example, and ultimate purpose. These five areas provide the content to accurately define Buddhist compassion and Christian love. Chapter 3 describes Buddhism’s struggle to ground love of neighbor ontologically, whether by the ontological givens of dependent co-arising or nirvana. Buddhism struggles to ground not only whether we should love our neighbors, but also whether we can do so. Christianity, on the other hand, proves entirely capable of grounding love of neighbor—whether should or can—given its theistic ontology. Chapter 4 describes the Buddhist and Christian responses to suffering when it comes to attachments. Buddhism asks us to let go of rigid attachments to persons, truth and goodness. Meanwhile, Christians are to cling to God, and as a result of loving God, they are to love people, hunger and thirst for the good, and rejoice in the truth. These ultimate attachments to persons, truth, and goodness help overcome this-worldly suffering. According to Chapter 5, Buddhism and Christianity differ sharply when it comes to aversion to and grief over sin. Buddhists cultivate equanimity toward the sin, reasoning that the problem is not actually the person’s fault and, furthermore, that the problem is not really a problem. Christians, however, are to love people enough that they hate the sin which destroys them. In hating evil and restoring people, Christianity undermines immense worldly suffering. Chapter 6 contrasts Gautama and Jesus as examples of combatting suffering. At each juncture, Jesus offered more to actually fight against suffering than did Gautama. Incredibly, the interfaith scholar who would Buddhicize Christianity’s ultimate example would mar the portrait of the paradigm who exemplifies the very qualities the interfaith scholar wants to emulate. Chapter 7 examines the Buddhist emphasis on “thusness” and the Christian emphasis on purposefulness. Insofar as the interfaith scholar would Buddhicize Christianity’s ultimate purpose, the robust purposefulness that gives one’s life meaning and motivation would erode into a purposelessness which, however emancipating, leaves one comparatively impotent in the face of this-worldly suffering. In light of these five contrasts, Christian love and Buddhist compassion are able to be defined and contrasted. The logical conclusion drawn is that to Buddhicize Christianity’s ultimacy would be to truncate Christianity’s efficacy, a result which should motivate these interfaith scholars to reconsider their proposals. / PhD, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015